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'....._; This report examines a main -but until now largely neglected -aspect of 
economic  integration,  namely  the  role  of  public  finance.  In so  doing, 
it goes  beyond the more familiar terrain of free  trade and monetary inte-
gration. 
A  major part of the work of the Study Group has been a thorough study of 
public finance in various federations and unitary states.  Financial relation-
ships  between  levels  of government and  the  economic  effects of public 
finance on regions within countries merited special attention. 
Based  on this analysis, the theoretical  literature on "fiscal federalism" and 
given  the  political  will  for  further  economic  integration  (falling  short, 
however,  of  monetary  union),  certain  changes  in  Community  expen-
ditures  and  revenues  during  the  "pre-federal  integration"  phase  are  sug-
gested,  particularly  extension  of  expenditures  on  structural,  cyclical, 
employment and  regional  policies  through  more participation in regional 
policy  aid,  and  in  labour market policies, a  Community  unemployment 
fund,  a  limited  budget  equalisation  scheme,  cyclical  grants  to  local  or 
regional governments and a conjunctural convergence facility.  The net cost 
of these  suggestions would lead to a rise in the Community budget from its 
present 0.7% to around 2-2
1
/2 % of Community GOP. 
For  more  ambitious  plans  the  Community  budget  would  have  to  be 
extended  by  far  more to provide sufficient geographical  equalisation  of 
productivity  and  living standards  together with  cushioning of temporary 
fluctuations, in the absence  of which, monetary union in particular would 
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At  the  end  of 1974  the Commission  asked  a  group of independent 
economists  (Professors Biehl,  Bro~m, Forte,  Freville,  O'Donoghue 
and  Peeters,  and  Sir Donald  MacDougall  as Chainnan)  to  examine 
the future  role of public finance  at the Community  level in the 
general  context  of European  economic  integration. 
The  Study  Group  held fourteen meetings  from  April 1975  to March 
1977•  Officials of several Directorates-General of the Commission 
also took part  in these meetings  (Economic  and  Financial Af'f'airs, 
Regional  Policy,  Budget,  Financial  Institutions and  Taxation). 
The  Group also had the benefit of discussions vrith  two  expert  con-
sultants from  the United  States  (Professor Oates)  and Australia 
(Professor Mathelvs) • 
The  results of the  lvork  are  presented in two  volumes.  The  first 
volume  contains the  General  Report,  including an  Introduction 
and  Summary,  all of which  have  been unanimously agreed by the 
members  of the  Study  Group. 
The  General  Report  draws heavily on the much  larger body of evi-
dence  and  analysis contained in this second volume. It consists 
of individual contributions by the members  of the  Study  Group, 
and  the  tloJO  expert  consultants from  the United  States and  Australia. 
It also  contains working papers contributed at the request  of the 
Group  by its secretariat of officials from  the Directorate-General 
for Economic  and  Financial Affairs of the Commission.  While  the 
authors of the  individual  chapters in the  second volume  take final 
responsibility for them,  they have all benefitted from  detailed 
discussion by the Group  as  a  whole. COMPOSITION  OF  THE  GROUP 
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Parliament A.  STUDIES  ON  THE  INTER-REGIONAL  ASPEDTS  OF 
PUBLIC  FINANCE 
IN  EXISTING  FEDERAL  AND  UNITARY  STATES Chapter 1 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
by 
A.J.  Brown - 13-
THE  INTERREGIONAL  ROLE  OF  PUBLIC  FINANCE  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Interregional movements  of public funds  may  be  regarded as being 
important for two  reasons.  First,  the ways  in which  they are related 
to changes in income  and  expenditure of the regions give  them  a  part 
in stabilising ·or destabilising relative changes in regional levels 
of economic  activity.  Second,  the average rates of flow  over periods 
of time affect the relative levels of living in the various regions. 
These  two  aspects may  be  examined  in turn. 
1.  The  Stabilising function of Public Finance 
This has to be  seen in the light of the fact that the  economies 
of the United Kingdom  regions are very "open"  - the ratio of their 
external to their internal transactions is very high.  This works  in 
two  directions.  On-the  one  hand it means  that the regions are 
liable to encounter large disturbances from  outside  ;  on  the other 
it means  that any change  in flows of funds within a  region is 
likely to be  dissipated through the other regions of the country, 
and  abroad  ;  in other words  the multipliers are likely to be  small. 
So  far as  the  'openness'  of regional economies is concerned,  precise 
information. is lacking in most  cases.  Only  for Northern Ireland are 
there records of imports and  exports of merchandise  on  a  basis 
similar to that of international trade statistics.  But for other 
regions  some  very rough indications of orders of magnitude  can  be 
derived from  surveys of movements  of goods  by  road and rail and  such 
data as there are about coastwise  shipping.  The  results can be 
expressed as the ratio of the average  of a  region's imports and 
exports of merchandise  to its gross domestic  product.  For Northern 
Ireland and  Scotland this ratio is about 0.8, for the South-East 
(with a  GDP  some  three  times as big as that for the  'average'  region) 
perhaps slightly smaller,  for the other English regions and  for Wales 
decidedly larger, rising to 1.5 or more  for those which are most 
centrally located.  This means  that the  least open  United Kingdom 
regions are  comparable  in this respect with  Luxembourg,  (which is 
smaller in both area and  GDP)  while  the rest are up  to twice as open, 
and  are  thus from  three to five  times as open as such countries 
(broadly comparable with  them  in size of GDP)  as Norway,  Denmark,  or 
the Republic of Ireland. 
Payments  to and  from  the central government are a  futher source of 
'openness'  in regional economies additional to those which  operate in 
independent countries.  In the  U.K.,  payments  to, and disbursements by 
the  central government are each  some  35  per cent of GDP  in the 
country as a  whole,  and  something like this must  be  true of individual 
regions - the  extent to which  regions  pay,  or receive,  more  or less 
than the  share corresponding to their po~ation  or GDP  obviously 
affects their level of disposable income,  while  the  sensitiveness 
of these  payments  to changes in their GDP  can have  a  powerful feedback 
effect on  those  changes,  to which  we  shall have  to return. - 14-
Factor movements  between regions are also freer,  in general,  than 
.those  between  separate countries.  From  the U.K.  as a  whole,  one 
resident in about 170 ·may  be  expected to emigrate  overseas each year, 
and  the  same  is true,  by definition of a  'representative'  region, 
though  the  propensity to emigrate  overseas is in fact much  greater 
from  some  regions than from  others.  But,  in addition,  one  resident 
in about lJO  may  be  expected to emigrate from  the  'representative' 
region to other U.K.  regions.  The  total propensity to leave a  region 
is thus some  2  - 2  1/4 times as great as that to emigrate  from  the 
country as a  whole.  On  interregional movements  of capital there are 
no  comprehensive data. It is, however,  possible  to compare  the 
interregional  'moves'  of manufacturing industry with those  moves 
that originate from  parent organisations outside  the U.K.  (  a  'move' 
being either a  simple  geographical transfer of an establishment 
or, more  commonly,  the setting-up of a  branch establishment distant 
from  a  'parent'  establishment which  continues in being).  In the 
period 1945-65,  of the  'moves'  to destinations in the United Kingdom 
which  survived to the  end  of that period,  about six times as many 
came  from  other regions in the U.K.  as came  from  abroad.  If one  looks, 
not at the number  of moves,  but at the total employment  they provided, 
the interregional group emerges  as about four  times as important 
as the international. 
To  see how  the greater openness of the regional economy,  as opposed 
to  the national, affects its vulnerability to changes in external 
demand  for its products, it is perhaps best to consider an example 
which,  while hypothetical, is constructed as far as possible from 
empirical U.K.  data.  Suppose  that a  United Kingdom  region loses 
~10 million of orders for finished motor vehicles.  The  loss of 
value added in the motor industry in the  region will be  about ~ 2. 7 
million.  The  loss of value added  in other industries in the region 
which  supply inputs directly or indirectly for its vehicle industry 
may  well, in a  typical region other than those in which  the component 
industries are most  concentrated,  be  something: like .t l.J million, 
giving a  loss of value added attributable directly to the reduced 
vehicle output of some  rJt 4  million. 
For the country as a  whole,  the loss of value added in the vehicle 
industry itself will still, of course,  be~  2•7 million,  but the loss 
in other industries supplying inputs to it directly or indirectly will 
(according to  the 1963  Input Output Tables)  be  aboutol!5.8  million, 
making a  loss  of~8.5 million in all.  (The  differences between this 
and  the .tlO million fall in orders is accounted for by  imported 
inputs and,  to a  small extent,  by  indirect taxation) 
These  falls in value  added will generate falls in that of other 
industries through  the Keynesian multiplier mechanism.  To  assess the 
size of the relevant multipliers, one  has, in the  case of the country 
as a  whole,  to take into account the  •leakages'  of purchasing-power 
into taxation, profits paid a broad,  imports,  and  savings  ;  also the 
offsetting effect of additional payments  on  account of unemployment - 15-
benefit and  supplementary benefit brought into existence by  the fall 
in demand  for labour and  the  increase of poverty.  On  the available 
information about these  leakages and  offsets, it seems  that the 
appropriate  short-term multiplier for the country as a  whole  is about 
1.4 ;  that is to say the  primary fall of.t8.5 million in national 
value  added  generates a  secondary fall of aboutotJ.4 million,  making 
~11.9 million in all. 
The  corresponding Keynesian multiplier for the region is smaller, 
because, in addition to  the  leakages into taxation,  savings,  profits 
paid abroad,  and  overseas imports,  and  the offsets from  unemployment 
benefit etc., which  can  be  taken as being the  same  (in relation to 
the  primary fall in income)  as for the country as a  whole,  there is-
a  leakage of profits into other regions,  and  a  further leakage into 
imports  purchased from  them.  The  best estimate the writer has been 
able  to make  is that,  typically,  this reduces  the appropriate 
multiplier to about 1.2.  The  primary income-fall  of~4 million is 
therefore  supplemented  only by  a  secondary fall of  J. 0.8 million, 
makingJ4.3 million in all.  The  national fall in value  added is 
therefore about 2  1/2 times  the  regional one  ;  the ratio of the 
corresponding reductions in employment  may  well be  similar.  Or,  to 
nut the  same  thing in anoth~r w~y, although we  have  supposed  the 
reduction in orders for motor vehicles to fall entirely upon 
establishments situated in one region in the first instance,  the 
resulting fall in value added  and  probably in employment  occurs as to 
only 4o  per cent in that region and  as to 60  per cent in the rest 
of  the  country (ignoring the further fall which  takes place abroad  on 
account of the reduction of United Kingdom  imports). 
To  counterbalance the  greate~ extent to which  a  region is padded  against 
the impact of falling external sales,however,  there is the  grea:ter 
extent to which,  by  virtue of its openness, it is at the mercy  of 
external demand..  '!he  British regions are  probably from  four to eight 
times as open  in this respect as  the national economy  is. They  achieve 
this very great degree  of openness,  with exports greater in value  than 
their total domestic  products,  by  specialising on  export goods  with a 
very high  import content  ;  their contribution of value added is small 
in relation to  the gross selling value of their exports.  Precise data 
are  lacking,  but a  better idea of the greatest extent to which  a  region 
can be  at risk may  be  obtained by  considering,  not the gross value of 
its exports,  but its value added.  Perhaps as much  as half of this 
might,  in an extreme  case  be embodied  in goods  and  services exported 
from  the  region  ;  the rest is almost certain to be  put into goods 
and  services for the  local market,  which  either in principle cannot 
be,  or in practice are not,  seriously in competition with external 
goods  and  services~ In the  U.K.,  the  proportion of national value 
added  that in fact goes into exports of gpods  and  services is about 
one  sixth.  A region might,  therefore,  be  three  times as liable to 
primary reductions in its income  and  employment,  in proportion to its 
size, as the  United Kingdom  is. Even  allowing for the smaller secondary - 16  ~ 
change  of income,  in relation to the  primary change,  and  for the fact 
that a  much  larger share of the  change  in profits generated in the 
region is likely to be  remitted elsewhere, it seems  that regional 
income  is likely to be  considerably more  liable to externally 
initiated short-term fluctuations  than is national income. 
The  basis of this argument, relating to  the  short run,  has,  however, 
been  the  treatment of changes in the  public sector's account in 
exactly the  same  way  as changes in the external account.  Primary 
changes in a  region's income  are  cushioned  (apart from  the effects 
of changes in its internal savings)  by  improvements  in its balance 
of payments  both with the national government  and  with  the rest of the 
outside world - falling taxes and  imports,  rising receipts of 
welfare  payments.  An  economy  without a  public sector adjusts to a 
fall in external demand  for its products by  reducing its income  to 
such  an1  extent as to bring its imports down  into line with its 
exports.  The  necessary fall in income  is reduced in so  far as  the 
economy's  products can  be  substituted for those in the  outside world, 
- a  process which  requires either flexible prices (including factor 
prices), flexible exchange  rates,  or an ability to erect trade 
barriers. If the  economy  has a  public sector which  cushions  the fall 
in income  through reduced  taxation and  maintained or increased 
expenditure,  thus keeping demand  for imports higner than it would 
otherwise be,  then either there must  be  borrowing from  outside,  or the 
need arises for some  means  of substituting the  economy's  products for 
those  of other economies. 
The  regions of the  United Kingdom  have,  of course,  no  means  of 
adjusting their exchange-rates or erecting trade-barriers in case 
of depression  ;  nor do  their relative levels of wages  (and  presumably 
costs) appear to have  any considerable short-term flexibility - over 
the decade  and  a  half for which  they are available,  indices of hourly 
earnings run nearly parallel to each other in the various regions. 
To  the extent that central government maintains a  region's effective 
demand,  it does  so  by  transfers to it, financed (if its total budget is 
in balance)  by  the  surplus of tax payments  over central expenditure 
in those other regions which  are relatively prosperous. 
The  country as a  whole,  on  the other hand,  has means,  at least in 
principle of diverting demand  by  manipulating its exchange-rate,  or 
letting it respond to market forces,  and  of adjusting trade barriers, 
but these are instruments which  would it would  lose in an  economic  and 
monetary union.  In those  circumstances,  and  in the absence  of any 
substantial built-in stabiliser operating through  Community  revenue 
and  expenditure,  the  U.K.  could itself maintain its internal demand 
in the  face  of a  fall in demand  for its exports only by  borrowing 
from  outside. If such  borrowing was  not possible,  there  could be  no 
cushioning of the full effects of the fall. - 17-
To  suppose  that, within· an economic  and monetary union,  a  country 
could not borrow  externally at all when  its economy  was  relatively 
depressed  (presumably repaying when it was  relatively prosperous) 
is certainly extreme.  It is worth  noting.,  however,  that in this 
admittedly extreme  case,  the United Kingdom  would  presumably have 
to reduce its GDP  by  about four times  the amount  of any fall in its 
export earnings  (or say,  five  times  the associated primary fall in 
value added)  in order to bring its imports down  correspondingly. 
'\ole  can therefore make  the following comparison  : 
On  the assumption that interregional trade is subject to much  the 
same  percentage variations as international trade, a  typical U.K. 
region is perhaps as likely to  suffer a  )  per cent primary fall 
in demand  for its factors  through external competition as the 
country as a  whole  is to suffer a  similar fall of 1  per cent.  The 
multiplier, however,  is likely to increase this only to,  perhaps, 
).6 per cent.  Reduction in the amount  of profit paid outside the 
region,  and in taxation,  together with increased welfare receipts 
from  the  central government  may  well bring its loss of disposable 
personal income  down  to about 1  per cent of GDP. 
A country the  size of the  U.K,  suffering a  1  per cent fall of 
demand  for its factors of production through competition or 
depression in its export markets,  might,  with its existing system 
of taxation and  benefits in operation,  find its factor incomes 
reduced  by  about 1.4 per cent and  personal disposable  incomes  by 
perhaps as little as 0.5 per cent.  This,  however,  would  be at 
the  expense  of a  deterioration in its balance of payments 
amounting  to something between 0.5 and  1  per cent of GDP.  If, 
to  take  the  most  extreme  case, it were  unable  to finance  any of 
this by  borrowing,  and  could not use  the  price mechanism  or 
trade barriers to  promote  substitution of its goods  and  services 
for external ones,  then it could bring its imports down  to match 
its exports only by  a  fall in GDP  of perhaps 5 per cent, with 
a  similar fall in personal disposable income. 
It seems  then that a  typical region of the  United  Kingdom  is subject, 
by  virtue of the great openness of its economy,  to probably more 
instability of employment  and  disposable income  than the  country as 
a  whole,  provided that the latter is able  to ignore fluctuations in 
its balance of payments,  meeting them  by  borrowing and  repayment. 
But in a  situation in which  variations in total demand  had  to be  used 
to adjust imports  to fluctuations in exports to any  large extent, 
the  U.K.  would,  despite its smaller degree of openness,  suffer greater 
(possibly very much  greater) instability of employment  and disposable 
income  than its regions do  now. - 18-
The  low  value of the multipliers is very largely due  to taxation 
and  poverty-related benefits.  In the  case of a  typical region,  the 
multiplier without these  influences might be  perhaps 1.6  ;  with  them 
it is about 1.2. For the  U.K.  as a  whole  the multiplier without any 
public sector might be  about 2.6  ;  in fact it is about 1.4. 
It should  perhaps be  emphasised that what has  been under discussion 
so far is short-term stability, the  short term for this purpose  being 
perhaps best defined as that in which  the  populations and  fixed capital 
equipments  of the areas under consideration can be  taken as given. 
In the  longer run  (from decade  to decade rather than year to  year) 
substantial movements  of both  people and  jobs can take  place. 
Mobility of population between regions has  the effect of making 
multipliers larger than in the  short term.  Where  the working population 
of a  region  is increased, rather than rnore  of the existing population 
being employed,  or those in work  doing more  overtime,  average rather 
than marginal  r.ates of tax become  relevant to  the increase in income, 
and  there is less offset (possibly a  negative offset) from  welfare 
payments  made  into the  region by  the central government.  Changes  in 
expenditure  on social capital are also induced by  population-changes 
while  one  might expect these  to be  related to the rate of change 
rather than the level of population  (  a  capital stock adjustment 
effect), in practice, in the  U.K.,  what happens is not easily 
distinguishable from  a  lagged response directly to numbers.  The 
effect of these differences is to raise  the Keynesian multiplier for 
a  region from its short-term value of about 1.2 to something more 
like 1.8 or 1.9. 
Permanent  loss of part of a  region's  'export'  markets,  therefore, 
produces a  loss of both employment  and disposable  income  which  builds 
up  over a  number  of years to levels considerably higher than have 
been suggested above  as the immediate results of a  sudden loss of 
markets.  One  might  suppose  that movement  of jobs, in search of 
plentiful supplies df labour,  would  provide an additional moderating 
influence in the slightly longer run,  but analysis of such movements 
in the  U.K.  in a  period when  regional policy was  not very active 
suggests very little, if any,  systematic tendency of this kind. 
Certainly the movement  of jobs in response to interregional differences 
in labour-market conditions is, in the absence of fairly vigorous 
government  policy to  promote it, very much  less than the  systematic 
movement  of labour.  Moreover,  where  differences in regional 
prosperity are very persistent,  some  de-stabilising factors  come 
into operation.  Regions of slow  growth  show  a  higher average age 
of social capital and  a  greater incidence of derelict industrial 
plant and  mining sites than do  regions of rapid growth,  and,  in so 
far as it is the  young  and enterprising members  of the  population 
who  are most mobile,  slowly-growing regions are likely also to have 
older and less adaptable workforces.  These  characteristics make  them 
less attractive for mobile industrial or commercial enterprise. 
It is considerations such as these, rather than any lack of stability 
of regional incomes in the face of short-run fluctuations in demand, 
that creates a  need for regional policy. - 19-
2.  The  Equalising function of Public Finance 
The  regions of the untted Kingdom  do  not,  in comparison with  those 
of most  other countries,  show  very wide  differences in the real product 
per head,  those in average  level of livlng are still smaller.  The 
differences that have  been most  important in their effect on 
public opinion are probably those in unemployment  (or,  more  generally 
in employment  opportunities),  followed in order of significance by 
differences in rate of growth  of employment  and  in the incidence of 
outward  migration. 
In real product per head of the  total population,  Northern Ireland 
is in a  class of its own  with a  level some  Jf,  per cent below  the 
national average,_but all the British regions lie within a  range  of 
between 8  - 11 per cent above  that average  (The  West  Hidlands and 
the  South-East respectively)  and  10  - 14 per cent below  (the North, 
Wales,  the  South-~lest, Scotland)  with  the East Jt1idlands,  Yorkshire 
and  Humberside  and  the  North-West near to  the average.  (see Table  1). 
These  differences owe  something to age-structure  ;  Northern Ireland, 
in particular, has a  lower proportion of its population in the 
active age-groups  than the  country as a  whole.  A larger amount  of the 
difference is attributable to differences in labour-force participation 
rates, almost entirely of women.These  are highest in the most 
prosperous regions  (the South-East and  ~est r-1idlands)  and  lowest in 
some  of the  poorest (Northern Ireland,  ~ales, the North),  though 
they are also high in the North  Hest,  which  is less prosperous. 
Unemployment  is also broadly associated with  low  income  per head 
across regions.  The  regional averages of output per head  of the 
labour force  in work  are  therefore  confined to a  narrower range  than 
those of output per head  of total regional population.  Northern 
Ireland falls only some  2J per cent below  the national average, 
Scotland  less than 10  per cent below,  and  the  South-East only 5 or 6 
per cent above.  These  productivity differences,  in turn,  owe  something 
directly to differences of industrial composition  (i.e.  to heavy 
concentration on  industries of generally high or low  net output ~r 
head),  but not very much.  The  influence of industrial structure 
is probably exercised to a  considerable extent indirectly, 
concentration on  an  unprosperous industry,  for instance,  tending 
to depress productivity in other indus.tries in the  region below its 
level elsewhere. 
The  last three  paragraphs relate  to  income  produced in the different 
regions in the strict sense  that it is produced in workplaces  located 
in them.  The  interregional distribution of income  according to its 
ownership is different, not so much  because  of interregional commuting 
(  negligible factor),  but much  more  through interregional transfers 
of rent, dividends,  interest, and  occupational pensions.  How  much  of 
each of these kinds of income  is received in each  region is, broadly, 
known,  but the  sources are not. It has to be  assumed  that, for 
instance,  dividends and interest paid by  industry and  commerce 
originate in the various regions in proportion to  the  gross surpluses - 20-
that are generated in them. 
On  this assumption  (and  using 1961  data) it has been estimated that 
the gross domestic  products of South-East England  and  the  South-West 
were  both  supplemented  by  net inward  transfers of property income 
and  occupational pensions from  the rest of the  country and  the outside 
world  to  the extent of 4  or 6  per cent  ;  Scotland and  Northern 
Ireland virtually broke  even  ;  the remaining regions - the  two 
midland  regions,  the l'lorth,  the  North-~{  est, Yorkshire and  Humberside, 
and  ~lales - provided net outward transfers,  ranging from  about 
J to 5 per cent of their gross domestic  products.  The  total net 
transfer into the  two  southern regions from  the rest of the country 
probably amounts  to about 2  per cent of the national gross domestic 
product. 
The  per capita incomes  from  work  and  property received by  residents 
in the various regions  (approximately,  their per capita gross 
regional products  )  therefore differ somewhat  from  their per capita 
gross domestic  products.  There is a  greater degree of interregional 
inequality in as much  as the regions of lowest GDP  receive little 
net property income,  or, in the case of Wales  and  the  North,  make 
net outward  payments,  while South-East England,  with the highest 
GDP,  received a  considerable amount,  and  so  has a  GRP  approximately 
75  per cent higher than that of Northern Ireland,  and  some  J5  per 
cent above  those of Scotland,  Wales,  or the  North.  These  are  the 
basic differences upon  which  transfers through  the  channels of 
public finance  operate. 
Part of the redistribution of income  through  these  channels arises 
from  differences in the incidence of taxation.  In 1964,  total public 
sector receipts per head of the population in South-~ast England 
were  some  8 5  per cent higher than in Northern Ireland and  about 
45  per cent higher than in Wales  or the North.  Taxation  (or rather, 
total public sector revenue)  is mildly progressive as between regions 
a  rise of 10  per cent in per capita GRP  is .associated with a  rise 
of perhaps 11  per cent in per capita public revenue.  There  are 
considerable irregularities clouding this relation,  since different 
regions have  different income  distributions  (some,  for instance,  have 
more  very wealthy residents than others in relation to their average 
income),  and  they have  different consumption habits- some  drink more 
spirits than others.  Scotland seems  to pay rather heavy  taxes in 
relation to its average  income,  the East Midlands  rather little ; 
but taxation does  slightly reduce  the  coefficient of variation of 
mean  regional incomes. 
When  one  comes  to  the return flow  of public expenditure  to the regions, 
there are  three concepts to distinguish.  The  first is the  simple  one 
of cash transfer payments  to residents in the regions  ,  in the form 
of welfare  payments,  state pensions,  debt interest and  subsidies and 
grants to industrial establishments  (with a  rough  adjustment for 
Regional Employment  Premium  and  other regional grants and  subsidies 
introduced since the  study on  which  this note is mainly based). - 21-
The  effect of these is quite powerful in the direction of 
equalisation.  Scotland and  Northern Ireland receive, in round 
figures,  about a  third as much  again per head as South-East ~ngland, 
and half as much  again as the vlest Hid lands  :  Wales,  the  North,  and 
the  South-;·! est also get substantially more  than average.  An  element 
in the total which  exerts a  regressive effect is interest on  the 
public debt,  paid to persons  ;  South-East England apparently 
possessing a  high concentration of recipients.  This,  together with 
agricultural subsidies, is the main  reason why  the  South-~est also 
does well  ;  but agricultural subsidies exert by  far their largest 
proportionate effect in Northern Ireland. 
The  second  concept of the return flow  to regions includes public 
expenditure on  goods  and  services which  has an effect on  regional 
rather than the  general national welfare.  This  expenditure  may  be 
taken as including all that on  the  social services and  on  the 
formation of social capita,l  ;  but not where  the  services of the latter 
are  sold at an economic  price,  apart from  subsidies which  are 
counted elsewhere.  Expenditure on  building hospitals and  schools,  for 
instance, is to  be  included but not that on  publicly-owned dwellines· 
Expenditure  on  central administration and  defence is included at a 
notional rate equal to  tl1e  average  per capita cost for the whole 
country,_  on  the  f-:>Tound  that the per capita benefits of these 
expenditures are  the  same  in all regions,  though  the  expenditures 
themselves are not.  Current per capita expenditure  of the kinds 
included does not seem  to vary much  from  one  region to another.  The 
variations appear to  be  somewhat  greater with capital expenditure, 
and  to favour  the  less affluent regions,  but with considerable 
year to year variation in their distribution. 
?utting together the  cash  transfers and  the  'regionally beneficial' 
expenditure  on  goods  and  services,  so  as to get a  total of 
'regionally beneficial'  expenditure,  one  finds a  very substantial total 
redistributive effect.  Wales,  Northern Ireland and  Scotland receive 
at least 15  per cent more  per head,  absolutely than south-East 
England and  the Hest Hidlands. 
The  total redistributive effect is, of course,  due  to  the effects 
of tRXation and  regionally beneficial expenditure  together, still 
taking the  benefits of expenditure  on  central government  administration 
and  defence  as being evenly spread over the whole  population. It 
seems  on  this basis of reckoning that only two  regions - the West 
Eidlands and  South-East England- make  a  net positive contribution 
the  others are net recipients.  Each  of the  two  contributes a  net 
sum  equal to 7- 8  per cent of its gross regional product  ;  their 
total contribution amounts  to  some  J  - J  1/2 per cent of the gross 
national product.  The  extent to which  this supplements  the gross regional 
product of the  receiving regions varies widely.  Yorkshire  and 
Humberside,  the  T~ast Midlands  and  the  North-West  receive  small 
contributions, varying up  to 2  per cent of their GRP.  The  South-West 
receives a  supplement of some  6  per cent,  the  North and  Scotland - 22-
7 - 10  per cent, vlales  perha-ps  a  little more,  and  Northern Ireland 
a  net contribution approaching JO  per cent.  The  extent of 
redistribution to a  region through  taxation and  regionally beneficial 
expenditure  together is highly  correlated,  negatively,  with per 
capita gross regional product.  south-East England's per capita 
average disposable income  plus public benefits is probably less 
than 40  per cent above  that of Northern Ireland,  and  less than 20 
per cent above  those of Scotland,  Wales  or the  North. 
There  is incidentally,  a  further factor which  narrows  the  gap 
between  the  per capita real incomes  available for consumption  and 
capital formation in the  regions - namely,  the rather higher 
level of consumers'  prices in the  south-East in comparison with  the 
rest of the  country.  Firm  regional data of prices of comparable  goods 
and  services are available only for food,  fuel and  power,  and 
(subject to wider margins  of error)  for housing which  is far the 
biggest source of difference. It may  be  proper to supplement  these 
by  adding an allowance for the greater cost (including cost in time) 
of travel to work  in some  regions,  more  especially the South-East. 
If this is done,  assuming that the prices of all other goods  and 
services are  uniform across regionsp it seems  that the relevant 
income-deflator for South-East England  (U.K.  = 100)  may  be  105 or 
106,  those for the  poorest British regions a  little under 100,  so 
that the real interregional range  of disposable  income  plus  public 
benefits within Great Britain is probably less than 15 per cent, 
from  the  least to  the  most  prosperous.  Northern Ireland,  of 
course,  remains well outside  this range. 
The  third concept of the  return flow  from  the  public sector, 
referred to above, is more  elusive in practice. It concerns  the 
distribution of effective demand  for factors of production.  The 
difficulty about it is that, while  the extent to which  effective 
demand  is abstracted from  regions by  taxation is reasonably clear, 
as is the  interregional distribution of public authorities' direct 
demand  for services,  demands  for goods  are not so  easily related 
to ultimate demands  for factor-inputs.  Capital formation by  public 
authorities in a  particular region,  for instance,  may  involve 
importing goods  into that region far more  than it involves  employment 
of the  region's own  factors.  To  solve  the implied problem one  would 
require interregional input-output data which  are not available. 
Making,  however,  the  (clearly inaccurate)  assumption that expenditure 
on  goods  in, or for use in, a  region is expenditure on  inputs from 
that region - a  procedure  likely to exaggerate  the interregional 
differences in pressure of demand  arising from  a  given inequality 
in regional per capita distribution of public  spending  - one 
receives  the  impression that, again,  the  public sector makes  a  net 
withdrawal of pur-chasing power  from  South-East England,  the West 
Midlands.,  and  in this case also the North-West in favour of, 
particularly,  the  South-West,  Northern Ireland, Wales  and  Scotland. T
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The  total transfer from  the net providers would  appear to be  some 
2  per cent of gross national product  (say 3  1/2 per cent of the 
combined  GRP  of the net providing regions),  but this, as already 
suggested,  is likely to  be  an overestimate.  At all events, it is 
clear that the  public sector plays an important part in financing 
regional current account balances,  notably those of the  peripheral 
regions. 
3.  J.egional Extermtl Balances and  their J.l'inancinF 
Such  direct datB,  as exist on  the  floHs  of e;oods  and  services into 
and  out of the  United Jangdom  regions are quite inadequate  to 
provide any basis for estimates of the net balances of interreeional 
trade or payments.  'Ihe  best that ccm  be  done  is to start from  the 
identity between  the  current external balance  of each regibn and  the 
excess of its domestic  product over its total expenditure  on  (or 
absorption of)  eoods and  services, 
The  difference  between  GD?  and  expenditure,  however,  obviously de,ends 
on  the  conventions ado-pted  in mea.surine;  the  latter.  The  chief source of 
ambiguity about  re~ional expenditure arises from  the  localisation in 
particular ref,ions of central e;overnment  administration,  Tllili tary 
establishments,  and  the  production  of military equi-pment,  which  are 
best thought of as  providine services,  not for the  ree;ion in question, 
but for the whole  country.  It seems  best to regard  the  proQucts  of 
these establishments as  beine;  'absorbed'  in all ree;ions in proportion 
to their populations.  negions  where  there are  hecwy  concentrations 
of them  can thus be  regarded as net exporters of such  services  to  the 
rest of the  country  ;  other reeions as net importers.  The  net export 
of services rmder  this head  from  South-.':ast Ene;land  is probably 
about 3 per cent of its GDP,  and  the  corresponding fieure for the 
3outh-¥Jest Region  may  be  as hieh as f)  per cent.  All the other 
regions  (except Northern Ireland)  axe  net importers,  mostly  to  the 
extent of 2  - 3  1;2 per cent of their GDP •. 
If regional expenditure is d_efined  in this way,  as including only 
the regional population's pro rata share  of the  national output 
of central government administration and defence  services,  regional 
per capita imports of all goods and  services may  be  estimated to  be 
roughly as in the first column  of Table  2.  The  figures are from  GlJJ? 
and  expenditure estimates averae;ed  for  the  two  years  1<;,(,1  and  19G4 
but at the  prices of the  latter year.  They  have,  of course,  a  low 
degree of reliability,  since  they  combine  the errors and  omissions of 
both  the  GDr  and  the expenditure estimates. It is, however,  fairly 
clear that there were,  in the  early 'sixties, net  imports into 
the  South-1'iest,  Scotland, Fales and  Northern Ireland,  prol:lably 
ranging from  somewhat  under 10  per cent of GDP  in the first of these 
regions to as much  as 25  per cent in Northern Ireland.  Except,  perhaps, 
for  the  North,  the  other regions showed  net exports probably 
ranging between 2  and  5 per cent of their respective GDP's. - 25-
The  most  easily estimated  sources of finance  for  these net transfers 
are first,  public  transfers  (transfer payments  proper and  'beneficial' 
current and capital expendtture in the  region,  minus  revenue  raised 
from  it) and,  second,  net receipts of property income  and 
occupational pensions.  These  are  shown  for the  period in question 
in the  second  and  third columns  of ~able 2,  the  sum  of  th~m in Column 
4,  and  the residual part of net imports,  not offset by  this sum,  in 
Column  5. 
This  last columnmust  consist largely of errors and  omissions.  To  the 
extent that it does not,  however, it should reflect net movements 
of private capital,  together with private remittances-the latter 
probably finance  considerable  flows  of imports into Northern Ireland 
and  Scotland.  All that can usefully be  said from  inspection of these 
residual figures is that their algebraic signs are  consistent with 
the  evidence  from  industrial  'moves'  (partly migration of industrial 
establishments,  but mostly formation or extension of branches in 
re~ons different from  those  of the  'parent'  establishments),  that 
manufacturing industry was  flowing from  the South-East,  and also 
from  abroad,  into \-Tales,  Scotland,  Northern Ireland,  the  North-West, 
and  the  North.  The  industrial and  commercial growth within the  'West 
Midlands  may  -rrell  have  been :tlnanced  by  net inflows of capital from 
other regions  (mainly the  South-East),  though  tl1ere  is known  to have 
been a  net outflow of manufacturing  'moves'  from  the West  Midlands. 
The  residual figures  show  only a  small positive correlation with the 
ratio of private capital formation  to  gross regional product,  which 
one  might  expect to  be  associated with reliance  upon  net private 
capital imports.  The  general conclusion must  be  that only the very 
broad outlines of the  pattern of regional balances and  their 
financing can  be  ascertained from  the data at present available,  but 
the  general nature of the pattern - the substantial net imports of the 
more  peripheral regions,  financed  largely by  transfers through  the 
ch~nnels of public finance  - emerges  clearly enough. - 26-
TABLE  2 
Regional Balances and  their ~~nancing ( cl per capita  1Y64  prices) 
1.  2.  3·  4.  5. 
Net  Net  Net  Sum  of  Residue 
imports  Public  pro:perty  2 & 3  (1 - 4) 
Region  (goods  &  Sector  inc.  & 
Services)  Expend- occup. 
ure  rensions 
North  + 10  + 23  - 23  0  + 10 
Yorks  &  - 26  +  10  - 20  - 10  -16 
Humber 
North- - 10  +  2  - 24  - 22  + 12 
Tflest 
East Hid.  - 19  +16  - 20  - 4  - 15 
~lest r·!id.  - 21  - 19  - 23  - 42  + 21 
S.E.  - 1!1  - 32  + 2J  - 9  - 7 
England 
South- + 41  + 20  +  29  + 49  - 8 
West 
Wales  + 65  + 42  - 19  + 2J  + 42 
Scotland  + 41  + 32  +  1  + 3J  +  6 
N.  Ire- + 85  + 6J  +  'l  + 70  +  15  land - 27-
Note  on  Sources of Tables  1  and  2 
The  estimates o.f  GDP  per head on  which  1'able  1 is based relate to 
the  years 19f.l and  1964  (see V.H.  Woodward,  Regional Social Accounts 
in National Institute of ~conomic and  Social Research,  Regional 
Papers No.  1  ;  Cambridge  1970).  The  estimates of public sector 
receipts and  expenditure derive from  the  same  source,  but have  been 
adjusted roughly to take account of the higher level of taxation 
in 19h8  in comparison with earlier years,  and  also  the  ~igher 
payments  to Development  Areas  through  investment grants  (from 1966) 
and  Regional ]':mployment  Premium  (since 1967).  The  figures given, 
therefore,  are intended to relate to  the  later 1960's. 
The  data on  net export balances and  their financing in Table  2 
are adapted  from  A.J.  Brown,  The  amework  f  Re  ional E ono  ics in 
the  United  Kingdom  (Cambridge,  1972  ,  Table J.ll and  from  Woodward 
.Q.2L  cit. and  are intended to relate  to  the early 1Y60's.  They 
differ from  the figures in the  sources quoted in that the latter 
adopted a  definition of regional expenditure  treating the  services of 
central government administration,  military establishments,  and 
producers of military equipment as being  'absorbed'  in the  regions 
where  they are  located  ;  and,  correspondingly,  calculated public 
expenditure in each  region as including not only those  items 
'beneficial'  to  the  population of the  region,  but also payments  to 
central administrators,  members  of the  forces,  and  producers of military 
material located there. Chapter  2 
by 
Yves  Freville - 31-
REGIONAL  REDISTRIBUTION  OF  PUBLIC  FUNDS  IN  FRANCE 
(  The  case of Brittany ) 
In France,  total tax receipts and  social welfare  contributions 
account for )8.4% of gross domestic product.  The  central authorities 
(central government  +social security funds)  have  direct control over 
the  use  of nine  tenths of these receipts and  contributions, while  the 
local authorities control only one-tenth.  The  central government has 
thus a  substantial influence on  the regional distribution of income 
in France. 
The  main  feature of this distribution is the dichotomy between  the 
Paris region and  the rest of France.  If average  per capita income  is 
assigned an  index of 100  ,  all tbe  regions other than the Paris region 
fall within a  15-point range  (85-100),  while  the  Paris region has an 
index of 14o.  The  statistics on  gross domestic  product per capita 
give a  more  detailed picture of the  situation in the regions other 
than the  Paris region and  bring out more  clearly the difference  between 
the regions in the  West  and  South-West,  which  have  little industry, 
and  the regions in North-East France  and along the  Rhone.  Of  the 
latter,  the  regions of Nord  and  Lorraine which are mining areas are 
experiencing the  traditional problems  of industrial reconversion. 
For a  century,  out-migration from  the West  and  the  South-West of France 
has  led to the  growth of the Paris region,  while  the relative strength 
of the North-East and  South-East of France has remained  stationary. 
These  few  observations make  it reasonable  to ask whether the  growth  of 
the Paris region,  which  has undoubtedly acted as a  magnet  for the rest 
of the French  economy,  was  not made  possible in part by  a  regional 
redistribution of public funds  in its favour  (in particular,  to offset 
the  high  congestion costs facing  the  region)  or whether,  on  the 
contrary,  the  other regions,  particularly the most  depressed regions 
in the West  of France,  do  not receive offsetting transfers from  the 
Paris region. 
In large measure,  interregional redistribution through  the flow  of 
public funds is not deliberate and  takes place  through  the  tax system 
and  through  current expenditure,  with little or nothing known  about 
the relevant mechanisms.  It is usefuJ  to  compare  it with  the  impact 
of a.  transfer policy for which  the  formulation of objectives 
inevitably has regional implications,  i.e. with policy on  central 
government  grants to  the  local authorities.  Finally,  we  propose  to 
show,  with  the help of an  example,  how  the  flow of public funds 
affects the  conditions of equilibrium for a  regional balance of 
payments. 
I.  REGIONAL  REDISTRIBUTION  OF  PUBLIC  FUNDS 
We  will attempt first to measure  the overall regional impact of 
public  spending and  revenue  from  taxes and  social welfare contributions 
and will then examine  the  policy on  grants to local authorities. 
1.1.  Regionalization of central government and  social security budgets 
While  better information is now  becoming available on  the  income - 32-
redistribution between  individuals achieved  through central government 
or social security spending virtually nothing is known  about the 
regional redistribution of public funds  :  generally speaking,  there 
is no  way  of knowing  whether a  given region comes  out better or 
worse  off in the redistribution process.  What  is more,the  only 
estimate available,  published by  INSEE  for 1962  (1),  has  the major 
drawback of recording tax receipts and  social welfare  contributions 
at their place of collection in the  case of taxes paid by  enterprises, 
the registered office  ;this does not make  much  sense economically 
given the  concentration of registered offices in Paris. 
1.1.1.  There is no  doubt that this lack of information owes  something  to  the 
way  in which  Treasury accounts are kept and  to  the  centralized 
structure of France,  but it is also attributable to the difficulty of 
defining correctly the concepts of "regionalized" revenue  and 
expenditure. 
The  concept  of-nregional1zed expenditure",  i.e. the  allocation to  a 
given region of an  item of central  government  expenditure may  be  de-
fined  in several  ways. 
The  concept of "regionalized expenditure", i.e. the allocation to a 
given region of central government  may  be  defined in several ways. 
- From  a  balance of payments  angle,  regionalized expenditure  comprises 
the  expenditure actually effected by  the  central government in a 
region  :  salaries paid to civil servants working in the region, 
transfers to  residents of the region,  purchases of goods  and 
services from  firms  located in the  region.  The  advantage  of 
adopting this strictly financial viewpoint is that it shows  central 
government demand  for regional goods  and  services as a  component 
of the region's aggregate  demand. 
Part of the  expenditure effected in the region may,  of course,  leave 
the region in the  form  of purchases made  elsewhere.  The  concept of 
"regionalized expenditure"  could,  therefore,  cover expenditure 
directly or indirectly effected through  the region's budget,  account 
being taken of the  secondary effects of apparent expenditure,  so  that 
it corresponds to central government  demand  for factors of production 
in the region.  However,  a  table describing inter-industrial trade 
between  regions would  have  to be  drawn  up  to determine  this demand. 
- In contrast,  from  what  may  be  termed  the  "benefit" angle,  central 
government  expenditure  may  be  broken downby  region in proportion to 
the advantages which  are  supposed  to accrue  to the region's 
residents  (firms and  households).  In the  case of indivisible public 
goods available to the nation as a  whole  (such as defence), 
expenditure will be  broken down  by  region in proportion to  the 
number  enjoying protection, although apparent defence  expenditure 
may  well be very unevenly spread over the national territory. 
Clearly, if the advantages accruing to  the  population of each region 
from  a  given item of central government expenditure are to be  ------
(1)  INSEE  and Direction du Plan  "Essai de  regionalisation des Comptes  de 
la Nation 1962".Etudes de  Comptabilite Nationale  No  9·  Paris. 
Imprimerie  Nationale  1966. - 33-
estimated,  the expenditure in question will, in practice,  hav~ 
to  be  broken down  by  region with the help of broadly arbitra. 
"apportionment formulae"  (for example,  in proportion to tota· 
population,  the size of the  labour force,  or the  number  of civil 
servants working in the region  ••• ) • 
In the  case  of France,  the  choice between  these various approaches 
is somewhat  hypothetical in that accounts only rarely give a 
breakdown  of direct expenditure in a  given region.  For almost all 
budget  items,~the exception of certain transfers and  capital 
expenditure, it is,  therefore,  necessary to use apportionment 
formulae  (e.g.  expenditure  by  the Ministry of 3ducation can be 
broken  down  according to  the  school population or the number 
of teachers). 
Similar difficulties arise with regard to the regionalization of 
central government  revenue  from  taxes and  social welfare 
contributions, despite the fact that the yield of the different 
taxes is known  in the departments at their place of collection. 
An  initial difficulty stems from  the  existence of taxpayers 
operating in more  than one  region  :  a  very large number  of firms 
possess establishments in several regions but pay  corporation tax 
in Paris, where  their registered offices are located.  Even  using 
the  concept of formal  incidence,  regionalization of the  tax  paid 
by  a  firm requires profits to be  first broken  down  between its 
various establishments.  Now,  there is no  general method  for 
doing this and  hence  the  revenue  accruing from  the  tax has  to be 
allocated with  the help of approximate  apportionment formulae 
(regional breakdown  of the  work  force  of firms operating in 
several regions). 
A second difficulty stems  from  the fact that account must  be 
taken of the  economic  incidence - and not the  formal incidence  -
of the various taxes.  As  an initial approximation, it may  be 
assumed  that personal income  tax  (IRPP)  is not shifted to other 
taxpayers  by  those  legally liable.  This simplification cannot, 
however,  be  applied to corporation tax, which  is by  no  means 
borne  entirely by  the  owners  of the capital but is passed on  in 
part to consumers  and  employees.  Similar difficulties arise with 
the  payroll tax. 
1.1.2.  These  few  remarks will have  illustrated the degree of arbitrariness 
involved in any attempt to regionalize central government 
expenditure  since,  most  of the  time,  approximations have  to be 
applied.  In order to reduce  the resulting ~isks of error, 
PRUD'HOMME  and  ROCHEFORT  (1) devised a  novel method.  It involved 
(1)  PRUD'HOMME,  ROCHEFORT  and  NICOL  :  "La  repartition spatiale des fonds 
budgetaires".  Trappes  BETURE  December  1973. - 34-
first breaking down  the French 1970  budget into relatively 
homogeneous  categories of revenue  (24)  and  expenditure  (85),  and  then 
breaking down  each of these categories between  the regions in various 
ways,  with the help of numerous  apportionment formulae  (in all, 81 
formulae  were  used,  such as population,  consumption by  households 
school population).  An  apportionment formula can be  dispensed with 
only if the  item of expenditure or revenue in question can  be 
regionalized in a  straightforward manner  (grants to  the local 
authorities  ••• )  In theory,  a  very large number  of separate breakdowns 
can  be  obtained if several apportionment formulae  are applied  to one 
and  the  same  category of revenue or expenditure.  In practice, 
15  types of breakdown,  known  as "options" were  devised.  '!he  results 
obtained do,  of course,  vary from  one  option to another but,  since 
they paint roughly the  same  picture,  some  provisional conclusions 
can  be  drawn. 
Below,  we  have  selected  two  of the  proposed  options  :  the first 
corresponds, if anything,  to  the  balance of payments  viewpoint 
(breakdown  of non-regionalized current operational expenditure in 
proportion to  the number  of civil servants and  military personnel), 
while  the  second reflects the benefit viewpoint  (breakd·own  in 
proportion to population).  The  last  column gives the  average for 
15  options. - 35-
TABLE  I 
REGIONAL  PAT'IERN  OF  THE  BUDGET  IN  FRANCE  ( 1970) 
Relative discrepancy  (expenditure - revenue  from  taxes and  social 
welfare contributions)  as %  of revenue  from  taxes and  social welfare 
contributions 
Option I  Option IV  Average  for the 15 
options 
Paris region  -20 %  - 26  %  - 27% 
Champagne  - 5  4  2 
Picardy  -15  5  - 3 
Haute-Normandie  -11  0  - 5 
Centre  10  - 1  9 
Basse-Normandie  9  3  16 
Burgundy  4  7  2 
Nord  - 5  14  5 
Lorraine  ·22  .34  25 
Alsace  - 3  1  2 
Franche-Comtl§  - 9  1  4 
Pays  de  Loire  0  15  11 
Brittany  42  22  35 
Poi tou  17  10  14 
Aquitaine  9  3  7 
Midi-Pyrenees  46  53  55 
Limousin  - 5  - 9  2 
Rhona-Alpes  - 6  - 2  - 8 
Auvergne  16  17  11 
Languedoc  6  16  18 
Provence  20  0  15 
Corse  20  19  32 
The  above  table reveals a  number  of similarities  : 
- the Paris region is extremely privileged in all cases 
- four regions are much  worse  off than the others  :  Lorraine, Brittany, 
Midi  and  Corsica. % D = E - R 
R 
50  % 
• 
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- The  division between  privileged and  underprivileged regions is 
not a  matter of chance  :  Graph  No  1  above  shows  that the  average 
relative discrepancy  (1)  is  inversely proportional  to the regional 
domestic  product per capita.  There  would  appear,  therefore,  to be 
a  mechanism  ensuring redistribution of financial flows away  from 
privileged regions  to  the poorer regions 
1.1.3. - A more  detailed statistical analysis of the redistributive  po~er 
of public finance  can  be  attempted using tl1e  methodological 
framework  put forward in Chapter 5 .  A system of taxation (or of ex-
penditure)  is neutral,that  is to  say has  zero  redistributive power, 
if revenue  from  taxes and  social welfare contributions (or 
expenditure) is proportional to regional incomes  ;  it has a 
redistributive power  of 100% if the  income  differentials, after 
transfers, are entirely eliminated.  The  redistributive power  of 
a  tax (or of an item of expenditure)  can be  measured  on  the basis 
of the difference between its elasticity with respect to regional 
income  and  unity  (corresponding to a  neutral transfer),  this 
difference being weighted  by  the relative share of the  tax in 
question in national income,  after transfers. 
(a)  The  French  tax system  taken as a  whole  would  seem  to be 
slightly progressive,  when  compared  with  the regional 
distribution of income.  Relating the  per capita tax index 
(base  = 100 for France as a  whole)  to the  per capita regional 
income  index yields an elasticity of 1.2j8, slightly higher 
than the neutral elasticity of 1  ;  the  redistributive power 
of taxes would  then be  of the order of 6 % 
INDEX  (Tps PER  CAPITA)  = 1.293  INDEX  (INCOME  PER  CAPITA) 
- 2?.2  R  =  0.769. 
Moreover,  the  progressiveness of the  French  tax system is 
mainly due  to the  IRPP  (personal income  tax), which  has a 
very high income  elasticity (2.653)  and  a  large redistributive 
impact  (8,6 %). 
INDEX  (I~PP PER  CAPITA)  = 2.653  INDEX  (INCOME  PER  CAPITA)  -
166.)  R  = 0.96.  (2) 
(1)  Relative discrepancy= Expenditure -revenue from  taxes and  social 
welfare contributions 
revenue  from  taxes and  social welfare 
contributions 
(2)  The  regional income  applied in this equation is the  gross total income 
less social welfare benefits and  social assistance expenditure,  plus 
pensions.  Source  :  V.  BRIQUEL  and  M.  VAILLARD  :  "Les  comptes  regionaux 
des menages".  Les  collections de  l'INSEE  NoR,  18  October 1975,  p.59 200 
100 
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The  progressiveness of personal income  tax at regional level is 
rather unexpected  since  progressiveness with respect to individual 
incomes is generally considered  to be  low.  It is due  primarily 
(cf.  Graph  No  2)  to the huge  disparity in per capita income  between 
Paris and  the  provinces.  Moreover,  the progressiveness of the  tax 
is much  greater than suggested by  the  tax scale since the incomes 
of small sole  nro~rietorships subject to  the flat-rate  scheme  (small 
traders and,  above  all,  farmers  are not  taxed  or taxed at  low 
rate~. The  poorest regions  (Ouest and  Sud-Ouest)  are also those where 
the  incomes  of sole proprietorships account for the highest 
proportion of regional income  ()6.6% in Brittany compared  with 
12.1 %  in the Paris region). 
(b)  The  data concerning the regional distribution of expenditure are 
even  less reliable than those  concerning  revenue.  They  suggest 
that the redistributive power  of expenditure is large  (about 15 %) 
since there is only a  very weak  correlation between  the gross 
domestic  products of the  regions and  expenditure,  the distribution 
of which  is roughly proportional to population. 
I~EX (EXPENDITURE  PER  CAPITA)  =  0.182  INDEX  (GDP  PER  CAPITA)  + 71.9 
R  =  0.025. 
The  most  privileged regions are the Paris region and  the  regions in 
the South of France  (Midi-Pyrenees,  Langudoc,  Provence). 
1.1.4.- The  redistributive power  of the  French  social security system 
The  social security system also operates in a  way  which  promotes 
further this financial equalization between  the rich and  the  poor 
regions,  if,that is,reference is made  solely to  the data published 
by  INSEE  concerning both social welfare contributions and  benefits 
in 1962.  Whereas,  at national level,  contributions match  benefits, 
the relative discrepancy between  benefits and  contributions narrows 
as regional per capita income  increases  (Graph  No  J).  Only  in the 
Paris region and  the region of Rhona-Alpes  do  contributions exceed 
benefits.  This is all the more  interesting since social welfare 
benefits are higher in the rich regions  than in the  poor  (  a 
maximum  index of 1.18 in Paris and  a  minimum  index of 0.78 in 
Brittany and  Basse  Normandie). 
In any case,  comparison  of the respective redistributive power 
of contributions and  benefits in 1962  shows  that the  former is 
greater than the latter.  The  linear regTessions of per capita 
contributions and  benefits with respect to regional per capita income 
(b~fore social transfers)  are as follows  :  (th~ data being 
expressed as  indices  :  base for France) RELATIVE  DISCREPANCY 
(Be~its - contributions) 
Contributions 
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CONTRIBUTIONS=  1.672  (INCOME)(l)_  67.5 
BENEFITS  = 0._548  (INCOME)(l ~ + 45. S· 
NET  BALANCE  =  1.122  (INCOt1E)(l)+ll2.7 
R2  = 0.887 
R
2 
=  0.525 
R2 
=  0.872 
Given  that social welfare  benefits accounted for 13.5% of 
households'  gross total income  (2) in 1962,  we  obtain the following 
figures  : 
Deviation of income  elasticity  Redistributive 
from  UNITY  power 
Contributions  +  0.672  9.12% 
Benefits  - 0.452  6.12 % 
The  redistributive power  of social welfare contributions is larger 
because of the structural deficit in the  social security scheme 
for agriculture which  results in an automatic  transfer away  from 
regions where  wage  and  salary earners form  a  high proportion of the 
labour force  to the  farming regions in the  West  and  South-West of 
France.  This_flow merely serves to offset at regional level the 
repercussions of the flight from  the  land on  the  age  structure and 
on  the size of the  labour force  in the  farming regions in the West 
and  South-West of France. 
The  figures available for 1970  enable  these results to  be  updated 
only for social welfare benefits  ;  their redistributive power  has 
been calculated disregarding pensions  (Graph  No  4). 
(BENEFITS  - PENSIONS)  = 0.621  (INCOME)(J)+  36.9  R2  =  0.406  (3) 
Redistributive impact  :  4.4% 
The  redistributive  power  of social welfare benefits does not appear 
very significant at regional level since there is a  positive 
correlation between  sickness benefits and industrial injury benefits, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  regional income  on  the other. 
(1)  Regional  income  is taken to be  equal to total gross  income  adjusted  for 
social transfers  : 
Total  gross  income  - social welfare benefits +  social  >·Jelfare  contributions 
(2)  Total gross income  is the  sum  of the  resources appearing in the 
"appropriation account" of households in the  French national accounts. 
(3)  The  income  taken  into account  is tot:  .1  gross  income  less social  welfare 
benefits and  assistance  expenditure. It has not  been possible to  adjust 
this figure  for contributions. Social  welfare 
benefits 
150 
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1.2.  The  redistributive power  of central government  grants to the local 
authorities 
The  system of central  government  grants to the local authorities is 
relatively extensive  since it accounts  for almost  11 %  of central go-
vernment  expenditure  (1)  and for 45%  for the local authorities'  actual 
revenue  (excluding borrowing). It is, however,  extremely 
heterogeneous since it comprises around  200  types of grant and affects 
almost 50  000  local authorities and  local authority associations• 
As  a  result,  the aggregated regional statistics mask  the very 
uneven  impact of the  system at the  level of the  "communes"  and 
"depa.rtements",  which  are the direct beneficiaries of central 
government grants. 
'Three  types of grant,  each managed  in an entirely independent manner 
and  along different lines, will be  analysed  : 
- The  ..Y!i!§  (sum  representing the local portion of the payroll tax (2)) 
is an unconditional grant automatically redistributing to the local 
authorities a  proportion of central government revenue  (redistributive 
tax-sharing) • 
- Infrastructure grants are specific grants allocated to individual 
projects.  They  enable  the central government  to control local 
authority investment in line with  short-term economic  or planning 
requirements. 
- Central government  participation in social assistance expenditure 
constitutes the main  operating grant. It is a  conditional and open-
ended  grant by  means  of which  the central government automatically 
finances a  given percentage of the  social assistance expenditure 
incurred by the depa.rtements  (matching grants). 
(1)  Unlike  the way it is treated in the national accounts and  budget in 
France,  we  regard  the  VRTS  as a  grant financed out of central government 
revenue  and  redistributed to the local authorities. 
(2)  A specifically local payroll tax wa.s  levied for a.  brief period  in 1968. - 44-
Table II 
CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT  GRANTS  TO  THE  LOCAL  AUTHORITIES 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974 
Total grants  (as %  of  15 072  17  030  18  912  21  412  24  380  29  :/>6 
central government  (9,68)  (9,92)  (10,07)  (10,29)  (10,30)  (10,77 
expenditure) 
Operating grants  (1)  4  664  5 187  5 660  6  191  7  106  8  413 
Infrastructure grants  2  5~  2 433  2  437  2  7:-P  2  971  3  702 
VRTS  78.50  9  410  10  915  12  465  14 303  17  4_50 
OPERATING  TOTAL  30,9 %  30,4%  29,3%  28,9%  29,1%  28,5% 
INFRASTRUCTURE/TOTAL  17,0%  14,J%  12,9%  12,9 %  12,1 %  12,5% 
VRTS/TOTAL  52,1%  55.3  %  57.7%  _58,2%  58,7%  59,2  % 
(1)  Including contribution to  social assistance expenditure incurred by 
the  "de:partements". 
The  basic feature  of all these  grants is that they have  a  small 
redistributive impact and  ease  the  burden of congestion costs 
generated by  urban  growth  an  the  local authorities in the  most 
urbanized areas. 
1.2.1 - VRTS 
The  VRTS  is an annual global grant,  indexed  to increases in the wage 
and  salary bill. Being indexed,  the  VRTS  rises more  rapidly than 
the  other items of central government  expenditure  (5% in 1969  ; 
6.7% in 1976)  and  the  GNP  (l.o8% of the  latter in 1969  ;  1.32% in 
1974). - 45-
Allocation of the VRTS 
The  grant  is allocated  among  the local  authorities "departements" 
and  "communes")  according to two  distribution formulae. 
The  first  is the  product,  collected by each  authority in 1976  of 
a  localised tax  :  local turnover tax  (imposed  on retail  sales and 
the  extension of VAT  to  the retail field). 
The  second is a  broad  indicator of local tax b'lirden borne by 
households  :  (the  product  of "local taxes paid by households"), 
and  o~mers and  occupiers of residential property (indicator based 
on the rental value of the property). 
The  relative weights  of these  two  apportionment  formulae  (1) 
change  each year over a  twenty-year period.  The  "guarantee" 
grants,  which  are  indexed to the yield of the local tax in 1967 
and  which  accounted for 100 %  of the total funds  available for  a 
allocation in 1968,  decrease by 5 % each year \-chile  the distri-
bu~ion grants,  allocated in proportion to the yield of "~ 
hold taxes",  rise by 5 %  each year.  (Thus,  the guarantee grant 
made  up  70  %  of the VRTS  (1)  in 1974  and  65  % in 1975,  and  will 
have been entirely phased out  by 1988). 
For instance,  a  "commune"  to which  T  francs  accrued from  the 
local  tax in 1967  and which  collected M francs  from household 
taxes  in 1974  received a  grant of G in 1975  : 
G = 1.674  T  + 0.553  M  (2) 
(1)  We  have  left out  out  of this simplified account  a  third component  for 
allocation  :  the local  action fund,  accounting for less than 5 % 
of the total  amount  of the VRTS. 
(2)  The  guarantee grants  in 1975  were  equal  to 167.4% of the  revenue 
v.rhich  accrued to the  "communes"  from the local  tax in 1967  and  55.3  % 
of the  revenue  Nhich  accrued to them  from  household taxes the previous 
year. 150 
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VRTS 
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The  impact of the VRTS  on  regional income  dispa.ri  ties 
The  allocation system adopted is bound  to result in a  very slight 
narrowing of regional income  disparities. 
- This is obvious in the case of the first apportionment formula 
(local tax in 1967)  :  changes in the  tax were  roughly proportional 
to regional consumption  (including consumption by  tourists) and 
slightly less than proportional to disposable regional income. 
Moreover,  this system favours  the major urban areas and in particular 
Paris because of the commercial attraction they hold for the areas 
they dominate.  The  regression equation relating the guarantee  grants 
from  the  VRTS  in 1975  to households'  total gross income  (expressed 
as per capita index with a  base of 100 for France as a  whole)  gives 
an income  elasticity for these grants that is very close  to unity  : 
(GUARANTEED  VRTS  75)  = 0.94 INCOME+  5.75  R2  = 0.85  (cf Graph  No  5) 
- The  second apportionment formula  (which  assumes  increasing 
importance)  has a  less significant impact.  Around  one-half of local 
taxation in France is accounted for by  a  tax levied on  the  productive 
capacity of firms,  the  new-style business tax  (1)  ("taxe 
professionnelle"), assessed on  the wage  and  salary bill and  the 
value of the capital equipment of each undertaking  ,  while  the other 
half is accounted for by  taxes assessed on  the rental value of 
residential buildings, which,  as a  general rule, are payable  by 
households.  The  way  the local tax burden is split between  these  two 
taxes varies greatly from  one  "comune"  to  another,  with those located in 
industrial areas and  enjoying substantial revenue  from  the business 
tax levying relatively modest  taxes on  households,  and  vice-versa. 
The  VRTS  grants indexed  to household  taxes thus have  an intercommunal 
equalization function that works  to the benefit of non-industrial 
(1)  This replaced the old business tax  ("contribution des patentee")  in 
1976. - 48-
"communes"  ;  however,  this equalization effect is virtually nullified 
at regional level.  Firstly,  no  account is taken of the  tax ratio in 
the apportionment formula  ;  the yield of household  taxes is the  only 
factor considered,  with  the result that,  given identical tax ratios, 
a  rich "commune"  - which  has a  large tax basis - will receive a  higher 
VRTS  grant than a  poor  "commune''.  Secondly,  the  least industrialized 
regions - where  a  higher proportion of the tax burden is borne  by 
households  - are also  the  least urbanized,  and this reduces the 
weight of expenditure and  local taxes and,  consequently,  leads to 
lower VRTS  grants. 
Local taxes on households and hence  the  VRTS  grants proportional 
to  these  taxes have  been found  to increase at about the  same  rate 
as total gross regional income  : 
(VRTS  HOUSEHOLDS  75)  ~ 0.96  (INCOME)  + J.OO  2 
R  = o.4J 
The  correlation between  these  two  variables  (expressed as a  per capita 
index, with a  base of 100 for France as a  whole)  is weakened  by  the 
existence of regional taxation patterns  (heavy tax burden in 
Languedoc  and  Provence,  light tax burden in the North-East of France). 
In all, the redistributive impact of the  VRTS  in 1970  was  practically 
zero  : 
(VRTS  70)  = 0.9J  (INCOME)  + 6.04 
Redistributive impact  :  0.1 %o 
1.  2. 2.  Specific infrastructure grants of the local authorities 
The  system of infrastructure grants has three main features. 
- It is a  system of specific grants Hhich  are made  to help finanee 
given infrastructure projects and  are negotiated one  by one.  The 
average rate of the  grant  varies according to the type of infrastruc-
ture project  involved and,  Hith the exception of school  infrastruc-
ture,  \·'hich  is eligible for grants of between 40 %  and  50 %  on  average, 
is  small  (10-20 %).  The  rates are  fixed by reference either to  a  . 
specific scale  (primary  and  secondary education)  or to  rate brackets 
determined  at  national level. Finally,  since these grants  are "closed-
end"  grants  and  since grant  applications exceed  available finance, 
projects are  selected for grant  allocation on  the basis of  ~raiting 
lists (as part of the  planning process). 
- This  system enables the central  government  to  control  local  authori-
ty investment  in line with  short-term economic  and  planning require-
ments  through the link between grants  and  borrowing as  a  "commune"  may 
only receive  a  lovr  interest  loan  from  a  public body managing  savings 
bank  funds  if it has  obtained a  grant  before-hand.  In this way,  the 
infrastructure grant  has  a  multiplier effect  on  the level of local 
authority spending  (an increase of 20  in the  volume  of grants  can - 49-
generate an increase of 100  in local public investment,  the differ-
being met  by a  change  in "communal"  indebtedness). 
- Lastly, all grant finance  - like, direct central government 
investment- is "regionalized",  that is to say allocated between 
the  re~ons in the light of the central government's regional 
policy objectives before being subdivided between  the  local 
authorities by  the central government's regional representatives 
(the "prefets") and,  in the  case of certain infrastructure projects, 
by the regional political authorities responsible for selecting 
projects from  the waiting lists. 
The  implicit objectives of the regional allocation of central 
government  infrastructure finance were  analysed by  R.  PRUD'HOMME 
for  the period 1966-70.  He  showed  that regionalized infrastructure 
expenditure was  determined mainly by  the  size of a  region's 
population and,  as a  secondary consideration,  by  the  population's 
rate of growth.  More  explicit allocation criteria (which were  not, 
however,  always  observed)  were  drawn  up during preparation of the 
Sixth Plan  :  80 %  of the  finance available was  to be  allocated 
between  the regions in an "egalitarian" manner  in the light of their 
public infrastructure requirements,  which  were  determined  on  the 
basis of the  population in each region, its rate of growth  and its 
rate of urbanization.  The  remaining funds,  i.e. 20  %,  were  to be 
allocated according to policy goals and  on  the basis of the 
following criteria :  existence of a  "metropole"  (corresponding to 
a  very large  town),  the fact of being one  of the least developed 
regions in the West  of France,  number  of workers for redeployment 
and  number  of new  jobs planned. 
If the infrastructure grants were  actually allocated in proportion 
to  Population,  their income  elasticity would  have  to be  zero. 
The  fact that the equation  : 
INDEX  (INFRASTRUC~RE GRANT  PER  CAPITA)  =  0.68  INDEX  (INCOME  PER 
CAPITA)  + 31.7  R  = 0.06 
yields no  significant value does  not invalidate this hypothesis. 
Nonetheless,  analysis of the regionalized infrastructure budgets 
for both infrastrucutre grants and direct central government capital 
expenditure gives an income  elasticity well above  zero  : 
INDEX  (INVE~TMENT PER  CAPITA)  = 0.492  INDEX  (PRODUCT  PER  CAPI'TA) 
+ 47.5  R  =  O.J07  (year 1973) 
Inaddition, regionalization of the capital expenditure  budget does 
not take into account "major projects"  (1)  which,  in many  cases, are 
carried out in the Paris region. It is, therefore,  highly likely that 
the concentration of investment in the Paris region  (in particular 
(1)  Cf.  the data given in the Annex. -50-
in the field of road construction and  public  transport) results in 
a  regional allocation of central government infrastructure expenditure 
and  grants that has zero redistributive  impact. 
1.2·3· Central government  contribution to social assistance expenditure 
The  social security system is supplemented  by  a  social assistance 
system  partly financed  by  the  local authorities (child welfare, 
welfare services for the aged  ;  medical assistance  ;  assistance 
for the blind and  the disabled).  The  central government makes  an 
automatic contribution to this expenditure in the  form  of an 
open-ended  grant that is proportional to  the volume  of expenditure. 
The  rate of the grant is determined  by  a  scale which  varies 
according to  the  type  of expenditure  (on  average,  81% for child 
welfare  expenditure, 69%  for assistance given to the mentalJy 
handicapped,  and  4J %  for expenditure on  medical assistance and 
welfare services for the aged  and  the disabled).  The  rate is also 
differentiated according to  the region,  ranging between  two  very 
wide  extremes  (26 %  for Paris, 89 %  for Corsica)  according to a 
formula drawn  up  in 1955  and not updated  since.  This formula  took 
account mainly of the  taxable capacity of each  "departement" and, 
as a  secondary factor,  its population structure  (percentage of old 
people,  of young  people),  but,  not having been revised, it has 
become  unfair and  out-dated. 
This grant is, nevertheless,  the  only one  to have  a  fairly 
appreciable redistributive  power  since there is a  negative correlation 
between it and  regional income  (before  social transfers)  : 
INDEX  (SOCIAL  ASSIST~CE PER  CAPITA)  = -0.45 INDEX  (INCOME  PER 
CAPITA)  + 142.8  R  =  0.09 
1.2.4.  The  overall redistributive power  of grants to the  local authorities 
The  redistributive power  of these  grants is necessarily small since 
they make  up  only 2.7% of household  income  (after transfers).  In 
addition,  their regional income  elasticity is high since  the  VRTS 
accounts for a  fairly large proportion of the total volume  of grants: 
I~EX (GRANTS  PER  CAPITA)  = 0.66  INDEX  (INCOME  PER  CAPITA)  + JJ.? 
R  = O.J9 
Income  elasticity  0.66 
Redistributive power  0.9 % 
This figure  ~s proof that, although  the financial system in France 
is on  the  whole  progressive in a  regional context,  this can in no 
way  be  traced  to a  policy of deliberate transfers to  the  most 
depressed regions.  But at any  rate the  surplus of expenditure over 
revenue  from  taxes and  social welfare contributions payable in these 
regions automatically restores their trade balances to  equilibrium. C
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II.  FLOW  OF  PUBLIC  FUNDS  AND  REGIONAL  BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS  EQUILIBRIUM 
It is impossible  to evaluate directly the role of public finance in 
achieving equilibrium in the regional balances of payments,  since 
there are not even  rough  statistical data on  the movements  of goods 
and  the financial flows  between  French regions. 
In the  circumstances,  only a  case  study for Brittany,  can  be 
referred to. 
This region  accounts for nearly 5 %  of the  population of France 
and  has  : 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
the lowest regional per  c~pita disposable  income  (17%  below 
the national average) 
the  lowest per capita gross domestic  product  (GDP)  (30%  below 
the national average) 
the  lowest GDP  per  job (30.5%  below  average).  The  proportion 
of Brittany's GDP  produced  by  the agricultural sector is the 
highest in France  (16.3 %  as against an average of 6.3 %)  ; 
that produced  by  the industrial sector (excluding building 
and  construction) is the  lowest  (20.6% as against 36  %). 
Regional economic  accounts for 1972  have  been  drawn  up  for Brittany(l) 
consisting of a  table of transactions in goods  and  services 
(accompanied  by  a  simplified input-output table for nine sectors) 
on  which  the  balance of payments hinges.  These  data make  it possible 
not only to measure  the degree of economic  integration of the region 
but also to define the ways  in which  the deficit on  its balance of 
goods  and  services is covered. 
2.1.  Degree  of economic  integration of Brittany 
The  region is relatively dependent on  the  outside world  since 
imports represent 54 %  of regional  GDP  (calculated as regional 
value added)  and  its exports only 39  %.  Brittany as a  region is 
therefore  three  times more  open  to the  outside world  than France as 
a  whole  ;  but its rate of economic  integration (exports +imports 
as a  percentage of GDP)  (93  %)  - comparable  to Belgium's rate  (9~) 
or that of the  Netherlands  (105  %)  - seems  fairly low  at regional 
level. 
Brittany's economy  is vulnerable  to a  reduction in exports both 
because  of the direct and  indirect effects of changes in final demand 
and  because  of the effects induced by  such  changes. 
(1)  "Le  tableau economique  de  la Bretagne".  Bulletin de  Conjoncture 
Regionale.  CREFE  Hennes  Nos  1  and  2 - 1976. -53-
(a)  The  direct and  indirect effects of changes in final demand 
We have classified imports into two  categories,depending on  whether they 
are used directly to meet  final demand  or whether they are intermediate 
products used as inputs in regional production.  '!his throws  light on 
the sensitivity of regional domestic  production to changes in 
external demand  (exports,  public infrastructure expenditure etc. ) • 
More  than half of imports  (52  %)  are directly induced by  changes 
in :final demand: of an increase of 100 in internal final demand  for 
industrial products  (excluding trading margins),  78% is met  from  an 
increase in imports and  22  %  from  a  change  in regional production. 
The  relevant figure is lower for the other sectors  :  24 %  only of 
food  and  agricultural products consumed  by  households is directly 
imported. 
The  rest of imports  (48  %)  are intermediate goods  used as inputs in 
regional production.  By  inverting the matrix of technical 
coefficients deduced  from  the regional input-output table  (1),  we 
have  been able to calculate  the  following results  (which  should be 
interpreted with caution,  since  the  breakdown into sectors is not 
very fine). 
(1)  The  following model was  used  : 
Let X be  the 9-component vector of regional production 
z  "  "  "  "  of regional intermediate consumption 
E  "  "  "  "  of exports 
Ml  "  "  "  "  of imports for intermediate 
consumption 
M2  "  "  "  "  of imports meeting final demand 
D  "  "  "  "  of final demand  (excluding exports) 
Assume  Z =  AX,  where  A is the matrix of intermediate consumption 
coefficients 
M 1= HX,  where  H is the matrix of the coefficients of 
"intermediate" imports 
M 2= JD,  where  J  is the diagonal matrix of the coefficients of 
"direct" imports 
Since X + M 1  + M 2 = Z + E + D 
X =  (I  - A + H)-l (I - J) D +  (I - A + H)  -l E 
M 1= H (I - A + H)-1(I - J) D +  (I - A + H)-l E 
M 2= JD 
In practice  the model  is more  complicated since commercial services 
are not counted as a  product in French  input-output tables,  even 
though  there exists a  sector "distributive trades" vJhich consumes inputs. 
The  input-output table is therefore not a  square matrix. -54-
Change  in final  Final  Gross  Value  added :  Imtx rts  rrotal 
demand  demand  pro- productive  Direct Inter- mports 
duction  branches and  mediate 
distributive 
trades 
Consumption  of  100  91  62  26  12  J8 
households  (1) 
Infrastructure 
investment- 100  126  64  0  .36  J6 
general govern-
ment  (2) 
Exports: industrial 
products  100  1.3.3  60  0  40  40 
Exports: processed 
agricultural  100  202  78  0  2.3  22 
products 
The  leakage due  to imports is much  lower  than the one  which  has 
been estimated for British regions  ;  this is partly explained by 
the  importance of agriculture and  of the food  industry in Brittany's 
economy.  Both  sectors have  a  low  propensity to import intermediate 
goods  (5 %  of gross production)  while  76 %  of the  food  products 
bought by  households in Brittany are produced in the region. 
(b)  The  induced effects of a  change  in final demand 
The  effect induced  by  the operation of the classical Keynesian 
multiplier depends mainly on  the size of the  leakages due  largely 
to tax payments  and  social welfare contributions.  No  precise 
assessment of these leakages has yet been .made  for the various 
sectors. 
( 1)  Assuming  stable consumption structure 
'(2) Building and public works 
The  final  column  shows  the  imports  contained in 100  units of final 
demand. -55-
In the non-agricultural  sectors,  the order of magnitude  of the 
leakages is, on  average, as follows at the margin  : 
VAT  15 %  of value added 
Corporation tax plus personal income  tax  (IRPP)  8 %  of value added 
Social welfare contributions (J7 %  of wages)  14 %  of value added 
A - Total leakage  through  public sector  J7 % 
B - Exported income  from  property (interest)  15 % 
Depreciation 
Total leakages A + B  52  % 
Thus,  a  reduction of 100 in regional value added  (excluding 
agriculture) would  lead to a  reduction of 48  in regional disposable 
income  and  of 4J.5 in regional consumption,  for a  marginal 
propensity to consume  of 0.905. 
(c)  Combined  effects 
Let us  take as an example  a  reduction of public investments by  the 
central government in the region, which  would  mainly affect the 
building and  public works  indust1.--y.  The  combination of direct and 
indirect effects would  lead to the following sequence  : 
Initial change  in investment 
Reduction in direct and  indirect imports of the 
public works  branch 
Change  in regional value added 
Reduction in leakages due  to  taxes and  social 
welfare contributions and  to exported income 
Change  in disposable income 
Change  in consumption 
Induced change  in regional value added 
- 100 
+  J6 
- 64 
+ JJ.J 
- J0.7 
- 27.8 
- 17.2 
The  Keynesian multiplier applicable  to the  "disposable income" 
variable is about 1.37 given a  marginal propensity to import goods 
consumed  by households of O.J8  and  a  marginal propensity to  save 
disposable  income  of 0.095. 
All in all, a  reduction in public investment of 100 would  reduce 
regional disposable income  by  42  and regional value added  by 87. 
These  figures show  how  sensitive Brittany's economy  is to fluctuations 
in external  demand- much  more  sensitive than Professor Brown  suggested 
in Chapter 1.  Brittany's high degree  of specialization in 
agricultural production,  and  the relative weakness  of its propensity 
to import food  products,  go a long way  to explain this concJusion. 1. 
2. 
-56-
Moreover,  the  leakages are  smaller in the agricultural  sector than 
in the  other sectors because  tax payments  and  social welfare 
contributions are  lower.  A rise in Community  intervention prices,  which 
in the  short-term is equivalent,  for a  given level of production,  to 
an increase in regional exports, is likely to generate a  sharper 
increase in Brittany's income,  than any other public intervention. 
However,  since Brittany's agriculture specializes mainly in livestock 
products,  the region is obliged  to import large quantities of grain 
to supply its feedingstuffs  industry. 
Output of final products by  Brittany's agriculture in 1972 
Value  in FF  As  a% of  Brittany's 
million  (excluding  total  agricultural 
VAT)  output as a% 
of French 
agricultural 
output 
Crop  12roducts  ~  1119  %  ~  •  .1£ 
of which  Cereals  171.9  2.1  1.2 
Potatoes  2J0.2  2.9  16.5 
other vegetables  395.0  4.8  6.8 
Livestock 12roducts  7  110.2  88.1%  ~ 
of which  Beef  972.4  12  9.4 
Veal  _568.2  7  12.4 
Pigs  1  96l.J  24.J  JO.l 
Milk  2  Jl7.8  28.7  15.4 
Poultry  674.1  8.4  20.1 
Eggs  4_53.0  5·7  19.5 
TOTAL  8  074.1  ~00 ~0  9. 6% 
The  region's cereal deficit for feedingstuffs,  on  the other hand,  was 
about  FF  570  million (1).  Any  change  in relative European  prices 
(for example,  a  rise in the  price of cereals in relation to the  price 
of milk)  may,  because  of the  lower  level of leakages from  the 
agricultural sector, result in large fluctuations in regional income. 
(1)  40  000  tonnes of wheat,  60  000  tonnes of maize  and  15 000  tonnes of 
various other cereals. -57-
2.2.  Regional balance  of payments  equilibrium 
2.2.1- The  problems involved in achieving regional balance of paxments 
equilibrium differ in two  main respects from  those arising at national 
level. First, the overall position is automatically balanced owing 
to the  existence of a  single national currency and of a  unified 
banking network  over the whole  national territory.  Secondly,  public 
sector transfers between regions may  considerably modify  the conditions 
for achieving external equilibrium of a  regional  economy~ since  they 
are much  greater, in relative  term~ than  transfers at European or 
international level. 
The  mechanisms  of capital movements  between regions ensure  that each 
region automatically has the  necessary resources to balance its 
accounts. 
A region with a  transitory deficit on its balance of goods  and 
services has no  need  to concern itself directly with the  level of 
its reserves of external means  of payment,  since all payments are 
made  in the national currency.  Moreover,  the existence of a  unified 
banking network  means  that the regional banks are  simply branches 
of national banks  ;  liquidity requirements in a  region with a  deficit 
are therefore necessarily matched  by  surplus liquidity in the other 
regions.  No  visible monetary  phenomena,  therefore,  accompany 
disequilibrium of the regional balance  of payments.  Exchange 
rate fluctuations and/or variations in currency reserves can  provide 
useful "warning signals" for nations, but regions have  no  such 
indicators  ;  the risk of suffering,a cumulative  process of 
disequilibrium is therefore much  greater for regions with a  balance 
of payment deficit than for nations. 
A persistent trade deficit which  is not balanced  by  a  corresponding 
public  transfer surplus cannot be  covered indefinitely by  increasing 
regional debts towards  the rest of the nation.  For example,  when  the 
deficit is due  to a  wage  level which is too high in reJation to the 
regional productivity of labour,  there is no  exchange  mechanism  to 
help reduce  the region's real wages  in relation to those of the 
rest of the country,  restoring the  competitiveness of the regional 
economy.  The  low  level of regional activity will thus be  an 
obstacle  to the emigration of local  labour~ 
This  develo~ment may  be  curbed by  compensatory capital movements, 
if they represent investments apt to increase regional productivity 
however,  experience in Brittany shows  that they may  also lead to 
part of the real property of the region's inhabitants  being put to 
other use  than that intended.  (1) 
(1)  Many  coastal farmers continue in business only by  selling some  of 
their land for the construction of holiday villas. -58-
BRITTANY'S  BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS  (1972) 
I.  GOODS  AND  SERVICES  Cr~~it  n(~It  Balance 
(+ 
1  - 1  Goods  :  exports and  imports  (1)  12.25  16.4  - 4.15 
1  - 2  Services  : 
insurance  a.ild  sundry i terns  0.65  1.75  - 1.1 
tourism  2.1  O.J  + 1.8 
interest and  dividends net  0.4  + 0.4 
public  services (postal service, 
broadcasting,  railways)  0.6  1.0  - 0.4 
Operating surplus of inter-
rerlonal firms  0.5  - 0  5 
TOTAL  GOODS  AND  SERVICES  - J.95 
II.  PUBLIC  SECTOR 
2  - 1 Central  ~overnment : 
taxes  4.76  - 4.76 
~of which  personal income 
of which  VAT) 
tax)  ~0.98) 
1.95) 
current operational expenditure  5·7  + 5.7 
caEital exEenditure  0,4  + 0,4 
balance - central government  +1.)4 
2  - 2  Social Securit;r 
General scheme  2.56  2·77  + 0.21 
Agricultural scheme  1.4J  O,JJ  + 1.10 
Other schemes  1.66  1. 55  + 0,11 
Balance  - Social Security  + 1.42 
TOTAL  PUBLIC  SECTOR  + 2.76 
In. eAPITAL  JIJVEMEN!fil  (net) 
J  - 1  Lon~ term caEital  : 
Direct investments  0.2  + 0.2 
Net  long-term loans  1.9  + 1.9 
Other net loans 
(speciilized intermediaries)  0.44  + 0,1.¥4-
Net  loans  (public financial  0.89  + 0.89 
intermediaries) 
Long-term  investments  0.1  0,2  - 0.1 
Sale of land  and  buildings to 
non  residents  0.5  + o. 5 
Total  :  long-term capital  + J.8J 
J  - 2  Short and  medium  term  caEital 
Net  medium  term  loans  0.7  + 0.7 
Net  short-term loans  0.74  +  0.74 
Liguid and  short-term deEosits  2.77  - 2.77 
Total short-and medium-term  - l.JJ 
capital 
J  - J  Mone;y:  SUEEl;I  :  i 
Notes  O,J  + O,J  i 
Current accounts  1. 33  - 1.  33 
Total money  supply  - 1.06 
,  TOTAL  CAPITAL  f10VEMENTS  ; 
+ 1,44 
ADJUSTMENT  0.25 
(1)  Including French naval  dockyards  exports  (1.0) -59-
2.2.2  - Brittany's balance  of payments  in 19?2 
(a) It is not easy to draw  up  the  balance of payments for a  region  ;  the 
difficulties are both statistical and  theoretical. In most  cases, 
we  have  solved the statistical difficulties by  using approximate 
estimates  (based,  for example,  on  road and  rail transport statistics, 
or banks'  over-the-counter business),  except for public sector 
transactions,  where  the information is fairly precise, although 
difficult to obtain.  The  theoretical difficulties mainly lie 
in defining the regional economic  units,  since  there are 
supra-regional units which  operate over the entire national 
territory.  These  are mainly  : 
- national enterprises (Electricite de  France,  Gaz  de  France, 
Societe Nationals des Chemins  de  Fer); 
- multi-regional enterprises with establishments in several 
regions  ; 
-central government  and  Social Security institutions 
- banks  and  financial intermediaries (as a  whole) 
Since  products and  monetary flows  move  freely over the whole  of 
the national territory,  the region is more  or less meaningless 
as a  frame  of reference to describe  the  transactions of supra-
regional units.  The  device  of allocating between  the various 
regions the profits and  bank  loans received or the  taxes paid by 
a  multi regional enterprise is of little use  for the analysis of 
behaviour.  While  supra-terri  tori.al enterprises are still relatively 
rare at the international level,  they are  becoming~more and  more 
common  at regional level  :  in 19?0,  private multi-regional 
enterprises accounted for 39  %  of wage  payments,  47%  of turnover 
and 61% of investment in Brittany's industry. 
To  take account of the  centralizing mechanisms  resulting from  the 
existence of multi-regional units it has been  decided  to attribute 
only those  transactions directly connected with production to  the 
regional establishments of multi-regional firms.  Other  t~nsactions 
(including financial transactions) are attributed to a  "fictitious 
region"  which  comprises all the multi-regional units.  In accounting 
terms,  the  gross operating surplus,  minus  wages  and  social charges, 
is entered as a  debit in the regional balance of payments  and 
transferred to the fictitious region.  Thus  financial transactions and 
distribution of income  by multi-regional firms  (1)  are not broken 
down  by  regions.  Fixed investment by  these firms in Brittany is 
offset only by  a  compensatory  flow  (direct investment). 
(1)  Including corporation tax (b) 
(c) 
- 60-
The  deficit on  the  balance of goods is large,  since it represents 
15 %  of the  regions gross domestic  product and  corresponds  to an 
export cover of imports of 75  %•  If the  balance on  invisibles is 
included,  particularly tourism and  the operating surplus of 
multi-regional enterprises (before  payment  of corporation tax) 
the deficit falls to FF  J  950  million.  Brittany's deficit is 
therefore heavy mainly  because of imports of energy,  and  in spite 
of the  large  surplus on  agricultural products and  food  (export 
cover of imports  :  170  %). 
Public sector transfers alone apparently cover 70%  of the deficit. 
(The  algebraic sign of this transfer is consistent with 
R.  Prud'homme's  research results, analysed above).  However,  the 
importance of public finance as a  balancing factor is attenuated 
by  the reduction in taxes paid  (since corporation tax  paid by 
multi-regional enterprises is not taken into account)  and  by 
inclusion in the general government  sector of the Frenc!1  naval 
dockyards  (which  increases central government  expenditure and 
reduces the region's exports). 
With  these  reservations, it would  seem  that the role of public 
funds in restoring equilibrium to the balance of payments is linked 
to  the region's agricultural spezialisation.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
surplus on  central government  transactions is due  less to  the level 
of expenditure  (in spite of military expenditure)  than to  the  low 
yield of taxation (low effective tax on agricultural incomes,  and 
reduced rate of VAT  on  products of agricultural origin). 
On  the other,  the excess of social welfare benefits over contributions 
(financed by  equaliza.tion at national level, and,  for the agricultural 
scheme,  partially financed  from  taxation) is mainly due  to the 
deficit of the agricultural scheme.  For that matter this transfer 
should  be  seen as  the  reflection of a  mechanism  for equalizing 
receipts between  generations,  compensating for the effects of 
emigration by  many  farmers'  sons,  rather than the result of a 
deliberate policy of assistance  to underprivileged regions  (for 
example,  social welfare  benefits per head  of population in Brittany 
are 21%  lower  than the national average,  while in the Paris region 
they are 17%  higher). 
(d)  The  surplus on capital account adds  to the correcting effect of the 
flow  of public funds.  It has not been calculated as a  residual,  but 
directly on  the  basis of regionalized Banque  de  France statistics (1) 
adjusted in a  number  of ways.  These  statistics have  the  major 
disadvantage  that they do  not classify loans by  type of borrower 
(households,  enterprises, etc.) It would  seem  that a  large 
proportion of long-term loans injected into Brittany's economy  in 
1972  were  building loans.  (From  this point of view,  1972  is not a 
very good  reference year,  because  of the  building boom  encouraged 
(1)  The  Banque  de  France  publishes each year a  double  regionalized study on 
banks'  over-the-counter business'and on  residents'  transactions. - 61-
both by  the banks' credit policy and  by  various tax measures). 
Over a  three year period, it seems  that capital was  being 
redistributed  (1)  from  the Southern regions  (Languedoc,  Provence) 
and Aqui taine  towards  some  industrial regions in the B:ast 
(lorraine, Champagne),  in the Haute-Normandie  and  in the  North, 
while capital transactions were  in equilibrium along a  band 
stretching obliquely from  Brittany to  the Alps.  This description 
should  be  treated with caution,  since the Banque  de  France 
statistics do  not permit correct treatment of the Paris region. 
The  Paris region is far and  away  the  biggest capital exporting 
region,  but this conclusion is meaningless,  since  lendin~ is 
concentrated  there  (46.5 %  of the national total of 1972)  as is 
the collection of deposits  (40% of the  total). 
It would  seem  that income  from  propert~on which  there is relatively 
little statistical materia~does not significantly modify Brittany's 
balance of payments.  No  doubt there is a  net,  though  small,  inflow 
of interest and  dividends into Brittany because of the region's 
long-term investments.  But  the transfer of the operating surplus 
of multi-regional enterprises does not necessarily offset this 
inflow since it must  be  adjusted for the amount  of corporation tax. 
The  relative importance  of the  i tern  "sale of land and  buildings to 
non-residents"  should  be  noted  :  more  than a  third of capital 
movements  result from  the sale of coastal land to summer  residents, 
and  also from  building investment in rapidly growing  towns. 
*  *  * 
Do  capital movements  and  the redistribution of public funds  make 
a  long-term contribution to equilibrium ?  The  answer would  be  yes 
only if capital flows  were  likely to  improve  the  competitive 
position of Brittany's economy  and  to increase its productivity. 
Although  some  public expenditure helps  attain this  objective  (roads, 
telephone networks),  it would  seem  that a  large part of private debt 
reflects  the  expansion of building,  and  that the surplus  in the 
balance of public flows  is due  to a  policy of supporting the agri-
cultural sector rather than to a  policy of improving the  region's 
productive  capacity.  Channelling public aid into the deficit regions 
is,  in the final  analysis,  more  important  than its actual amount. 
(1)  Comparative  analysis of changes  in assets and  changes in liabilities 
resulting from  residents'  transactions. T
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GE~ANY 
by 
Dieter Biehl - 67-
DETERMINANTS  OF  RIDIONAL  PRODUCT  AND  REGIONAL  INCOME  IN  GERMANY 
1.  Determinants of Interregional Productivity Differences 
1.1.  Interregional income  differentials can  be  analysed from  two  points 
of view  : 
- From  a  supply oriented productivity or performance  point of view. 
The  question to  be answered is :  What  are the determinants of 
interregional- actual or potential- productivity or output 
differentials ?  · 
- From  a  demand  oriented welfare  point of view  :  What  factors determine 
the disposable income  of the  resident regional population ? 
In both cases,  the question involved is the role played by public 
finance in determining output or disposable  income. 
The  first part of this paper presents a  brief summary  of the newly 
developed  "bottle-neck" factor approach which  can  serve as a 
startin~ point for the explanation of interregional productivity 
income  {regional product) differentials.  The  second  part deals with 
the disposable  income  aspect.  In both cases, data from  German  regions 
or the  German  Lander  form  the basis for the empirical analysis. 
1.2.  In principle,  the  resource endowment  of a  country or a  region can be 
considered as determining its production possibilities or potential 
output.  But it is not so  much  the  total resource  endowment,  but 
rather a  set of "bottle-neck" factors which  determines the  productive 
capacity and  limits the development or income  potential.(l) Whereas 
natural resources in the broadest sense,  ranging from  topography  and 
climate to geographical  location,  can be  considered as being very long 
term,  if not  secular,  determinants of development  potential, it can 
be  argued that the endowment  with fixed social capital  ("infrastructure" 
equipment),  agglomeration and the given sectoral structure of a  region 
represent  such bottle-neck factors in the medium  run. 
The  economic  potential of these bottle-neck factors is higher,  the 
higher their degree of immobility, of indivisibility, of polyvalence 
and  of non-substitutability. 
The  reason is, in general,  the expense- in terms  of.resource costs 
to  compensate  a  region for the non-existence of these bottle-neck 
factors,  or to replace already fully utilised bottle-neck factors, 
and  furthermore  the  possibilities for substitution become  more 
limited as their location is more  fixed,  as their productive capacity 
is higher and  as they are in more  specialised industries. It is for 
(1)  Cf.  For this proposition b.  Biehl et al.  ,  BestimmungsgrUnde  des 
regionalen ~ntwicklungspotentials, Infrastruktur, Agglomeration und 
Wirtschaftsstruktur (Determinants of the Regional Development 
Potential, Infrastructure, Agglomeration  and Economic  Structure), 
Kieler Studien 133,  TUbingen  1975. - 68-
example  very expensive  to compensate  a  region for its peripheral 
location and its bad  topography with  the aid of transportation 
infrastructure  (roads,  railways, airports,  waterways).  Compared  with 
a  better located and  topographically not disadvantaged area,  a  larger 
share  of regional resources has  to  be  used in order to  decrease 
communication  (including transportation)  costs.  These  bottle-neck 
factors can be  considered as  'public'  factors of production compared 
to  the  "private" factors  like mobile  lab:>ur  and private saving. 
Whereas  transportation infrastructure determines interregional 
communication  cost, agglomeration is the  most  important determinant 
of intraregional communication costs.  Sectoral structure, finally, is 
a  bottle-neck factor in so far as e.g. an agricultural region will 
have  to  use  more  resources to adapt its resources to industrial 
production compared  with an already industrially developed region. 
Or  to  use  a  more  general formulation  :  The  costs of changing  the 
sectoral production structure, which  means  transition from 
agriculture  to industry and  from  industry to the  service  sector, are 
higher  than changing only the  product structure or the  enterprise 
structure within a  given production pattern- larger (qualitative) 
changes are more  expensive  than smaller (quantitative)  ones. 
l.J.  As  far as the  overall structure of production is concerned, it is 
uossible  to  imagine  a  world  scale of all industries or all produceable 
goods  and  services, ranked according to  their relative resource 
requirements.  From  a  simplifying point of view,  this scale starts 
with  the relatively least capital intensive  products  (and at the 
same  time  more  labour intensive  ones)  at the  bottom and ends with 
the  most  capital intensive  (least labour intensive ones) at the 
top, if "capital" is defined as comprising at the  same  time material 
private capital (buildings,  machinery,  etc.), material public 
capital (infrastructure) and  private human  capital.  Each  country or 
region can  be  attributed its individual place or rank on  that world 
scale,  depending on its relative resource  endowment  and  the  number 
of different industries or goods  and  services they are  producing. 
1.4.  This is a  static picture of the  international and interregional 
division of labour,  as it presents itself at a  given point of time. 
The  dynamics  of economic  development enter  the  scenario if one 
takes account of the fact that savings and  investments increase 
productive  capacity and  make  capital cheaper compared  with  labour. 
As  a  consequence,  entrepreneurs in all those  countries or regions 
where  capital has become  relatively cheaper and  labour relatively 
more  expensive,  will find it profitable  to engage  themselves in more 
capital intensive lines of production.  But since relatively capital 
intensive lines of production in countries on  the  lower part of the 
world  scale are at the  same  time  frequently relatively labour intensive 
in countries on  the upper pa.rt,  competition "from below"  force  the 
capital richer countries to give  up  those  productions and  to provide 
additional incentives for expanding their relatively more  capital 
intensive activities.  During that process of continously changing 
division of labour and  continously changing productiQn structures in 
all countries and  regions  participating in international - 69-
trade,  the world  scale of produceable  goods  and  services is 
extended,  too  :  Because  for  the  countries at the  top of the  world 
scale,  there exist no  production lines which  they can  take  over from 
a  country still ahead of them,  they have  to put relatively more  , 
resources into  the  production of new  knowledge,  i.e. in research and 
development.(l) 
1.5.  The  resource  endowment  approach can be  summarized  in the  proposition 
that the relative resource  equipment  per member  of the  labour force, 
per  job or even  per capita of resident population,  determines  the 
potential output and, if the  existing productive  capacity is fully 
used,  also  the actual output. 
(l)  This  Rim~lified picture of economic  development can admittedly not claim 
to explain all aspects of international division of labour and  of 
structural change.  It relies heavily on  the  classical ideas of comparative 
advantage  and  of the  propositions of Heckscher and  Ohlin.  As  e.g.  Lary 
(cf.  Hal  B.  Jary,  Im  orts of Hanufactures from  1ess Develo  ed  Countries, 
New  York  and  London  19 8  and  Fels  cf.  G.  Fels,  "The  Choice  of Industry 
!,1ix  in the  Division of labour Between  Developed  and  Develping Countries", 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv,  108  (1972),  pp.  71  ff.)  have  shown,  it is 
possible  to explain the division of labour between  developing and 
developed countries along the  Heckscher-Ohlin lines fairly well, if one 
extends  the  notion of "capital" in order to  comprise  not only private 
material capital stock,  but also human  capital.  But  even if one 
differentiates the  approach further and if one  follows e.g.  Sev  Hirsch in 
his classification of "Ricardo-goods"  (as  synonym  for natural resource 
based  goods)  and  of "product cycle  goods",  (cf.  S.Hirsch,  "Hypotheses 
Regarding Trade  Between  Developing and Industrial Countries",  in  : 
H.  Giersch  (Ed.),  The  International Division of Labour, Problems  and 
Perspectives,  Kiel 1974,  pp.  66  ff.)  the  core  of the argument remains 
still valid, if it is based on  a  proper definition of capital.  The  new 
element introduced  through  the  product cycle hypothesis is the assumption 
that a  product in its first phase  of life may  be  a  relatively capital 
intensive one  (high content of human  capital for research and  development), 
but may  become  later on a  relatively labour intensive one, after the 
production  technique has been standardized and is internationally freely 
available.  This explains why  developing countries are  successful even 
with products which  have  relatively high material capital requirements, 
but low  requirements as to  human  capital including skills. - 70-
An  existing resource  ca~city can  be  said to be  fully- or optimally-
used if it is combined  with  that quantity and quality of mobile, 
divisable,  specialized and  substitutable private factors of production 
llike private capital and  labour)  which  makes  actual equal to  potential 
product or income.  vlhether  this is the  case depends  on  a  special 
benefit-cost-ratio,  namely  the relation between  roductivit  and  the 
real wage  rate or the  "efficiency wage"-rate.(1),  (2  The  higher the 
(1)  The  real wage  rate can be  used as cost indicator,  because wages  due  to 
trade  union and  employer arrangements are  normally inflexible downwards, 
so  that they have  a  statutory character whereas other cost components 
are  of a  residual nature or at least open  to negotiation in both 
directions.  In addition,  labour in the  long run will always  become 
more  expensive  since it represents a  combination of "natural"  labour 
with  (increasing) human  capital.  ~ven if the rate of return to human 
capital remains  constant or decreases slightly, wage  rates per hour 
or per employee  will,  therefore,  increase in time.  In the international 
case,  the real wage  rate has to  be  adjusted for changes in the real 
exchange  rate. 
(2)  See  e.g.  H.  Giersch,  "Beschaftigungspolitik ohne  Geldillusion" 
(Employment  Policy Without Money  Illusion), Die  Weltwirtschaft,  2/1972, 
PP•  127 ff.  According  to Kaldor,  Keynes  coined  the  phrase of 
"efficiency wages"  for the  inverse relationship (wages  through 
productivity) and  used  this relationship already to explain employment 
effects (cf.  N·  Kaldor,  "The  Case  for Regional Policies", Scottish 
Journal of  Politicalt<~conomy (1970),  p.  )42). - 71-
~roductivity per person,  the higher is the international and 
interregional competivity of a  given production line or of a 
regional or national production pattern. 
A given resource  endowment,  therefore,  limits the  income  per 
capita which  can be  produced by  a  region.  Since  the  private factors 
of production are especially mobile  and divisable,  they can be 
attracted to a  region where  an unused  public resource capacity exists 
by  pa~ing them  an adequate  remuneration (interest payments  and 
wages). 
A centrally located and  optimally agglomerated region for this 
reason has  a  better resource  endowment,  all  jobs  in such  a  region 
to the  extent that they make  use of these resources,  are more 
productive  compared  with a  peripheral  and thinly populated area. 
If wage  rates are equal for  those regions,  the  productivity-wage 
relationshi~ is higher in the former than in the  latter. As  a 
consequence,  profits are higher in the  former and  lower in the latter, 
which  in turn attracts private capital into the  better  endowed 
region and  pushes capital out of the  less well  equipped one. 
The  first region is then also capable of attracting additional 
labour through  commuting  and  immigration,  whereas  the  less endowed 
will suffer from  outcommuting and  outmigration.  If mobility of 
labour is low,  this will cause  overemployment in the first and 
underemployment in the  second  type of region.  That means  to  put 
it simply,  that under conditions of different productivity wage 
relatios, but equal wage  rates, capital does not move  towards  labour, 
but labour is forced  to  move  towards capital. 
All  these effects taken together will set a  brake  to  the "spread 
effect" of labour-intensive industries in a  national or international 
setting  :  The  extent and  the  speed of displacement with which  these 
industries shift their location from  the center to  the  pheriphery 
is reduced and,at the  same  time,  incentives for  the central regions 
to invest in more  capital-intensive lines, especially in tertiary 
activities,  are  reduced  too.  The  net effect is a  considerable 
reduction in the  chances for economic  development in the  less well 
endowed  regions under equal wage  rates. 
1.6.  The  above-mentioned  negative effects are  caused by  the fact that 
wage  rates are not in line with productivity in the  two  types of 
regions.  These  considerations lead to what  I  think to  be  the  hard 
core  of the  regional problem  :  The  distortive effects of the dual 
monopoly  of Trade  Unions  and Entrepreneur's Associations on  the  labour 
markets on  on9  hand,  and  of the regional mal-distribution of public 
investment on  the  other hand.  This has  two  implications  : 
- First, if Trade  Unions  base  their wage  bargaining strategies on  the 
goal of equal pay  for equal qualification,  and if this strategy 
is successful nationwide,  the resulting wage  structure and  wage 
levels will be  more  or less equal over all regions.  But since 
productivity differs between regions because  of different resource - 72-
endowments,  this will create  the already mentioned  tendencies 
towards  overemployment in high productivity regions and  underemployment 
in low  productivity regions.  The  outcome  will be  worse,  the more 
Trade  Unions  claim,  and  Entrepreneurs accept,  that wage  increases for 
low  skill  peo~le are higher relative to high skill ones.  This creates 
the  well-known  "minimum  wage  unemployment"  and is especially 
detrimental to  labour-intensive low  skill industries in the 
peripheral  regions.  To  the extent that there exists a  "machinery 
embodied"  technical know-how  for these  labour-intensive  products 
which  can  be  transferred easily to developing countries,  lower real 
wage  rates, adjusted for possible higher communication costs, will 
enable developing countries to efficiently compete  with  these  labour-
intensive industries in the  low  productivity regions in developed 
countries. 
- Second, if governments  continue  to distribute infrastructure 
eguipment according to needs (that means  e.g. according to density 
of population,  in-migration and/or voter-potential),  they will 
favour  the already high income  regions and  disadvantage  the  others 
thus aggravating the already existing differences in productivity. 
The  fact that private capital also prefers investment in these high 
productivity regions is, therefore,  not what it is commonly  thought 
to  be  - namely  a  market failure - but rather a  failure of the 
political decision making  process. 
1.7.  The  main difference between  the national and  the regional case is 
conditioned by  the fact that international competitiveness does not 
depend  on  the absolute difference  in productivity and  consequently 
on  the absolute amount  of resources  per capita in relation to  the 
wage  rate, but on  the comparative  resource  endowment.  The  reason for 
this is that the  exchange  rate system which  relates national prices, 
output and  capital transactions on  the world  markets will normally, 
if it is flexible  enough,  tend  to create equilibrium in the  balance 
of payments,  which  means  that the absolute advantage  of better 
equipped countries and  regions is reduced via revaluation to  the 
extent that some  of their products are  no  longer internationally 
competitive.  Since  this revaluation for the richer country is a 
devaluation for the  poorer ones,  the latter will gain in 
competitiveness if it accepts the implied lowering of its real wage 
rate compared  with  the rest of the world(l).  Furthermore,  a  national 
(1)  Exchange  rate changes,  therefore,  can do  the  same  trick for open 
economies  as e.g.  Keynesian deficit spending does  for closed economies 
Both  reduce  the real wage  rate compared  with what it would  have  been 
otherwise.  They  also fail under the  same  conditions - if a  country is 
not ready  to suffer a  decrease  in real income  and  if Trade  Unions  fully 
anticipate  the  change  of the  exchange  rate or the  change  in the  price 
level,  in short  :  if there is not enough  money  illusion (cf.  H.  Giersch 
"Some  Neglected Aspects of Inflation in the World  Economy",  Public 
Finance/ Finances Publiques,  Vol.  XXVIII  (1973),  P•  108) - 73-
economy  can use certain policies (e.g.  monetary,  fiscal, tariff 
and  non  tariff barrier policies) in order to influence either the 
exchange  rate or to favour or disfavour specific goods  or services, 
kinds of income,  and  types of capital transaction. 
In contrast to this, a  single region inside a  national economy 
cannot make  use  of these instruments in order to compensate  for a 
bad  resource  endowment  ;  its real efficiency wage  is determined by 
the  income  potential of its resources.  Since neither changes in the 
(regional)  exchange  rate nor changes in the  (regional)  price level 
are  possible which  can dissimulate  the  consequences of interregional 
differences in resource  endowments,  the  problems are not hidden 
behind a  curtain of money  illusion  :  The  question is one  of to be 
or not to be, i.e.  ,  if and  to what extent a  region is ready to have 
lower wages  than other better equipped regions in order to  remain 
competitive in terms of its productivity-wage relationship, and/or 
if and  to what extent the  richer regions are ready to redistribute 
income  to  the  poorer ones,  thereby subsidising a  higher real wage 
rate in the recipient regions.  Consequently if Trade  Unions  and 
employers fix tmiform national wages  for each category of labour, 
they force  people either to  leave regions with poor resource 
endowments  or to stay and  become  unemployed,  unless the  public 
sector redistributes income  between well and  badly endowed  regions.(l) 
1·8.  Statistical evidence for the  proposition that structural change  is a 
corollary of economic  development can be  found  when  the relative 
shares of agriculture,  industry and  services for countries or 
regions with different development levels measured  in per capita 
terms are analysed.  International and  interregional cross section 
studies show  that there  exisi:B a typical pattern of structural change 
as far as  these  three  large sectors are  concerned  (see Chart 1  and  2) 
- The  share of agriculture is falling,  although with decreasing rates  ; 
- industrial activities first, i.e. at a  low  per capita income, 
increase,  then reach a  maximum  and  later on.decrease  ; 
- service activities (in the  largest sense including governments) 
present an inverse picture,  they decrease first, reach a  minimum  and 
then increase again (2). 
This  shows  that structural change  is not symmetrical  ;  it changes its 
character in the  development  process  :  If a  country or a  region in 
the  course of its development moves  through  the  mentioned world 
scale of branches of  products from  the  bottom  to  the  top, it 
(1)  The  redistributive role  of the  public sector will be  dealt with in 
part 2. 
(2)  The  proposition as such has already been developed e.g.  by  Fourastie, 
and  others.  For  conclusive statistical evidence  see  the sources cited 
~low Chart 1  and Chart 2. Sector 
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DIRECTIONS  OF  SECTORAL  CHANGE 
Chart  1 
DATA  BASE:  Up  to  62  Countries,  1950-1967 
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substitutes products which  formerly had  been in the agricultural 
or in the  service sector through industrial ones during the first 
phases of development,  whereas an inverse substitution process 
between industrial products and  services takes place in the later 
stages.  The  relative decrease of industrial activities and increase 
in tertiary activities in highly developed countries and  regions 
can also be  taken as some  evidence for the  so-called Wagner's  law 
of expanding state activities, because  the  public sector seems 
to increase in those  countries relatively fast (1). 
1.9.  Empirical evidence  can also  be  presented for the  proposition that 
the relative resource  endowment  determines  the  per capita income 
potential and  largely also  the actual income  per capita.  An  analysis 
of the infrastructure equipment and  of the  "settlement structure"(2) 
of German  labo·ur market regions  revealed that there exist large 
interregional differences.  If one  compares  for example  the  index 
figures for physical infrastructure  (e.g.  road-kilometers,  railway-
kilometers,  high tension electrical supply networks,  gas supply, 
dwelling infrastructure  school places, hospital beds,  per head or 
per square kilometer)(J)  for these regions,  the  following relative 
disparities show  up  : 
- For the  group of the  seven infrastructure categories analysed  taken 
together,  the  index for  the best equipped region in the Ruhr  area 
is 7.5  times  the  index of the worst equipped region  ; 
- road  supply is the  single category with  the  lowest maximum-minimum 
ratio with J.J  :  1 
- hospital beds have  the largest mini-max-ratio of J20.6  1  (4) 
(1)  See  for this aspect of development e.g.  the  papers and  the discussion 
published in Public Finance/Finances Publiques,  especially Vol.  26 
(1971),  no.  1  and  subsequent issues.  An  interesting interpretation of 
this phenomenon  has been  presented by  A.T.  Peacock and J.  Wiseman  with 
their "displacement hypothesis"  :  They  assume  a  sort of "ratchet effect" 
in arguing that it is especially when  periods  of wars  and  social crises 
are finished that  governments  can  expand other civil activities. 
(2)  See  to  I.I~footnote 
(J) In the regressions the variables used have  been defined either in per 
capita terms or in -per  square  kilometer  terms,  depending on  whether  the 
specific variable has a  higher correlation with population or with  land. 
They  can therefore be  categorised as either "population serving" or 
''space  serving". 
(4)  This extremely high last relationship points also  to  the fact that 
labour market regions which  are deliminated according to  commuter  flows, 
are  not necessarily at the  same  time  the  "optimal" service areas for the 
health system. - 76-
If the indicators for  the  physical infrastructure equipments are 
used in order to estimate a  quasi-production function,  where  infra-
structure equipment "explains" regional income  per capita,  the  max-
min-relationship become  smaller.  For e.g.  the  seven categories taken 
together,  the ratio becomes  now  2.2  :  1.  The  agglomeration potential 
calculated with  the aid of a  settlement-structure coefficient, 
reaches a  relation of 2.0  :  1.  These  figures  show  that themarginal 
"productivity" of an increased infrastructure equipment or an increased 
population density is decreasing, 
From  this it follows  that an equal increase in per capi~ income 
requires higher public investments in already well equipped regions 
compared  with less equipped ones. 
1.10.  Agglomerated  centers and  regions have  not only positive externalities 
in form  of lower communication cost,  but also negative externalities-
environmental damage,  air and water pollution,  noise, and  time 
consuming  ~rivate and  public  transportation.  The  existence of 
(1) 
- positive or negative  - external effects means  that private and 
social costs and  benefits diverge.  A reasonable  assumption is that 
this divergence is higher  the higher the degree of agglomeration because 
increasing agglomeration produces  increa~ing - sometimes  progressively 
increasing- social costs.  The  existing positive effects of 
agglomeration on  the other hand  - e.g.  lower communication costs 
through larger and  more  transparent goods-,  labour- and  capital-
markets - are  to a  large extent already reflected in higher private 
profits and  in the  greater attraction especially large urban centres 
have  for new  private investments. 
Even if there do  exist positive externalities which  are not reflected 
in lower private costs,  one  can.safely assume  that the  negative 
externalities in highly agglomerated industrial centers or regions 
already outweigh  the positive externalities,  so  that the overall net 
effect is an increase in social costs which are not reflected in 
higher private costs.  1be  result is that our existing system of 
national and regional accounts,  which  reflects mostly private costs 
and  benefits,  overestimates the real increase in social welfare in 
highly  agglomerated regions.  Real growth in these  regions is 
therefore  lower.(l) Whereas  national account figures overestimate  the 
American  economists estimate  that the real increase of welfare, 
according to a  new  "measure  of economic welfare"- concept  (NEW),  is 
only about 2/J of the increase in real GNP  as calculated on  the 
basis of national accounting systems for the u.s.  Since this is already 
the  outcome  of a  national averaging of regional figures in a  highly 
developed country,  the deviations from  this average  in the  most 
agglomerated u.s.  - regions may  be  such  that some  of these regions 
may  already experience  negative real growth measured  in terms of 
social benefits and costs despite positive national account figures. - 77-
real output effects of a  given resource  combination for agglomerated 
regions,_the  same  production function relationship can nevertheless be 
used  in order to estimate  the real income  effects of these resource 
combinations in less developed and  less agglomerated regions,  because 
their agglomeration costs are  lower. 
1.11.  The  resource  endowment  approach is not exhausted with the analysis 
of sectoral structure,  infrastructure equipment and  agglomeration. 
A possible approach  to evaluate  the  importance of other resources 
consists in determining the  influence of the peripheral or central 
location of a  region on  its development potential.  The  hypothesis 
to  be  tested is that the  potential product of a  region depends also 
on  its proximity to areas of high level economic  activity.  The  idea 
behind  this proposition is a  combination of the already explained 
relative competitivene$approach and  of the export-led growth approach 
The  less under given real wage  differences the communication cost a 
peripheral region incurs in participating in interregional trade 
with  the central high income  regions,  the  more  competitive will this 
region be  with its products in the markets of the central regions. 
A well specified test would  have  to take  into account all categories 
of communication cost,  starting from  information cost up  to 
transportation cost in the  narrow  sense of the  term.  A simple  proxy 
of this set of variables may  be  geographical distance measured  in 
kilometers. 
A test of this variable for the 61  regions of the  six old member 
countries of the European Communities  (Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy, 
Luxemburg,  ~etherlands) shows  that this hypothesis is relevant (see 
Chart J)  :  Income  per head is lower,  the more  distant a  region is from 
the high income  center of the  Cologne/DUsseldorf area in Germany.  'lbe 
coefficient of determination can be  improved, if density of population 
is added  as a  second  explanatory variable.  The  latter variable has  the 
expected positive sign which  means  that whereas  income  decreases with 
increasing distance,  agglomeration acts as a  countervailing power. 
1.12. Density of population is a  proxy for agglomeration,  and agglomeration 
means,  in addition to concentration of population,  concentration of 
public infrastructure equipment and  a  well structured network  of 
central places and  markets  (1)  or settlement structure.  'lhe  results 
(1)  See  for the  theory of central places w.  Christaller, Die  zentralen Orte 
in Stiddeutschland,  eine okonomisch-geographische  untersuchung Uber  die 
Gesetzmassi keit der Verbreit  und  Entwicklun  der Siedlun en mit 
§tadtischen Funktionen  The  central places in southern Germany,  an  in-
vestigation  into the  laws of distribution and  development of settlements 
with  urban functions),  Jena 1933,  and  for a  generalised regional  location 
theory A.  Losch,  Die  raumliche  Ordnung der Wirtschaft,  Eine  Untersuchung 
Uber  Standort, Wirtschaftsgebiete  und  internationalen Handel  (The  spatial 
order of the  econom~, a  study of location,  economic  space  and 
international trade),  Jena 1940.  The  latter book  has also been  translated 
into English and  published under the  title  :  The  Economics  of Location, 
New  Haven  and  London  19_54. - 78-
obtained for the 61  european regions therefore  suggest that poor 
regions in as far as they are either peripheral ones or unsufficiently 
agglomerated ones can substitute public investment for their low 
loca  tional potential. 
An  indirect test of this hypothesis has been made  for German  regions 
by  separating those  regions which  after the second  world  war  received 
regional aid from  the Federal Government  and  other regions,  and  by 
using data from  only the non-subsidised regions in order to estimate 
quasi-production functions for infrastructure and  settlement 
structure  (1). 
This exercise revealed that the coefficient of determination increased 
considerably, if only data from  the unaided  regions are used,  which 
means  that the  subsidised regions had a  more  distorted and  less 
economically determined  infrastructure and  settlement structure or in 
other words  that their rates of resource utilisation differ more. 
In addition, if the income  potential of the aided regions is 
calculated using the quasi-production functions of the unaided  regions, 
the result is a  relative over-ca:pa.ci ty of infrastructure and 
settlement structure of about 19  per cent in the aided regions. 
This can be  interpreted as meaning  that the aided regions as a  group 
need  relatively more  infrastructure and a  better settlement structure 
in oxder  to compensate  for lacking other natural resources,  especially 
for a  worse  location compared  with more  prosperous regions. 
1.13.  These  results can also be  interpreted to the effect that the  19% 
deviation from  the'hormal" output represents an indicator for the 
required devaluation of the regional exchange  rate, if such  a  thing 
existed.  But  since it is not  possible to have  different regional 
exchange  rates inside a  national currency area, forces which  would 
otherwise create balance of payments deficits under this restriction 
show  up  as the most  important regional problem  :  unemployment, 
commuting  and  emigration. 
It has  to be  noted in this context that until 1970/71  the Deutsche 
Mark  can be  considered as having been undervalued,  which  implies 
an export subsidy and  an .import tax. If under  these very favourable 
conditions for national growth  (which,  among  other things,  explains 
the high and  until 1970  still increasing share of industry in 
Germany  despite the above  mentioned  structural relationships),  there 
existed nevertheless regions with significantly lower  performance as 
described 
(1)  The  regions used  for these calculations are larger ones compared  with 
the already mentioned  labour market regions  ;  the Federal Republic is 
divided into only 61  functional entities units,  the so-called 
"Raumoxdnungsregionen"  (cf.  D.  Biehl et al., "Determinants of Regional 
Development  Potential, Infrastructure, Economic  Structure and 
Agglomeration",  The  German  Economic  Review,  Vol.  lJ (1975),  no.  2, 
PP•  117-1)4. - 79-
Chart  3 
Relation between Product  GNP  per Head  and  Distance of the  Regions  from  the 
High-Income  Center of the  EEC  (Cologne/DUsseldorf Area)  in 1968. 
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above,  the  conclusion must  be  that these regions would  have  done 
still worse  if the  exchange  rate had  been at its equilibrium value. 
And  :  since  exchange  rate conditions have  changed drastically in 
in the  meantime  with  the effect that many  people  believed· that the 
existing floating rates are at least temporarily too high,  making 
the  m1  an overvalued currency,  the conclusion is that the actual 
recession in Germany  with an unprecedented overall unemployment 
figure of almost 6  r~ during the  last year 1974/75 is not so  much 
a  cyclical phenomenon,  but an indicator of the  strength of the 
adjustment process caused by  the  change  from  the mr  being an 
undervalued currency and  by  the  structural factors explained above. 
2.  Determinants of Interregional Disposable Income  Differences and 
Regional Balances of Payment 
2.1.  As  already mentioned  (cf.  para 1.7.), whereas international 
competitivenessdependson comparative resource  endowment, 
interregional competitiveness is determined by  differences in 
absolute amounts and qualities of available resources,  tecause  there 
is a  fixed exchange  rate between regions belonging to  the  same 
national economy.  This implies that regions ought to suffer even 
more  from  balance of payments  problems  compared  with nations. 
'!he  question is therefo-re  Nhy  these regional balance of payment 
problems  do  not seem  to  be  observable. 
The  first answer naturally is that because  there are no  distinct 
regional currencies, it is simply not possible  to calculate such 
a  regional balance of payments.  But  the effects that an adverse 
balance of payments  normally has on  national economies  can also 
be  observed in the regional case e.g.  emigration and  unemployment. 
Since it is not possible  to deal with regional balance of payments 
problems  through devaluing  or revaluing the  (not existing) regional 
currencies,  these adverse effects must  show  up  ~ven stronger unless 
there are compensating mechanisms. 
The  regional trade  balance  can be  expected to  show  an increasing 
deficit (net imports), if the relative prices for tradeables 
increase because  of a  deterioration in the  productivity-wage 
relationship  (PWR).  This implies that the weighted average  real 
wage  rate has  to be  lower,  the  lower the regional resource 
endowment  per  job.  But  because  Trade  Unions  claiming and 
entrepreneurs granting equal pay for equal work,  relative 
interregional wage  differentials in a  country are normally smaller 
than differences in relative resource endowments  and,  consequently 
productivity.  As  the cited example  for Germany  show,  there exist 
relatively large differences especially in public infrastructure 
equipment.  This  seems  to be  true also for other countries,  especially 
as far a.s  infrastructure density in space,  agglomeration and  location 
(site) of regions are  concerned. 
If wage  rates were  completely equalized throughout a  country, if 
relative resource  endowments  differ,  and if there is only one - 81-
strongly agglomerated region in a  national economy,  one  would 
accordingly expect that the rate of unemployment  would  be  increasing 
with increasing distance  from  the central agglomerated region. 
Increasing unemployment  with increasing distance  from  the  center 
is one  effect of an unfavourable  regional balance of payments 
In the  less well endowed  regions,  regional exports are  lower than 
regional imports because  the  PWR  is distorted compared  with the 
one  compatible with full employment.  But increasing unemployment 
induces increasing transfers out of the national unemployment 
insurance  system  ;  as a  result,  consumption in those  regions can 
remain higher compared  with the case were  private disposable  income 
is exclusively earned in production.  The  public transfers,  therefore, 
subsidize  private consumption in that region and  these subsidies 
compensate  for a  part of 'the regional balance of payments deficit. 
2. 2.  A second  type of adjustment to an unfavourable  balance of payments 
consists in increased out-commuting and  out-migration.  The  reason 
is the  same  as in the unemployment  case  :  If regional exports are 
not competitive  enough, it depends  on the relative mobility of 
labour compared  with  the degree of downward  inflexibility of wages, 
whether an adverse  balance of payment causes more  out-commuting and 
out-migration or more  open  unemployment.  The  lower the mobility with 
given inflexible wages,  the higher will be  the rate of unemployment 
and  the  lower the activity rates of the  population.  On  the  other 
hand, if wages  are  more  flexible downwards,  real wages may  be 
reduced to  such an extent that both  unemployment  and  out-commuting 
or out-migration are  reduced.  In the  out-commuting/out-migration 
case,  there also exists an  income  flow  back  to  the factor exporting 
region which  increases regional disposable  income  relative to 
domestic  income. 
2.3.  A possible third type of adjustment consists in capital flows  out 
of the region with a  low  P~lR and  a  corresponding "import" in capital 
returns.  This  presupposes like in the  out-commuting/-migration case 
that the capital owners  retain their resi~ence in the  region and  only 
invest abroad  (1).  But this type  of adjustment is not necessarily 
linked with the deterioration of the  PWR;  capital is more 
often exported from well endowed  regions. 
(1)  It is easy to construct a  taxonomic  matrix e.g.  under the general 
assumption that factor mmers  can decide a)  where  to  'reside'formally 
(for purposes of income  taxation),  b)  where  to  'invest'their factor 
services,  and  c)  where  to  'consume'  the  proceeds of that investment. 
Cf.  for such an auproach in the  context of a  tax harmonization framework 
Dieter Biehl, Aus!uhrland-Prinzip, Einfuhrland Prinziu und  Gemeinsamer 
-Harkt-Prinzi  •  Ein Beitra  zur Theorie der Steuerharmonisierun 
Export Country Principle,  Import Country Principle,  <.:...nd  Common  Harket 
Principle  ;  A Contribution to  the  Theory of Tax Harmonization), 
Koln  1969,  PP•  349  ff. - 82-
2.4.  In an international framework,  those adjustments to an adverse  balance 
of payments  are  supplemented  by  the possibility of changing the 
exchange  rate in order to restore equilibrium in the  balance of payment 
In an interregional framework  (all regions belonging to the  same 
national economy),  exchange  rate adjustments are excluded,  but another 
type  of adjustment transaction exists  :  net transfer (i.e. expenditures 
minus  taxes  )  from  the  central government or horizontal tax/expenditure 
equalisation schemes.  The  payments  to and  from  the national 
unemployment  insurance  system have  also to be  considered as a  part 
of that public sector adjustment mechanism.  (1) 
These  public transfers,  too,  make  regional disposable income  to be 
relatively higher than regional output and  domestic  income  earned 
in production.  The  public sector can therefore perform the function 
of a  potent "  equalizer "  of disposable  income  per capita and 
compensate  via transfers otherwise existing regional balance  of 
payment deficits. 
The  extent to which  the  budgets of the different levels of government 
and  of the  social security system in Germany  really operates in this 
way,  will be  analysed in the next part of this paper. 
J.  The  Equalizing Effects of the Public Sector in Germany  1960  - 1970  (2) 
J.l.  In 1974,  the Statistical Office of the  German  Lander for the first 
time  published figures according to the  usual national  accounti~. 
definitions for the  ten Lander and  West-Berlin from  1960  - 1970  tJ) 
Whereas  the figures  on  earned income  take account  of the export 
and  import  between  each individual Land  and the rest of the world 
(including the other Lander),  the figures for entrepreneurial 
income  from  wealth represent  only the difference between  income 
arising in a  Land  and  the imported income,  i.e. the exported 
income  is not  subtracted.  (4) 
It is now  possible to differentiate between a  number  of different 
income  definitions (see  below).  In addition,  information is available 
for current revenue  and  expenditure of all levels of government  and 
on  public investment expenditltte.  On  the basis of the figures for the 
regional distribution of existing infrastructure equipment, it can 
(1)  International aid payments  e.g.  to developing countries are similar 
to public transfers in the interregional case. 
(2)  For  this part of the  paper I  am  indebted to Mr  Re  chenbach of the staff 
of the Directorate General for Economic  and  Financial Affairs of the 
Commission,  for his detailed comments.  I  have  also used  the results of 
I1r  Reichenbach's  anal~sis given to the Study Group  on the effects of 
Public Finance  flows  tsee para. 3.8. below) 
(3)  Cf.  ~ntstehun  Verteil  und  Verwendun  des Sozial rodukts in den 
Jltndern,  Standardtabellen 1960  - 1970,  Stuttgart 1974  referred to in 
what  follows as "Lander Accounts  1974").' 
(4)  Landertab3llen 1974,  s. XIII - 83-
be  assumed  that there may  be  significant differences in this respect 
It has indeed required much  effort on  behalf of the Statistical 
Lander Offices to present figures for these categories as well.  But 
in order to find a  Lander  breakdown  of the expenditures especially 
of the  budget of the Federal Government  and its affiliated budgets 
it has not been possible  to  always rely on  original data.  To  a  large 
extent, keys  have  been selected in order to distribute  some  large 
expenditure categories.(l) 
3.2.  So  as to  be  able  to present some  detailed information especially 
on  the effects of the  German  public finance  system a  number  of 
endogeneous variables have  been defined. 
- Total public expenditure minus  total receipts of all levels of 
~overnment, including the  social security system,  per inhabitant 
\ TEI  - TRI),  and  as a  percentage of total expenditure  ((TE-TR)/TE), 
- expenditure of the  social security system minus  social security 
contributions,  per inhabitant (SEI-SCI)  and  as a  percentage of 
expenditures  ((SE-SC)/SE), 
-received current transfers per inhabitant  (RTI), 
- paid current transfers per inhabitant ( PTI) , 
-received minus  paid current transfers per inhabitant  (RTI-PTI), 
- amount  of federal funds  paid  to Lander governments for joint tasks 
('Gemeinschaftsaufgaben"  and  similar purposes),  mostly organised as 
matching grants in absolute  (FF)  and  per inhabitant terms  (FFI). 
Furthermore,  the  following indicators for  special types of income 
or parts of it were  constructed. 
Deficit or surplus of business and  wealth income  per inhabitant 
(BWI), 
- difference between net domestic  product at factor cost and 
disposable income  of private households  (NDPI-PDYI), 
-deficit or surplus of business and  wealth income  per inhabitant 
~lus received minus  paid current transfers per inhabitant 
\BWI  + RTI-PTI).  -----
(1)  This naturally distorts the interpretation of these figures,  especially 
the results of regression analyses,  because  one  may  simply "re-detect" 
the  keys  used in distributing federal funds  to  the  I~er. But since  the 
expenditures of each Land  and of its local governments  can be 
attributed directly to  the  Land  in question,  the errors may  not  be  so 
great as to make  such  calculations meaningless. - 84-
Since  public funds are often found  to be  distributed according to 
variables like population,  space and/or density of population  (the 
latter is at the  same  time  a  proxy for the above  mentioned 
agglomeration variable), all three  (I,  S,  I/S)  have  been  used as 
exogeneous variables.  In addition which  of the  possible different 
income  definitions proves to be  the best explanatory factor for the 
different endogeneous variables has  been investigated 
- Gross  Domestic  Product per Inhabitant (GDPI) 
-Gross National  (Regional)Product per Inhabitant (GNPI) 
- Wage  and  Salary Income  per Inhabitant (WI) 
- Net  Domestic  Product  per Inhabitant (NDPI) 
- Net  National  (Regional)  Income  per Inhabitant  (NNYI) 
- Gross Domestic  Product per Person in the  Labour  Force  (GDPLF) 
- vlage  and  Salary Income  per Person in the  Labour  Force  (WLF) 
- Private Disposable Income  per Inhabitant (PDYI) 
- Net  Domestic  Product per Person in the  Babour  Force  (NDPLF) 
- Wage  and  Salary Income  per Dependently Employed  (WDE) 
Some  of these  income  variables have  also been  used on  a  per square 
kilometer basis  ("income density"),  namely  (GDPS),(GNPS),  (PDYS) 
and  (ws). 
In order to test the  infrastructure equipment approach on  the 
Lander  level as well,  a  special infrastructure index has been 
constructed on  the  basis of the available data mentioned  above  for 
the  labour market regions  (INF).  Due  to data constraints,  this 
variable is at present only available for 1966. D
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Table  2  Mini-Max-Ratios  ~960 and  1970  for Different per Capita 
Income  Definitions 
1960  1970 
GDPI  1  :  2,09  SH:HH  1  :  2,0J  SH:HH 
GNPI  1  :  1,87  RP:HH  1  :  2,0J  SL:HH 
WI  1  :  1,7J  RP:HH  1  :  1,96  SH:HH 
NDPI  1  :  1,85  SH:HH  1  :  1,77  SH:HH 
NNYI  1  :  1,~  RP:HH  1  :  1,71  SL:HH 
GDPLF  1  :  1,65  BY:HH  1  :  1,5J  N:HH 
WLF  1  :  1,_56  RP:HB  l  :  1 ,'+'+  DY:HH 
PDYI  1  :  1,41  RP:HH  1.  :  1,44  SL:HH 
NDPLF  1  :  1,41  BY:HH  1  :  l,JO  N:HH 
WDE  1  :  1,24  N:HB  1  :  1,26  SH:HH 
Abbreviations  GDPI  =Gross Domestic  Product per Inhabitant 
GNPI  = Gross  National  (Hegional)  Product per 
Inhabitant 
WI  =Wage  and  Salary Income  per Inhabitant 
NDPI  =Net Domestic  Product per Inhabitant 
NNYI  =Net National  (Regional)  Income  per Inhabitant 
GDPLF  = Gross  Domestic  Product per Person in the 
Labour  Force 
WLF  = Wage  and  Salary Income  per Person in the 
Labour  Force 
PDYI  = Frivate Disposable  Income  per Inhabitant 
NDPLF  = Net  Domestic  Product per Person in the 
Labour  Force 
WDE  = Wage  and  Salary Income  per Dependently 
Employed 
SH  = Schleswig-Holstein 
HH  = Hanse s tad  t  Ham burg 
RP  = Rheinland-Ffalz 
HB  = Hansestadt Bremen 
BY  = Bayern 
N  = Niedersachsen 
SL  = Saarland - 87-
J.J.  The  figures for the  ten Lander  (1)  for the years 1960  and  1970  are 
presented in table  1  ;  Table  2  contains figures  showing  the 
relation between  the  lowest and  the highest income  per capita as 
"~ini-Hax"-ratios (MMR). 
(a) 
(b) 
The  general picture  these figures  show  can be  summarized  as follows 
For  1960  with  the  exception of two  income  definitions,  WLF  and  WDE, 
Hamburg  is the region with  the highest per capita income.(2) 
The  region with  the  lowest per capita income  differs more  according 
to  the  income  definition used.  Whereas,  in 1960  Rheinland-Pfalz 
has the  lowest income  figures in 5 cases,  Schleswig-Holstein in 
2  cases,  Bayern in 2  cases and  Niedersachsen in 1  of the  10  cases, 
it is Schleswig-Holstein and  the  Saarland which  in 1970  are on  the 
end  of the  scale in 4 and  3 cases respectively,  followed  by 
Niedersachsen  (2)  and  Bayern  (1). In 1970,  the  Saarland and 
Schleswig-Holstein are  the  regions with the  lowest income  per 
inhabitant figures,  while at the  same  time  their MNR' s  are 
considerably higher  for these definitions compared  with those 
definitions based on  the variables per member  of the  labour force 
which  implies that they have  low  participation rates and/or that 
a  part of the  labour force  of these  countries is commuting  to 
other regions.  This is especially relevant in the case of 
Schleswig-Holstein,  where  large numbers  of people are  living in 
Schleswig-Holstein,  but are  working in Hamburg.  This,  on  the other 
hand,  increases the  figures for Hamburg  on a  per inhabitant basis, 
since now  value added  produced  by  these  commuters  is credited to 
the resident population or resident labour force  in Hamburg  when 
these definitions are used. 
As  Table  2  shows,  the  MMR  are largest for GDPI  and  GNPI  figures 
(1  :  2.09 and  1  :  1.87 for 1960  ;  and 1  :  2.03 in both cases for 
1970),  This  seems  to indicate,  especially for 1970  where  both 
r~ffis are equal,  that the  market determined adjustment  processes 
(1)  ~<Jest-Berlin has been excluded  because  of the  special economic  situation 
of that town.  Isolated from  normal  economic  circuits of the  West  German 
Economy,  it is heavily subsidized from  Federal Government  funds.  The 
normal  market relationships  ~resumably are  therefore distorted and 
would have affected the regression results. 
(2)  This is important in so far as it is frequently argued that the  top 
position of Hamburg  is mainly due  to  the  high indirect taxes collected 
there,  It is nevertheless  true  that indirect taxes minus  subsidies 
account for about  ~0% of the  GDPI-figures in Hamburg  compared  with 
about 10% for  the  ~nd with  the  lowest figure  (Saarland).  But even 
if another nroductivity indicator like  NDPI  is used,  the  overall 
result is not significantly changed  (cf.Table 1). - 88-
have  not been working.  But if one  takes into account that the  gross 
and market price based income  concepts may  be  distorted as already 
explained,  and if one  therefore  compares  the net concepts at factor 
costs per inhabitant,  NDPI  and  NNYI,  the  productivity related first 
indicator has a  higher  ~~R as expected.  Also  differences are clearly 
smaller on  the net and  factor cost base  than on the gross and 
market base. 
(c) A comparison of the  income  definitions related to  a  per capita 
base  with  those related to a  per person of the labour force  base 
reflects that there are relatively large differences as to activity 
rates and  the degree of commuting  between regions.  The  largest 
difference  shows  up  in the  WI  and  WDE  ratios.  In this case,  in 
addition also differences in the relationship between dependently 
employed  and  selfemployed  persons in a  region affect the result. 
(d)  The  fact that the  WDE  indicator is the  absolutely lowest in both 
years shows  that interregional wage  differentials are relatively 
small and  that they are, as expected from  the resource  endowment 
approach,  especially lower  than all othermmRsbased on  productivity 
indicators. 
).4.  As  already mentioned,  public sector financial flows also influence 
the  interregional per capita differences  :  If regions  (Lander)  with 
high per capita incomes  are net taxpayers (net transfer payers)  and 
regions with  low  per capita incomes  net expenditure receivers 
(net transfer receivers),  the  public finance  system  can be  said to 
contribute  to interregional income  equalisation.  Since net payments 
reduce and  net expenditure  increase  the  possibility that a  region 
pays higher wages  and  other factor  remunerations,  the  equalising 
power  of a  given public  finance  system can be  judged with  the 
aid of regression analysis,  in which  public sector variables like 
(TEI-TRI)  are  used as explanatory and  the different income 
definitions as endogeneous variables. 
Total ex endi  ture minus  total recei ts,  (1)  both  per capita and  as  a 
percentage of total expenditure  TEI-TRI  and(TE-TR)/TE))show  a 
strong correlation with  the agglomeration variable and  almost all 
per space  income  variables  :  The  difference between  TE  and  TR  is 
greater,  the higher population and  income  density.  Hamburg,  the 
Land  with  the highest income  figures,  has a  negative balance 
(a deficit) which  means  that it "exports" more  taxes and  social 
contributions than it "imports" in the  form  of overall public 
expenditures.  On  the  other hand,  the  "poorer"  Lander like 
(1) It would  have  been preferable  to have  used  expenditure minus  receipts 
for the central (federal)  governments alone  but this is not possible 
because overall investment  (capital)  expenditure is not separated 
by  government  level in the  Lander Accounts.  On  the  other hand  a 
higher debt financed deficit in poorer countries which is reflected 
in the  variable  used above  also reflects equalisation. - 89-
Schleswig-Holstein and  Saarland have  positive balances  (a surplus) 
because  expenditures here are higher than taxes.  What  is more,  these 
results show  up  in the cross section analysis as well,  where  the 
ten lander are compared  with each  other for selected single years 
between  1960  and  1970,  and in the  pooled cross section/time series 
analysis for all lander and  the  ten years together.  The  negative 
signs for the I/S variable  show  (1)  that net expenditure is higher 
the  lower  the  population density,i.e.  the  more  agglomerated regions 
pay  more  and  the less agglomerated ones receive  more. 
Results for  the  agglomeration variable  : 
(TEI-TRI)  1960  = 127.216  - 0.6)6  (I/S)  R2  = .6J6 
(TEI-TRI)  1970  =  _534.449  - 1.  _542  (I/S)  R2  .827 
(~I-TRI) 1960/70  =  J62.485 - 0.957  (I/S)  -2  R  = .721 
( ( TE-TR) /'Th~)  1960  5.014 - O.OJ15  (I/S)  :R2  = .693 
((TE-TR)/TE)  1970  12.530 - O.OJ25  (I/S)  R2  .778 
((TE-TR)/TE)  1960/70  10.899 - 0.0294  (I/S)  -2  R  = • 708 
The  results for the best income  density variable are  similar in that 
they clearly show  that as income  density becomes  higher net 
expenditure,  either per capita or as a  percentage  of total 
expenditure,decreases. 
(TEI-TRI)  1960  =  74. 7J6  - 81.684  ( GNP/S)  R.2  =  .817 
(TEI-TRI)  1970  = 497.067 - 171.]41 (PDY/S)  -2  R  = .849 
(TEI-TRI)  1960/70  = 27J.444 - 81.645 ( GNP/S)  -2  R  =  .818 
((TE-TR)/TE)  1960  2.4_53  - 8.28J  (GNP/S)  R2  = .759 
((TE-TR)/TE)  1970  9.072 - 1.8_54  (GNP/S)  R2  =  ·794 
((TE-TR)/~~) 1960/70  7.050  - 2.JJl (GNP/S)  -2  R  =  .692 
All other income  density variables also perform well,  the  lowest 
coefficient of determination being 0.656  (z). 
Income  per capita figures  used  as explanatory variables perform 
even better as the income  per space variables.  This  shows  that 
public sector redistribution did not only work  between 
(1)  The  coefficients are all significantly different from  zero at the 5 % 
level. 
(2)  Note  that all coefficients of determination  (R.2)  are corrected for 
numbers  of freedom in order to  compensate  to  some  extent for the low 
number  of observations  (n=lO)  in the  cross-section regressions. 3.6. 
- 90-
agglomerated and  not agglomerated regions,  but in addition 
even  stronger,  between regional populations with higher and 
lower incomes  per capita. 
(TEI-TRI)  1960  =  2)66.141- 0.471  (GNPI) 
(TEI-TRI)  1970  =  5305.830  - 0.487  (GNPI-) 
(TEI-TRI)  1960/1970  = 1750.734- 0.246  (GNPI) 
R 2
=  .939 
n 2
=  .969 
n
2
=  .563 
The  time  series values are significantly lower  than the cross 
section ones.  If ((TE-TR)/TE)  is used,  the  coefficient of 
determination falls as far as 0.424.  This  seems  to indicate that 
although a  single Land  did not change  its relative position from 
one  year to  the  next,  the  cross section functions for each  year do 
not change  steadily,  so  that the  time  series trend is not so  stable. 
But it may  also be  that the  time  series trend is not a  linear one 
so  that the  linear function approach  used is not able  to describe 
that trend adequately. 
Compared  with  these results,  the outcome  of the  social security 
expenditure/contribution analysis is inconclusive,  the coefficients 
of determination being not significantly different from  zero.  An 
inspection of the figures  shows  up  large variations  from  year to 
year which  seem  to reflect cyclical fluctuations  to a  certain 
extent. 
Received  and  paid current transfers of private households which 
include  the  social security transfers, but cover also other 
categories of household  tranfers, especially all direct taxes,  seem 
to be  a  better indicator for public redistributive activities. If 
one  considers separately transfers received and  transfers paid, 
a  similar picture arises as compared  with  the results for overall 
public expenditure and receipts  :  the agglomeration variable and 
the  income  density variables have  the correct sign and  the fit is 
E2latively good.  The  coefficients of determination reach a  maximum 
R  of 0.847 for paid  transf~2s (taxes etc.), but are  lower for 
received transfers (highest R  =  0.509).  If both variables are 
taken together in the  form  of a net m_easure  (RTI-PTI),  the coefficients 
of determination decrease  from  1960  to 1970  from  about 0.57  to 0.35. 
This shows  that,  primarily because  of the  progressivity of direct 
taxes,  transfers have  a  more  redistributive effect on  the 
revenue  side  and  in addition it can mean  that the equalising and 
redistributive effects of the budgetary system have  developed more 
towards  an  income  per capita basis and  away  from  an income  density 
basis. 
This hypothesis receives support from  an analysis with  the aid of 
income  per capita variables.  The  highest correlation is obtained 
for the net regional product per inhabitant (NNPI)  as exogeneous 
and  the  paid transfer variable  (taxes etc.) as endogeneous  variable. 
Obviously this income  definition describes overall "tax"  base  best. 
This is compatible with  the  poorer results for income  density, - 91-
because  most  taxes paid by  private households are related to 
personal tax bases and not to agglomeration effects.  Due  to  this 
fact,  the deficit/surplus variable for current transfers is also 
much  better explained with  income  per capita definitions,  even in 
the  time  series approach. 
(PTI)  1960/70 
(RTI-PTI)  1960/70 
)00.628  + 0.347  (NNPI) 
621.335  - 0.180  (NNPI) 
-978 
-794 
3.7.  The  results for the  special federal funds variable  (FF)  and  (FFI) 
differ from  this pattern•  If these  matching grants really :had 
equalising effects which  they should have  according to their very 
purpose,  this variable must  show  a  high negative correlation with 
income  per capita figures.  One  would  expect that poorer Lander get 
more  federal  funds  for the different "Gemeinschaftsaufgaben" which 
have  been established in order to reduce  the existing differences 
in the  level of public services and  infrastructure equipment 
between the  Lander  (1). 
Surprisingly enough  there are only very low  and  mostly insignificant 
correlations between  the FF-variable in absolute or in per capita 
terms as endogeneous  and  income  peE2capita and  per space as 
exogeneous variables.  The  highest R  - value is O.Jl.  But the 
correlations are very high if space is used as an explanatory 
variable.  This confirms  the  often formulated  presumption that a 
uncoordinated system of different grant schemes  between central 
and  lower levels of government will frequently fail as far as 
equalising purposes are  concerned.  In addition,  some  of the  German 
"Gemeinschaftsaufgaben" have  long been criticised because  of 
their alleged "sprinkling can effect" which  meant  a  relatively 
equal distribution across space,  independent from  objective need 
criteria and  contrary to  the  stated aim  of these funds.  Although, 
e.g. with  the  introduction of the  "Gemeinschaftsaufgabe"  improvement 
of regional economic  structure,  Lander with relatively more 
(1)  These  funds  include grants of the  Federal Government  for investment 
in universities  (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Hochschulbau),  for the  improvement 
of regional economic  structure  (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe  Verbesserung der 
regionalen l·lirtschaftsstruktur),  improvement of agricultural structures 
and  coast protection (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe  Agrarstruktur und 
Klistenschutz),  local government road investments  (Forderung des 
kommunalen  Strassenbaus),  short distance public  passenger traffic 
r_,y,,-::_o:,:-:::.:.  (0ffE·ntlicher Personenna.hverkehr),  city planning (Stiidtebau-
fC5rderung)  and  hospital financing  (Krankenhausfinanzierung).  The  data 
are taken from  Bernd Reissert,Die finanzielle Beteiligung des Bundes 
an den Aufgaben der Lander und  das Postula  t  der "Einhei  tlichkei  t  der 
Lebensverhaltnisse  im  Bundesgebiet",  Schriftenreihe des Vereins fUr 
VerHaltungsreform  und  Verwaltungsforschung e.V.,  Bonn  1975. - 92-
backward regions  succeeded in rece1v1ng more  funds  than Lander with 
more  prosperous regions,  the  positive equalising effect of these 
funds  was  soon compensated for  :  the highway  program was  cut, 
and  these  cuts fell more  heavily on  the  peripheral  and  not densely 
populated regions because  there  the priorities for highway  building 
were  low.  In addition,  the  funds  saved in this way  were  used in order 
to  pay  subsidies to highly agglomerated regions in order to improve 
their city rail transportation systems.(l)  Furthermore,  other types of 
"Gemeinschaftsaufgabe"  like university and hospital construction 
counteract the regional policy because  the  "richer" regions are able 
to have  more  of these resources and  hence  receive higher absolute  grants, 
although the matching ratio of the Federal  Government  is generally 50  %• 
From  1960  to 1970,  the  positive correlation of the  absolute federal 
grants variable  FF  with space  increased from  .712  to  .911.  At  the  same 
time,  the  correlation with  the  size of regional population increased, 
too,  but remained considerably lower  (.088 in 1960,  .645 in 1970). 
Finally,  federal grants Ezr inhabitant are higher,  the higher the  net 
in-migration.  The  small R  for this relationship is the  only remarkable 
correlation for the FFI  variable. 
The  tendency shown  by  these  figures is definitively contrary to  the 
stated purpose  of these  grants because  the  situation in 1970  is now 
characterised by  the  fact that these federal payments are distributed 
according to space and  population.  Fortunately,  the  correlation with 
population density is not very high,  so  that a  small equalising effect 
presumably remains  between  the densely populated and  rich "city 
states" Hamburg  and  Bremen  on  the  one  hand and  the  "surface states" 
on  the  other.  But  since  there are still relatively large  income 
differences between  them,  this is only a  slight modification to  the 
overall picture. 
3.8.  As  far as the  overall picture is concerned,  the  above-mentioned results 
are  generally in line with a  study made  by  H.  Reichenbach.  His  paper 
also found  thatregional differences are reduced if one 
compares  the  income  indicators going from gross to net  figur~~ and 
from  productivity related  to disposable  income  related definitions. 
Ranking  them  according to  the  span between  the minimum  and  the 
maximum  figures,  the order is as follows  (cf.  Table  3)  (2)  : 
(1)  This  seems  to  be  the  most  important problem in regional policy  : 
that the positive effects of specific regional policies 
are diluted if not actually counteracted  by  the  regional distribution 
of central government expenditure.  The  above  example  of "regressive" 
distribution of public  infrastructure between regions clearly shows 
the  cumulative effect  of public investment expenditure over  space. 
(2)  PI  = GNP  - Depr.-(IndT-Sub)-Prof.  retained  ;  DI  = PI+Transf.  in-Transf. 
out  ;  PCON  = DI-Sav. - 93-
GDP 
GNFI 
PI 
DI 
PCON 
(ranging from 81% of German  average  to 166  %), 
(79  - 160) 
(81 - lJJ) 
(89 - 128) 
(92  - 126) 
In these figures,  too,  the  effects of market determined adjustment 
processes show  up  as well as effects caused  through  the  public 
sector tax/expenditure  mechanism.  This is also true in the  case of 
private consumption,  an indicator not used in the  preceeding 
analysis because  ~rivate consumption out of a  lower income  per capita 
is higher  (and  saving smaller)  compared  with higher incomes 
independent  of whether there exists,  e.g.  a  progressive or 
regressive  tax system. 
J.  9.  The  following comments  can be  made  in the  light of table  J 
- GDP  and  GNP  differ because of wages  paid to employees  commuting 
from  one  region to another and  ot  property and  entrepreneurial income 
being paid  to a  region other than the  one  in which it originated. 
It is a  well-known fact that many  people  live in Schlesrdt:;-Holstein 
and  Niedersachsen and  work  and/or hold wealth in Hamburg.  The  other 
notable  cases are  Saar and  Baden-WUrttemberg.  In the Saar the  outflow 
of factor income  consists of about  half of wages  and salaries and half of 
property and  entrepreneurial income.  In Baden-WUrttemberg  the  surplus 
of inflowing factor income  is largely due  to property and 
entrepreneurial income. 
- The  difference  between  GNP  and  PI is due  to three factors  : 
depreciation,  indirect taxes minus  subsidies, and  retained profits. 
Depreciation is an almost constant fraction of GDP,  and  thus has no 
explanatory power  for  the  levelang out of regional differences in 
GDP.  As  can be  seen from  Table  3,  indirect taxes minus  subsidies is 
the  most  important determinant in equalizing per capita GDP 
different~als  with an index span of 67  for Saar to )08  for Hamburg. 
Since  subsidies are relatively unimportant,  indirect taxes play the 
major role.  The  enormous  amounts  paid by  Hamburg  and  Bremen  are 
to a  large  extent due  to  the fact that excises are  levied from 
enterprises, e.g. for oil (more  than 40 %  by  Hamburg)  for tobacco 
(about 40%  by  Berlin)and for coffee  (more  than 4o%  by  Bremen). 
TVA  payments  have  a  bias in the  same  direction but are  less 
spectacular.  Since excises are federal taxes,  the high  GDP  figures 
for Hamburg,  Bremen  and  Berlin to a  large extent only reflect loca-
lisation of industries and  institutional tax arrangements  for certain 
industries. 
- The  other factor with a lbt  of explanatory power  is retained profits, 
with  index figures varying between 51  for Saar and  192  for Hamburg. 
Since retained profits are a  major stimulus,  and  financing source 
for investment,  they reflect not only present economic  performance 
but also give  some  indication of the futur self-induced growth 
possibilities of a  region.  On  the other hand,  there is probably 
some  bias in the very high figures for Hessen and  Hamburg  to the T
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extent that these  two  Lander have  exceptional concentrations of 
head offices of multi-regional and multi-national enterprises. 
- The  difference between  personal and  disposable income  is equal to 
transfers going into and  out of the region.  Transfers improve  the 
situation of the  poor Uinder,  except for Ba.yern  where it remains 
nearly constant, with  the greatest relative benefit going to 
the smallest regions,  Schleswig-Holstein and  Saar,  whereas  the 
relative position deteriorates in rich regions,  except for Berlin 
which does best. 
- Transfers paid out (J9% direct taxes,  50  % social security 
contributions,  11 %  others) are roughly proportional to GDP  but 
clearly progressive with respect to PI.  Except for the  case of 
Berlin,  transfers paid out as a  percentage of GDP  are almost stable, 
varying between  20  %  for Hamburg  and  24 % for Baden  WUrttemberg. 
'!he  remaining small differences are not easily explainable. 
-Since social security receipts represent 72% of total transfers 
received,  the relative number  of retired people in a  region and  the 
high proportion of early retired coal miners in Saar and  Nordrhein-
Westfalen exert a  substantial influence on  the regional distribution 
of these  transfers.  Thus  Berlin and Hamburg  receive highest per capita 
transfers since their percentage of retired people  (65  and older) is 
2J.J% and  19.2% with German  average equal to 1'+.1.  On  the other 
end  of the scale is Baden-WUrttemberg  with 12.4% of retired people. 
For the rest the income  and  age  class components  explain to a  large 
extent the differences,  such  that e.g.  Schleswig-Holstein as a  poor 
Land  with a  high proportion of retired people  (16  %)  gets about the 
same  per capita amount  as rich Hessen  with 14% of retired people. 
J.lO.  It is also possible  to estimate  to a  certain extent ~er  trade 
balances on  the basis of the information provided in the 1974  Utnder 
Accounts.  They  contain figures for the socalled "Restposten"  (Table 6 
in the  La:nder  Accounts)  which is a  residual aggregate of trade 
balances  (exports minus  imports),  changes in stock and "statistical 
differences".  In an unpublished  study by  H.  Reichenbach an attempt 
is made  to derive from  these data an estimate of the trade  balances in 
eliminating the changes in stocks.  For that purpose,  the  period 
1960-70  has  been divided into three business cycles periods 1960-6), 
1964-67 and  1968-70.  For each cycle  the national average change  in 
stocks has been allocated to Linder according to their shares in 
federal GNP,  and  the results deducted from  the  "Restposten".  This 
then gives the estimated  'trade balance'  figures shown  in Table 4. 
As  between  the  three business cycle periods the pattern of estimated 
trade balances of the  L!nder showed  considerable stability, with 
extreme  values observed in the case of a  20 % of GDP  surplus in 
Hamburg  and  a  14% of GDP  deficit in the Saarland.  Of  the four - 96-
Table  4  Trade  Balances of the  German  Lander,  1960-1970 
Export -Import 
Annual  averages,  Mill  DM 
Exrrt·- Import 
A  nnua  averages, % of GDP 
60-63  64-67  68-70  60-63  64-67  68-70 
Schleswig-Holstein - 912  -1.463  -2.008  - 7.9  - 9·3  - 9·8 
Niedersachsen  -2  •  ..)94  -3.940  -3.973  - 6.6  - 8.2  - 6.5 
Nordrh.-Westfalen  5.8)6  6.851  9.216  5.6  5.0  5.2 
Hessen  619  523  1.217  2.1  1.2  2.2 
Rheinland-Pfalz  - 728  -1.225  - 795  - 4.2  - 4.9  - 2.4 
Baden-Wlirtemberg  2.196  3.694  7.200  4.4  5.3  7.9 
Bayern  -1.914  -1.447  - 719  - ].6  - 2.0  - o. 7 
Saarland  - 852  -1.002  -1.250  - 14.0  -lJ-3  -1).6 
Hamburg  3· 728  4.886  5·746  20.J  20.1  19.0 
Bremen  286  6)8  1.041  5-0  8.5  11.1 
Berlin  - 443  - 796  -1.150  - 3.2  - 4.4  - 4.9 
Table  5  Balance  of Federal Government  and  Social Security 
Revenues  and  ~xpenditures of the Germany  ~nder 1960-70 
Revenues- Expenditures  Revenues- Expenditures 
Annual  averages,  Mill.  DM  .Annual  aver~ges, % of GDP 
~o-63  64-67  68-70  60.;.6J  64-67  68-70 
Schleswig-Holsteit  - 543  - 948  -1.231  - 4.7  - 6.0  - 6.0 
Niedersachsen  - 551  -1.749  -2.063  - 1.5  - 3.7  - 3·4 
Nordrh.-Westfalen  6.477  6.267  7·935  6.2  4.6  4.5 
Hessen  1.042  1.542  1.635  3.5  3.7  2.9 
Rheinland-Pfalz  - 519  - 5)1  - 308  - J.O  - 2.J  - 0.9 
Baden-WUrtemberg  2.687  ).323  5.424  5.4  4.8  5.9 
Bayern  - 40  - 93  1.206  - o.1  - o.1  1.2 
Saarland  - 271  - 637  - 830  - 4.5  - 8.4  - 9.0 
Hamburg  3.803  4.464  6.163  20.7  18.3  20. 1 + 
Bremen  408  689  l.Z55  7.2  9.2  1).4 
Berlin  - 143  - 847  -1.63J  - 1.0  - 4.7  - 7.0  ,_._ - 97-
most  populous  Lander,  Niedersachsen experienced deficits of the 
order of 6 to 8 %of GDP,  Bayern deficits of 1  to 4%  of GDP, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen surpluses of 5 % of GDP  and  Baden-WUrtenberg 
surpluses of 4  to 8 % of GDP.  The  main  changes over time during the 
period are  seen in the increases of the  surpluses of Baden-Wlirtemberg 
and  Bremen,  and  the  reduction of Bayern's deficit. 
Table  5 gives data from  the  same  source representing the net balance 
of flows  of finance  to the  Lander  from  the federal budget and  social 
security funds.  These  public finance  balances in large measure  offset 
the  trade balance. 
Chart 4 presents both  the  trade balance and  federal public finance 
balances  (on  the vertical scale)  together with per capita GDP  by 
Land  (on  the horizontal scale).  The  vertical lines on  the Chart 
indicate  the  extent of differences between  the  two  figures· 
- trade and  public finance  - by  Land. 
The  Chart suggests a  remarkably strong relationship between  GDP 
per capita and  the trade and  public finance  balances, with high 
GDP  per capita going with trade surpluses and  public finance deficits, 
and vice versa.  The  only marked  deviation from  the general pattern 
is in the  case  of Berlin, where  the  trade deficit and public 
finance  surplus are much  higher than would  be  predicted on 
the basis of its GDP  per capita.  However  this is readily 
understandabUe  in view  of the special fiscal regime  from  which 
Berlin benefits, and  which  is more  advantageous  than the normal 
fiscal federal arrangements in Germany. 
The  quality of the relationships is perhaps so  remarkable  that 
one  is inclined to question how  far they result from  parameters 
used  in the  construction of statistical estimates, as opposed  to being 
based  on  'real' data.  A tentative impression is that the  public 
finance data are partly estimated and partly 'real'. It seems  that 
the  trade  balance data are, as mentioned,  residual rather than 
directly measured  or even directly estimated.  In view  of the 
interest of the data it may  be  worthwhile  making  enquiries with 
the statisticians responsible for the source  to check the 
significance of the relationships implied. 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
4.1.  To  summarise it can be  argued that there is convincing evidence  that 
apart from  market  forces which· tend to compensate for deficits in the 
balance of trade of the  German  Bundeslander,public sector revenue 
and  expenditure flows  contribute considerably in equalising regional 
per capita income  and  in preventing regions  becoming  'bankrupt' 
when  their trade balance is in overall deficit.  The  following 
important points lead to  this conclusion  : - 98-
- Total per capita public expenditure minus  revenue  in the  regions is 
significantly negatively correlated with agglomeration,  income  density 
and  per capita income.  "Richer" regions are  therefore net payers and 
"poorer" regions net receivers of public funds. 
- Transfers paid and  received compensate  to  some  extent for adverse 
regional trade balances.  The  offsetting effects are larger on  the 
revenue  side because of the relatively stronger progressivity of direct 
taxes.  The  expenditure side however,  seems  to counteract this 
equalisation to a  certain extent,  because  poorer groups of inhabitants 
(e.g.  old age  pensioners and  other net social security transfer 
receivers) are more  concentrated in the  "richer" regions which 
consequently also receive high transfer payments.  This may  also explain 
together with  the almost regressive effects of social security 
contributions why  the  social security system  taken as a  whole  does not 
seem  to be  an income  equalising factor. 
- Flows  of public funds  play a  major role in explaining the  reduction 
in regional differentials of disposable per capita income. 
Indirect taxes  (especially excise  taxes), direct taxes and  social 
security contributions all act as "equalisers" in the  same  order of 
importance.  But  the  importance of indirect taxes is caused  by  the  formal 
incidence approach  used, which  means  that the amount of the  tax is 
apportioned to the collection point and  not to the final bearer of the 
tax.  Consequently Lander  like Hamburg  and  Bremen  transfer a  large 
proportion of indirect tax revenue  because  they are  the most  important 
harbours  through which  many  highly taxed commodities are  imported and  not 
so  much  because  they are "rich".  As  regional per capita consumption 
differs much  less than regional per capita product, indirect taxes would 
not be  the most  important factor in the equalisation of income  if they 
could  be  apportioned according to  the final destination of the  taxed 
good. 
- Both  regression analysis and  a  more  detailed inspection of the figures 
show  that the relatively high equalising power  of the public revenue 
system is to some  extent counteracted by  the  less progressive regional 
distribution of public expenditure.  This seems  especially true for some 
Federal expenditure  programs  which  should  be  orientated towards 
equalisation targets but which  with  the  exception of the Gemeinschafts-
aufgabe· "Improvement of regional structure" are not working in that 
direction. 
4.2.It should be  noted finally that the analysis presented here did not 
investigate the  powerful role of the  Gennan  "Finanzausgleich" as a 
specific equalisation instrument.  This has been done  in an internationally 
comparable  way  for several countries in Chapters 5 and 6.  The  effects of 
the  Finanzausgleich are nevertheless reflected  ~n the results of this 
analysis as the overall tax revenue  of each  Land  includes that part of its 
taxes received  through  the intergovernmental transfer system. - 99-
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Interregional redistribution by  the Italian state budget,  social 
security systems and  public enterprises in 1971-71 
1.  Introduction 
This  paper attempts to evaluate  the  interregional redistribution 
by  the Italian state budget,  social security systems and  public 
enterprises for the  years 1971-7J.  For this purpose  revenues of the 
three  public institutions were  attributed to regions where  they had 
their  ori~in and  expenditures to  those  where  they had  their 
impact  (1).  The  distribution of revenues according to  the region 
of origin tries to identify the region where  these  revenues are 
borne.  The  assumptions and data used  to achieve  this aim are 
nresented in detail in  the Annex.  For expenditures an attempt has 
been  made  to attribute  them  to  the  region where  they are spent  ;  as 
for revenues  the allocation procedure is described in  the  Annex. 
The  redistributive effect of revenues and  expenditure is then 
measured  by  the  'redistributive power'  as developed in Chapter 5· 
2·  Redistributive  Power  of Italian Public Finance 
Tables 1-3  summarize  the results of the redistributive effect of 
Italian public finance  for  the  years 1971-7).(2)(3). 
The  overall redistributive effects of the  two  categories - revenue 
and  expenditure  - show  marked  differences.  Although  total revenues 
represent some  35  ~of primary income,  the redistributive power 
is at best only 2·6% (1973)  whereas expenditure,  with a  volume  of 
around 45  %,  gives a  power  of between  JO  and JJ %  (see Tables 1 
and  2). 
Since in both cases the  volume  is substantial,  the variation in 
effect is due  to  the  regional per capita distribution of the  flows. 
For aggregate revenues it will be  seen that the distribution is, 
in all three years,  approximately proportional to per capita 
primary income,  which  implies  virtual regional neutrality and 
minimal  interregional redistribution. 
Turning to aggregate expenditure,  the distribution a.pproaches  an 
almost equal per capita basis with a  resulting significant 
redistributive power.  The  elasticities  of between O.OJ  and 
0.19  for state and  - 0.17 and 0.15 for public enterprises 
expenditures imply a  virtually uniform  per capita level of 
provision of goods and  services, while  the  rather less uniform 
(1)  Cp.  Chapters 9 and 8  for  a  discussion of the  concept  of  'origin'  for 
revenues  and  'impact'  for expenditures. 
(2)  Since  1973  several  changes have  taken place both on  the  revenue  and 
expenditure  side.  In 1974  income  tax changed  from  a  schedular tax to a 
more  progressive  single  tax and  there is now  a  system of specific purpose 
grants to  the regions. 
(3)  Differences between the results given in this chapter and  those  in 
chapters 8  and  9 are due  to  the use of different definitions of primary income. 
In this chapter net national  product at market  prices is used whereas 
chapters 8  and  9  employ  net  national  product  at  factor cost. T
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level of social security expenditure is offset by  the substantial 
volume. 
For the  most  part,  the redistributive effect is achieved almost 
automatically since, with  the  exception of category XII,  capital 
transfers to regional development agencies and  for public infrastructure 
investment in poorer regions,  there is no  explicit redistributive 
intent. 
Social  ~ecurit  Contributions 
Direct and indirect taxes 
From  Table  1 it can be  seen  that in the  period  under consideration 
the initial slight regressivity of indirect taxes gives way  to 
slight progressivity while  in the  case of direct taxes the 
progressivity declines somewhat.  The  redistributive power  changes 
from  0 7  (1971)  to ).4 %  (197J)  for both  taxes together. 
Among  direct taxes there are  three main  components  :  'tax on moveable 
wealth',  'personal income  tax'  and'corporate income  tax', of which 
only the tax on  moveable  wealth has a  significant redistributiveeffect. 
The  small regional progressivity of this tax would  seem  to be  due 
to the fact that it is a  schedular tax with different rates,  covering 
wages,  pensions,  profits and interest among  other things.  The  small 
redistributive impact of  'personal income  tax'  and  corporate  income 
tax'  is due  to  the fact that before  197~ the  bulk of tax on  personal 
income  and  corporate profits was  collected under  the heading  'tax on 
moveable  wealth', and  they  thus have  a  small volume. 
In the field of indirect taxes,  a  major tax reform occured in the 
case  of sales taxes.  In 1973  value added  tax was  introduced,  taking 
over from  the  previous  turnover and  sales taxes, and  the effect of 
this  reform is clearly visible in the move  from  a  1972  redistributive 
power of- 1.2 to a  positive figure of 1.7 in 197J• 
This change  results from  the  reduction in regional regressivity 
(increase in elasticity from  0.61 in 1971/2 to 0.7J in 197J). 
This is due  to  the fact that the  previous sales tax was  basically 
a  one  rate tax  (4 %)  whereas  VAT  has 5  rates,  ranging from  (l97J) 
18  %  on  luxury goods  to a  reduced rate of 1  or J %  on  some 
essential products  (standard rate 12  %),  and  the  consumption of the 
more  highly  taxed goods  and  services appears  to have  been relatively 
greater in richer regions. 
Excises  show  a  more  or less constantly negative redistributive effect, 
reduced  somewhat  by  their selectivity which  counteracts their expected 
regressive nature and  the  size of revenue  as a  share  of primary income 
(6-7 %).  One  item worthy of comment.  is the  excises on  tobacco,  which 
although only about  .7% of primary income  contributes some  40%  of B. 
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the  negative redistribution effect due  largely to its almost equal 
per capita incidence. 
Social security contributions 
The  uniformly small and  even negative redistributive effect of this 
category is due  to  two  factors - its virtual regional neutrality 
(1.04  to 0.96)  and  the regressivity of the contribution tariff. 
Public enterprise revenues 
Much  the  same  comments  apply here as for social security contributions 
in that the elasticity shows  virtual neutrality and  consumption of 
services will have  a  larger share in the  income  of poorer regions. 
Social Securit  and  Public 
The  most  notable feature of Table  2 is the illustration it gives of 
the  fact that expenditure of a  significant amount  on  an equal per 
capita basis will achieve substantial redistributive effects.  This 
'central'  premise is clearly supported by  the figures for aggregate 
expenditure where the elasticity is very slightly positive and  the 
share of primary income  is around 44 %,  giving a  redistributive power 
of JO  - JJ  %. 
The  major components  by  which  this overall redistributive effect is 
achieved are social security and  public enterprise expenditures and, 
among  state expenditures,  current and  capital transfers  (Categories 
V and  XII)  and  wages  and  salaries.  The  redistributive power  of these 
components depends  on  the volume  of expenditures and  their elasticity 
characteristics.  Roughly  equal per capita expenditures per region 
imply for public enterprises expenditures and  wages  and  salaries a 
redistributive effect with respect to primary income  differentials 
(approximately 10 %  and  7 %)  which is almost equal to the  volume  of 
expenditures in these fields.  State and  social security transfers 
have  weaker redistributive characteristics (an elasticity of the 
order of 0.4)  and  have  thus a  redistributive power  of only 6 %  and 
8%  although  the  volume,  9%  and  14% of primary income,  is substantial. 
The  most  high-powered redistributive instruments in Italian public 
finances are capital transfers to regional development agencies and 
for public infrastructural investment in the  poorer regions.  This 
is also the  only instrument specifically designed for redistributive 
purposes  ;  all other instruments achieve  their redistributive effect 
almost automatically and  'invisibly'. 
The  preceding remarks refer, of course,  to  the average  redistributive 
effect and  as such  conceal several  anomalies in that some  regions are 
treated favourably and  others unfavourably.  In the  case  of rich - 108-
regions this means  that the relative  (1)  public finance  outflow 
is modest relative to  the average  ;  for poor regions the relative 
public finance  inflow is greater than for the average of poor 
regions. 
The  most  striking examples of favourably treated rich regions are 
Valled'Aosta,  Liguria,  Lazio and  Toscana.  For Valle d'Aosta this can 
be  explained by its unusual constitutional setting (2), its mountainous 
characteristics and  the  fact that it is thinly populated.  These  three 
factors combine  to  produce  a  lower  than expected  tax outflow and  a 
relatively high rate of public expenditure. 
In the  case of Liguria the relatively favourable  position is due  to 
an  'overstatement'  of primary income  which  is explicable  by  two  main 
factors - tourism and  revenue  from  oil excises (via Genova).  Lazio 
owes  its apparently preferential position to  the  simple fact that it 
contains the seat of central government  (Rome)  and  thus benefits 
from  high  expenditure on  administration. 
The  reasons underlying Toscana's favourable  position are partly 
historical and  partly structural.  This was  a  region of numerous  small 
states with a  resulting large number  of public employees,a state of 
affairs which  persisted even after the unification of Italy. It has 
a  large number  of small businesses,rich farmers  and a  tourist in-
dustry receiving preferential tax treatment. 
The  reverse case, i.e. rich regions which  seemingly overcontribute 
to the equalisation process, applies to Lombardia  and  Trentino.  While 
in the case of lombardia this would  appear to  be  due  to  the 
concentration of heavy industry ensuring that tax  payments  are at an 
above  average level, in the  case of Trentino no  obvious  explanation 
suggests itself (J). 
Of  the  poor regions which  do  not conform  to  the  'normal'  pattern, 
Basilicata and  Sardegna  show  a  favourable  position while Veneto  and 
Campania  appear to do  less well. 
The  measure  of apparent benefit or disadvantage in these cases is 
the relative over-or under-compensation for low  primary income.  Both 
Basilicata and  Sardegna are recipients of disproportionately large 
shares of public expenditure relative to  their population,  due  to their 
size and  low  population density, while  their tax payments are 
substantially reduced  by  the  favourable  treatment accorded  to the 
southern regions.  In addition sardegna is an autonomous  unit and 
presumably  similar tax considerations apply as for Valle d'Aosta.  -----
(1)  The  concept of relative outflow or inflow is appropriate because  the 
central budget as a  whole  is in overall deficit. 
(2)  Implying favourable  tax treatment in the  case of excises. 
(3)  A possible explanation may  be  that taxpayers in this region are more 
conscious of
1their civic duty. - 109 -
Campania  and  Veneto  both have  a  high population density and  thus receive 
proportionally smaller amounts  of public expenditure  per capita. 
Veneto  has,  in addition,  a  relatively low  percentage of pensioners 
which  reduces the benefits from  social security expenditures and 
makes  for a  larger than average  tax base. 
J.  Trade  balances and  public finance flows 
The  last stage in this analysis of the  impact of public finance in 
the  regions is to examine  the effect of redistribution on  regional 
consumption and  investment expenditurE and  resource  flows  between 
regions. 
As  a  first step,  the aggregate central government deficit was 
distributed in proportion to regional product and  the result of 
this calculation,  together with other components,  was  used  to 
derive  the regional fiscal balance  (1). 
The  second  step was  to calculate the regional trade or payments 
balance by adjusting GNP  to exclude  the  current~count balance of 
payments  surplus or deficit and  apply a  proportional adjustment 
to each region's product.  Regional consumption and  investment 
expenditure was  then subtracted from  these adjusted regional products 
to give regional balance of payments. 
The  average of the  1971/72/73 trade and fiscal balances as percentages 
of primary income  are given in Table 3 and  these values, relative to 
primary per capita income,  are plotted in Graph  1. 
The  generally observed  pattern of resource  transfer from  rich to poor 
regions financed  by  central government is clearly shown  in Table J 
with flows of public finance out of the  north (offsetting their 
trade surpluses)and flows into the  south  (offsetting their trade 
deficits). 
(1)  Fiscal balance  :  T - S + D 
where  :  T = revenue  from  the region 
S  = public expenditure in the  region 
D =regional share  of aggregate deficit (1) 
(2) 
- llO-
Table  3  Trade  and fiscal balance  of Italian regions, 
annual  average  1971-73  as  percentage of primary 
income 
Region  Trade 
balance 
Valle d'Aosta  +  6.0 
Piemonte  +  11.8 
Lombardia  +  17 .o 
Trentino Alto Adige  +  11·7 
Veneto  - 1.6 
Friuli Ven.  Giulia  +  6.2 
Liguria  +  14.1 
Emilia Romagna  +  1.2 
Toscana  +  4·9 
Umbria  - 19·9 
Marche  - 11·5 
Lazio  +  3.1 
Abruzzi  - 16.3 
Molise  - 30.2 
Campania  - 18.0 
Puglia  - 33-3 
Basilicata  - 49·4 
Calabria  - 30.3 
Sicilia  - 28.0 
Sardegna  - 41.6 
( +) 
(-) 
exports are greater than  imports; 
imports  are  greater than exports. 
(1)  Fiscal  (2)  balance 
+  2.5 
+  8.0 
+.  12-3 
+  5·2 
+  2.2 
+  3.0 
+  4·9 
+  3.1 
- 1.8 
- 9.0 
- 4·1 
- 0.6 
- 16.3 
- 26.6 
- 11.8 
- 17.6 
- 32.7 
- 27.6 
- 14.8 
- 24.7 
(+)  the  region contributes more  to  public institutions  than it receives 
(after distributing the overall deficit in proportion to primary 
income); 
(-)  the region receives more  than it contributes. - Ill-
The  most  striking aspect of the  balances is their high level when 
compared  with  those in other European countries.  The  Italian deficits 
(Table  J)  range  from  2 % in Veneto  to 49  % in Basilicata (average 
26  %)  with five regions above  30  %,  while  the surpluses range  from 
1 % in Emilia Romagna  to 17 % in Lombardia  (average 8 %)  with four 
regions above  10  %.  In Qermany  (1968/70)  and  the  United Kingdom  (1964) 
the equivalent polar cases are, for deficits,  the Saarland (1).6)  and 
N.  Ireland (21. 7)  and  for surpluses,  Hamburg  (7.9)  and West  Midlands 
(J.2). 
If one  turns to the fiscal balances in Table J,  the large  trade 
deficits in the south are matched  by  equally large net public finance 
inflows  (fiscal balances),  ranging from  2%  to JJ% (average  16  %). 
It is noteworthy that in three cases the  public expenditure financing 
of the  trade deficit is exceptionally large  (fiscal balance as 
percentage of trade deficit), Molise  (88  %),  Calabria (91  %)  and 
Abruzzi  (100  %) ,  with  the average  level being around 65  %•  These 
cases are,  perhaps,  extreme  examples of the general rule that small, 
poor,  peripheral regions are often generously aided by  central 
government. 
In the regions with trade surpluses the net flow  to central government 
averages around  5%  with only two  regions,  Piemonte  (8  %)  and  Lombardia 
(12.3) ,  above  this figure.  The  average of the flows  as  a  percen-
tage of trade surplus is about  51 %  and here again only Piemonte 
(68  %)  and  Lombardia  (72  %)  are above  this figure. 
The  three  'odd men  out•,  Veneto,  Toscana and Lazio,  where  the balances 
are of opposite sign,  have  been dealt with earlier (page  108).  In 
the  case of Veneto,  the basic reason for both the trade deficit and 
the net public finance  outflow is a  high population density with 
low  numbers  of pensioners, while in Toscana  and Lazio  the primary 
reasons for the net  public finance  inflows are high numbers  of public 
employees  in both regions and  large numbers  of rich farmers  in Tos-
cana. C
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The  methodology used to arrive at a  regional  disaggregation of the 
revenue  and  expenditure of the central budget,  social security system 
and  public enterprises 
While  in some  cases  regional data were  available directly,  it was  in 
many  cases necessary to  employ  indicators or proxies  to allow distri-
bution on  a  regional basis.  These  'distributors' will be discussed 
in detail later in the note. 
A further difficulty concerns  the use of formal  as  opposed to effec-
tive incidence.  In the  cases  of all direct taxes,  social security 
contributions,  payments  to public enterprises  and business  taxes, 
such  as  registration tax,  stamp duties  and  government  concession tax, 
formal  regional  incidence has  been used,  whereas  for sales tax,  excises 
and  consumption taxes,  the effective incidence has been adopted.  It 
is assumed  that any ~  forward shifting will not substantially 
affect the regional distribution of those  taxes  where  the  formal 
regional  incidence has  been used. 
Detailed Methodology 
Direct  taxes 
I  Tax  on  moveable  property 
II 
This  was,  prior to its abolition in the  recent tax reform,  a 
schedular tax on  various  classes  of income,  which  are listed 
below  with details of the  'distributor' used  : 
Class  of income 
Interest 
Profits 
(and  corporation tax) 
Professional  income 
+  income  from  own  businesses 
Wages  and pensions 
Progressive  income  tax 
Distributor 
Regional  distribution 
of bank deposits 
Regional  industrial product 
leas  industrial labour costs 
Regional  tax registers 
Regional  tax registers 
Regional  tax registers 
This  did not become  significant in terms  of yield until after 
the tax reform of 1973. 
III  Succession duties  Regional  tax registers 
The  residue  of direct  taxes  was  distributed pro rata with 
regional  income  tax collections. - ll4-
It is recognised that there are possible  shortcomings in some  of 
the distributors and details of why  the various choices were  made 
may  be  he 1  pful. 
In the case of interest it would  have  been  preferable to use  regional 
holdings of shares,  bonds etc., but there are no  regional data on  the 
subject.  \~hile regional tax collection details are available  these 
do  not provide an accurate measure  since under the withholding method 
the  tax is levied at source. 
The  proxy adopted for schedular profits tax and  corporation tax by 
taking regional industrial product avoids the  problems associated 
with  'head office'  profits which  may  bear tax outside  the region/s 
where  the  profit arose. 
The  two  taxes are assumed  to be  proportional to profits and are 
therefore allocated regionally on  the basis of the industrial 
product net of industrial labour costs. 
It is possible, in the case of professional etc.  earnings,  that part 
of the  taxed income  arose outside the region of residence,  which  may 
lead  to  some  under assessment of revenue  in certain regions with 
high concentration of members  of the  professions. 
The  data on  profits and  iP4ependent income  were  lagged  two  years to 
take account of the assessment delay,  which  does not arise in the 
case of wages  and  interest. 
The  nroblem of withholding of taxes in  the  cases of tax on  wages 
and  pensions was  overcome  by  using regional tax registers which 
show  tax due  from  residents including tax withheld elsewhere.  This 
same  method  was  used  for the  progressive income  tax. 
The  regional registers were  chosen as being most  representative in the 
case of succession duties,  though it is true that the  property passing 
may  not J.n  fact be  situated in the region of assessment,  and  indeed 
the heirs may  live outside the region. 
Indirect taxes 
Prior to the  reform which  introduced VAT  in 197J  the most  important 
indirect tax was  turnover  sales tax. 
The  basis for the regionalisation of this tax is the regional 
distribution of sales of six classes of final consumption  goods.  To 
which  the  sales weighted rates of tax were  applied and  the resulting 
products were  then multiplied by  coefficients reflecting the average 
sales of each  commodity.  Investment multiplied by  the  normal rate 
of tax  was  added  to these amounts. 
In 197J  VAT  was  introduced and  the apportionment of this among  the 
regions was  also based  on  the six categories of consumption goods. - 115-
Miscellaneous business taxes such as registrr tax,  stamtatax and 
tax on  governmental  concessions were  dealt w1th  on thesis of 
regional collection which,  as mentioned earlier, appears to coincide 
fairly well with regional effective incidence. 
In the case of the various excises  on  beverages,  sugar,  liquid fats, 
edible oils (excluding olive oil), tobacco  and  salt, and  the 
consumption  taxes on  coffee  and  cocoa,  the  regional distribution 
was  based  on  I STAT  data of regional consumption of the various 
commodities.  For the  consumption  tax on  bananas  the only available 
base was  regional population. 
In the above  cases it is clear that some  regions will be  under or 
overestimated in terms of yield due  to lack of detailed data.  In the 
case of beverages, for example,  no  account can  be  taken of regional 
preferences for wine  as opposed  to beer or,  since  the  consumption data 
for coffee also cover tea, of any  local preference for one  over the 
other.  In the case of tobacco a  distortion may  arise due  to  the fact 
that the  tax often has a  price elasticity greater than 
unity, and it is to  be  expected  that more  expensive cigarettes will 
be  smoked  in richer regions. 
Customs  duties and  other border taxes were  distributed on the same 
basis as sales tax,  wh1le  agr1cultural levies were  ~istributed 
on  the basis of regional consumption  of food. 
Radio  and  television fees,  lottery receipts, excises on  gas and 
electricity were  all distributed according to regional collection or 
subscription data. It was  assumed,  in the  case of lotteries, that 
any inter regional sales of lottery tickets would  be  small.  As  for 
the gas and electricity taxes,  these are paid by  the consumer and 
are thus accurately localised. 
The  excise on  mineral oils was  initially divided, at national level, 
into five  broad  consumption  categories weighted by  the appropriate 
tax rate.  These  totals were  then apportioned regionally according to 
regional consumption data supplied by  the Ninistry of Industry. 
Social Security Contributions 
The  regional split is mainly based on  regional income  from  wages. 
It should  be  noted that a  distinction was  drawn  between  the  public 
and  private sectors since regional wage  data for the  two  are 
available. 
Minor distortions could have  arisen between  regions due  to the fact 
that  : 
(a)  lower rates apply in agriculture which  may  result in overassessment 
in regions with significant income  from  agriculture. 
(b)  lower rates apply for central as opposed  to local government 
employees  though  this should cause  no  systematic bias. - 116-
(c) reduced rates are applied in the private sector in Southern 
Italy and  in the  case of small business. 
In all cases, however  the  problem was  satisfactorily resolved:  for 
example  in the  case of point (c)  the central government  repays  to 
the social security institutions the receipts 'lost'  through  these 
al:atements and  a  regional split of the refunds is available. 
Receipts of State  ~nterprises 
Enterprise 
Railways 
h:lectrici  ty 
Post Office 
Distributor 
Density of rail networks as a 
proxy for regional private.ex-
pendi  ture on transport 
Private - regional consumption 
data 
Commercial  - regional industrial 
product 
Regional consumption data 
In the case of railways the method  adopted  should give a  reasonably 
accurate  balance  between richer and  poorer regions so far as concerns 
revenue  from  transport of goods.  An  improved  method  for distributing 
this category by  using specific regional receipts for goods 
transportation by  rail is being developed. 
For the  Post Office •egional data were  available on  parcels, letters 
and  telegrams sent together with purchases of postal orders. 
Government  Expenditure 
This split into fourteen categories -seven current and  seven capital 
as follows 
Current 
Constitutional bodies 
(Parliament, Courts,  etc.) 
Personnel 
Pensions  to former staff 
Purchases of goods  & services 
Transfers 
Interest 
Tax  repayments 
Capital 
Public building and  works 
Equipment 
Transfers 
Purchase of shares and 
grants to industry 
Subsidies to public enterprises 
(deficits) 
Local authorities 
Social security 
Of  the total under  these headings  some  60  %  was  apportioned among  the 
regions on  the basis of payments  by  the  provincial treasuries together 
with a  small proportion whose  regional incidence is fixed  by  law. 
Payments  to state enterprises and  social security are available on - 117-
a  regional basis and these payments  were  netted out when  consolidating 
total  ex~enditure to avoid double  counting. 
Some  25 %  of the  total was  distributed using indicators. 
Current 
In the case of constitutional bodies,  there is no  problem  since all 
this expenditure is allocated to Rome  (Lazio).  For wages  and  pensions, 
that part not accounted for by  payments  from  provincial treasuries 
(35 %  of wages  and  20 %  of pensions) was  apportioned according to  the 
regional distribution of state employees,  which  may  understate  the 
position of Lazio since  the greatest proportion of top civil 
servants are employed  there. 
The  same  key was  used  for the residual of purchases of goods and 
services  (about 40-50  %)  not already regionalised.  The  objection here 
is that the expenditure on  defence is given a  distorted distribution 
but no  more  so  than would  be  the case if some  key  based  on  benefits 
or payments  to suppliers were  used. 
Of  transfers some  60 %  had  to be  distributed otherwise  than on  the 
basis of regional treasury payments  and  were  dealt with either on  an 
item by item basis or by indicators. 
War  pensions and  damage  compensation and  fringe  benefits to state 
employees,  were  apportioned  on  a  straight population basis and 
according to state regional personnel expenditure respectively, 
Interest on  and  repayments of public debt were  distributed according 
to regional shares in bank  deposits since the  bulk of public debt 
is held by  banks. 
Tax  renayments follow  regional distribution of the original tax 
collection, 
Capital 
Of  the expenditure on  public buildings and  works,  some  50%  was 
already regionalised through treasury payments  and  the remainder was 
dealt with  pro rata on  the  same  basis.  Since  the data refer to 
provincial treasury expenditure it may  be  argued that the suppliers 
may  not be  resident in the region in which  the work  is done,  but in 
the event the distribution arrived at does  not differ substantially 
from  that for central government  public works  for which  data do 
exist. In any case this category only accounts for about 1.5 %  of 
total government expenditure. 
Equipment  expenditure was  allocated in proportion to government 
personnel expenditure. - ll8-
Capital transfers, divided between  those  to private enterprises and 
those  to  local authorities, were  apportioned according to regional 
industrial value added  and  the  location of the recipient body 
respectively. 
Share  ublic enter rises were  for ENI,  IRI 
and  EFIM  about 5 6ths of the total  distributed according to the 
regional breakdown  of their investments and for the Me.dio  Credi  to 
Centrale according to location of recipient enterprises.  Grants for 
public undertaking deficits were  distributed according to their 
regional  expenditures. 
Ca-pital  expenditure of the Cassa del Nezzogiono  was  distributed 
according to data provided  by  that body. 
Current and  Capital 
In the  case of social security, regional expenditure data were 
available both for transfers and  goods  and  services offered while 
expenditure on  personnel was  distributed according to regional 
number  of employees,  a  method  also used for the current account 
expenditure of state enterprises. 
The  only state enterprise not thus treated was  the  tobacco  monopoly, 
for which  regionalised data on  value of tobacco used in manufacture 
were  available and  served as a  key for distributing both current 
and capital expenditure. Chapter  5 
THE  OVERALL  REDISTRIBUTIVE  EFFECT  OF 
PUBLIC  FINANCES  IN  SEvr<;N  INTEGRATED  ECONOMIES 
(working paper) - 121-
1.  Introduction 
This chapter summarizes  the findings of the following four chapters 
6  - 9  on  the redistributive effect  of taxes, general purpose  grants, 
specific purpose  grants and  other expenditures in four federations  (1), 
Germany,  Australia,  Canada  and  the  USA  and  three unitary states, 
France, Italy and  the United Kingdom. 
This  summary  has four parts  (1)  a  description of interregional 
differences in average  per capita levels of production and  income  ; 
(2) a  survey of the  total redistributive effect of public finances, 
(J) a  discussion of the  main  instruments in the various countries 
bringing a bout the total effect and  (  4)  the  :relationship between 
the regional balance in public finances and  the  trade balance. 
Annexes  1  and  2  discuss the  methods  of measuring the redistributive 
effects of  ~ublic finances  used  in the four following chapters. 
2.  Interregional differences in average per capita levels of production 
and  income. 
Table  1  shows  the maximum  interregional. differences in average 
per capita production or income  in the  countries studied and  degrees 
of interregional inequality measured  by  Gini-coefficients (2) 
The  figures  shown  for the  poorest and richest regions give a  simple 
but imperfect measure  of the overall interregional inequality of 
income  distribution  ;  they fail to take into account either the 
population size of the extreme  cases, or the wealth or population 
size of intermediate regions between  the  extremes.  The  Gini-coefficient 
of inequality corrects for these deficiencies. 
Ranked  by  the Gini-coefficient Australia has the  most  equal 
interregional income  distribution followed  successively by  Germany, 
the  United Kingdom  and  Switzerland.  France,  the  United States and 
Canada  show  higher degree  of inequality,  while Italy has outstandingly 
the most  unequal distribution. 
(1)  Summary  data on  Switzerland are included in some  of the  following 
tables  ;  but because  of the absence of data on  the  social security 
sector (more  than half of all federal expenditures)  and  the heavy 
reliance on  the formal incidence approach for other federal expenditures, 
Switzerland is not included in Chapters 6-9.  The  source for the Swiss 
data is W.  Wittmann,  Bundesstaatlicher Finanzausgleich  :  Eine  Global-
bilanz.  Zeitfragen der schweizerischen Wirtschaft und  Politik, Nr.  101 
(1971).  The  source for all other countries are given in Chapters 6-9 
(2)  Where  available Table  1  gives data on  GDP  and  personal income.  In the 
assessment of the quantitative redistributive effect of public finances 
(as given  in Table  2),  personal income  is used  mainly for  two  reasons  : 
(1)  to improve  the comparability of results between  ~uropean and  non-
European countries for which  only personal income  data exist, and  (2) 
personal income  (excluding public  transfers) appeared  to  be  more  relevant 
to  the  measurement  of redistributive effects. ~
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Sources  to Table  1 
GDP  Germany  :  Volkswirtschaftliche  Gesamtrechnung der Lander 
Entstehung,  Verteilung und  Verwendung  des Sozialprodukts in den 
Ui.ndern.  Standardtabellen 1960  bis 1970.  Stuttgart 1975. 
France  Regions  fran9aises.  statistiques et indicateurs,  projet 
de  loi de  finance  pour 1975·  INSEE  Paris. 
Italy  :  ISTAT.  Bolletino mensile di statistica No.  11,  Nov.  1976. 
United  Kingdom  :  ~conomic trends No.  277,  Nov.  1976.  CSO  London 
Switzerland  :  UBS,  IA  Suisse en chiffres 1973 
Personal income  :  Australia - National income  and  expenditure.  ABS 
Canada  - National accounts Income  and  expenditrue 
1926/7 Dominion  Bureau of Statistics 
United States- Survey of Current Business,  August  1972 
and  1976.  US.  Dept.  of Commerce,  Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
Germany  as for  GDP 
France  as for  GDP 
Italy (net national product at factor cost  )  :  as for 
GDP 
United  Kingdom  :  Own  computations based  on  Regional 
Social Accounts for the  United Kingdom,  V.H.  Woodward, 
NIESR  regional papers 1, Cambridge  University. 
Switzerland(net national product at factor cost)  : 
Wittmann,  op.  cit. - 124-
The  ratio of lowest to highest average income  seems  generally to 
indicate smaller differences between countries in interregional 
inequality.  However,  the  ranking by  the ratio is broadly consistent 
with  that by  the Gini-coefficient,  Germany,  Switzerland and  the  USA 
being the  only marked  exceptions for  the United States and  Germany 
this is readily explainable  by  in the  one  case Alaska and  Washington 
D.C.  with  their high incomes  and  small propulations and in the other 
case  the  'Stadtstaaten'  Hamburg  and  Bremen  ;  for Switzerland it is 
likely to  be  due  to  the existence of many  very small sized  'Kantons' 
).  Interregional redistributive effect of public finances 
The  overall interregional redistributive effect of public finances 
is summarized  in Table  2.  The  figures indicate for recent years the 
percentage extent to which  public finance at the central or federal 
level tends to equalize average  per capita income  differentials 
between regions.  The  average  extent of equalisation in the countries 
shown  is about 40  %,  with Australia and  France clearly above  this 
average and  the  United States and  Germany  significantly below  (for 
Switzerland  the data does not cover social security transactions 
and  so are far from  complete). 
Two  measures are  given in Table 2- 'unweighted'  and  the other 
'weighted'  by  population.  The  difference between  these  two 
measures  - though quantitatively unimportant for  the aggregate 
shown  in most  countries - involves a  significant political and 
economic  issue.  Under  the  'unweighted'  measure  the  idea is to 
regard all regions or states as equal units,  this corresponding 
to the  extreme  confederal principle of  'one state- one  vote'. 
The  'weighted'  measure  follows  the  model  of the  unitary state 
because it takes into account the  population size of each  region 
or state. 
If the change  in income  differentials due  to redistribution were 
the  same  for all regions, i.e. income  is increased in all poor regions 
by  a  uniform  percentage and  decreased in all rich regions by  the 
same  percentage , r ela  ti  ve  to the average ,  the  two  measures  give 
identical results. If the change  in income  differentials is 
different between  regions,  e.g.  some  regions are treated relatively 
more  favourable  than others,  the measures  give in general different 
results,  the difference depending on  whether a  region is small 
or large and  whether it is rich or poor. If a  small poor region is 
treated favourably for instance  the  unweighted redistributive power 
measure will indicate a  larger overall redistributive effect. 
The  overall redistributive effects observed differ as between federal 
and  unitary states  :  for federal states the average is about 35  %, 
whereas it is about 45%  for unitary states.  This difference is mainly 
explained by  the  smaller federal level as compared  to central level 
public finances.  This is apparent from  comparing  the  following figures 
of total and  federal or central public expenditure as shares of GDP - 125-
Table  2 
The  overall redistributive effect of public finances in major 
federations and  European central states 
(Percentage degree of reduction in inter-regional income  differences) 
Redistributive Power  Change  in Gini-
Average  of individual  coefficient of regio -
regions'  reduction in  nal income  inequality 
per capita income 
differences (regions 
due  to public 
finances  (regions 
unweighted  by  popu- weighted by  popu-
lation)  lation) 
Federations 
Germany  29  39 
Australia  53  53 
Canada  32  28 
USA  28  23 
Switzerland  (1)  (22)  (10) 
Average  of 
federations  (2)  35  J6 
Uni tar;y:  states 
France  :}+  52 
Italy  47  44 
United  Kingdom  36  31 
Average  of unitary 
states  46  42 
Average  of federations 
and  unitary states  (2)  4o  39 
(1)  Excluding social security 
(2)  Excluding Switzerland because of its incompleteness - 126-
in the countries concerned  (where  the central or federal level 
expenditure  includes all grants to lower  levels of government) 
Table  3 
Public Expenditure as a  Percentage Share of GDP  at market prices 
all levels of  central or federal 
government  government 
Germany  f1971)  41.1  24.7 
France  1972~  J8.3  35.4 
Italy  1972  41.1  35·7 
United  Kingdom  (1972)  41.5  33.9 
Australia (1972/J  27.9  22.5 
Canada  (1971/2)  J8.5  19.) 
(9.7)a  Switzerland  (1973)  )9.8  23.6 
United States (1971/2)  37.6  22.8 
a  excluding social security 
It is important to note that, although  the  net inter-regional 
transfers serve  to offset so high a  proportion of inter-regional 
differences in primary incomes  (more  than half of them  in some  cases), 
they are not themselves very large as proportions of GDP  - only 
2·5% of it in the United States, for example,  3.7% in the  United 
Kingdom,  and  4.2 %  in Italy.  (1) 
4.  The  interregional redistributive effect of public finances  by  major 
instruments 
The  equalising flows of public finance  just described affect the 
living standard of regions either directly by  taxes or transfers on 
or to individuals, or indirectly by  inter-governmental transfers, or 
by  the direct provision of public services.  For the purposes of the 
measurement  of the interregional redistributive effect of public 
finances  these direct and  indirect influences are  treated as if 
equivalent, i.e. a  unit of account of direct transfer to individuals 
in a  certain regions is assumed  to have  the  same  redistributive impact 
as a  unit of account of an inter-governmental transfer, or the direct 
provision of public services worth  one  unit of account. 
(1)  For these  three countries the net flows  can be  computed  since complete 
revenue and  expenditure data relating to  one  year are available. - 127-
For federations  the effect of revenues,  general and  specific purpose 
grants and direct expenditures is treated separately in the four 
following chapters.  Table 4 summarizes  the findings.  For unitary 
states the effect of revenues and  total expenditures is dealt with in 
Chapters 8  and  9.  Table  5 gives a  summary  of the results obtained. 
In the following the results in Table 4  and  5 will be  interpreted and 
complemented  with more  detailed insight from  the chapters referred to. 
The  redistributive power  of revenues is in most  countries almost 0 
(varying between  2.7% in Australia and- 1.6% in Italy), with the 
United States (8  %)  and  especially France  (20  %)  as marked  exceptions• 
The  personal income  tax is in most countries the  predominant 
instrument of progressive interregional distribution, whereas  general 
sales taxes and  excises are interregionally regressive.  The  overall 
redistributive power  depends  on  the central or federal mix  of these 
taxes,  the  tariff characteristics and  differences in the  structural 
mix  of incomes  between regions.  The  importance of the  mix  of 
progressive and regressive  taxes can be  exemplified  by  comparing 
Germany  and  the  United States. In the  U.S.A.  a  high  percentage of the 
income  tax is federal and  there are no  federal  @Bneral  sales taxes. 
In Germany  the  opposite was  true in the year of study 1970  :  70% 
of general sales taxes and  only 4J %  of personal income  taxes were 
federal.  Thus,  in the  USA  there is a  tendency for the regressive 
taxes to be  internalised at the regional (state)  level, and  so 
substantial redistribution occurs at the federal level  ;  in Germany 
it is the  progressive  taxes that tend to be  internalised at the 
regional  (Linder)  level, and  so  almost no  redistribution occurs 
at the federal level.  The  outstanding amount of French interregional 
redistributions of taxes and  social security payments is due  to the 
difference in tax regimes concerning farm and  non-farm,  small 
business and  corporate income  and  not so  much  to a  high tariff 
progressivity. 
The  redistributive power  of expen:li ture is on average about 40 % for 
the  unitary states and  JO%  for the federations studied. 
In unitary states the redistributive effect has  three main  sources  : 
(i) expenditures on  goods  and services and  salaries provide roughly 
equal per capita benefits (which is redistributive in terms of its 
effects on  regional income  differentials)  ;  (ii) social security 
finance  tends  to provide support to regions with high ratios of 
children,  women  not seeking work  and retired people, which  are 
often poor regions  (this is observed clearly in France and  Italy) 
(iii) grants to local and  regional level of governments  :  for the 
United Kingdom  agricultural and  rate support grants and  for Italy 
capital transfers to regional development agencies and  for public 
infrastructural investment have  a  high-powered redistributive impact. T
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Footnotes to Table 4 
(1)  The  redistributive  power  measures  the average of individual 
regions'  reduction in per capita income  differences (regions 
unweighted  by  population). 
Cp.  Annex  1 and  2 
(2)  Change  in Gini-coefficient of regional income  inequality (regions 
weighted  by  population) 
Cp.  Annex  1  and  2 
(3)  Years of studies  : 
Revenues 
Direct 
:gxpendi tures 
General  Specific 
Purpose  Purpose 
Grants  Grants 
Germany  1970  1970  1973  1973 
Switzerland  1967  1967 
Australia  1971/72  1973/74  1971/72  1973/74 
Canada 
USA 
1969  1973  1973/74  1973/74 
average  average  1972  1974  1969/71  1969/71 
(4)  The  Swiss  figures are not comparable  to  those of other federations 
since  (i) social security (more  than half of total federal 
expenditures receipts and  payments  are excluded):  (ii) Grants 
are  not treated separately and  (iii) the regionalisation of 
revenues and  expenditures is predominantly based  on  the  formal 
incidence approach.  The  source for the  Swiss  figures are Tables 3 
(for revenues)  and  Table  6  (for expenditures)  of the  following 
study  :  \f.  Wittmann,  op.  cit. 
(5)  Excluding Switzerland because  of its incompleteness and  taking the 
average  of the  two  USA  alternatives. - 130-
Table  5 
The  interregional redistributive effect of public finances in major 
European  Central States 
(Percentage degree of reduction in inter-regional income  differences) 
Country  (J)  Revenues  Expenditures  Total 
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
France  21  regions 18.5  20.7  J2.6  Jl.  7  51.1  .52.4 
8  regions 22.4  18.6  J4.7  JJ.J  .57.1  .51.9 
France  (average  20 •  .5  19.7  JJ.7  J2 •  .5  _54.2  .52.2 
of 2  versions) 
Italy  -1.6  -1.8  48.4  4.5.J  46.8  4J  •  .5 
United  Kingdom  0.2  -1.8  J6.o  J2.9  J6.2  Jl.l 
Average  of above 
countries  6.4  .5.4  J9.4  J6.9  45.8  42.J 
(1)  The  redistributive power  measures  the  avera~e of individual regions' 
reduction in per capita income  differences  (regions unweighted  by 
population).  See  Annex  1  and  2 
(2)  Change  in Gini-coefficient of regional income  inequality (regions 
weighted  by  population).  See  Annex  1  and  2. 
(J)  Years  of studies  : 
France 
Italy 
United  Kingdom 
Revenues 
1969 
1973 
19t'14 
(4)  Taking  the average of the  two  French alternatives 
I<~xpendi  tures 
1970 
1973 
1964 - 131-
For federations the redistributive effect of expenditures is 
separated into three components  :  direct expenditures,  general 
purpose  equalisation and  specific purpose  grants.  Direct exueniitures 
have  an average redistributive effect of about 12% (1),  which  as in 
the  case of central states is due  to national policies providing 
roughly  equal per capita benefits and  regionally redistributive 
social security. 
The  average redistributive  power  of general  purpose  equalisation is 
lJ %,  i.e.  the  same  order of magni tud:e  as that of direct expenditures 
-but with considerable differences between  the federations.  In 
Australia and  Canada  there are major general purpose  grant systems 
that tend  to equalise the fiscal capacity of the states yielding a 
redistributive effect of about 25%  and  15  %•  In Germany  the fiscal 
capacity of poor regions is equalised to a  minimum  of 95 % of the 
national average  through  tax-sharing arrangements and  horizontal 
transfers between  L[nder,  with a  more  modest role for federal grants. 
The  total redistributive power  of these arrangements at about 10 % 
is considerably smaller than the Canadian and Australian effect mainly 
due  to  the  preferential treatment of the rich Stadtstaaten Hamburg 
and  Bremen.  The  USA  introduced a  general purpose  grant (called 
'revenue sharing') only in 1972. It allocates a  fixed amount  of 
money  to all states with  low  profile fiscal capacity characteristics 
according to certain formulae.  Accordingly  the redistributive power 
is very small  (approximately 1  ~~) 
The  redistributive power  of specific purpose grants is on average 
G  ~ and  thus about half of the redistributive power  of direct 
exuenditures or general  p~pose equalisation ;  Canada  and  the  United 
States are close to this average, Australia  (10  %)  above  and  Germany 
(1 %)  below it. Most  grants are given to five  program  categories  : 
health,  education,  welfare,  transport, and  regional development. 
The  redistributive  power  for each of these categories depends  on  the 
program  volume  and  the regional distribution of this volume. 
Among  specific purpose grants in Germany  (mostly known  as  'Gemein-
schaftsaufgaben)  only the regional development program has 
significantly redistributive characteristics but the  program  volume 
is too  small to have  a  major effect. 
In the other three federations health and  welfare are  small volume 
programs  with redistributive characteristics,  leaving the major 
redistributive effect in Australia to  transport (5  %)  and  education 
(2 %),  in Canada  to regional development  (J %)  and  in the  USA  to 
(1)  For Canada  and Australia this includes social security payments  only. 
From  the  experience of other countries it is likely that other direct 
expenditures would  also have  a  redistributive effect cringing Canada 
and  Australia approximately to  the  orders of magnitude  of the  USA  and 
Germany - 132-
'Food  stamps'  and  urban redevelopment programs  (2.5 %). 
5.  Interregional balance of payments  and  public finance  balance 
The  redistributive effect of public finances as observed in all federa-
tions and central states studied,  has  major macro-economic  consequences 
for the  regio~~:in richer regions there is a  relative surplus of taxation 
over public expenditures implying a  resource  transfer to  the central 
or federal budget  ;  conversely in the  poorer regions there is a 
relative surplus of public expenditures over taxation implying a 
resource  inflow from  the central or federal  budget  (1).  These 
resource  transfers contribute to equalising regional production 
and  expenditure  per capita,  thus offsetting to a  considerable degree 
~ce  of payments  current account surpluses (for richer regions) 
or deficits (for poorer regions).  For a  region the  'relative public 
finance  surplus'  appears to be  a  major  safeguard preventing it 
from  going "bankrupt" when  it is suffering from  a  deficit in its 
trade  balance.  From  the country  studies in Chapter 1  to 4 it is 
~ossible for selected regions in Germany,  France, Italy and  the 
United  Kingdom  to give an idea of the approximate orders of 
magnitude  that seem  to be  involved.  The  data are given in Table  6. 
In the  examples  given balance of payments  deficits for poorer 
regions cover the range  between 7 %  and  22  %  of regional product 
(average  13  %)  with  two  exceptional  cases at 26% (Calabria)  and 
42  % (Basilicata)  ;  balance of payments  surpluses for richer regions 
range  from  2 % to 15% of regional product  (average 8  %).  To  these 
balances of payments  correspond public finance  inflows into poorer 
region· between 3%  and  16% of regional product  (average 9 %), 
24 %  for Ualabria and  28  %  for Basilicata  ;  and  public finance  flows 
out of richer regions between 3 %  and  11  ~~ of regional product 
(average (  %) •  For poorer regions balance of payments  current account 
deficits are  thus matched  to nearly 70% by  public finance  inflows  ; 
for richer regions the trade  surpluses are matched  to even more  than 
70  %  by  public finance  on  outflows.  The  variation around these average 
is relatively small  ;  Abruzzi  (100 %)  and  Calabria (91 %)  being 
exceptional cases  (2)  among  poorer regions and  Hessen  (1J2 %), 
South  ~ast (200 %)  and  Liguria (35  %)  among  richer regions. 
(1)  The  concept of relative surplus or deficit is appropriate  because  the 
central or federal budget as a  whole  could be  in overall surplus or 
deficit. 
(2)  Hore  than 20 %  difference from  the average. - 133-
Table  6 
Public finance  flows  and balance of' 
payments  as percentages of regional product 
Public finance  Balance of payments 
outflow  (-~ or  current account 
inflow  (+  surplus  (+)  or 
deficit (-l 
Relativel;r :eoor  regions 
or states 
Germa;y  (average 1968-70) 
Niedersachsen  +  3.4  - 6.5 
Schleswig-Holstein  +  p.O  - 9.8 
Saarland  +  9.0  - 13.6 
~  (1972) 
Bretagne  + n.o  - 15.0 
Y.:!.:.  (  19 64 ) 
Wales  +  7.8  - 12.1 
Scotland  +  6.1  - 7.8 
N.  Ireland  + 16.1  - 21.7 
Italy (average 1971-73) 
Umbria  +  7-8  - 17-4 
Abruzzi  + 14.8  - 14.8 
Basilicata  + 28.0  - 42.3 
Calabria  +  23.5  - 25.8 
Unweighted  average(excl. 
Basilicata +  Calabria)  +  9.1  - 13.2 
Relativel;r rich regions 
or states 
Germany  (average 1968-70) 
Baden-Wlirttemberg  - 5·9  +  7.9 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  - 4·5  +  5.2 
Hess  en  - 2.9  +  2.2 
!d.:!.:.  (1964) 
South East  - 4.8  +  2.4 
West  Midlands  - 2.9  +  3.2 
Italy (average 1971-73) 
Piemonte  - 7·4  + 10.9 
Lombardi a  - 11.1  + 15  .. 3 
Liguria  - 4.4  + 12.6 
Unweighted average  - 5·5  +  1·5 
Public finance 
flow as percentage 
of balance of 
Pa:vments 
52 
61 
66 
73 
64 
78 
74 
45 
100 
66 
91 
69 
75 
87 
132 
200 
91 
68 
73 
35 
73 - 134-
6.  Summary 
The  substantial interregional income  differences observed in all 
federations and  central etates studied, are reduced by an average 
degree of 40 % by interregional flows  of central or federal level 
public finances.  For selected regions in the European countries 
Germany,  France ,  Italy and  the  United Kingdom  this flow  of public 
finances was  observed to amount  to J% to 28%  (average 7.5 %), 
offsetting trade deficits in poorer regions by  nearly 70% and  trade 
surpluses in richer regions by  more  than 70  %. 
In the  unitary states a  large part of total interregional redistribution 
is automatically and  'invisibly'  achieved by  the  provision of roughly 
equal per capita public services and  the  social security system. 
A significant but smaller amount  of interregional redistribution is 
due  to a  regionally progressive tax system.  In the  United Kingdom 
and  Italy agricultural and  rate support grants and capital transfers 
to regional development agencies and for public infrastructural 
investment have  a  high-powered redistributive impact. 
In the  federations a  considerable share of the total redistributive 
power is explicitly voted or negotiated on  a  geographic basis  : 
the  instruments in question being general and  specific purpose  grants. 
General purpose  grants tend to have  on  average  a  redistributive  power 
in the  same  order of magnitude as direct expenditures  ;  they are 
clearly the most high  powered  redistributive instrument since this 
result is obtained with relatively small federal expenditure amounts. 
The  redistributive power  of specific purpose  grants is on  average 
about  half as large as the redistributive powtr of direct expenditure 
or general  purpose grants. 
In federal systems  the relative mix  between instruments appears  to  be 
a  major variable for political choice the  extreme  positions are  those 
of Germany  and  the  United States with Australia and  Canada  in an 
intermediate situation (1).  In Germany  the  federal level operates an 
almost regionally neutral  tax  system by  giving a  relatively high 
share of the  progressive taxes to the  Lander  ;  the specific purpose 
grant system is not redistributive except for a  small volume  regional 
development  program  ;  thus inter-Lander redistribution  is concentrated 
on explicit budget equalisation through tax-sharing arrangements, 
horizontal transfers between  ~nder and  modest federal  'supplementary 
grants'.  In the United states, on  the other hand,  a  large share of 
progressive  taxes are at the federal level implying a  substantial 
amount  of inter-state redistribution ;  several specific purpose grants 
are designed explicitly to account for differences in state's fiscal 
capacity implying overall a  modest but significant redistributive 
role  :  general purpose  grant system  (Tevenue  sharing') is a  small 
volume  and  inefficient instrument for inter-state redistribution. 
(1)  Interestingly there has since  1970  been changes in the  German  and  United 
States systems moving  both  'closer to the average'  :  In Germany  the  tax 
reform of 1970  increased  the federal share in progressive  taxes and in 
the  United  States a  mildly redistributive general  purpose  grant (the 
'revenue sharing') was  introduced in 1972. - 135-
Annex  1  Methods  of measuring the interregional redistributive 
effect of public finances. 
Studies of the interregional redistributive effect of public 
finance differ in objective and  scope  from  the  more  usual ones 
of the redistributive effect by  income  group but encounter corresponding 
methodological problemsa 
(i)  the allocation of public finances  to regions 
and  based on  this allocation, 
(ii)  the measurement  of the average  redistributive effect. 
1.  The  allocation of public finances  by region 
Public finances can affect the living standard of regions either 
directly by  taxes or transfers on  or to individuals, or indirectly 
by  intergovernmental transfers, or by  the direct provision of 
public services.  For the  purposes of measuring their interregional 
redistributive effect the direct and  indirect influences are  treated 
equivalently, i.e. a  unit of account of direct transfer to individuals 
in a  certain region is assumed  to have  the  same  redistributive 
impact as a  unit of account of an inter-governmental transfer, or the 
direct provision of public services costing one  unit of account. 
The  regional breakdown  of general purpose  equalisation and  specific 
purpose· grants poses no  serious methodological  problems,  since 
reliable data sources exist of regional benefits or payments  under 
these  schemes. 
For revenues there is a  rich literature (1)  on  the question of effective 
incidence which  has been  taken into account in the  methods  used  for the 
regional allocation of revenues.  For personal income  taxes,  general 
sales taxes and  excises and  import duties there is general agreement 
on  assumptions to be  made,  whereas  there are different approaches  to 
the allocation of corporate  income  taxes and  social security 
contributions  (cp.  Chapter 9).  However,  these differences are 
unlikely to introduce distortions severe  enough  to destroy the 
com~ability of overall results on  the redistributive effect of 
revenues between  countries• 
For large parts of public expenditure,  salary and wage  payments  and 
social security and other transfers, all studies try to  allocate them 
to  the  region of residence of the benefitiary  by  using either finance 
data or appropriate distribution keys.  The  allocation of expenditures 
on  goods  and  services encounters the crucial public goods  problem 
of  'indivisible'  national benefits.  The  approach  to this problem 
differs between  stUdies (cp.  Chapter 8)  ;  it has been  tried, however, 
to make  the redistributive power results as comparable  between 
countries as possible. 
(1)  Cp.  e.g.  P.  Mieszkowski,  Tax  Incidence Theory.  The  Effects of Taxes  on  the 
Distribution of Income.  Journal of Economic  Literature, Vol.  7  (1969) 
pp.  1103-1124. - 136-
2.  Measurement  of the average redistributive effect 
A measure  of the redistributive effect of public finances  should 
give comparable results whether the instruments of redistribution 
are  public revenues,  direct expenditures,  grants or any aggregation 
of these.  For the definition of such a  measure  the regional per 
capita distribution of these items has to  be  related to an average 
per capita regional income.  For all types of public finance and all 
but two  countries  (1)  the income  concept used is personal income  : 
this is chosen as the basis of measurement  mainly for two  reasons  : 
- to improve  the comparability of results between European  and  non 
European countries for which  only personal income  data exist 
- because  personal income  appeared to be  more  relevant than output 
to  the  measurement of redistributive effects. 
Two  measures are used here for quantifying the interregional distributive 
effect of public finances  on  personal income  : 
(1)  the  percentage change  in the Gini-coefficient of concentration 
(also called  'weighted'  measure)  ; 
(2)  the redistributive power  (also called  'unweighted'  measure). 
The  change  in Gini-coefficient  is a  traditional measure  used also 
in studies of redistributive effects by  income  group. It is computed 
in the  following way.  First, for personal income  unmodified  by 
redistribution (called in the following explanation primary income) 
the degree of regional inequality is measured  by  the Gini-coefficient 
which is a  weighted average  of per capita income  differences,  where 
relative population shares are used as weights.  (2)  (J) 
Secondly,  an income  as modified  by  the interregional redistribution 
in question (called in the following explanation modified income)  is 
calculated.  r·1odified  income  serves the  purpose  of measuring  the  joint 
effect of revenues and  expenditures on  primary income.  Thus,  for a 
given instrument in isolation say revenues,  an expenditure amount 
(1)  These  countries are Italy and  Switzerland for which  personal income 
data are  not available. 
(2)  For a  formula  see Annex  2,  equation  (J). 
(J) A value of 0.0 means  exact equality  ;  a  value of 1.0 all income 
concentrated in one  region. - 137-
equal to national  revenues is allocated to regions in proportion 
to their primary income.  Consequently,  modified income  is equal to 
primary income  minus  revenues plus the regionally allocated 
expenditure.  An  analogous procedure is employed  in the  case of an 
expenditure instrument in isolation (1). 
Finally,  the Gini-coefficient of regional inequality is computed 
for modified income.  The  percentage change  of this Gini-coefficient 
relative to  that of primary income  is the  'weighted'  measure  of 
the redistributive effect of revenues or expenditures.  The  measure 
for total public finances is obtained by  adding  the measures for 
the  simple  instruments (2). 
The  redistributive power is a  measure  developed for the  purpose  of 
this report.*  It measures  the average  extent to which  regional 
primary income  differentials are reduced  by  public instruments.  An 
income  differential is defined as the difference between  the  per capita 
index munber  (national average  =  100)  and  the  national average,  i.e. 
100.  A single region's reduction in its primary income  differential 
is the  percentage change  of the  modified income  differential relative 
to  the  primary income  differential.(3)  The  redistributive power is 
equal to the weighted average of regions'  reductions in primary 
income  differential where  the  squares of primary income  differentials 
are used as weights. 
The  redistributive power  can be  calculated in an  economically 
meaningful and  easily interpretable way.  This calculation has two 
stages  (4). 
(1)  In the  case of horizontal equalisation payments,  modified income 
i,s  simply the sum  of primary income  and these  (positive and  nega-
tive) payments. 
(2)  Because  regional allocations of  reve~es and expenditures relate 
in most  cases to different years it is not  possible to calculate 
an income  'modified  1  by all public finance  instruments  and thus 
to compute  the resulting total change  in Gini-coefficient.  Impli-
citly, it is thus assumed  that the redistributive effect does  not 
change  considerably between different years. 
(3)  If  a.  rich region is at 120 %  of national primary income  per 
capita and after taxes,  say,  its income  is 115 %  of national 
average,  this region's reduction in its primary income  diffe-
rential is  (20  - 15) /  20,  i.e.  25  %. 
(4)  The  equivalence of the above definition of the redistributive 
power with this method of calculation is proved in Annex  2. 
*  based on  a  concept developed by Horst  Reichenbach - 138-
The  first  stage is to  compute  the elasticity of interregional :per 
capita differentials in revenues or expenditures with respect to 
~rimary income  differentials.  The  elasticity coefficients are obtained 
by  regression analysis,  (1.)  with the  revenues or expenditures in the 
various regions as the dependent variables, and  primary income  as the 
independent variable.  The  elasiticity is the  slope of the regression 
line. If this slope is 1.0 the revenue or expenditure in question may 
be described as  'neutral'  ;  i.e. it varies between  regions by  the  same 
per~entage as  primary income.  A revenue  source with an elasticity 
greater than 1.0 is 'progressive'  (tends to reduce  percentage  i~come 
differentials)  ;  an expenditure  source with an elasticity greater than 
1.0 is 'regressive'. 
Secondly,  the redistributive power  is calculated by  weighting the 
deviation of the elasticity coefficient from  neutrality by  the 
percentage  that the revenues or expenditures bear to primary income. 
Since an elasticity coefficient of 1.0 corresponds to neutrality and 
thus  to Zero  redistributive  power,  the deviation of the elasticity 
coefficient from  neutrality is obtained simply by  subtracting 1  from 
the elasticity in the  case of revenues,  and  by  subracting the 
elasticity from  1  in the case of expenditures. 
Numerical  examples  of elasticity values for hypothetical revenue 
and  expenditure instruments,  and  the calculation of their 
redistributive power,  are given in the  following Tables  1  and  2. 
A graphical presentation is given in Chart 1.  The  slopes corresponding 
to the elasticity coefficients of cases A,  B,  C and  Dare shown  on 
the  lefthand side.  Their redistributive power is shown  on  the right-
hand  side in terms  of the vertical distances between  the regression 
lines.  For the revenue  case A,  for example,  the redistributive  power 
is the distance  'a'  between  the  line of case A and  that of the zero-
redistributive power  case B and  the horizontal line through  the 
origin (which  would  itself represent the  case of 100% redistributive 
power). 
Difference between the  'weighted'  and  'unweiahted' measure 
The  difference between the  •weighted  •  and  •unweighted  •  measure  invol  vee 
a  significant political and economic  issue of relevance for the 
Community  case,  using the  'unweighted  •  measure  implies that all 
regions are regarded as equal units, this corresponding to the 
extreme  confederal principle of  'one state- one vote'.  The  'weighted' 
measure  takes into account  the population size of each region,  and 
is thus more  meaningful  in relation to a  unitary state where  the 
(1)  The  regression Line is restricted to pass through the point 
(100,100),  i.e. national averages,  since otherwise the region's 
reduction in income  differential implied b,y  the regression line 
would vary with primary income.  This restriction is more  a  point 
of formality than substance,  since the unrestricted  re~ession 
line will nonnally be very close to the point  (100,100). - 139-
Table  1 
Meaning  of the Elasticity Coefficients 
Case  Elasticity  Revenues  Expenditures 
coefficient 
A  2.0  progressive  regressive 
B  1.0  neutral  neutral 
(proportional)  (proportional) 
c  o.o  regressive  frogressive 
(invariant)  invariant) 
D  -1.0  more  regressive  more  progressive 
(inversely  (inversely 
proportional)  proportional) 
Table  2 
Calculation of Redistributive Power 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Elasticity  Deviation of  Revenues  or  Budgetary 
Case  Coefficient  i:·C.  from  expenditures a::  Redistributive 
(E. C)  neutrality  percentage of  Power 
primary income 
Reve- ~xpendi- Reve- Expendi  Reve- Expendi- Reve- Expendi-
nues  ~ures  nues  tures  nues  tures  nues  tures 
3  X  5  4  X  6 
A  2·0  2.0  1.0  -1.0  20%  20  ~~  20%  - 20  7~ 
B  1.0  1.0  o.o  o.o  20  20  0  0 
c  o.o  o.o  -1.0  1.0  20  20  -20  20 
D  -1.0  1-1.0  -2.0  2.0  20  20  -40  40 - 140-
CHART  1 
Elasticity Coefficients and  Redistributive Power  of Taxes  and Transfers 
A.  Revenues 
Revenues 
p. c. 
B.  Expenditures 
Expenditures 
p.c:. 
80 
80 
A:  elast.  = 2 
(regressive) 
100 
Elasticit;y 
B: elast.  = 1 
(neutral) 
C:  elast.  = 0 
(progressive) 
elast.  = -1 
Cmore  progressive) 
120  Primary 
Income  p.c. 
Modified 
Income  p. c. 
Redistributive Power 
120 
Redi str.  Power 
100-
A:  R 
Bf R 
c:  R 
.0:  R 
Redistr.  Power  R  100X 
80 
80  100  120  Primary 
Income  p. c. 
= -alb 
= olb 
.  c/b 
"'  d)b - 141-
central government is based  on  the  principle of 'one  person - one 
vote  '  (1). 
If the  change  in income  differentials due  to redistribution were  the 
same  for all regions, i.e. income  is increased in all poor regions, 
and decreased in all rich ones,  by  the  same  percentage, relative 
to  the average,  the weighted and  unweighted measures give identical 
results (2)  ;  if these  percentage changes are different between 
regions,  the measures  give in general different results. If, for 
instance, a  small poor region is treated relatively favourably,  this 
will tend to make  the unweighted  measure  show  a  greater degree of 
redistribution than the weighted one. 
In the Community  the  'unweighted'  measure  would  thus  indicate 
substantial redistributive effects even if only Ireland and  a 
small number  of small,  poor regions in, say, Italy and  the 
United Kingdom  were  to be  treated favourably by  Community  finances, 
whereas  the same  order of magnitude  would  be  shown  by  the  'weighted' 
measure  only if Community  finances favoured a  larger share of 
population with  below  average  income. 
Furthermore  there are technical differences between the  two  measures: 
-The method  of calculating the  'unweighted'  measure  has the advantages 
of making it possible to see how  different states lie in relation 
to the regression line defined above,  i.e. it is easy to see which 
regions are treated favourably or unfavourably relative to the 
regression line. 
- The  'unweighted'  measure  has the advantage of being strictly 
additive, i.e.  the  sum  of the redistribution powers  of single 
instruments is the  same  as the redistributive power  of these 
instruments working  together. 
(1)  This  principle is reflected in the sensitivity of the measures with 
respect to  the  number  of regions having equal per capita income  and 
the  spatial distribution of income  within a  region.  vThereas  the 
weighted  measure  does not change at all, if one  region is separated in-
to  several with  equal per capita income, it changes significantly if 
a  region is separated into several with  unequal  per capita income. 
The  reverse is true for the  'unweighted'  measure, i.e. this measure  is 
less sensitive  to per capita income  differences within a  region 
but more  sensitive to the  number  of regions with  equal per capita 
income. 
(2)  This is proved in Annex  2. - 142-
Annex  2  Algebraic representation of the  'unweighted'  and  'weighted'  measures 
of the redistributive effect  of public finance  and  comparison 
between them 
Algebraic representation of measures 
Let  n  be the number  of regions  in a  country. 
For region i  (i = 1,  ••• ,  n)  the share in national  primary income  is y
1
, 
its modified  income  share yim'  and  its population share P.i•  The  indices 
of regional  income  per capita  (national  average  =  1.0  )  are y  1/pi for 
prima~ income  and  yim/p1  for modified  income,  the  corresponding income 
differentials d.  =  y./p1-l and  d.m  =  y.m/p.-1  and  hence  the  reduction in 
1  1  1  1  1 
income  differential 
(1)  r.  = (d.  - d.m)/d1• 
1  1  1 
The  'unweighted'  measure  of the redistributive effect of a  public finance 
instrument is the redistributive power  defined as  the average of the 
reductions  in income  differential  in the various  regions,  unweighted by 
regional population,  but  weighted by  the squares of the primary income 
differentials. 
n 
(2)  run •  (  ~ 
i  =  1 - 143-
As  described above  the  'unweighted'  measure  of the redistributive effect  of 
a  revenue  instrument  can be  obtained in an  economically more  meaningful  and 
interPretable way  by multiplying the deviation from  neutrality  (s* - 1) by the 
national  average  rate of revenues  to primary income  (~) where  s* is the 
slope of the regression line of the  regional per capita revenue  indices 
on  the regional  primary income  indices,  restricted so as to pass  through the 
point of national  average  (100 %,  100  %).  s* is thus the least square esti-
mator of the  equation 
t i  I Pi = (  1  - s )  +  s  Y.  I  P. •  With  the definitions d  T = t  . I  p  _  1  and 
I 
1  1  T  i  i  i 
di =  Yi  Pi  - 1  this equation reduces to d.  = s  d.  for which  the least 
1  1 
square estimator is given by the  equation 
s*  =  d. 2  ). 
1 
n 
.Z 
1  = 1 
T 
d.  d.  )  1 
1  1 
From  equations  (1)  and  (2) it follows that: 
run 
Since 
n  z 
i  =  1 
run 
n 
(2_ 
i  =  1 
n 
d.  d.m  ) I  (  Z  d. 2) 
1  1  i  = 1  1 
n  z 
i  = 1 
d.m  =  d.  (l+T) -T  d. T  (1) 
1  1  1  ' 
~  2  ?  T  d.  d.m  z  (  di  +1" d.- -,.,d.  d.)  and  hence  1  1  i  =  1  1  1  1 
n  n  n 
(-!'% 
i  =  1 
d.2 +'T z 
1 
i  = 1 
)I( z 
i  =  1 
run  =  ( s* - 1 ) j"" • 
-r  + tr s*  , 
An  analogous  proof may  be  applied to expenditure  instruments. 
(1)  This  follows  immediately from  the equation for the modified income 
share  m 
y.  = y.  (1+7)- t.1'. 
1  1  1 
i.e. - 144-
The  'weighted'  measure  of the redistributive effect of a  public finance 
instrument  is the  change  in Gini-coefficient  of modified  income  relative 
to primary income: 
(3) 
(4) 
is 
w  (g  - gm)/g  where  r 
1  n  n  - - g  2  z  z  pi pj 
i  = 1  j  = 1 
(1) 
the Gini-coefficient of primary income 
m  1  ...!!. 
g  = 2 .Z 
1  1  = 
ldi-dj\ 
and 
the Gini-coefficient of modified  income. 
Comparison between measures 
The  'weighted'  and  •unweighted'  measures  give identical resul  ta 
provided that the region's reductions  in income  differentials 
are all equal,  i.e.  r.  =  r  for all  i  (2) 
1 
From  equation (1),  dim  •  (1-r)  di'  and  thus,  from  equation (4)  and  (5) 
gm  = \1-r(  g  = (1-r) g. 
Hence  from  equation  (3)  the  'weighted' measure is obtained 
rw  =  (r/ - (1-r  )r/) /  r!  r  un 
r 
(1)  Cp.  e.g.  H.  Theil,  Economics  and  information  theo~. Amsterdam  1967,  p.  121. 
(2)  Formally one  has  further to assume r(l, i.e. primary income  differentials 
are  reduced to less than 100  %. Chapter 6 
BUDGET  EQUALISATION  THROUGH  GENERAL 
PURPOSE  GRANTS  IN FEDERATIONS 
(  t-~orking paper - 147-
I. In traduction 
1.  This  paper is concerned with the instruments of explicit financial 
redistribution in six federal government systems - mainly the 
Federal Republic of Germany,  Australia,  Canada and the  United 
Sta  tea,  and in less detail, Austria and Switzerland.  'Ihree  broad 
categories are identified  : 
- budget equalisation schemes,  where  automatic formulae  are  used 
to attain specified degrees of equalisation in the financial 
capacity of state governments. 
- tax-sharing arrangments with redistributive characteristics. 
This excludes the frequent cases where  tax revenues collected 
at the centre are handed  back to the states more  or less as 
if the revenue  had  been  the states'  own  resources  ;  it does 
cover,  however,  cases where  other, deliberately redistributive 
keys or formulae are  used to hand  back  the  states  • share. 
- other general purpose grants.  The  distribution of these grants 
may  be  more  arbitrary,  and influenceable on a  year-to-year 
blsis by  the forces or political bargaining,  whereas in the other 
two  categories poll  tical bargaining can only intervene from 
time  to time when  the formulae  come  up for review. 
2.  A simplified view of the various systems is set out in Table 1. 
While  the categorisation is in some  respects debatable  (see  the 
notes to Table 1), the  broad picture is that the German,  Canadian, 
Australian and Austrian federations all have rather powerful budget 
equalisation systems; In the German  and Australian cases the  formal 
equalisation systems have  to be  seen in combination with.·other 
related parts of the redistribution system (the sharing··out of VAT 
revenue in Germany  and  the Australian Fi~cial Assistance. Grants). 
Equalisatio:u systems do  not exist in the Swiss and United States 
f'edera!;ions,  although some  relatively small scale.redistribution 
takes place in their revenue-sharing arrangements. 
J.  Parts II, III and IV  of this paper cover the  three categories in 
turn.  Part V seeks to compare  the relative importance  and 
redistributive effects of the various schemes. T
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II.  Concepts of Budget Equalisation 
Before reviewing the different schemes in detail, it may  be  helpful to 
recall the main theoretical concepts that lie at the heart of budget 
equalisation, and  to identifiy in a  simple way  where  these find their 
counterparts in practice in the six  federations. 
The  following five concepts, or approaches,  are  taken from  a  paper 
by Nusgrave  (1)  which is widely considered to be  a  classic contribution 
on fiscal federalism. 
1.1.  equalisation of actual tax receipts 
1.2.  equalisation of tax capa.ci ty 
l.J.  introduction of a  tax effort factor 
1.4.  equalisation with respect to expenditure needs 
1.5.  'perfect'equalisation as a  function of tax capacity,  tax effort and 
expenditure needs. 
1.1.  Equalisation of actual tax receipts.  Transfers are made  to equalise 
the actual revenue  per capita available to state fiscs. 
The  most simple way  to do  this is to oblige  the  above average  revenue 
states to pa.y  transfers to  the  low  revenue states ('horizontal' 
redistribution).  The  same  result can be  reached if the federal fisc 
taxes the weal  thy states and  pays these amounts as general purpose 
grants over to the  poorer states ('vertical' redistribution). 
The  'horizontal'  transfer variant of this equalisation approach is 
basically the background of the  ~erfinanzausgleich in Germany. 
In Austria there exists a  rather pure  'vertical'  form  of actual 
per capita tax revenue equalisation (the  'La.ndeskopfquotenausgleich') 
where  the Federal government pays equalisation grants to  the  states 
with below average  per capita tax revenue in order to bring  them 
up  to the Federal average. 
The  equalisation of actual per capita tax revenue  can be criticised 
where  states have  a  large degree of tax autonomy  because of the 
incentive to substitution for local tax collection effort.  States 
(1)  Richard  A.  Musgrave,  Approaches  to a  Fiscal Theory of Political 
Federalism,  Public Finances  :  Needs,  Sources,  and Utilization, 
National Bureau of Economic  Research,  Princeton University Press 1961, 
and  Theories of Fiscal Federalism,  Public Finance,  24.1969.4. - 150-
receiving the grants or transfers may  use  them,  rather than to 
attain given standards of public service,  to reduce  their own  taxes. 
'Ibis weakness is not, however,  applicable where  tax harmonisation 
is virtually complete and where  the states are not or only marginally 
able  to change  the  ~tes and  bases of their local taxes  ;  and this 
indeed corresponds to the  German  and Austrian cases. 
1.2.  Equalisation of tax capa.ci ty.  To  avoid inequity and undesirable 
substitution effects in federations with non-uniform tax bases or 
tax rates (as is the case for several taxes in Canada,  the u.s.A., 
Australia or Switzerland.),  the standard for equalisation may  be 
tax capa.ci ty, defined as the result of applying , a  standard tax rate 
(a federal average if these are non uniform)  to the state's per capita 
tax base, and  comparing this with the result of applying the  standard 
rate to the  national per capita tax base.  Redistribution then takes 
place from high  tax base states to  low  tax base states. '!he 
standardised tax bases may  have  to be  estimated. 
This approach is basically that adopted in ~.  Twenty  provincial 
revenue  sources are subject to equalisation.  Any  province which  could 
not,  by applying the national average  'standard  •  rate to its own 
tax  base, derive  the national average  per capita revenue, is 
entitled to an equalisation grant to make  up  the deficiency. 
l.J.  Introduction of a  tax effort factor.  The  move  from actual tax receipts 
to tax capacity may  eliminate the incentive to reduce  the local tax 
effort r  however,  tax capa.ci ty equalisation contains no  specific 
incentive for a  high tax effort, and it can be argued that equalisation 
payments  should only be  made  in conjunction with a  state tax effort 
incentive.  The  tax effort of a  state may  be measured as the ratio of 
its state tax revenue  to its tax base (its actual tax base in 
harmonised tax systems,  or its estimated tax base in others). 
A tax effort factor of this kind has a  prominent place in the 
complicated formulae  used for the general revenue-sharing system 
of the United States.  '!here,  one  of the objectives is explicitly to 
favour low-base, high-effort states. 
1.4.  Equalisation with respect to expenditure needs.  Equalisation systems 
that aim at equivalence of public service standards have  to  take into 
account expenditure as well as revenue variables.  For application 
in equalisation formulae  indices of need for each state are required, 
these typically having to represent different numbers  of school-age 
children in relation to the active labour force,  the effect of urban 
density or population dispersion on road and other public service costs, 
etc.  The  indices of need can then be multiplied against the  tax 
capacity, or other revenue  indicators• Redistribution can then  take 
place, in its extreme  form,  from  low  need-high tax revenue  states 
to high need - low  tax revenue  states. - 151-
Construction of indices of need for a  broad collection of public 
services is in practice a  difficult but not unsurmountable  problem. 
Most  federations build some  kind of needs factor into their 
redistributive systems,  Canada  being the  notable exception in its 
confinement to tax capa.ci ty equalisation.  Germany,  Austria, 
Switzerland and the United States all use  simplified urban density 
weighting factors to this end,  while  the calculation of the 
Australian special grants incorporates detailed adjustments for 
quantified needs for given public services. 
1.5.  'Perfect' equalisation with respect to tax capacity,  tax effort 
and  expenditure needs.  The  principle of Musgrave's  'perfect' 
equalisation formula is that the degree of benefit obtained by  low 
ca~ci  ty-high need states is made  dependent in part on  their own 
tax effort. 
The  only system that in practice combines all three variables is 
the  United States general revenue-sharing scheme,  although  (as is 
pointed out elsewhere in this paper)  this cannot be regarded as an 
equalisation scheme  proper, and its extremely complex  combination of 
criteria results in compromise  results which  in part seem  to 
contradict the purpose  of some  of the individual criteria. 
Countries with little or no  state fiscal autonomy,  like Austria 
and Germany,  clearly have  no  place for a  tax effort variable. 
Australia's special grants system combines  tax capacity and  needs 
but not tax effort. 
2.  Budget Equalisation in Practice 
Equalisation systems  'proper'  have  been identified in four of 
the federations - Germany,  Austria, Canada,  and Australia.  The 
distinguishing characteristic of  'proper'  equalisation is that 
open-ended  funding is made  available to ensure that the aggregate 
fiscal capacity of the states is equalised (to given degrees), as 
opposed  to arrangements where  limited sums  of money  are redistributed 
- sometimes  nonetheless through  the use of similar criteria. 
There  are differing degrees of equalisation between  the four  cases 
('some are more  equal than others•). subject to qualifications set out 
below  in the detailed descriptions, a  hierarchy of degrees of 
equalisation may  be  established in broad terms as follows  : 
- in Germany  the Landerfinanzausgleich raises per capita fiscal 
receipts of the poorer states to 95  % of the federal average, 
although it is the  VAT  redistribution (see Part III) which  does 
a  larger preliminary(!) amount  of redistribution  J 
(1)  'Preliminary'  redistribution is meant  in the  sense  that the other grants 
are  taken into account  as state revenue  in making  the  'final'  equalisa-
tion calculations. - 152-
- in Austria the  Landeskopfquotenausgleich equalises per capita 
fiscal receipts of the  states to 100% of the federal average, 
also completing a  larger preliminary (1)  amount  of redistribution 
through  shared  taxes  ;  and  similarly in ~  the equalisation 
grants raise the fiscal capacity of the  provinces to 100% of the 
federal average  ; 
- in Australia the  Special grants go  even further in raising the  per 
capita budgetary capa.ci ty of tl'E  poorest states to 100 % of the 
level of the  two  wealthiest states, this completing a  very much 
larger preliminary (1)  amount  of redistribution done  by  the 
Financial Assistance Grants  (see Part IV). 
The  equalisation systems are  now  described in more  detail. 
2.1.  The  German  Landerfinanzausgleich ('state financial compensation') 
Financial equalisation between  the German  Linder is designed to 
ensure  that a  below  average  Land  always reaches 95 %  of the  per 
capita average  tax receipts of all Linder,  and  that a  Land  required 
to make  equalisation transfers does not, as a  result,  fall below 
100 %  of the average of the  Lander.  Not all laDder tax receipts are 
included,  but the excluded  taxes are relatively unimportant.  The 
resultant transfers from  fiscally rich to fiscally poor states are 
direct 'horizontal'  payments  which  do  not affect the  Federal budget. 
The  Federal Ministry of Finance does  the  calculations and  keeps 
the score. 
The  level of the equalisation contributions (for paying Lander)  and 
equalisation grants (for receiving Lander)  is determined by  the 
relationship between  the  'tax capacity indicator'  (steuerkraftmesszahl) 
and the  'equalisation indicator  '  (Ausgleichsmesszahl). 
The  tax capacity indica  tor of a  Land  is the  sum  of the  Land's tax 
revenue  and  of its communes'  (Gemeinden)  adjusted tax revenue.  A 
Land's  tax revenue  comprises its share of joint taxes  (income  tax, 
corporation tax,  VAT)  and  of the  trade  tax levy  ( Gewerbesteuerwnlage) 
and its own  taxes  (succession duty,  wealth tax,  tax on  motor vehicles, 
duty on  beer and  betting and  gambling  tax).  The  tax revenue  of the 
communes  are also taken into account,  however,  only to  the extent 
of 50  %,  and  are made  up  of the  communes'  share of income  tax and  the 
tax capacity indicators for the  taxes on real estate and  the  trade 
tax on  profits and  capital (Gewerbesteuer),  less the  trade  tax levy 
(Gewerbesteuerumlage). 
The  equalisation indicator for a  Land is the  sum  of the  two  separate 
indicators for the  revenues of the  L[nder and  the  communes.  The  ----
(1)  'Preliminary'  redistribution is meant in the  sense  that the other 
grants are  taken into account as state revenue in making  the  "final" 
equalisation calculations. - 153-
indicators  are calculated from  the  tax  revenue  to  be  equalised,  in 
terms of per capita average  tax revenue  of the Federal Republic, 
multiplied by  the  population of the  Land,  with  the  population figures 
weighted  by  specific percentages  (see below). 
Two  kinds of adjustments are in fact made  to  take into account the 
different expenditure  needs and  costs of the  Lander. 
First, a  number  of !11nder are allowed  to make  certain flat-rate 
deductions from  their tax capacity indicator to  take into account 
special burdens  (these consist, for example,  of university costs 
in the  Saarland, and  port amenity costs in Hamburg  and  Bremen). 
Secondly,  by  weighting the equalisation indicators, allowances are 
made  for the differences in the regional distribution of the 
population in the individual Lander  ;  these all go  in the direction 
of giving financial help as a  function of population density. 
In establishing the equalisation indicators of the  Lander,  the 
population figures for  the city-state Ui.nder  of Hamburg  and  Bremen 
are given a  weighting of 135 % (compared  to 100 %  for the  other 
Ui.nder). 
In establishing the equalisation indicators of the  communes,  the 
population figures of each  commune  are weighted as follows 
Number  of inhabitants 
per commune 
0  to  5,000 
5,001 to  20,000 
20,001 to  100,000 
100,001  to  500,000 
500,001  to 1,000,000 
1,000,001 and  over 
100% 
110  ~~ 
115  ?b 
120% 
125% 
130  r~ 
In addition, extra credit is given for communes  with a  population 
of over .500,000.  This credit is 2  % of the  population for a  Land 
with a  density of 1,.500  to  2,000 inhabitants per square kilometer, 
4 % for a  land with a  density of 2 ,000  to 3,000,  and  6  ~~ for a  Land 
with a  density of over 3,000. 
If, after these adjustments,  a  Land's  tax capacity indicator is 
higher than its equalisation indicator it is required to make 
equalisation payments,  and  if its tax capacity indicator is lower 
it is entitled to receive equalisation payments. 
The  equalisation transfers to the  receiving Lander are calculated 
by  applying graduated percentages to the amounts  by  which  the  tax 
capacity indicator falls short of the equalisation indicator.  These 
transfers are fixed at 100 %  of the amount  of the  shortfall below 
92  %  of the equalisation indicator, and at 37.5% of the amount  of 
the shortfall in the  92  to 100 %  range. - 154-
The  equalisation contributions of the  JB.ying  ULnder  are calculated 
by applying graduated percentages to tranches of the  excess amounts 
giving rise to an equalisation liability. These  excess amounts are 
arrived at as follows.  Tax  capacity ranging from  100  to 102% of the 
equalisation indicator is left out of account  ;  tax capa.ci  ty 
ranging from  102  to 110 % counts to  the  tune of 70  % ;  and  tax 
capacity over 110% counts in fUll. 
If, after such equalisation,  the per capita. tax revenue of a 
receiving Land is below 95%  of the  average  tax revenue  of the  !Ander, 
the equalisation transfers to  this Land  must be  increased by the 
shortfall and  the calculation of the equalisation contributions of 
the  paying Ui.nder  changed accordingly.  However,  if, after equalisation, 
the per capita. tax revenue of a  paying Land falls lower than the 
average  tax revenue of the Linder,  the snortfall must be  met  by the 
other paying Linder,  in proportion to their equalisation contributions. 
Table  2  shows  the equalising effect of the Landerfinanzausgleich 
system for 197J,  and notably the raising of all Utnders'ta.x 
revenues  to  the 95%  level The  importance of the urban density 
weightings in the  system is seen in the very high level of Hamburg's 
tax revenue  even after equalisation,  and  the fact that Bremen is 
a  recipient state in spite of its high tax revenues. - 155-
Table  2 
Revenue  equalisation effects of the German  Linderfinanzausgleich 
in 1973 
Per capita tax revenue(a)  Per capita tax revenue 
receiving Linder  ~  equalisation, as  (b) ~  equalisation 
underligned)  a  percentage of the  as a  percentage of the 
Llinder average  Lander average 
Hamburg  147.9  1J2.4 
1l!:!!!!!  116.0  124.0 
Hessen  106.6  101.2 
Baden-WUrttemberg  105.J  100.0 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  102.0  lOO.J 
Bavern  95.8  97.0 
Rheinland-Pfalz  89.5  95.0 
Niedersachsen  88.1  95.8 
Schleswig-Holstein  88.1  96.9 
Saarland  88.1  101.7 
Federal average  100.0  100.0 
(a)  Including the Landers'  share of joint taxes  (income  tax,  corporation 
tax, VAT),  and  of the trade  tax  levy (Gewerbesteuerumlage)  and their 
own  taxes  (succession duty,  wealth  tax,  tax on  motor vehicles, duty on 
beer and  betting and  gambling  tax). 
(b)  (a) !  equalisation payments 
Source  :  derived from  unpublished Federal Ministry of Finance  sources. - 156-
2.2.  Austrian Landeskopfguotenausgleich  ('state per capita quota 
compensation') 
Payments are made  to the  Lander  to equalise  (up  to 100 per cent,  since 
1971)  their per capita revenues from  their part of taxes which  are 
shared between  the federation,  Linder and  municipalities.  These 
taxes account for a  high proportion of the  total tax revenue of the 
Lander  ;  and in a  large degree this revenue is distributed between 
Lander  on  a  basis of tax collections, which  leaves substantial 
inequalities in fiscal capacity to be  corrected by  the 
Landeskopfguotenausgleich. 
2 •  .3.  Canadian Equalisation 
The  Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements  Act,  1972,  extended  the 
1967  equalisation system for the five-year period 1972-1977. 
As  already indicated, the 1972-1977  equalisation formula is based 
on  twenty  so-called "standard taxes", which a::e  all provincial 
revenue  sources.  'Ihe  most  important are  the  personal and  corporate 
income  taxes,  sales taxes, oil  royalties  and  school purpose  taxes. 
For each of the  twenty revenue  sources a  base is chosen to represent, 
as closely as possible,  the actual base of that revenue  source. 
Total revenue  for all provinces from  that source is then divided by 
the  nation-wide  base  to arrive at a  'national average provincial 
revenue rate'.  This rate is then applied to the  base  in a  particular 
province and  the resultant 'tax' is divided by  provincial population 
to obtain the  per capita yield of the  'tax' at the national average 
rate.  The  difference between this per capita yield and  the national 
average  per capita yield,multiplied by  the province's population, 
represents the  equalisation due  to the province with respect to  tll.at 
revenue  source.  Total equalisation,  for each  province,  represents 
the  sum  of the equalisation amounts,  both positive  and  negative, 
calculated for each revenue  source.  When  the  equalisation total for 
any  provj.nce  is shown  as a  negative amount,  no  equalisation is 
payable. 
Table  1  shows  the equalising effect on  provincial revenue.  !he 
equalisation receipts of the  lowest revenue  states are very 
substantial,  adding around half as much  again to their own  resources. 
The  post-equalisation results are  then for many  provinces quite 
close,  the remaining differences reflecting the  freedom  of provinces 
to vary their own  tax efforts•  The  most  striking case,  however, 
is that the  ~uebec which  starts with  the highest own  revenue receipts 
of all provinces,  then receives substantial equalisation benefits,  so 
has an even greater lead in terms of total revenue  per capita. 
(See,  however,  footnote  (b)  of Table  J). - 157-
Table  3 
Revenue  equalisation effects of the Canadian equalisation 
system financial year 197'3/74 
¢ Can. 
Provincial(a)  Equalisation  Provincial 
(receiving )rovinces  revenue  per  grants per  revenue  per 
underlined  capita before  capita  capita~ 
equalisation  equalisation 
Quebec  798.7  (b)  105.4  904.1 
Alberta  781.0  - 781.0 
Ontario  748.4  - 748.4 
British Columbia  706.7  - 706.7 
Manitoba  _561. 7  98.1  659.8 
Saskatchewan  557.7  1_50.5  708.2 
~ince Egward  Isl~d  _54l.J  284.4  C$25.7 
New  Brunswick  .52J.O  216.9  7J9.9 
Nova  Scotia  484.7  192.8.  677.5 
Newfoundland  444.7  284.0  728.7 
National average  719.2 
Source  :  Provincial govemment finance,  Revenue  and Expenditure 
(Estimates l97J) 
(a)  Defined as "Gross  general revenue  from  own  sources" in Canadian 
fiscal statistics 
(b)  Not  strictly compatible  since it includes a  relatively higher share 
of income  tax revenue  given to  Q,uebec  as a  result of having "opted 
out" of certain shared-cost programs  ;  see Chapter  7  on  specific 
purpose .grants - 158-
2.4.  Australian Special (Equalisation)  Grants 
The  Australian federal government  pays Special (equalisation) Grants 
to certain poorer  'claimant'  states on  the basis of budgetary 
comparisons made  with the  two  wealthiest 'standard'  states.  '!he 
grants are paid on  the recommendation of the  Grants Commission,  an 
independent body  established in l9JJ•  (The  Commission's role was 
extended in 197) to  recommending  grants to states for local 
authorities.) 
The  situation of the  six states has in recent years been as follows 
- standard states  : 
- claimant states 
- other states (neither 
standard nor claimant)  : 
New  South Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia (until 1974-75) 
Tasmania  (until 197J-74) 
Western Australia 
Tasmania  (from 1975-76) 
South Australia (from 1975-76) 
The  Australian Special Grant system  used  to differ in technical 
methods  from  the other equalisation systems,  being based on  calculations 
of differences in the current budget balances of the standard and 
claimant states (called the  'budget results'), adjusted for 
differences in revenue-raising effort  and  expenditure  standards. 
Implicitly what was  being measured was  nevertheless each claimant 
state's shortfall in fiscal capacity, and  since 1974  the Commission 
has assessed a  claimant state's fiscal need directly by aggregating 
its assessments of need for dlfferent revenue  and expenditure items. 
As  regards revenue-raising capacity,  the  Grants Commission's 
general approach is to take each field of state taxation (of which 
the most  important are probate and  succession duties,  land taxes, 
stamp duties,  liquor tax,  gambling  taxes,  pay-roll .tax  and 
statutory corporation payments)  and  each other major  source of 
revenue  (of which  the most important are land revenues and mining 
royalties)  and  estimate, as accurately as possible from  the 
available  information,  the amount  of revenue  that each  claimant 
state would  have  raised had it applied a  revenue effort of standard 
severity.  The  Commission's  standard is derived from  the average of 
the revenue  structures of the standard states (taking into account 
the revenue  base  and  the rates).  Subject to allowance  for population 
differences,  the difference between  the notional standard tax 
revenue  of the  claimant state and  the  revenue it would  have  raised on 
average if it had  had  the standard states'  revenue  bases  (and 
revenue  efforts) is then the measure  of the  claimant state's need for 
that revenue  source.  '!be  claimant state's need  may  be  negative if it 
has above-standard revenue-raising capacity. - 159-
As  regards expenditure needs,  a  large part of the states  •  total 
budget expenditure is on social services, and this is reflected in 
the  assessment of the  Grants Commission.  The  Commission's objective 
is to estimate what  the expenditure in each field of social services 
would  be  in each claimant state if it operated those services at a 
level equal to the average of the standard states.  This amount is 
then compared with the standard states' expenditure  (adjusted for 
population differences)  and  the difference is the measure  of the 
claimant state's need  (which  may  be  negative for a  particular item). 
Expenditure  needs arise from  such factors as differences in the 
number of units for which  services need to be  provided  (for example, 
in education as a  result of demographic differences), or differences 
in unit costs (for example, as a  result of differences in the scale 
of service provision or in population dispersion).  Other expenditure 
needs may  be  associated with administrative services, debt charges, 
or state business undertakings. 
A claimant state's needs may  be  partly met  through other grants or 
shared taxes from  the federal government  (such as Financial 
Assistance Grants).  The  recommended  Special Grant is therefore  the 
difference  between the assessed needs and  the contribution which 
those other grants or revenues make  towards  the assessed needs. 
Table 4 indicates the effect of the Special Grants on  total state 
revenues in 1971-72.  Over half of the state revenues shown  are 
accounted for by  the very large Financial Assistance  ~rants (see 
Part IV). - 160-
Table 4 
Revenue  equalisation effects of the Australian Special Grants 1971-72 
(receiving states  State revenues(l)  Special Grants  State revenues 
underlined)  per capita~  per capita  (1)  per capita 
Special Grants  ¢A  after Special 
¢A  Grants  ¢A 
Tasmania  29).9  24.62  )18.5 
Western Australia  249.5  - 249.5 
South Australia  222.8  lO.o6  2)2.9 
New  South Wales  200.)  - 200.) 
Queensland  205.6  4.86  210.5 
Victoria  197.)  - 197.J 
Total  209.)  211.7 
(1)  Receipts  from  the federal  government  (including Financial  Assistance 
Grants)  and  state taxes,  excluding other non-tax revenues. 
Grants Commission,  Fortieth Report,  Canberra 1973,  and  P~yments to or 
for the  States and  Local  Government  Authorities,  1974-75,  Canberra 1974• 
The  federal government has kept in its hands  (in negotiation with 
tile state governments)  the distribution of the larger part of the 
transfers to the states, while  the  Special Grants calculated by the 
independent Grants Commission appear to be  the final and relatively 
small finishing touches  to  the equalisation process.  As  noted above, 
Financial Assistance Grants or other revenues containing an equalisation 
element have  been  taken into account by  the Grants Commission in the 
-process of calculating the amounts  to be  recommended as Special Grants. 
The  Special Grants may  nonetheless be  considered to have  a  greater 
significance  than their nominal amount,  since they have determined 
the final degree of equalisation  ;  if the Financial Assistance Grants 
were  relatively less for the  claimant states,  the Special Grants would 
be automatically greater (See again Part IV  on this inter-relation). - 161-
III.  Tax-Sharing Arrangements  with Redistributive Characteristics 
It is often the  case in federations that the revenues from  certain 
taxes are shared between  the  federal and state governments,  or are 
collected by  the federal authorities and handed  back  to  the  states. 
In the  present paper we  are not concerned with cases of this sort 
where  the states'  shares of such  taxes are distributed in a  manner 
equivalent to  taxes having been the own  resources of the  states; 
because  no  redistribution is involved. 
We  are concerned,  however,  with instances where  taxes are handed  back 
to the states in a  deliberately redistributive manner.  Redistribution 
of this kind,  as described in the following examples,  tend to follow 
from  the  use  of population keys·  - sometimes  weighted to reflect urban 
density or other 'needs'  factors - or more  complicated criteria 
having much  in common  with  some  of the equalisation formulae  already 
described. 
1.  The  German  shared taxes 
More  than two-thirds of total tax revenue in Germany  come  from  taxes 
which  are  shared between  the different levels of government.  Income 
tax and  the tax on  industry and  trade  ( Gewerbesteuer,  excluding 
payroll tax) is shared between Bund,  Lander and municipalities. 
Corporation tax and  VAT  are shared between  Bund  and  Lander. 
Of  these  taxes only the  VAT  is the  subject of deliberate 
redistribution in the  sense  just defined.  Before  describing the 
VAT  fromula, it is worth  noting that the  'neutral' distribution of 
the other shared taxes is itself a  rather complex  operation.  For both 
personal and corporate income  tax, in particular,  the locality of 
collection does not provide a  satisfactory basis for distribution 
of the  states' share.  To  correct the distortions inherent in the 
'collection basis'  (resulting, for example,  from  the concentration 
of corporate tax revenues in cities with head offices.  of large 
firms)  adjustments are made  to the distribution according to certain 
rules  (zerle~) which  seek to represent the real localisation of 
the tax base  see Chapter  16 ) • - 162-
'!he  redistribution of the  VAT  revenue has two  stages.  First, the 
Bund  versus Iiinder shaxes can be  varied, as a  result of negotiations 
and federal legislation.  The  shaxes have evolved recently as follows 
65  :  35  in 1973,  63  :  37  in 1974,  68.25  :  31.75 in 1975  and 
69  :  31  in 1976.-
'!he  second stage,  the relevant one  in the  present context, 
redistributes the  35  per cent total for all the  Lander (in 1973) 
between the  lAnder. 
'!he  financial Equalisation Law  of 1969  specifies that 75  per cent 
of the Lander's share of VAT  is to  be  allocated in proportion to the 
number  of inhabitants of the  Lander,  and up  to 25  per cent of the 
Uinder' s  shaxe as supplementary shaxes  (Ergiinzungsanteile). 
Supplementary shaxes are paid to those  ~er  whose  revenue  per 
capita,  from  income  tax,  corporation tax and the  trade tax levy 
(Gewerbesteuerumlage),  and from  their own  taxes  (wealth tax,  tax on 
motor vehicles, succession duty,  betting and  gambling tax, duty on 
beer) is below  the average for the Lander.  The  qualifying Ui.nder 
receive supplementary shares bringing their revenue  to 92  per cent 
of the average for the  Lander. 
The  distribution of the Lander's share of VAT  between the individual 
Iiinder has to oo  seen as the first step of "fiscal equalisation", 
i.e. equalisation of per capita tax revenue of the  Lander as described 
in Part II. 
Table  5 shows  the extent of revenue  equalisation achieved by  the 
VAT  redistribution process.  ('!he  figures in the final colwnn are 
identical to those in the first column of '.i.'able  2, which illustrates 
how  the  VAT  redistribution is the first stage of the equalisation 
process completed by the Landerfinanzausgleich). - 163-
Table  5 
Revenue  equalisation effects of the  German  VAT  redistribution 1971 
Per capita tax revenue(a)  Per capita tax revenue 
before redistribution  (b)~ 
of VAT,  as a  percentage  redistribution of VAT 
of the Linder average  as a  percentage of 
(c)  the Lander average 
Hamburg  164.)  147.9 
Bremen  12).0  116.0 
Hessen  110.7  106.6 
Baden-WUrttemberg  109.0  105.) 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  104.7  102.0 
Bayern  94.5  95.8 
Rheinland-Pfalz  86.4  b9.5 
Schleswig-Holstein  81.0  b8.1 
Niedersachsen  77·3  88.1 
Saarland  72.2  e8.1 
Total  100.0  100.0 
{a)  Including the Landers'  share of joint taxes (income  tax,  corporation 
tax)  the  trade  tax levy ( Gewerbesteuerumlage),  and  their own  taxes 
(wealth tax,)  tax on  motor  vehicles,  succession duty,  the duty on  beer, 
and betting and  gambling  tax). 
(b)  As  (a)  plus VAT. 
~:  The  92% equalisation rule  (described in the  text) applies to the 
sum  of tax revenues before  VAT  redistribution (as in the first column), 
and for this purpose  uses only one-quarter of the Landers'  share of VAT 
revenue.  The  remaining three-quarters of their VAT  revenue  is then 
distributed on  a  population key basis,  subject to some  further corrective 
refinements.  The  sum  of this VAT  revenue is included in the  second column 
(which is why  not all amounts  necessarily reach 92  %) 
~  :  derived from  unpublished Federal Ministry of Finance  sources - 164-
2.  Swiss  shared  taxes 
The  25  cantons of the  Confederation have  a  considerable degree  of tax 
autonomy,  particularly in the field of personal income  tax and 
corporation tax.  Tax  sharing arrangements between  the Federation and 
the  cantons are not very important. 
Some  rather small parts of the  revenue of an anticipatory tax 
(Verrechnungssteuer),  stamp duties, a  mill  tary service exemption duty 
and  the profits from  the alcohol monopoly  and  the National Bank  are 
distributed from  the  Federal Government  to the  cantons,  normally on 
a  population basis. 
Only  one  Federal tax,  to  judge  by its relative revenue  importance, 
seems really significant in the  present context.  This is the  so-called 
Federal Direct Tax  (FDT),  the former federal defence  tax  (Wehrsteuer) 
which  is a  tax on  corporate  income  and  net worth,  and on  individual 
income. Although much  less  important than the  cantonal  and  local 
income  and  corporation taxes,  FDT  revenue  was  around 7 per cent of 
total tax revenue  in Switzerland in 1972. 
The  FDT  is distributed 70  per cent to  the  Federal government  and  JO 
per cent to the  cantons.  The  distribution of the  cantons'  share is 
based  on  three  types of keys. 
- 25  per cent  (of total tax revenue)  based on  local tax revenue,  which 
implies no  redistributive effect ; 
- 1.25 per cent (of total tax revenue)  based  on  cantonal population, 
which  implies  some  redistributive effect  ; 
- J.  75  per cent (of total tax revenue)  based on tax capacity 
(Wehrsteuerkraft),  used in combination with a  set of rules that 
gives a  strong redistributive effect.  This will be  described in 
more  detail,  partly because it also serves for  the distribution 
of other Federal-cantonal transfers, particularly specific purpose 
grants. 
The  Wehrsteuerkraft (tax capacity)  of a  canton is defined as per 
capita cantonal revenue  of the  FDT  collected in that canton.  Only 
cantons with a  below  average  Wehrsteuerkraft per capita receive 
compensation  payments  (Ausgleichszahlungen) from  the 3·75 per cent 
of total FDT  revenues. 
The  J.  75  per cent of the  FDT  is then distributed to the  below-average 
cantons in proportion to their respective Wehrsteuerkraft per capita 
after this key  has been weighted as follows  : - 165-
- for financially strong cantons by 
- for financially medium  cantons by 
- for financially weak  cantons  by 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
The  distinction between  'strong',  'medium'  and  'weak'  cantons is_for 
this purpose  determined by a  set of indices which  comprise  cantonal 
and local tax revenue,  population density and  special factors like 
hill farming. 
J.  Austrian shared taxes 
A large part of total taxation in Austria consists of shared taxes, 
shared between all three levels of government.  The  Federation takes 
the  largest share, followed  by  the municipalities, with the states 
(Bundeslander)  in third place.  In most  cases the states'  share is 
distributed on  the basis of local collections (i.e. without 
redistributive effect). 
Some  shared tax revenues of the  states are, however,  redistributed 
on  a  population l::asis,  notably the wage  taxes, 5/6ths of the duty 
on  wine,  VAT  and  the duty on  beer.  A particularly complicated key 
is applied for sharing the duty on  mineral oil, the  formula  including 
population,  territorial criteria, kms.  of roads,  and  the revenue of 
the  taxes on  motor vehicles and  on  industry and  trade  (Gewerbesteuer). 
The  equalisation process for the  liinder is then completed by  the 
Finanzausgleich mechanism  already described in Part II. 
4.  United States Revenue  Sharing 
The  present system of Revenue  Sharing in the  United states was 
established by  the state and  Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, 
and  is administered by  the  Federal Office of Revenue  Sharing. 
According  to the Act,  approximately ¢ )0.2 billion is to be  returned 
to more  than )8,000 state and  local governments over a  five-year 
period from  1972  to 1976  (1).  Legislation in October 1976  extended 
the 1972  Act  with certain amendments  through 1980.  The  State and 
Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments  of 1976  did not alter the 
distribution formulae. 
(1)  Divided as follows 
Entitlement period 
Period 1 
Period 2 
Period J 
Period 4 
Period 5 
Period 6 
Period  7 
Dates 
1/1/72 - 30/6/72 
1/7/72  -31/~2/.72 
l/l/7J - 30/6/7J 
1/7/7J - 30Z6/74 
1/7/74 - 30{6/?5 
1/7/75 - 30/6/76 
1/7/76 -31/12/76 
Amount 
¢ 2 ,6_50  billion 
2,6:JJ 
2,988 
6 ,0.50 
6,200 
6 ,J.50 
J,J25 - 166-
In purely formal  te:tms,  the  programme  is financed from  a  Trust 
Fund  into which  funds are paid frOm  Federal income  tax 
collections.  However,  since neither the total allocation nor 
its distribution formulae  are in any  way  determined  by  the income 
tax,  the  programme  is more  a  general grant system than a  shared 
tax. 
The  revenue allocation procedure involves four major stages  : 
- determining the aggregate  sum  going to each of the fifty-one 
state areas  ; 
- splitting each amount  into shares for state and  local government: 
one-third of the state's allocation is paid to  the  state 
government,  and  the remaining two-thirds are apportioned to 
units of local government within  the  state  ; 
- allocating the  two-thirds'local share  by  county areas 
- calculating each  local jurisdiction's part of the total sum 
available for the  county in which it is located. 
Because  of certain minimum  and  maximum  provisions in the  law, 
the calculations for the  second,  third and fourth steps must 
be  carried out several times.  The  following paragraphs describe 
only the first step for the  state area allocations. 
The  Revenue  Sharing  law reflects a  compromise  between  two 
different formulae  which  were  initially adopted by  the House 
of Representatives and  the Senate respectively, with a  bias 
more  in favour of urban areas sought by  the  House,  as opposed 
to  the Senate's relative inclination towards rural interests. 
The~  formula  provides equal weight for three factors  : 
- population 
- general tax effort, <Bfined  as the  ratio of total state and 
local tax revenue  to the  personal income  of the state's 
residents  ; 
- relative income,  defined as the ratio obtained by  dividing 
the  nation-wide average of per capita income  by  the state's 
per capita income. 
Under  the  Senate  formula,  each state's shared revenue is 
determined by  multiplying the  three relevant factors and 
dividing the result by  the  sum  of the  corresponding products 
for all fifty-one  state areas. - 167-
Under  the House  formula,  each state is entitled to  the  sum  of five 
component amounts,  each of which reflects the state's proportion of 
the national total of a  specified factor,  as follows  : 
- population (22 %  weight) 
- ~opulation times relative income,  as defined for the 0enate formula 
(22 %  weight) 
- urbanised population (inhabitants of urbanised areas having 
nucleus cities with populations of JO,OOO  and  over)  (22% weight) 
- general tax effort,  as in the  Senate  formula  (17 %  weight) 
- 15 per cent of revenue  from  state-imposed personal income  taxes, 
but for each state not less than one  per cent or more  than 6  per 
cent of the federal personal income  tax liabilities of its residents 
(17 %weight). 
In the  Senate-House  compromise, it was  agreed that  : 
- the  total amount  due  to each  state area should be calculated 
according to both formulae  ; 
- each state then  should be  assigned that formula amount  which  gave 
it the  larger of the  two  sums  ;  and 
- the resulting amount  for each  state then should be  scaled down 
by whatever uniform  percentage was  necessary to bring the 
resulting total for all states within the  sum  appropriated for the 
particular entitlement period. 
The  1972  allocations for Jl states were  based on  the  senate  formula. 
The  allocations of the  other 20  states were  determined by  the  House 
formula.  Nearly all the states that gained from  application of the 
Senate formula rank  low  in per capita income ~  and  most of them  rank  low 
also in their extent of urbanisation.  On  the other hand,  the  states to 
which  the House  formula is more  favourable  generallyJank high in both 
measures. 
In the  United States context,  the  Revenue  Sharing programme  appears 
to be  a  relatively small first step in general purpose redistribution 
by  the federal and  state governments.  The  programme  has  some  features 
common  to budget equalisation schemes,  but is very limited in its 
extent compared  to the  'proper'  equalisation schemes  described above. 
The  attempt to help urban areas, as reflected in the ~  formula, 
appears to have  been submerged  by  other elements in the allocation 
process,  notably as a  result of incorporating a  penalty for high fiscal 
capacity as indicated by  high per capita income  because  the  most 
highly urbanised states typically have  above-average  incomes  (1). 
(1)  See  the detailed evaluation by Nathan,  Manvel  and  Calkins,  in Monitoring 
Revenue  Sharing,  The  Brookings Institution,  1975 - 168-
The  direction of its redistributive effect, however,  is fairly 
clear, especially in favour of low  fiscal capacity - high tax effort 
states, penalizing those  with high capacity and  low  effort.  For 
example,  the  poorest state, Hississippi,  with a  per capita :personal 
income  (in 1969)  of 62  per cent of the  federal average,  received ¢ 40 
per capita in shared revenue  in 1972,  whereas Connecticut,  the richest 
state with a  per capita personal income  of 125  per cent of the federal 
average,  received~ 22.  These  amounts  have  only a  small  impact,  however 
on  relative state revenues,  the per capita state revenue  of Mississippi 
improving 2  percentage  points towards  the federal average,  Connecticut 
declining 1  point.  (See  Table  6, which  relates, however,  only to  the· 
one-third state government receipts, whereas  the dollar amounts  just 
quoted refer to  the  total state area receipts.) - 169-
TABLE  6 
Effect  of United States Revenue-sharing on State Revenues,  1970-71 
Ta.x  revenue  Shared revenue  Tax  revenue  I  (3)-(1)  Personal  ~ncome 
State 
p,c.~  p.c. 
p.c.~  Index numbers  +  or  - p,c,  (1969) 
revenue¢  aha.ring  revenue  sharing  changes  Index 
¢  ¢ 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Alabama  208.57  8,76  217.33  81.1  100.2  81.8  + 0.7  74 
Alaska  347.62  7.30  354.92  135.2  83.5  133.5  - l.  7  119 
Arizona  295.00  9.44  304.44  114.8  108,0  114.5  - 0.3  94 
Arkansas  196.86  10.04  206.90  76.6  114.9  77.8  + 1.2  69 
California  292.19  9.35  301.54  113.7  107.0  113.4  - 0.3  116 
Colorado  234.86  8.22  243.08  91.4  94.0  91.4  o.o  100 
Connecticut  263.93  7.39  271.32  102.7  84.5  102.0  - o. 7  125 
Delaware  404.14  n.  72  415.86  157.2  134.1  156.4  - 0,8  105 
District of Columbia  - - - - - - - 123  (;inc.  with Maryland) 
Flonde  232.26  7.20  239.46  90.3  82.4  90.1  - 0.2  98 
Georgia  215.13  7.96  223.09  83.7  91.1  83.9  + 0.2  85 
Hawa.J.i  488.57  10.26  498.83  190.1  117 ·4  187.7  - 2.4  108 
' Idaho  261,84  9.95  271.79  101.9  113.8  102,2  + 0.3  85 
Illinois  283.45  8,22  291.67  110.3  94.0  109.7  - 0,6  112 
Indiana  202.78  7.30  210.08  78.9  83.5  79.0  + 0.1  98 
!"OW&  228.20  8.90  237.10  88.8  101,8  89.2  + 0.4  92 
Kansas  204.47  1·11  212.24  79.5  88.9  79.8  + 0.3  94 
Kentucky  226.38  10,64  237,02  88,1  121.7  89.2  + 1.1  78 
Louisiana  271.19  11.39  282,58  105.5  130.3  106,3  + 0.8  75 
Ma.l.ne  228.30  10.73  239.03  88,8  122.8  89.9  + 1.1  82 
Maryland  293.55  9.10  302,65  114.2  104.1  113.9  - 0,3  113 
Massachusetts  261.35  9.67  271.02  101.7  110,6  102,0  + 0,3  109 
Michigan  290.34  8.42  298.76  112.9  96.3  112.4  - 0.5  108 
Minnesota  291,25  9.32  300,57  113.3  106,6  113.1  - 0.2  97 
MJ.ssissippi  232.59  13.49  246.08  90.5  154.3  92.6  + 2,1  62 
MiSSOUI'l.  184.47  7.01  191.48  71.8  80.2  72.0  + 0,2  95 
Montana  196.60  9.83  206.43  76.5  112.5  77.7  + 1.2  93 
Nebraska  198.18  8.72  206.90  77 ,l  99.8  7(,8  + 0,7  90 
Nevada  356.82  7.85  364.67  138.8  89  .• 8  137.2  - 0.6  114 
New  Hampsh1re  159.36  7.49  166.85  62.0  85.7  62,8  + 0,8  96 
New  Jersey  209.46  1 .·,5  217,21  81.5  88.7  81.7  + 0,2  118 
New  Manco  310,83  11.19  322.02  120.9  128.0  121,1  - 0,2  78 
New  York  347.42  10.77  358.19  135.1  123.2  134.8  - 0,3  116 
North Carolina  254.86  8,92  263.78  99.1  102.1  99.2  + 0.1  79 
North Dakota  230,00  11.96  241.96  89.5  136.8  91.0  + 0.5  79 
Ohio  167.25  6,69  173.94  65.1  76.5  65.4  + 0.3  103 
Oklahoma  213.05  7.67  220,72  82.9  87.7  83,0  + 0,1  86 
Oregon  211.25  8.45  219.70  82.2  96.7  82.7  + o.s  101 
Pennsy  1  van1 a  261.67  7.85  269.52  101.8  89.8  101.4  - 0.4  98 
Rhode  Island  282.67  8.48  291.15  110,0  97.0  109.5  - 0.5  100 
South Carolina  232.44  9.53  241.97  90.4  109.0  91.0  + 0,6  74 
South Dakota  182,73  12,06  194.79  71,1  138.0  73.3  + 2,2  77 
Tennessee  186.44  8.39  194.83  72.5  96.0  73.3  + 0,8  79 
Texas  194.47  7.39  201,86  75.6  84.5  75.9  + 0.3  90 
Utah  253.16  9.62  262,78  98.5  110.1  98.9  + 0.4  86 
Vermont  315.14  11.03  326,17  122,6  126.2  122.7  + 0.1  89 
Virginia  224.12  7.62  231.74  87.2  87,2  87.2  o.o  96 
Washington  330.87  7.61  338.48  128.7  87.1  127.3  - 1,4  108 
West  Virginia  240.74  13.00  253.74  93.6  148.7  95.5  + 1.9  75 
Wisconsin  324.19  10,05  334.24  126.1  115.0  125.7  - 0.4  97 
Wyomng  270.00  9.99  279.99  105,0  114.3  105.3  + 0.3  93 
National  average  257,06  8.74  265.8  I 
100,0  100.0  100,0  100 
~·  D1fferent  tables 1n Nathan et al.,  op.  c1 t. and  own  calculations - 170-
IV.  Other General Purpose  Grants 
t~hereas the  preceding sections concern  systems  characterized by 
automatic  formulae  or by  the fixed distribution of shared taxes,  the 
general purpose  grants discussed in this section are characterized 
by  their openness to regular political bar~ing on  their total amount 
and  their distribution, and  the absence  of any  transparent and 
precisely quantified economic  justification. 
Australia and  Germany  both have  parts of their systems  whi~hare of 
this kind.  Canada  and  the United states do  not. 
1.  German  Erg?.nzungszuweisungen  (supplementary grants) 
In addition to  the  ~nderfinanzausgleich and  VAT  redistribution 
mechanisms  already described,  there exists a  further category of general 
pur.pose  grants paid from  the  Federal Government  to  the  'fiscally poor' 
Lander.  The  total amount  of these  so-called ErgUnzungszuweisungen is 
a  matter of political bargaining between  the F'ederal and  Lander 
governments.  For the years 1974  - 76  the  total amount  of the  grant has 
been fixed at an amount  corresponding to 1.5 per cent of total VAT 
revenue.  The  distribution key,  also fixed politically and  unchanged 
since  1972,  is shown  in Table  ?,  together with  the relative population 
and  GDP  shares of the states in question (which  are  shown  for information: 
they are not determinants of the distribution key). 
Table  7 
(recipient  Fixed distri- Amounts  Population  GDP 
I.iinder  only)  bution key  of  of supp.  distribution  distribution 
supp.  grants  grants in  perc~ntages  percentages 
percentages  Mio  DM 
Bayern  21.8  120.0  42.5  46.7 
Niedersachsen  .)6.9  20).0  28.5  27.6 
Rheinland-Pfalz  20.6  llJ.O  14.5  15·7 
Saarland  5.8  )2.0  4.5  4.5 
Schleswig Holst  14.9  82.0  10.1  9.5 
Total  100.0  550.0  100.0  100.0 
~  Finanzbericht 1975,  and  Statistisches Jahrbuch 1974. - 171-
The  receiving Lander are  the  same  as the beneficiaries under  the 
Landerfinanzausgleich mechanism,  except that the city-state of Bremen 
is excluded. 
The  relative importance of the  ~rginzungszuweisungen has been growing 
substantially, rising in amount  from  8 per cent of equalisation 
receipts from  the  Landerfinanzausgleich mechanism  in 1970,  to J9 per cent 
in 1974.  (These  figures are not strictly comparable,  since the equalisation 
receipts are net, whereas all states contribute to the financing of the 
~rg#nzungszuweisungen- see part V below.) 
The  effect of the l!::=giinzungszuweisungen is to raise further the degree 
of fiscal equalisation in Germany  from  the 95  per cent minimum  after 
the  Uinderfinanzausgleich to an effective 97·5 per cent minimum  (see 
Table 8), although  the latter percentage has no  place in any distribution 
formula in the way  that is true of the 95  per cent or the  VAT  92  per cent. 
Table 8 
1.  2.  J.  4. 
1973  Per Capita tax  Index  Per capita  Per capita 
revenue after  Uinder  'supplementary  1 + J  tax revenue 
inter-~  average  grant'  for  after inter-
equalisation  = 100  'fiscally poor'  'iiiider 
Uinder  equalization 
!!:!!!!  suppl. 
grants'  as 
a  Lander 
average in 
Column  1 
Nordrhein- DM  DM 
Westfalen  1,222.0  lOO.J  - 1,222.0 lOO.J 
Bay ern  1,11:32.1  97.0  11.1  1,19).2  97-9 
Ba.den-WUrttemb.  1.,218.)  100.0  - 1,218.; 100.0 
Niedersachsen  1,167.2  95.8  28.1  1,195.3  98.1 
Hessen  1,2)2.9  101.2  - 1,2)2.9 101.2 
Rheinland-Pfalz  1,157·4  95.0  J0.6  1,188.0  97.5 
Schlesw.-Holst.  1,180,8  96.9  )1.9  1,212.7  99.5 
Saarland  1,2;8.7  101.7  28.7  1,267.4 104.0 
Hamburg  1,61).0  1)2.4  - 1,61).0 1)2.4 
Bremen  1,510.7  124.0  - 1,510.7 124.0 
Total  1,218.J  100.0  100.0 
~  as for Tables 2  and  7 - 172-
2.  Australian Financial Assistance  Grants 
The  origin of the Financial Assistance  Grants dates back to the 
second  world war  when  the federal government  took over exclusive 
powers  to impose  income  tax.  By  way  of compensation,  the  states were 
paid  'tax reimbursement grants', which  were  initially based on  the 
states'  average  income  tax collections in the  years 1939-40  and 
194C-41. 
In their origin,  therefore,  the  grants had in principle no 
redistributive effect and  were  analo~ous to a  system of shared 
income  tax  (as at present in Germany).  !be states have  always 
retained the  constitutional right to return to  the field of income 
tax collection in competition with  the  federal  government,  although 
they would  have  forgone  the Financial Assistance  Grants if they had 
attempted  to do  so  and  politically such action was  virtually 
impossible. 
Over  the  years,  however,  the  Financial Assistance  Grants were 
transformed into a  major instrument of redistribution in favour of 
the financially weaker  states,  notably in 1959  when  their name  was 
adopted.  The  base  allowances were  normally revised every five  years 
(the last ~uin~uenium was  1970-75),  with regular annual revisions in 
the  light of population changes,  increases related to  the  national 
wage  index,  and  a  so-called betterment  (or growth)  factor. 
As  from  1976-77,  Financial Assistance Grants have  been replaced 
by  an arrangement for  sharing income  taxes with the  states (see 
Chapter  13). 
The  relative magnitude  and  redistributive power  of the Financial 
Assistance  Grants is illustrated in Table  9.  It is evident that these 
grants dwarfed  the  Special  (e~ualisation) Grants and  the Special 
Revenue  Assistance  (see further below)  in size,  both as a  general 
source of  state finance  and as an instrument of redistribution 
to  the  financially weaker  states.  The  two  relatively rich and  populous 
states of New  South Wales  and  Victoria received (in 1971-72)  about 
;t  A.  100  per capita, with  the other poorer and  less populous  states 
receiving between ¢.  A.  125 ¢.A.  178  per capita.  (see also Part V 
on  redistribution effects.) - 173-
Table  9 
Australian Federal General Purpose  Grants  to the States in 1971-72 
¢.A.  per capita 
New  Victoria  Queensland  South  Western  Tasmania 
South  Australia  Australia 
Wales 
Financial  99.47  98.59  125.12  lJJ.89  l6J.J4  178.24  Assistance 
Grants 
Special  7.71  ).85  4.65  5.01  5·75  6.41 
Revenue 
Assistance 
Special 
(equal.)  - - 4.86  10.06  - 24.62 
Grants 
Total  107.18  102.44  1)4.6J  148.96  169.09  209.27 
~  as Table  4 
There  was  no  definite,  formula-based distribution key.  Rather,  the 
distribution in money  terms  inherited from  previous years was 
continuously pushed  and  pulled through  the  processes of political 
bargaining into the distribution pattern for the  succeeding years. 
The  inter-relation with  the Special (equalisation)  Grants must, 
however,  be  continously borne in mind •.  F'irst, as a  concrete 
illustration, is the fact that over the  years amounts  of Special 
Grants were  on  occasion consolidated into the Financial Assistance 
Grants.  For example,  Table  9  shows  Tasmania in receipt of special 
grants in 1971-72.  Subsequently it was  agreed that Tasmania  would 
cease  to  be a  'claimant'  state in exchange  for an increase in its 
base  Financial Assistance Grant. 
Secondly,  the criteria developed and  calculated by  the  Grants 
Commission  seem  to have  had  an important influence in the  public 
debate as a  general standard of reference. 
Total 
llJ.85 
5·73 
2.41 
122.00 
Thirdly,  as already indicated in Part II, the calculation of the 
Special Grants  (albeit only for  the  limited number  of claimant  • states) - 174-
topped  up  the  Financial Assistance  Grants,  but did so  according to  the 
Grants Commission's  own  criteria, which  took  the Financial Assistance 
Grants into account as receipts of the states when  recommending  the 
amounts  of Special Grants. If the Financial Assistance Grants were 
cut,  then all other things being equal,  the  Grants Commission  would 
automatically recommend  increased Special Grants for the  "claimant" 
states. 
Finally, in the continuing debate in Australia on how  best to 
organize  their fiscal federalism,  a  thesis frequently advanced was 
that the Special Grants and  Financial Assistance Grants  should be 
merged  ;  opinions naturally differ as to whether this consolidated 
operation should lie in the hands of the  independent Grants 
Commission  or of the  Federal and  State Governments. 
Under  the  new  federalism arrangements which  operate from  1976-77, 
the states'share of income  taxes is initially being distributed 
in accordance  with  the distribution of the Financial Assistance  Grants 
in 1975  - 76,  and  the financially weaker states will continue  to 
have  access to the  Grants Commission.  Provision has also been  made  for 
a  periodical review of the interstate relativities, but so  far no 
decision has been  made  as to  how and by  whom  this review will be 
undertaken. 
J.  Australian Special Revenue  Assistance 
Ad  hoc  increases in the  grants for some  or all states are frequently 
agreed by  the Australian Government  within the  course of a  year.  This 
Special Hevenue  Assistance i.s  sometimes but not invariably, built 
into the  base for the  purpose  of calculating the Financial Assistance 
Grants in successive years. - 175-
V.  Relative  Importance  of Egualisation Payments  and  other General 
Purpose Grants in State Revenues,  and their Redistributive Effects. 
1.  Relative  importance in state revenues 
and shown  graphically 
as per cent  of  (1)  as per cent  of total 
state tax revenues  state tax and non-
tax revenues  (2) 
highest  lowest  average  highest  lowest  average 
Germany  85  4  33  35-0  2  18 
Australia  284  114  148  51-7  34  39 
Canada  95  0  12  28.6  0  7 
United States  6  2  3  2.6  o< 3)  2 
2.  Redistributive Effects 
This  section compares  the redistributive effects of the various 
mechanisms  described above.  Table  10  summarises the data that 
permits these  comparisons  to be made,  giving (i) the range  of index 
numbers for vertical federal  per capita grant  amounts  (average  =  100), 
(ii) the volume  of equalisation payments as percentage of personal 
income,  (iii) the elasticity of the program with respect  to personal 
income,  (iv) its statistical significance,  and  (v)  the 
redistributive power  and (vi)  the  change  in Gini-coeffioients due  to 
the equalisation payments. 
The  overall picture is that the  equalisation mechanisms  of Germany, 
Canada  and Australia achieve  significant redistributive effects, 
ranging from  10  to  25%  redistributive power  with respect to regional 
or state personal  income  differentials.  The  United States General 
revenue-sharing scheme  has  only a  very slight redistributive power 
- of under  1 %. 
(1)  The  denominator here excludes  shared tax revenues  identified as 
'redistributive'  in Part III,  as well  as the other types of 
general  purpose grants. 
(2)  The  denominator here  includes all tax revenues,  general  purpose 
and specific purpose grants and  other non-tax revenues. 
(3)  Negligible - 176-
The  results are not  strictly comparable  between Germany  and the 
other federations,  since the Finanzausgleich consists of net 
transfers between states whereas in the three other federarions 
gross payments are made  from  the federal  budget to states.(1) 
However,  the difference in redistributive power  between gross and 
net  effects of the equalisation is smaller than 2 % for Australia, 
0,5 %for Canada and 0,3 %for the United States.  (2)  (3) 
The  German  system of general purpose grants has  a  redistributive 
effect in the order of 10% (4).  The  difference between the 
redistributive power  and the  change  in Gini  coefficients is mainly 
due  to the preferential treatment  given to the high income  ~nder 
Hamburg  and  Bremen,  which  is weighed more  in the redistributive 
power  measure  since Hamburg  and Bremen  have  a  relatively small 
population.  If Hamburg  and  Bremen  were  omitted from  the  computations 
the redistributive power  would  increase to about  18  %. 
The  considerable amount  of redistribution is achieved with a  very 
small  volume  of inter-Lander transfers.  The  net transfer from  rich 
to poor Lander  in VAT-sharing  and  Finanzausgleich is respectively 
about  0.2 %  and 0.3 % of total German  personal  income.  The 
redistributive effect  of the two  instruments is at 4.2 % and 
4.6 %  nearly equal.  Supplementary grants are of minor  importance. 
The  Australian grant  system is the most  powerful redistributor of 
the four federationsstudied.  Its redistributive effect  is in the 
order of 25  %,  i.e, about  a  quarter of personal  income  differentials 
is eliminated by general  purpose grants.  This is  pos~ible because 
regional differences in personal  income  per capita are  small  in 
Australia- the mini-max ratio is about  1.2 as  compared  to  about 
2  in the three other federations - and  the poorest  states in 
Western Australia and  Tasmania have  small  populations,  which  can be 
easily treated preferentially without  severely burdening the big 
rich provinces.  As  in the German  case this fact  also  explains the 
considerable difference between the two  mea~ures of the redistribut-
ive effect. 
(1)  In the  case of German  VAT-sharing Finanzausgleich and  Total the 
elasticity is not  defined. 
(2)  These  figures  are derived from  the redistributive power  study of 
revenues  in Chapter 9 by applying the elasticity results to the 
general  purpose equalisation volume. 
(3)  The  net  effects are not  used in order to  be  able later to aggregate 
the  single results for taxes,  general purpose grants,  specific 
purpose grants and  other expenditures without  double  counting. 
(4)  The  VAT-sharing  in Germany  is atypical  since it is not  an expenditure 
part  of the federal  budget.  In order to evaluate its redistributive 
power it was  therefore necessary to assess the region of origin of 
shared VAT  revenues.  As  in Chapter 9 it was  assumed that  VAT  is borne 
by consumers  and therefore regionally allocated in proportion to 
private  consumption. - 177-
Most  of the total redistributive effect  is achieved with the 
financial  assistance grants.  Since these grants are vertically 
distributed to all provinces the equalisation volume  (5%  of total 
national  income)  is quite  substantial.  Special grants have  a 
considerable redistributive effect with the same  volume  as German 
supplementary grants.  Special  revenue  assistance is of minor 
importance. 
Canadian equalisation grants have  a  redistributive power  in the 
order of  15  %.  Though  the Canadian  system is vertical this 
degree  of equalisation is achieved with an equalisation volume  of 
only 1.4% of national  personal  income.  This is possible because 
only below average fiscal  capacity provinces receive equalisation 
payments  and  populous Ontario, Alberta,  and British Columbia have 
above  average fiscal  capacity. 
In contrast to the Canadian  ~stem the  US  revenue  sharing distri-
butes  a  fixed  amount  of 0.6 % of national  personal  income  to 
all states and  achieves therefore only a  comparably negligible 
redistributive power  of one half to one  percent. - 178-
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Footnotes for  Table  10 
(1) 
( 2) 
In the  case  of the German  VA~sharing and Finanzausgleich the 
amount  of net transfers from  rich to poor countries as percent-
age  of personal  income. 
The  elasticity is the  slope of the regression line of the 
equalisation payment  on  personal  income  (see methodology 
developed in Chapter 5). 
Examples  of elasticity coefficients for vertical equalisation 
payments 
1.0 
o.o 
- 1.0 
Equalisation payments  proportional to personal  income 
(no redistributive effect) 
Equalisation payments  equal  per capita (redistributive 
effect proportional to the  equalisation volume) 
Equalisation payments  inversely proportional to 
personal  income  (strong redistributive effect) 
In the case  of horizontal  equalisation payments  no  elasticity 
can be  calculated,  since the  sum  of payments  equals  zero. 
The  redistributive power measure  is calculated directly by 
formula  (2)  in Chapter  5· 
(3)  Redistributive effect measured by the  reduction in personal  income 
differentials  bet~,reen regions  due  to the equalisation payments 
under the  assumption of regionally neutral  financing of these 
p~ents. It is equal to the deviation from  neutrality - measured 
by the difference between one  (neutral case)  and  the elasticity-
multiplied by the  equalisation volume. 
(4)  A modified  income  is calculated by adding to  personal  income 
per capita equalisation p~ents and  subtracting (for vertical 
payments)  amounts  representing the regional  breakdoHn  of the 
neutrally financed national total  amount  of  p~ents. The  Gini-
coefficient  of this modified  income  is compared  -vJith  the  Gini-
coefficient of personal  income. 
Source  Tables  A1  - A3 - 182-
TABLE  A 1 
Federal  General  Purpose  and Equalisation Grants per Head 
German:y  (BRD)  1973 
Total  VAT  Finanz- Supplementary 
grants  revenue  ausgleich  sharing  grants 
Schleawig~olatein  451  36  107  32 
Niederaachaen  468  _76  _94  28 
Nordrhein-Weatfalen  239  _23  -20  0 
He seen  193  21  65  0 
Rheinland-Pfalz  377  20  67  31 
Baden-WUrtt em berg  194  -24  -64  0 
Bay  em  305  17  15  11 
Saarland  592  !43  166  29 
Hamburg  71  _89  l89  0 
Bremen  357  41  97  0 
Berlin  0  0  0  0 
BRD  279  0  0  9 
BRD  (absolute)  17326  0  0  559 
Range  of index numbers  25/212  0/355 
Grant a  as %  of PI  0.2  0.3  0.1 
Elaatici  ty  - 7o39 
Statistical significance R2 
0.414 
Rediatri  buti  ve  power  9.4  4·2  4.6  0.7 
Change  in Gini-coefficient  14.5  5.8  7.4  1.4 
Federal  General  Purpose and Equalisation Grants per Head 
Australia 1971/12 
Total  Financial  Special  Eguali  sat  ion 
grants  assistance  revenue 
grants  aSsi"S'ta.ii'ce  grants 
New  South Wales  108  99  8  0 
Victoria  102  99  4  0 
Queensland  135  125  5  5 
South Australia  149  134  5  10 
Western Australia  169  163"  6  0 
Tasmania  209  178  6  25 
Australia  122  114  6  2 
Australia (absolute)  1573  1470  11  26 
Range  of index numbers  84/172  87/157  67-/l35  0/1022 
Grants  as %  of PI  5.8  5·4  0.3  0.1 
Elasticity  - 3.62  - 3.11  0.35  - 38.6 
Statistical significance R2  0.796  0.756  0.019  0.686 
Redi at ri  but  i ve  power  27.1  22.4  0.2  4.6 
Change in Gini-coefficient  20.4  18.5  - 0.6  2.8 
DM  per annum 
f!  POP 
10053  2580 
9951  7259 
11005  17246 
11253  5584 
10183  3701 
11750  9239 
10296  lo853 
9310  1112 
14966  1752 
12627  729 
11384  2048 
10914  62101 
677770 
85/137 
Aua.  ¢ per annum 
2196 
2180 
1893 
1891 
1982 
1791 
2090 
26952 
86/105 
4798 
3534 
1851 
1274 
1047 
392 
12896 - 183-
TABLE  A 2 
Federal  General  Purpose  and Equalisation Grants  per Head 
Canada 1973/74  Can.~ per annum 
Total 
equalisation  PI  POP 
grants 
Newfoundland  284  2039  541 
Prince Edward  Island  284  2305  115 
Nova  Scotia  193  2775  805 
New  Brunswick  217  2517  652 
Quebec  105  3315  6081 
Ontario  0  4376  7939 
Manitoba  98  3590  998 
Saskatchewan  151  3312  908 
Alberta  0  3868  1683 
British Columbia  0  3998  2373 
Canada  61  3748  22095 
Canada  (absolute)  1344  82812 
Range  of Index Numbers  0/463  54/117 
Grants as %  of PI  1.6 
Elasticity  - 8.39 
Statistical significance R2  0.965 
Redistributive power  15.4 
Change  in Gini-coefficient  13.0 
Federal  General  Purpose and Equalisation Grants per Head 
New  England 
.Middle Atlantic 
East  North Central 
West  North Central 
South Atlantic 
East  South Central 
West  South Central 
Mountain 
Pacific 
u.s.A. 
u.s.A.  (absolute) 
Range  of Index numbers 
Grants as %  of PI 
Elasticity 
Statistical sigtrificance R2 
Redistributive power 
Change  in Gini-coefficient 
U.S.A.  (9  regions)  1972  U.S.A.  ~ per annum 
Revenue 
sharing 
27 
28 
24 
26 
25 
28 
25 
28 
27 
26 
5414 
91/109 
0.6 
- 0.09 
0.030 
0.7 
0.5 
PI 
4370 
4587 
4440 
3972 
3899 
3206 
3541 
3903 
4484 
4162 
866624 
85/110 
fQE 
12099 
37660 
40926 
16624 
31773 
13102 
19983 
8840 
27216 
208223 Maine 
New  Hampshire 
Vermont 
Massachusetts 
Rhode  Island 
Connecticut 
New  York 
New  Jersey 
Pennsylvania 
Ohio 
Indiana 
Illinois 
Michigan 
Wisconsin 
Minnesota 
Iowa 
Missouri 
Kansas 
Nebraska 
South Dakota 
North Dakota 
Delaware 
Maryland 
Virginia 
West  Virginia 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Georgia 
Florida 
District  of ·columbia 
Kentucky 
Tennessee 
Alabama 
ltississippi 
Louisfana 
Arkansas 
Oklahoma 
Texas 
Montana 
Idaho 
Wyoming 
Colorado 
Utah 
Nevada 
Arizona 
New  Mexl.co 
California 
Oregon 
Washington 
Alaska 
Hawaii 
United States 
United States  (absolute) 
Range  of index numbers 
Grants  as %  of PI 
Elasticity 
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TABLE  A 3 
Federal  General  Purpose  and Equalisation Grants per Head 
U.S.A.  (51  regions)  1972 
Revenue  f.! 
sharing 
32  3224 
22  3931 
33  3288 
29  4429 
26  4076 
22  5007 
32  4799 
23  4899 
24  4067 
20  4265 
22  4121 
25  4840 
25  4576 
30  3961 
28  4004 
27  3999 
21  3977 
23  4124 
26  4082 
36  3393 
36  3425 
29  4951 
27  4595 
23  4035 
30  3149 
27  3606 
28  3262 
24  3677 
22  3935 
32  5619 
27  3288 
25  3415 
26  3217 
40  2838 
34  3252 
28  3005 
23  3458 
22  3745 
30  3699 
30  3505 
30  4081 
25  4305 
29  3500 
24  4822 
28  3948 
32  3260 
28  4585 
25  3964 
23  4081 
22  5040 
31  4781 
26  4162 
5414  866624 
77/153  68/121 
0.6 
- 0.59 
Statistical significance R2 
0.255 
Redistributive power  1,0 
Change in Gini-coefficient  0.6 
u.s.  ~ per annum 
1029 
771 
462 
5787 
968 
3082 
18367 
7367 
11926 
10782 
5291 
11251 
9081 
4520 
3896 
2883 
4753 
2258 
1525 
679 
632 
565 
4056 
4764 
1781 
5214 
2694 
4720 
7259 
748 
3299 
4031 
3510 
2263 
3720 
1578 
2634 
11648 
719 
756 
345 
2357 
1126 
527 
1945 
1065 
20451 
2182 
3443 
325 
799 
208223 Chapter 1 
SPIDIFIC  PURPOSE  GRANTS  IN FOUR  FEDERATIONS 
(  l"lorking paper  ) - 187-
1.  Introduction 
This paper is concerned with intergovernmental specific purpose 
grants in four federations  :  the  Federal Republic of Germany,  the 
United States, Canada  and  Australia. 
Table  1  situates the overall magnitude  of specific purpose  grants 
as 12  to 28  per cent of federal government expenditure,  from 
5  to 10  per cent of total public expenditure, and from  2  to  about  4 
percent of GNP  of the countries concerned. 
Intergovernmental specific purpose  grants are an extremely 
important part of the  mechanics of federalism,  as also of central-
local government relations in unitary states. This importance  stems 
from  the fact that specific purpose  grants are a  main  means 
whereby  the responsibilities for governmental functions  can be 
shared between  levels of government,  as opposed divided between 
governments  on  the basis of exclusive  competence.  To  follow  the 
current jargon,  specific purpose  grants are a  means  of  'cooperative 
federalism',  as opposed  to earlier conceptions of (exclusive 
competence)  'dual federalism'. 
The  interest in specific purpose  grants in the Community  context is 
the greater to  the  extent that the  functions of the Community 
institutions are more  likely to grow  through  the development of 
partial and  cooperative responsibilities in areas of competence 
shared with national governments,  as opposed  to  the transfers of 
exclusive  competence  from  national governments  to  the  Community. 
Sectors in which  Community  activit¥ has recently been developing 
(aid, regional and  social policies) are all instances of shared 
responsibilities, in which  the  Community  has been participating with 
specific purpose grants together with national governments. 
The  economic  function of specific purpose grants is usually 
allocative (i.e. aimed at affecting the  level or precise nature of 
~ublic expenditure  by function),  but may  also be  redistributive 
(i.e. aimed at providing a  degree of fiscal equalisation as between 
lower levels of government). 
It will be  seen that the mix  between these allocative and 
redistributive objectives depends in the  four cases studied in 
large measure  on  whether the country in question has a  system of 
budget equalisation.  As  has been described in Chapter  6 
Germany,  Australia and  Canada all operate rather comprehensive 
btrlget equalisation (general purpose  grant)  systems,  whereas  the 
United states does not.  As  a  result the United States'  specific 
purpose grant system has become  much  more  complex  than in the 
other three cases, with many  more  categories of grants, and  a 
tendency to build into many  of them  formulae  that aim at some  degree 
of fiscal equalisation.  Thus,  in the  United states, as a  federation 
without a  general purpose  budget equalisation system,  an attempt is 
made  to combine  allocative and redistributive  ~unctions in the - 188-
TABIE  1 
Relative importance of intergovernmental specific purpose 
grants in Germany,  Australia,  Canada  and  the United States 
Germany  Australia  Canada  United  States 
1973  1973  - 74  1973-74  1973  - 74 
Specific purpose 
Grants 
in mill.  nat.  15,407  1,208  4,419  )6,011  (l) 
currency 
%  of federal 
government  12.7  27.7  22.1  12.1 
expenditure 
% of total 
public  5·5  7.0  9.9  7.5 
expenditure 
%of GNP  1.7  2.4  3.2  2.7 
General  :12ur:e2se 
0.5(2)  ~  3.1  1.0  0.4 
%of GNP 
Other federal 
public  10.9  16.0  11.7  19.6 
ex~nditure 
% of GNP 
(1)  Corresponds  to the  total of )8,)40 for fiscal year 1974  shown  in 
later tables. 
(2)  The  figures for general purpose  grants for Germany  only include  the 
Erganzungszuweisungen  (supplementary grants)  and  Bundeshilfe  (Federal 
aid) for Berlin, and  exclude  the  budget equalisation function of the 
Landerfinanzausgleich and  of VAT  redistribution,  since  these are not 
federal expenditure.  However,  it should be  borne  in mind  that the latter 
two  functions account for much  the larger part of the  total redistributive 
power .of German  equalisation and  general purpose  grant functions 
(see Chapter  6  ).  For this reason the  importance  of German  general 
purpose  grants is somewhat  understated in the  Table. 
~  :  Tables in the following country reports and in Chapter  6 - 189-
specific purpose  grant system;  whereas in Germany,  Australia and 
Canada,  the existance of separate equalisation systems allows  the 
specific purpose  grant instruments to  be  directed at a  simpler 
range of allocative functions. 
There  is here a  further point of interest to the  Community,  to the 
extent that it may  be  thought relatively unlikely that the  Community 
will move  quickly into large scale redistribution through general 
purpose  grants  ;  if this should be  the  case  the  Community's  needs for 
redistribution functions would  have  to be  met  (as in the  United 
States'case) in large measure  by a  mixing of the redistributive 
and  allocative functions  through  programmes  of specific purpose 
grants. 
The  rapid growth  of specific purpose  grants in the  United States over 
the last forty years has been  paralleled (or, maybe  more  followed) 
by  an elaborate theory of intergovernmental grants, which  in turn 
occupies an important place in the economic  theory of federalism  (1). 
The  central feature of the  theory is 'hha.t  government  expenditure 
functions  should optimally be  assigned to a  level of government 
whose  juridiction corresponds to the spatial incidence of the 
benefits from  the  expenditure.  Where  for political or historical 
reasons,  or because of the  need  to limit the  number  of levels of 
government,  the benefits fall, for example,  over a  broader area than 
the  jurisdiction of the  government  concerned,  then a  sub-optimal 
allocation of resources will occur with respect to the  expenditure 
function in question•  In this case a  federal system can correct the 
defect through  the higher level of government extending a  specific 
pupose  grant to  the  lower  government  concerned,  with the grant 
compensating for the benefits that 'spill over'  the .frontier 
(see Chapter  10 ). 
It is not pretended that the  theory and  practise of intergovernmental 
grants correspond in any  exact way.  However it will be  seen below 
that the specific purpose  grant systems of the four federations 
do  concentrate on  sectors where  there is a  broadly recognizable 
'national interest' in a.  lower level of government's field of 
responsibility. 
The  content of this paper is to a  large degree  devoted to assessing 
the redistributive effects of specific purpose  grants.  As  the 
preceding paragraphs have  already shown,  however,  specific purpose 
grants usually have  as their primary role  the  pursuit of alloca.tive 
objectives in a  multi-tier government  setting. 
2.  Types  of specific purpose  grants 
The  distributive and  allocative effects of specific purpose  grants 
(1)  See  :  Wallace  E.  Oates,  Fiscal Federalism,  Harcourt Brace  Jovanovitch, 
1972,  and  for a  summary  presentation,  Richard and  Peggy  Musgrave, 
Public Finance  in Theory and  Practice,  (Chapter 26,27), Mqgr,aw-Hill 
Koga.kusha.,  1973 - 190-
are crucially dependent on  the  type of grant, notably on  : 
- the allocation (or allotment) criteria, as between  states, which 
may  be  based on  indicators of need,  defined most  simply by 
population or target  population-re.g.  school children,  aged,  etc), 
and/or on  :fiscal caJaci  ty (for example,  an inverse relationship 
to state income  per capita)  ; 
- the  matching requirements for the state financial participation, 
which  may  be  a  uniform  percentage, ~·  or a  variable percentage 
- the~  or closed-ended nature of the facility i.e. whether or 
not the grant programme  should finance all eligible requests 
without limitation, 
- the availability for projects, or for narrow  or broadly defined 
programmes  of spending (block grants being the  name  for broadly 
defined programmes). 
The  theory of intergovernmental grants has produced a  rigorous 
systematisation of the effects of these different kinds of grants 
in the framework  of microeconomic  models for the utility maximisation 
of the rational government  unit.(l) Considerable efforts have  been 
made  in the  United States to use  applied econometric analysis to 
test the validity of the  microeconomic  theory of grants  ;  the  scope 
for applied research is considerable in the  United states since 
there are relatively good  public finance statistics for over 
4o,OOO  local government  units.  (These  findings are briefly 
commented  on  below). 
Before  setting out the  types of specific purpose  grants used in the 
four federations, it may  be  useful to quote  Selma  Mushkin's 
summarisation of formula grants and  their relationship to allocative 
and distributive objectives (2): 
"Grants with allotment on  the basis of program  need  measures,  no 
matching.  To  the extent that the measures of need in terms of 
population are adequate,  these grants can be  interpreted as equalizing 
grants directed  toward  uniform program  performance  levels. 
Grants with allotment on  the basis of program  need  measures,  uniform 
matching.  These  are not purported to be  equalizing but rather are 
intended to provide undifferentiated support for uniform progr.am 
performance  levels. 
(1)  See  Oates, Musgrave,  op.  cit., for summary  presentations and further 
references and  Chapter  10 
(2)  Selma  J. Mushkin  and  John  F.  Cotton,  Sharing federal funds for state and 
local needs,  Praeger Publishers,  New  York  - Washington  - Lond.on,l969,p.66 - 191-
Grants with per capita income  measures in the allotment formula, 
uniform  ma. tching.  These  grants could  be  interpreted as intended to 
be equalizing,  but not properly designed to equalize effort to 
achieve  uniform program  performance  levels  ;  or as not intended 
to be  equalizing,  but rather that the use of per capita income 
in the allotment is intended to serve as a  program-need weighting 
factor. 
Grants with allotment on the basis of program need,  which incorporate 
per capita income  measures in the matching provisions.  These 
equalize effort per total dollar expended,  but do not provide 
inducements for the states to move  to uniform program performance 
levels as measured  by  per capita expenditures. 
Grants containing per capita income  measures both in allotment and in 
matching provisions.  The  simplest of these meet the formal criteria 
for grants intended to equalize effort to achieve  uniform  program 
performance  levels  ;  the remainder are  too com plica  ted to  be 
categorized neatly in regard to their effects on fiscal effort and 
program  performance  level." 
It will be  seen that whereas in the  United States all combinations 
of these  types are used,  Canada,  Australia and  Germany  use  only the 
first and  second types.  Besides formula grants, other types of grant 
programs are project grants, shared-cost prof.ams  (Canada)  and 
Gemeinschaftsaufgaben  (common  tasks,  Germany  • 
).  Specific Purpose Grants in Four Federations 
For the four federations,  existing programmes  of specific purpose 
grants have  been grouped together in the  following sectors  :  health, 
education, welfare,  manpower,  roads,  housing,  regional and  urban 
policies. 
In reviewing each country major differences in the organization of 
these  public services have  constantly to be  borne  in mind,  notably 
the  basic constitutional choices in the distribution of primary 
responsibility for the  sectors between federal,  state and  local 
levels of government.  The  account that follows is deliberately rather 
thin on  these institutional facts,  since the  purpose is to concentrate 
on  the  types of formulae  and programs  used,  and their distributive 
implications. 
J.l.  United States 
The  United States'  system of specific purpose grants is more  complex 
than in any other federation.  By  the  end of the  'sixties analysts had 
counted 495  separate  federal programmes  of specific purpose grants(l). 
The  reasons for this abundance  appear to be  :  first the  inadequacy 
..,(-l"(")_F_o_r_a-recent  description and  analysis of the United States'specific 
purpose grants see James A.  Maxwell,  Specific purpose grants in the 
United States  :  recent developments,  The  Australian National University, 
Canberra,  1975 - 192-
and/or uneveness of public services provided at the  state level of 
government,  in part due  to  the absence of a  federal system of 
budget equalisation, and,  secondly the federal government's use of 
specific purpose  grants as a  principal means  to make  good  these 
deficiencies.  The  process began during the depression of the 
'thirties, and  expanded very fast with  the  build-up of the welfare 
state  (Great Society etc) during the sixties.  By  the early 
'seventies the  tide was  turning against the  extraordinary 
proliferation of grant systems, with  the  recourse  to block  ,grants 
and general revenue  sharing helping simplify consolidate and 
decentralise federal intervention. 
J.l.l. Health.  Public health grants are relatively unimportant (J per cent 
of the  total), with about JO  programs covering, inter alia, health 
services planning and  development,  mental health research and  _ 
preventive health services.  ("Medicaid" is covered under public 
assistance below,  since it is not a  general health program,  but 
aid for selected groups.) 
(1) 
An  interesting feature,  however,  is the  "Hill-Burton" formula, 
originally used for allocating funds  between states for a  hospital 
construction program,  but since extended  to a  considerable number 
of other specific purpose grant programs in health and other 
sectors. 
The  original Hill-Burton formula allocates funds proportionally 
to population weighted by  an expression that is based on  the 
square  of the inverse of state personal income  per capita.  (1) 
In some  other applications the  formula applies the simple inverse 
of personal income  per capita. 
The  following is an example  for a  nation with two  states,  A and  B, 
of equal J)9pulation,  with personal income  per capita of ¢ 120  for 
A,  ¢ 80 for B,  and ,¢  100 for the national average  : 
2 
Ai  =  al 
£ p. (1.0 - 0.5  ~  2 
j  J  y 
where  A.  is the allocation to the i  th state, a1 is a  constant 
dependiftg on the size of the appropriation,  P.is the  population of 
the  i  th state,  Y.  the per capita income  of tfie  i  th state, and  Y 
the  per capita ideome  of the nation. - 193-
The  Hill-Burton weighting factors would  then be  : 
personal  weighting  weighting 
income  factor  factor 
per  (simple)  squared 
capita 
State A  $ 120  0.4  O.Jl 
State B  ¢  80  0.6  0.69 
ratio of A to B  1.5  0.66  0.44 
The  weighting factor is known  as the  'allotment percentage'. It 
is evident that 'Hill-Burton',  simple or squared, is in :principle 
a  rather powerful redistributive instrument.  The  Hill-Burton formula 
is in some  applications used directly to allocate blocks of money 
to states  ;  in some  other applications the  'allotment percentage' 
is used as a  basis for variable matching ratios.  These  ratios are 
constrained by  minimum  and  maximum  federal participation rates 
(ranging usually from  one  third to  two  thirds). 
).1.2. Education.  Grants for education account for about 10  per cent of all 
specific purpose  grants, with the most  important programs in (a) 
elementary and  secondary education,  (b)  school assistance for 
areas seriously affected by  federal activities (e.g. military, or 
government),  and  (c) vocational education. 
As  regards schooling,  the  primary responsibility rests with the 
special  'school district'  level of jurisdiction. Federal aids 
therefore intervene only selectively, for example  in favour of 
educationally disadvantaged children.  The  main  grants  (under the 
1965  Elementary and Secondary Education Act,  Title I) have  gone 
to school districts in which more  than J %  of the  school-children 
were  living in 'poverty'  (family income  below  ¢ 2000).  The  aid 
is then calculated as the  larger of half the state or national 
average educational expenditure  times the  numbers  of children 
in the  'target population'  ;  there are no  matching requirements. 
The  school assistance for  'federally affected'  areas is basically 
aimed  at reimbursing state governments for the educational costs 
of exceptional concentrations of children dependent on  federal 
government activities.  (A  small but analogous example  is seen in 
the European Schools funded  from  the Community  budget).-
Expenditure  under the Vocational Education Act of 1961 is also 
of interest (by analogue with the European Social Fund)  for its 
concentration of vocational training and retraining.  Funds  in this 
case are distributed by  a  formula based on  the  statGs'  populations 
in three target age  groups,  weighted by  the  simple Hill-Burton 
'allotment percentage' •  A uniform matching ratio of ::fJ  :  ::JJ  is 
applied for allocation of funds within the  global allotment. - 194-
3.1.3.  Public assistance  welfare  •  '!his is the  most  important category 
providing  12  billion of specific purpose  grants in 1974,  out of 
the  total of ¢ J8  billion.  Two  programs  in turn account for about 
90  per cent of the  total (a) maintenance  assistance and  (b) 
'medicaid'. 
Maintenance  assistance.  This group of programs  started in 1935  when, 
under the Social Security Act,  the  federal government  gave 
financial assistance  to  the  states in providing for certain 
categories of the  unemployable  - the aged,  dependent children and 
the blind.  For the first two  decades after 1935  the dominant 
category of public assistance was  old age  assistance.  By  1973  the 
relative shares were  : 
Dependent children 
Old  age  assistance 
Disabled 
Blind 
Others 
~ 
65.6 
17.3 
16.0 
0.8 
0.3 
100.0 
More  recently, aid to the needy aged,  the blind and  the disabled has 
been "federalized", i.e. taken over as direct expenditure  Wld.er  the 
new  Federal supplemental security income  (SSI)  program of 1974. 
The  remaining Aid  to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),  where 
the  'federalisation' attempt did not succeed, is concentrated on 
poor families without male  breadwinners,  for whom  state aids vary 
a  lot.  The  open-ended federal  AFDC  grants are distributed to  the 
states according to a  "step-down" approach  ·:  each state receives 
5/6  of the first ¢ 18  of a  maximum  average  monthly  payment  of 
¢ 32  per recipient.  For  the  remainder ¢ 14  each state receives a 
proportion which,  like in the Hill-Burton formula,  is varied 
inversely with average  per capita state income,  but not less than 
50  % and  not more  than 6 5 %. 
Since  1965  states have  the option of using the Medicaid  matching 
formula  (see below)  for determining their AFDC  grants, which  in 
effect allows most of the rich states to raise their average receipts 
to high levels. 
Medicaid is a  Federal aid to states to help finance  medical services 
to families with dependent children receiving public assistance 
(AFDC),  ani to most  aged,  blind and  disabled persons eligible for 
supplementary security income  payments  ( SSI).  The  grants are 
open-ended,  and  subject to a  Hill-Burton variable matching ratio J.l.4. 
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within the mini-max  range of • :fJ  to .8J  •  allotment percentages  •. 
States have a  large say, however, in determining the eligibi"'ity 
levels and medical benefits covered under the Medicaid programme. 
As  a  result, there are variations in these  programme  elements among 
states.  Although  the Medicaid matching formula  provides higher 
Federal matching to  low-income  states, most of the  program. funds 
go  to high-income states. More  affluent states have apparently 
proved better able and willing to expand  the  population and 
services covered  (see further below  on redistributive effects). 
There are  plans for a  federalisation of Medicaid in the form of 
a  Family Health Insurance Plan. 
Economic  opportunity and manpower.  One  of the most important new 
federal programs in the early 1960's in relation to  the  "war against 
poverty" was  the Economic  Opportunity Act of 1964.  Federal aid was 
provided "to educate and condition the  poor to achieve  productive 
lives".  The  munerous  (mostly project) grants under this program 
have  been drastically reduced in recent years and are now 
concentrated in the field of community action programs, for example 
experimental programs like Head  Start (Kindergartens for poor 
children)  and Job Corps  (training programs for disadvantaged youth). 
The  grants are  closed-end and are distributed to state areas 
according to a  target population key  '  1/J of the  number  of public 
assistance recipients, 1/J of the  number of unemployed,  and 1/J of 
the number of children living in poor families.  There is a  uniform 
federal matching ratio of 90  %. 
The  main  programs in the area of manpower  policy (under Titles I 
a:rd  II of the Comprehensive  Employment  and  Training Act of 197J) 
aim at local employment  schemes.  This is an area in which  (under 
Title I) earlier schemes have  been merged into simpler block-grants, 
the  funds  now  allocated without matching requirements,  and  the 
allotments dependent 50  % on prior years'  receipts, 37.5 %  on local 
unemployment  levels,  and 12.5% on  the  number of low-income  families. 
Similarly (under Title II)  ,  grants are made  for transitional public 
employment  schemes,  with closed-end allotments based on local 
unemployment  levels. 
3.1.5.  Highwavs.  Federal grants are available for construction and 
maintenance of inter-state highways and  the so-called ~  programme 
(for primary ani secondary roads and urban networks).  TOgether they 
comprise  12  % of total federal grants. Both categories are  closed-end 
grants financed from  an earmarked Highway  Trust Fund  {with 
revenues  from excises on motor fuel,  tyres,  trucks, buses etc.) Census  region 
New  England 
Middle Atlantic 
East  North Central 
West  North Central 
South Atlantic 
East  South Central 
West  South Central 
Mountain 
Pacific 
Total 
Census  region  Health 
New  England  6.69 
Middle Atlantic  5.502 
East  North Central  3.905 
West  North Central  6.103 
South Atlantic  6.305 
East  South Central  7.608 
West  South Central  5.101 
Mountain  9.501 
Pacific  5.705 
Total'  5.82 
Regions: 
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u.s.  Specific Purpose  Grants,  1974 
by census  region 
Health  Education  Welfare  Economic 
Opportunity 
81356  212321  827778  229121 
205065  694138  3288089  689187 
159504  538328  2232085  569138 
101799  300703  699931  254508 
209276  704782  1366623  441805 
101867  386142  636133  211247 
105140  417195  1009451  295154 
89216  216759  363021  200832 
158837  525992  2184261  587192 
1212059  39948J,.5  12607373  3507474 
Economic  Education  Welfare  Opportunity  Highways 
17.46  68.07  18.84  19.88 
18.62  88.22  18.49  15.06 
13.18  54.64  13.93  17.61 
18.03  41.96  15.26  25.86 
21.23  41.18  13.31  24.86 
28.84  47.51  15.78  21.72 
20.24  48.98  14.32  20.37 
23.08  38.66  21.39  43.00 
18.89  78.46  21.09  21.92 
19.20  60.58  16.85  21.66 
Highways 
241696 
561252 
719501 
431398 
825117 
290877 
419894 
403743 
610171 
4508179 
Other 
70·34 
58.51 
49.72 
54.22 
63.42 
81.78 
63.51 
58.78 
5Q.61 
60.13 
!Jew  Er!gland  - Jlaine1  !Jew  Hampshire,  Vermont,  Jlaesaohusetts,  Rhode  Island,  Connecticut 
Middle Atlantic - New  York,  JJew  Jersey,  PeJlllllylvania 
East Borth Central - Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois, Jliohigan,  Wisconsin 
West  North Central - Xinnesota,  Iowa,  Jlissouri1  JJ.  Dakota, s. Dakota,  1Tebraska1  Kansas 
¢  1000 absolute amounts 
Other  Total 
855300  2447572 
2180772  7618503 
2030891  6249447 
904356  2692695 
2104832  5652435 
1094988  2721254 
1308967  3555801 
551964  1825535 
1409047  5475500 
12510132  38,340P31 
'/.  per capita 
Personal 
Total  income 
1974 
201.30  5,696 
204.40  5,951 
153.00  5,722 
161.40  5,261 
170.30  5·155 
203.20  4,303 
172.50  4,719 
194·40  5,075 
196.70  5,942 
184.24  5.448 
South Atlantic- Delaware,  Jlaryland,  D.C.,  Virginia,  West  Virginia,  JJ.  Carolina, s. Carolina,  Cleorgia1  Florida 
East South Central - Kantuclq,  Temleaaee1  Alabama,  Jlississippi 
West  South Central - Arlamaas,  Louisiana,  Oklahoma,  Texaa 
~  - Jlontana,  Idaho,  Wyoming,  Colorado,  JJew  Mexico,  Arizona,  Utah,  JJevada 
~  - Washington,  Creson,  Califomia, Alaska,  Hawai 
~:See  Annex - 197-
~ 
u.s. Speoitio P!uyose Grants,  1974 
by state  ¢per capita 
lielfare  Economic  All  State  Health  Educatlon  (public  opportun1  ty &  H1gh>1ays  other  Total 
ass1stance)  manpower_ 
Dlstrlct of Colwnoia  31.29  104.30  129.89  81.35  22.07  168.50  537.40 
Connectlcut  4·87  15.02  52.53  11·37  16.08  85.92  191·77 
Neu Jersey  3.63  13·29  52.83  18.69  15.63  47.65  151.73 
Alaska  17 .oo  145·21  46.49  57 ·75  248.10  176.43  690.99 
Nelj>J  York  5.33  21.54  121.78  21.41  12,74  64.76  247·57 
Del<J..-.are  8.28  18·53  39.89  15.67  37·16  58.70  178.23 
Nevada  5·46  18.29  28.40  31.26  60.73  112.23  206.37 
Ill1nois  3.20  13.98  69.19  13.95  18.48  54·71  173·51 
Haua11  11.84  43.85  63.28  18.47  52.25  79.60  269.30 
Callfornia  4.66  17.31  89.47  20.71  15·93  47.06  195·17 
l•laryland  7·94  16.10  43.92  11.16  18152  57.22  154.86 
I•iich1gan  4.30  13.72  67 ·56  16.40  19.22  48.88  169.98 
Massachusetts  7 ·42  17.65  76.53  19.95  14.87  55· 76  192.20 
Washin;cton  9-94  17 ·72  57 ·97  23.58  31·44  59.39  200,04 
Kansas  5·56  21.77  36.38  14.35  24.41  42.53  145.00 
OhlO  4.30  12.90  38.74  12.53  16.04  55·58  140.10 
Goloradv  11.00  21.03  52.70  15.26  25·45  55.81  181.24 
Fennsyl•Janla  6.75  16.85  55·75  13.30  17 ·78  62.14  172-57 
NebrA.Sl~c.  5·65  19.07  41.37  u.oo  26.08  42.24  147-42 
Rhode  Island  3.67  20.28  77.29  24.32  33.66  73-70  232.92 
i·~innesota.  4-37  15-58  60.32  15.61  28.48  65-76  190.13 
Iol.JD.  5-03  14-95  81.01  11.74  17·14  44-70  124-56 
Floncl,,  5·54  16.77  25.90  94-82  21.86  99-54  132.81 
Incil.?.na  3-30  11·77  27·47  11.36  17.62  37.36  108.89 
i:Jort~l  JJ;-,J:.ota  10.12  25.25  40.69  20.23  39.90  61.67  197.85 
V1rt,1n1a  4·47  24.92  40.62  10.73  30.64  52-55  163.92 
l·iissour1  6-57  17.20  36.80  16.98  23.65  53-57  154·77 
Oree;on  7.09  15·55  47-40  24.20  27.65  60.12  182.00 
~dscons1n  4-47  11.97  60.37  14-78  15.37  37.89  144-85 
Neov  Ha.mpsiure  6.52  19.58  41.73  13.09  28.14  56.08  165.13 
Ari~ono..  8.58  27.56  26.91  24.84  38.35  58.86  185.10 
Hyom1ng  12.70  27.26  23.50  33.92  95-88  55-10  247.22 
I1Ionte..na  11.29  29.68  39.06  26.12  73.84  68.66  248.64 
'I'exas  4·70  18.37  44.08  12.76  18.94  57.92  156.76 
Georpa  5.62  20.48  69.94  12.84  21.06  80.16  210.06 
South  Da..<:ota  17.09  31.48  43.37  21.09  57.29  96.23  266.55 
C!klahoma  6.00  27.09  66.28  18.00  11·72  64.72  199.82 
North  Carolina  5-81  24.84  40.03  12.24  16.17  58.28  157 ·39 
Idal10  5.02  22.72  39.20  22.52  55·18  52.80  197-45 
Vermont  10.62  24.21  84.01  22.64  53-74  87.53  282.74 
Utal1  13.27  23.67  44-27  18.23  54.32  49-07  202.85 
'l·ennessee  6.67  25.32  39-57  13.85  18.75  71.39  175·54 
l•lalne  9.62  17-64  75·98  25.63  26.41  75.64  230.92 
Kentucky  9.34  23.90  50.06  17.83  23.94  92.90  217.98 
Hest hrpnia  9.24  16.84  40.65  23.14  100.99  98.67  289.52 
Louisia.r1a  4-84  21.59  56·75  16.68  32.29  82.91  215.07 
Ne·,;  Mex1co  11.13  26.67  49·73  28.92  42.41  99.60  258-46 
South  Garol1na  5·79  22.57  31-56  16.72  11·56  85.95  180.15 
AlElbn..rna  7.13  26.07  50·97  14.74  26.77  77 ·97  203.64 
Ar.f;:ansas  8.30  25.91  55-46  18.61  16.33  78·17  202.78 
J.lJ.SSJ..SS1!)p1  8.42  50·24  58·50  19.79  18.64  100.11  255· 70 
United States  5.82  19.20  60.58  16.85  21.66  60.13  184.24 
~:See  Annex - 198-
The  inter-state highway  grants are allocated to the states on 
the basis of the estimated cost of completing the National 
Inter-state System.  The  federal matching ratio is 90  %. 
Most  of the  ABC  programme  grants are distributed according to key 
based on  area,  population and  mileage of rural routes.  'Ihe 
federal matching ratio is 70  %. 
).1.6. ~·  The  final category  (food stamps.  urban affairs etc.) is a 
miscellaneous but important group of programs  : 
food  stamps 
child nutrition 
low-rent public  housing 
other social welfare 
urban affairs 
agricultural and  natural resources 
other miscellaneous 
¢ billion 
2.8 
1.2 
1.1 
1..3 
2.4 
0.4 
J.J 
12.5 
The  most  important single element is the food  stamps  program,  which 
is 100 %  financed  by  the federal government  (except for half of 
the  administrative costs borne  by  other levels of government).  Since 
the benefit and elegibility standards are also federally determined, 
the  programme  is more  a  direct federally-delegated function  than 
a  specific purpose  grant (thus resembling the  German 
Bundesauftragsverwaltungen  ~see below).  Low  income  families, defined 
as having to spend  more  than  JO  %  of their total income  to obtain 
an adequate diet, are able to obtain food  stamps at a  concessional 
price compared  to the value of the  food  which  they can use  then to 
buy. 
The  next most  important program,  urban affairs, is a  new  closed-end 
formula-based  Community  development block grant, replacing a 
variety of old specific purpose  grants (including urban renewal, 
neighbourhood development,  rehabilitation, open-space  land, 
water and  sewage  facilities, model  cities etc.) The  beneficiaries 
are .500  cities and 85  urban counties.  'Ihe  formula apportionment is, 
for 80  %  of the funds,  based on  (a)  population,  (b)  poverty 
(double-weighted)  and  (c)  the  extent of overcrowding in housing. 
The  program is being phased  in over five  years from  1974,  with 
special provisions,  to cushion changes in benefits compared  to 
the earlier collection of specific purpose  grants. 
).2.  Canada 
Canadian federal specific purpose  grants take  the form  of a  small 
number  of shared cost programmes,  with relatively simple 
distributional criteria and mostly arising in the areas of health, - 199-
education and  welfare  (1) 
).2.1. Health.  This is the  single most  important block of grants, almost 
wholly accounted for by  the following  two  programs. 
The  Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services program is intended 
to ensure that all residents have  access to necessary hospital care 
services regardless of their ability to pay.  The  Federal Government 
makes  an open-ended  contribution to each province consisting of 
25  %  of the  national average  per capita cost of such services,  plus 
25%  of the  province's average  per capita cost of the  services 
multiplied by  the  number  of insured persons in the  province. 
·The  formula was  intended to vary the per capita grants inversely 
with a  province's per capita income,  However,  differences in 
hospital service costs and  in fiscal capacity (e.g.  personal income) 
are only crudely related,  and  the result is that any equalizing 
effects are" haphazard and  anomalous". (2) 
Quebec  "opted out" of the  program in 1965.  The  contributions  . 
to Quebec  took instead the  form  of obtaining a  higher share of 
federal income  tax revenues and other financial adjustments, 
leaving the total amount  of federal contributions to Quebec 
unaffected.  The  policy of Quebec  in recent years has been not to 
enter in shared-cost programs in fields of exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction. 
Medical Care is a  further open-ended  program  with aims analogous 
to the hospital program.  '!he federal contribution to each  province 
is calculated as ;p % of the na  tiona.l average per capita cost 
of providing all medical care insured services in all provinces 
multiplied qy  the  number  of insured persons in the  province  concerned; 
which  means  that low  cost provinces receive more  than 50  %  of their 
program costs and  high cost provinces less. 
Because  almost the  total population is insured for medical  care 
(as for hospital insurance),  the  medical care grants are in fact 
distributed according to a  simple  population key.  The  Federal 
Government  intends to establish ceilings on federal contributions 
for 1976-77  and  subsequent years (e.g.  a  Inaximum  increase of 14.5% 
in 1976-77). 
(1)  G.E.  Carter,  Canadian Conditional Grants since world  War  II, Canadian 
Tax  Foundation,  1971,  and  for recent developments in shared cost 
programs  Federal-Provincial fiscal :relations in Cana,da,  An  OVerview, 
De-partment  of Finance,  Ottawa,  September 1975. 
(2)  Carter,  op.  cit, p.  48 - 200-
).2.2. Education.  Since 1967  the Federal Government  has been making 
open-ended  contributions to  the financing of post-secondary 
education.  The  present arrangements expire in 1977  and will be 
renegotiated by  the Federal Government  and  the  provinces.  . 
The  total federal contrl  bution to a  province is equal to 50  % of the 
eligible operating costs of post-secondary educational institutions 
subject to  the following minimum  and  maximum  provisions  : 
(a)  no  province receives less than ¢ 15 per capita.,  escalated by 
the  national :ra. te of increase in e ligi  ble operating costs 
and 
(b)  the  total federal contribution may  not exceed  115 %  of the 
preceding fiscal year. 
The  federal contributions are met  in two  ways,  ''tax transfers'  and 
'cash transfers' •  Under  the  former,  the  Federal Government 
transfers to each  province a  sum  equivalent to a  certain percentage 
point of the federal personal income  tax and corporation income 
tax.  The  balance of the total federal commitment is then made  up 
by  cash adjustment payments.  'llle  'tax transfer' arrangements were 
introduced to obtain the acceptance of Quebec,  which,  as in the 
case of health, prefers such a  'detour' for constitutional 
reasons. 
).2.). Welfare.  In  1966~various earlier specific purpose  grants were 
replaced by the Canada  Assistance Plan  (CAP),  which  now  covers 
virtually all fefferal  Jayment  to  the  provinces in the welfare 
field.  Under  the  CAP  the  Federal Government  gives open-ended 
reimbursements for 50  %  of the  shareable costs of financial 
assistance  provided in the area of social assistance,  child welfare, 
institutional care, and  welfare services.  Since  the rates of 
assistance ~  set by  the provinces,  the level of federal payments 
depends  on  provincial decisions. 
Quebec  does not participate in the CAP.  The  'opting out'  arrangements 
are similar to thoee for the Hospital Insurance  program.  The 
total amount  of federal contributions to Quebec  is, again, 
unaffected by  these  arrangements. 
J.2.4. ~.  This  category is dominated  by  (a)  :programs  for the  promotion 
and  development of certain regions and  (b)  federal government's 
subsidies for cultural activities.  The  most ambitious regional 
development project is the fifteen-year development  plan for 
Prince Edward  Island, whose  implementation began in 1969. - 201-
Canadian Specific Purpose  Grants,  1973-74 
¢  •ooo  absolute amounts 
Province  Health  Education  Welfare  Other  Total 
Newfoundland  61,121  11,710  26,047  14,243  113,121 
Prince Edward  Island  10,479  2,107  5,232  14,282  32,100 
Nova Scotia  78,154  35,258  28,401  12,721  154,534 
New  Brunswick  63,779  16,205  32,285  24,412  136,681 
Quebec  626,370  330,061  320,884  142,539  1,419,854 
Ontario  784,102  402,486  214,156  65,315  1 ,466,059 
Manitoba  107,106  37 '772  39,815  18,659  203,352 
Saskatchewan  89,267  27,452  36,238  13,197  166,154 
Alberta  175,917  96,624  55,136  14,402  342,079 
British Columbia  211,138  78,012  83,957  11,972  385,079 
Total  2,207,433  1,037,687  842,151  331 '742  4,419,013 
¢  per capita 
Personal 
Province  Health  Educa~ion  Welfare  Other  Total  income 
1973 
Newfoundland  113  22  48  26  209  2'  7fJJ 
Prince Edward  Island  91  18  45  124  279  2,922 
Nova  Scotia  97  44  35  16  192  3,332 
New  Brunswick  98'  25  49  38  210  3,089 
Quebec  103  54  53  23  233  3,839 
Ontario  99  51  27  8  185  4,840 
Manitoba  107  38  40  19  204  4,071 
Saskatchewan  98  30  40  15  183  3,803 
Alberta  104  57  33  9  203  4,325 
British Columbia  91  34  36  5  166  4,581 
Total  100  47  38  15  200  4,254 
~:see  Annex - 202-
3·3·  Australia 
Specific purpose grants have  a  relatively limited role in Australian 
federalism,  with the  dominant programs  in the field of tertiary 
education and roads. 
There  has been  some  tendency in recent years, however,  to move  the 
balance of dependence  on  specific versus general purpose  grants in 
favour of the  former  - as some  of the  following examples  show.  (1) 
The  major Australian specific purpose  grants tend not to be  formula 
based,  but rather dependant on negotiations between the Australian 
Government  and  state Governments,  assisted by  advisory bodies 
("Commissions")  whose  function is to recommend  grants for specific 
programs  of national interest on  the basis of economic  criteria 
of need. 
3.3.1. ~·  Accounting for only 4%  of total specific purpose  grants, 
health grants are principally for Community  health facilities 
(since 1973/74)  and  tuberculosis hospitals. 
The  new  grants for Community  health facilities are  the  subject of 
longterm national programs,  as identified by  the  Hospital and 
Health Services Commission,  whose  recommendations are  then the 
basis for decisions of the Australian Government. 
In the first year,  1973  - 74,  the Australian Government  met  100 % 
of the costs of all projects.  Since  then the Federal matching ratio 
became  75%  (for capital costs)  and  90%  {for operating costs) for 
most  programs,  and  100 %  for some. 
Grants for  tuberculosis hospitals are open-ended grants, with no 
state matching requirement required, as the  states are  reimbursed 
for all approved  current and capital expenditures for these hospitals. 
3.3.2. Education.  Educational grants are dominated  by  tertiary education. 
Since  tho  establishment of the  Australian Universities Commissions 
(AUC)  in 1959  an upper limit to  the  amount  of federal government 
assistance for universities is fixed for each state in the  light of 
an assessment of expenditure  needs assessed by  the  AUC.  There  have 
been matching conditions of ¢ 1.85 in state contributions for every 
¢ 1  of current Federal grants, and ¢ 1 for ¢ 1 in respect of capital 
grants.  Broadly similar arrangements exist for advanced  education 
and  teachers colleges with  some  differences,  however,  in the 
matching rules. 
(1)  Australian specific purpose  grants are described in various publications 
of the Centre for Research  on  Federal Financial Relations,  Canberra, 
e.g.  Robert Jay,  'Ihe  shift to specific purpose  grants  :  From  revenue 
sharing to cost sharing, in :  Responsibility sharing in a  federal 
system,  ed.  by  R.L.  Mathews,  The  Australian National University, 
Canberra,  1975. - 203-
As  from  January 1974  the  Australian Government  has assumed  full 
financial  responsi~lity for financing the universities and colleges 
of advanced  education, alongside a  reduction in (general purpose) 
Financial Assistance Grants  (see Chapter  6  ) •  The  work  of the 
education Commissions  continue and  the Federal funds are still 
provided as specific purpose  grants to the states, because  the 
Australian Government  has no  constitutional power  to  pay  funds 
direct to universities and  colleges. 
The  Australian Government  has recently expanded its commitments 
in the area of primary and  secondary schools.  An  advisory body 
was  created in 1973,  the Interim Committee  for the Australian 
Schools Commission  (the Karmel  Committee),  with the task of 
recommerrling  grants to states based on  needs evaluation.  There  are 
no  specific matching requirements.  Formerly,  including 1973-74, 
school grants have  been allocated to the states based on  population 
and  number  of pupils.  From  1973-74  to 1974-75  school grants more 
than doubled. 
One  further Federal grants programme,  although of relatively small 
importance,  might be  mentioned  because  of its relevance  to  the 
European Community  ;  the grants program  for child migrant education. 
The  purpose is to provide  special instruction for migrant children, 
particularly to assist these children to achieve a  sufficient 
command  of the English language  to  join fully in normal classes. 
In addition to these grants, the  states are reimbursed for the 
costs of certain adult migrant education services which  they 
provide  on  behalf of the Australian Government. 
J.J.J. Welfare.  All significant social security benefits in Australia have 
been the responsibility of the Australian Government  since 1946. 
Welfare  grants are, therefore, insignificant. 
J.J.4. Transport.  In 1973-74  almost all transport grants went into ~· 
Road  grants began in 192.3-24,  and  were  until recently the largest 
specific purpose  grant category. 
The  year 1973-74  was  covered b  the Commonwealth  Aid  Roads  Act 1 
which  operated for the five  year period 1969-70  to 197.3-7  • The 
grant arrangement15  for this period were  based on a  report of the 
Bureau of Roads,  and has the  task of recommending  an appropriate 
size for the  total road program,  its distribution between different 
kinds of projects and its allocation among  the states. 
The  actual program,  adopted  by the Australian Government,  however, 
was  in many  respects different from  the Bureau's recommendations. 
The  total size of the grants program  was  much  smaller,  and  the 
distribution keys have  been more  influenced by  political considerations 
than the Bureau's attempt to base the allocation on economic  criteria 
and analysis. - 204-
Australian Specific Purpose Grants,  1973-74 
¢ •ooo  absolute 81Jlounts 
State  Health  Education  Welfare  Transport 
Other  Total  (roads) 
New  South Wales  13,864  208,518  10,013  99,540  48,676  380,611 
Victoria  10,836  187,608  5,627  66,560  36,632  307,263 
Queensland  8,309  79,480  5,566  64,466  48,603  206,424 
South Australia  7,233  68,505  3,290  32,334  23,464  134,826 
West  Australia  8,786  61,215  4,191  51,637  14,966  140,795 
Tasmania  2,212  17,207  1,023  14,040  3,519  38,001 
Total  51,240  622,533  29,707  328,577  175,860  1,207,917 
¢  capita 
Transport  Personal 
State  Health  Education  1-/elfare  (roads)  Other  Total  income 
191_2-73 
New  South Wales  3  44  2  21  10  80  2,673 
Victoria  3  52  2  18  10  85  2,622 
Queensland  4  41  3  34  25  107  2,368 
South Australia  6  57  3  27  20  112  2,342 
West  Australia  8  57  4  48  14  131  2,350 
Tasmania  6  43  3  35  9  96  2,228 
Total  4  48  2  26  14  94  2,542 
~~see  Annex - 205-
The  total grant amount for the five  year period was  ¢ 1,250 million. 
¢ 1,200 million was distributed in the following way  ;  5 %  to 
Tasmania and  the remaining 95 % between all states by giving equally 
one-third weights to area,  population and  motor vehicle registrations. 
The  remaining ¢ 50  million went as supplementary grants to the three 
less populous states,  South Australia, Western Australia and 
Tasmania. 
Matching requirements,  which were  formerly 50  :  :JJ,  have  been 
altered such that each state must increase its own  road expenditure 
at the  S8llle  rate as the increase in its registered motor vehicles. 
3.3.5.  Nearly half of the  'other'  category comprises grants for industrial 
assistance.  A large diversity of project grants to one  or more 
states for specific geographic or industrial and  agricultural areas 
exists under this heading. 
3.4.  Federal Republic of Germany 
(1) 
(2) 
The  analysis of the German  inter-governmental grants system is a 
rather difficult task.  Specific purpose grants are not a  clearly 
identified subject of analysis  (by comparison with the u.s.,  Canada 
and Australia) with the result that the data base is not readily 
available from published official sources  (1), and analytical 
contributions on the  subject are only now  beginning to appear (2) • 
It has therefore been necessary to build up  the content of this 
note  from  various  primary sources (constitutional literature, 
unpublished working papers  (3)  etc.), and  some  of the detail is set 
out to permit reconciliation with established terminology. 
The  main official sources,  the Finanzbericht (financial report) of the 
Finance Ministry,  Sta.tistisches Jahrbuch (statistical year book)  and 
other publication of the Federal Statistical Office and  the Federal 
Budget documents,  do not give a  distribution of specific purpose grants 
programmes  by Lanier. 
Bernd Reissert, Die finanzielle Beteiligung des Bundes an Aufgaben der 
Uinder und.  das Postula  t  der ''Einhei  tlichkei  t  der  bensverh&l  tnisse 
im  Bundesgebiet",  Financial participation of the Bund  n  func  ons 
of the Larder,  and the norm  of "Uniformity of Living Standards"), 
Schriftenreihe des Vereins fUr Verwaltungsreform und  Verwaltungsforschung 
e.v., Nr.  4, Bonn,  1975.  Reissert's work is part of a  research project 
undertaken at the International Institute of Management  (in the 
Wissenschaftszentrum),  Berlin, directed by F.w.  Scharpf.  The  Scharpf-
team  pre  :pared various papers on 'fiscal federalism  •  for the International 
Seminar on Public Economics  (ISPE),  which took place on January 1976 
in Berlin. 
(3)  Working papers for the Enquete-Kommission Verfassungsreform  (Commission 
for Constitutional Reform),  e.g.  document 137,  Zahlenma.terial Uber 
emeinsame  Finanzie  n  von Bund  und  Lindern im  Haushalts·ahr 1  ~ 
Figures on common  financing of Bund  und  :uinder in 1974  ,  February 1975. - 206-
In the constitution certain fUnctions are identified as exclusive 
Bund  responsibilities (defence,  external affairs, rail a.nd  air 
transport and  communications).  The  social security system is also 
organized centrally at the national level.  Functions not otherwise 
identified in the federal constitution are the financial responsibility 
of the  Lander am  local government,  although there are many  areas of 
joint legislative responsibility.  The  subject of the  present section 
concerns,  therefore, a  limited area of mixed  financial responsibility. 
'Ihe following broad categories of federal expenditure, identified by 
their basis in constitutional law  (Articles of the  Grundgesetz 
(abbr.  GG  'Basic law'), are here classified as specific purpose grants 
J.4.l.Common tasks,  'Gemeinschaftsaufgaben',  (Art.  91 a  GG) 
Three areas of expenditure are recognized as being of national 
importance, with joint planning and financing by the Bund  am.  Lander. 
'Ihese are  t 
- university construction 
- improvement of the regional economic  structure (i.e. creation of 
employment,  inf'rastrucutre investment, etc. in needy regions 
(F'Brdergebiete) 
- improvement of the agricultural structure and of the coastal 
protection. 
The  Bund  financial contribution is usually 50  %  in the first two 
areas, 60 %  for agriculture and  70 % for coastal protection.  The 
allocations are generally made  on  the basis of the recommendations 
of joint Bund-Uinder Commissions, adopted by the Federal Government 
and at least 6  Land  Governments. 
J.4.2.Coordination in Education and  Research  (Art  •.  91  b  GG) 
While  Education is basically a  responsibility of the  Lander,  there 
is constitutional provision for joint Bund-Lander planning and 
coordination (Bildungsplanung)  and  the Bund  meets certain costs in 
this area incurred by  the  Linder. 
The  Bund  finances research of national importance  through subsidies to 
forty or so research institutes (Fox:schungsf"orderung) J.4.J 
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While  as a  general rule each level of government finances its 
responsibilities from its own  resources,  there are a  number of 
cases in which the Uinder execute Bund  programmes,  and are in full 
or in part compensated by restitution payments from  the  Bund. 
The  cases of 100% restitution arise under Art.  104 a, 2 
(Buniesauftra.gsverwaltung)  and concern  military administration, air 
and road costs.  Since the  I.Qnd.er  have  no  say in either the  legislation 
or financing,  these  prograna are closer to direct fedeml expend.i ture 
than to specific purpose grants.  No  information is available on  the 
distribution by Linder of these restitutions (Erstattungen). 
'lbe  concept of delegated functions is broadened,  however,  under 
Art.  104.  a  J  for certain programmes  of cash aids to individuals 
('Geldleistungsgesetze')used for student grants, housing and  savings 
subsidies and other programs,  whereby  the  Bund.  is able to have  an 
important say in determining functions which  would  otherwise be  the 
responsibility of the Linder.  The  Bund  contributes at least 50  % 
of the  program costs, and  where its contribution exceeds 75% it 
can determine  the  program without agreement of the Bundesrat. 
Student grants are open-ended programs with a  6 5 % federal matching 
ratio, whereas graduate grants are closed-end. 
'lbe  housing,  savings ani rent grants are open-ended programs with 
a  ;JJ  %  federal matching ratio. 
J.4.4.  Federal gra.nts-in-aid (Fina.nzhilfen)  for investment (Art,  104 a, 4GG) 
Specific purpose grants {zweckgebundene  Zuweisungen)  are provided to 
the Linder and municipalities to support investment projects with 
the aim of short-term. economic  stabilisation or long-term growth 
policy  ;  sectors covered are  local transport,  urban development, 
social housing, and hospi  tala, 
A wide  interpretation of this constitutional basis could allow 
the Bund  to step into various fields of investment expenditure 
cons.titutionally reserved to Lander ani municipalities, '!his 
possibility has been somewhat  limited by  a  restrictive interpretation 
of the Article by a  High  Court .decision of March  1975,  which 
stipulates that the  Bund  has broadly to accept the investment project 
plans elaborated by the  Lander.  Federal anti-recession programs 
in the  investment area in 1974/75 were  based on this Article, and 
also Federal aid for storm damage. 
'Ihe  hospital construction and investment program is allocated, first, 
as to a  fixed amount divided on the basis of hospital bed numbers, 
and,  secondly,  as to about 90  % of the total on a  population basis. - 208-
The  federal matching ratio is one-third. 
The  local transport program is a  closed-end allocation, distributed 
partly (for roads)  on  the blsis of the number  of registered motor 
vehicles, weighted by  type of vehicle, am giving a  special 
weighting of 1·25 in favour of the eastern border regions 
(Zonenrandgebiete)and partly for public transport projects.  The 
federal matching ratio is 60  %,  except for 75 %  in the case of the 
eastern border regions. 
The  social housing grants are based on  a  long-run federal housing 
program,  supporting construction in certain problem  regions, for 
low-income  families,  and  refugees etc.  The  allocations are based 
on  a  population key,  and  to a  small extent on  target population 
keys.  (e.g.  refugees) 
The  urban development  grants are allocated on  the basis of Bund-
Lander negotiations for specific projects, the distribution in-
tentionally favouring the fiscally poor Uinder,  am  the  city states 
of Bremen  and Hamburg.  The  federal matching ratio is one-third. 
3.4.5. Other grants am  restitutions 
'!his is a  miscellaneous category of grants (some  already described) 
on  which  we  have  no  information on  the distribution by  Linder 
'unwritten competences of the Bund • 
(ungeschriebene Zustandigkeiten des BUndes) 
transfers to various public agencies 
(other than Linder and  local government) 
other unallocated grants, including a  considerable 
amount  of federal delegated functions 
(Bundesauftragsverwaltungen,  Art.  104 a, 2, 
see above) 
total unallocated by  sector 
education and research (see above) 
subsidies for general savings  (see above) 
total unallocated by  Land 
total allocated by  Land  (Table 6) 
total specific purpose  grants 
mill.  DM 
2.000 approx. 
680 
~ 
4.139 
732  * 
460  * 
5.331 
10.076  * 
15,4<>7 
*Reconciliation with Table  5  10,076 + 732  +460  = 11,268 
~:See  Annex - 209-
German  Specific Pl.lrpose  Grants,  1973-
- by oollllti  tutional basis 
- by programme  and f'lmotional.  area 
in Mio  DJI 
Art.  91  a  GG  Art.  91  b  GG  Art.  104,  a,  3  Art.  104,  a,  4 
Shared cost programmes  Coordination in  Restitutions  Grants-in-aid  Total 
( Gemeinschaftsaufeaben)  the educational  ( Geldleistu!.!l!- (Finanzhilfen)  1- 4 
and research field  nsetze) 
(Bild!!:!!~!!;e1anune; 
Forsch!!:!!l!!fC:irderune;) 
1.  2.  3·  4.  5· 
University  Bildungs- Student  Local 
construction  1,422  planung  84  grants  1,137  transport  2,008 
Improvement  of  Forachungs- Premiums  for  Urban deve-
regional  econo- f8rderung  648  savings  lopment  85 
mic structure  206  schemes for 
house  con- Social housing 
Improvement  of  at  ruction  grants  (sozi-
the agrioul  tu- (Wohungsbau- aler Wohnungs-
ral structure  prilmien)  1,458  bau)  592 
and coastal 
protection  1,052  Private hous- Hospital 
ing subsidies  construction  972 
(Wohngeld)  569 
Other  1,033 
Total  2,680  732  4,197  3,657  11,268 
in Mio  DM 
Regional  aDd  Total  Health  Education  Transport  Housing  other structural  Other 
1  - 6  policies 
Hospital  con- University  Local  Saving sub- Improvement  Subsidies for 
struction  construction  transport  aidies for  of regional  general sa-
(104 a,  4)*  972  (91  a)  1,422  (104 a,  4)  2,010  housing  structure  r!tng schemes 
(104 a,  3)  1,459  (91  a)  206  (104 a,  3)  4fi> 
Tuberculosis  Student 
aid  ~t:. 3) 
Private  .Agrioul  tu-
(104 a,  3)  12  1,137  housing  ral  and coa-
subsidies  atal pro-
Grants for  (104 a,  3)  570  r;~)B  graduates  1.052 
(104 a,  3)  49  Social 
housing  Petrol 
Education 
~t:.  4) 
subsidies 
andre- 592  for agri-
search  cultural 
(91  b)  732  ant  reprises 
(104 a,  3)  511 
Urban de-
velopment 
(104 a,  4)  85 
984  3,340  2,010  2,620  1,853  460  ll,268 
*  oonsti  tutional basis in brackets 
~~  see Annex - 210-
German  Specific Purpose  Grants,  1973 
in Mio  DM  absolute amounts 
Regional  and 
Land  Health  Education  Transport  Housing  other etruc- Sub-total  Others  Total 
tural policies 
Baden-WUrttemberg  136  395  268  434  232  1,465 
Bayern  169  421  319  490  440  1,839 
Berlin  47  99  92  85  14  337 
Bremen  12  41  17  33  8  111 
Hamburg  33  93  95  72  12  305  not 
Hess  en  90  235  245  224  127  921  allo-
cated 
Niedersachsen  115  279  204  316  413  1,327 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  258  865  632  663  219  2,637 
Rheinland-Pfalz  63  99  78  152  128  520 
Saarland  23  32  19  36  46  156 
Schleewi~oletein  38  50  41  115  215  459 
Total  984  2,609  2,010  2,620  1,853  10,076  5. 331  15,407 
in DM  per  oapi  ta 
Regwnal  and 
GDP  Land  Health  Education  Transport  Housing  other struc- Sub-total  1973  tural policies 
Baden-WUrttemberg  14.8  42.9  29.1  47·1  25.2  159·1  15,280 
Bayern  15.6  38.9  29.5  45.3  40.7  no.o  14,260 
Ber~  22.9  48.2  44.8  41·4  6.8  164.1  16,498 
Bremen  16.4  56.0  23.2  45·1  10.9  151.6  19,823 
Hamburg  18.8  52.9  54·0  40.9  6.8  113·4  25,496 
Hess  en  16.2  42.3  44·1  40.)  22.8  165·7  15,651 
Niedersachsen  15·9  38.5  28.2  43·7  57·1  183.4  12,596 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  15.0  50.2  36.7  38.5  12.7  153.1  15,221 
Rheinland-Pfalz  n.o  26.8  21.1  41.1  34.6  140.6  14,045 
Saarland  20.6  28.7  n.o  32.)  41·3  139.9  13,243 
Schleswig-Holstein  14.8  19.4  15·9  44·7  83.6  178·4  12,215 
Total  15·9  42.1  32.4  42.3  29.9  162.6  14,951 
~~  see Table  5 and  Anno:  (for reconciliation of Tables  5 and  6  see text) - 211-
4.  Redistributive Effects 
Tt:.e  redistributive effects of specific purpose  grants in the four 
federations are set out in 
- Table  ?,  which  gives (i) in per capita index form  the minimum 
and  maximum  values for grants received  (range of index numbers), 
(ii) the volume  of grants as a  percentage of personal income,  (iii) 
the elasticity of grants with respect to personal income,  (iv) 
its statistical significance,  (v)  the  budgetary redistributive 
power  and  (vi)  the  change  in Gini-coefficients due  to  the grants. 
- Chart 1, which  plots for each country the  index numbers  for total 
grants received per capita and personal income per capita  used for the 
computations  sUmmarised  in Table  ?, and  the slopes representing 
the elasticity coefficients from  regression equations  ; 
The  assumption underlying this methodology is that the specific 
purpose  grant expenditures can be  treated for the  purpose  of 
incidence analysis as transfer receipts.  This assumption is debatable, 
although less so  than would  be  the case for other categories of 
expenditure which  give  'indivisible' national benefits (defence, 
central government administration).  The  specific purpose grants 
mostly concern  types of expenditure whose  benefits are identifiable 
with the regions in question. 
The  United States case, while highly complex  and  warranting a  detailed 
commentary,  does nonetheless yield a  number  of interesting summary 
conclusions. 
A preliminary point is that the  picture given by  the budgetary 
redistributive  power  is greatly different according to whether three 
exceptional states, Washington  D.C.,  Alaska and  Hawai  are  treated 
apart.  All three states have  clearly been able  to secure exceptional 
advantages,  Washington  D.C.  because  of the direct federal government 
responsibility and its obvious political exposure,  Alsaska and 
Hawai  because  of their geographic separation,  their ethnic differences 
and/or their relatively recent accession to  the  federation.  For most 
types of grants these states receive up  to 400% of the per 
capita national average  benefits, in spite of their high per capita 
personal income  levels,  whereas  the  mini-max  range  for grants per 
capita in the other 48  states tends  to  be  in the  region of 50  % to 
200  %.  In the  use  of regression techniques these extreme deviations 
from  the main  body  of observations have  a  very great influence on 
the results,  hence  the ability of the  three states to change  the 
sign of the relationship with personal income.  In the Gini  measure, 
on  the other hand  these  exceptional cases are weighted with their 
rather small populations and  therefore have  a  modes·::.  influence only. 
Concentrating now  on  the  '9' and  '48'  variants of the U.S.  case, 
there is in four eategories a  broad consistency in these  two  sets of 
results.  In order of importance  'food stamps'  etc, highways, - 212-
education and  health have  a  significant redistributive effect in the 
order of 2.5% to O.J %·  Out  of the  two  remaining groups,  'economic 
op~ortunity' has a  relative unimportant redistributive power, 
whereas for  'welfare•  the redistributive effect differs according to 
the  regional breakdown as well as the measure  used.  The  population 
weighted measure  in the  census region variant show  a  negative 
redistributive effect of the order of - 2%.  This is mainly due  to 
the  favourable  treatment of rich and  populous  states such as New  York 
and  California,  which  when  aggregated with Sinaller states into 
census regions have  a  dominant influence on  the whole  region.  The 
redistributive effect of total grants is heavily influenced by  the 
'welfare'  group and  thus shows  a  variation between  2% (9  census 
regions,  Gini measure)  and 5·5 %  (48  States,  redistributive power 
measure),  but  with about  3 %  as the most  convincing value,  since two 
variants are close to it and  for these variants the corresponding 
'welfare effect  is equal  and  about  the  average of the two  other 
variants (cp. Table  7)• 
The  main  progressively redistributive results seem  to be  traceable 
to  the following characteristics  : 
- for the  elementary and  secondary school programme  the use  of target 
po~ulation keys aimed at children living in  'poverty'; 
- for the vocational education programme  the  combined  use  of target 
population keys and  variable matching ratios inversely  related to 
personal income  ; 
- for  the  Food  Stamp  programme  the  use  of nationally uniform  benefit 
standards criteria defining low-income  families. 
These  cases contrast with  those in the  welfare and  economic 
opportunity and  manpower  groups,  where  regressive or no  significantly 
redistributive results are obtained 
- in the Medicaid and  Maintenance Assistance programmes  the open-
ended  formula,  combined  with states' options to exercise 
relatively high minimum  matching ratios and  their considerable 
liberty in setting the  standard and cost of benefits, has resulted 
in the high income  states of New  York  and  California securing 
exceptionally high federal contributions (these  two  states obtain 
JO  %  of Medicaid  grants as against their 21 %  share of personal 
income  and  19% share of population); 
- in the Economic  Opportunity and  Manpower  programmes,  while  there 
is a  marked  use of target  population criteria (like local 
unemployment  rates), it is reportedly the  case  that the heavy 
reliance on  the project form  of aid has resulted in the 
'grantmanship'  of local and  state governments  becoming an important 
determinant of the  outcome,  with the more  active and  better staffed 
local administrations obtaining more  money. - 213-
Redistributive Power of Specific Purpose  Grants 
i  ii  iii  iv  v  vi 
Range  of  Progr8lllllle  Elasticity  Statistical  Redistri- % change 
Index  Volume  as  of progr8lllllle  significance  butive  in Gini-
Numbers  %of persona  with respect  of elasticity  power  (3)  Coeffi-
income  to personal  (2)  cient  (4) 
income  (1) 
Health  93/144  0.2  0.12  0.023  0.1  0.1 
Germany,  Education  46/126  0.4  1.30  0.477  - 0.1  0.2 
10  L!i.nder  Transport  49/138  0.3  1.68  0.457  - 0.2  0.3 
Berlin  Housing  76/111  0.4  0.14  0.044  0.3  0.4 
excluded 1973  Regional  Deve- 23/279  0.3  - 3.38  0.422  1.2  1.9 
lopment 
Total  86/113  1.5  0.10  0.025  1.35  2.0 
Health  75/200  0.2  - 4-85  0.533  1.0  1.0 
Australia  Education  85/119  2.1  - 0.03  o.ooo  2.2  3.3 
6 Provinces,  Welfare  80/200  0.1  - 5-45  0.615  0.6  0.5 
1971/1972  Transport  69/185  1.2  - 3. 75  0.478  5-5  5-3 
Other  64/179  0.6  - 2.21  0.162  2.0  3.8 
Total  85/139  4.2  - 1.68  0.421  11.2  14.2 
Health  91/113  2. 7  - 0.04  0.017  2.8  2.9 
Canada,  Education  38/121  1.3  1.16  0.658  - 0.2  0.7 
10  Provinces,  Welfare  71/139  1.0  - 0.63  0.519  1.7  2.5 
1973/74  Regional  and  33/827  0.4  - 6.52  0.442  3.0  1.  7 
other 
Total  83/139  5·3  - 0.36  0.327  7.2  7-9 
Health  55/538  0.1  0.34  0.003  0.08  - 0.14 
Education  61/756  0.4  2.03  0.060  - 0.39  - 0.33 
United States  Welfare  39/214  1.2  0.61  0.054  0.47  - 0.16 
51  States  Economic Oppor- 64/562  0.4  1.19  0.031  - 0.06  - 0.25 
F.Y.  1974  tunity 
Highways  59/1145  0.4  2.02  0.026  - 0.44  0.74 
Foodst.  Urban etc  62/293  1.2  0.06  o.ooo  1.12  0.97 
Total  59/375  3. 7  o. 79  0.046  0.77  0.79 
Health  57/303  0.1  - 1.85  0.182  0.3  0.3 
United States  Education  63/159  0.4  - 1.69  0.372  1.0  o.8 
48  States  Welfare  39/200  1.2  0.51  0.039  0.6  - 1.3 
D.c., Alaska,  Economic  Oppor- 54/480  0.4  - 0.14  0,001  0.4  0.6 
Hawai  excluded  tunity 
F.  Y.  1974  Highways  60/475  0.4  - 2.01  0.066  1.3  1.1 
Foodst. urban etc  61/183  1.2  - 1.17  0.246  2.6  2.5 
Total  58/154  3. 7  - 0.68  0.161  6.2  3.8 
Health  67/163  0.1  - 1.39  0.242  0.3  0.2 
United States  Education  69/150  0.4  - 1.88  0.695  1.1  0.9 
9  Census  Welfare  64/146  1.2  2.04  0.466  - 1.2  - 2.4 
regions,  Economic Oppor- 79/127  0.4  0.64  0.120  0,1  - 0.1 
F.  Y.  1974  tunity 
69/198  Highway  0.4  - 1.12  0.089  0.9  1.0 
Foodst.  urban etc  83/136  1.2  - 1.30  0.602  2. 7  2.6 
Total  83/111  3. 7  - 0.07  0.004  3.9  2.2 - 214-
Footnotes to Table  7 
(1)  Examples  of elasticity coefficients  1 
2. 0  - per capita grant differentials twice as big as per capita 
personal income  differentials (negative redistributive 
effect- regional inequalities are increased by  grant 
programme) 
1.  0  - per capita grant proportional to personal income  per capita 
(no  redistributive effect) 
0.0 - per capita grant equal for all regions  (redistributive 
effect proportional to volume  of pro~e) 
- 1.0- per capita grant inversely proportional to personal income 
per capita (strong redistributive effect) 
(2)  An  elasticity coefficient of almost zero is statistically 
insignificant by  the  usual tests  J  however,  for the  purposes of 
the  present analysis a  distribution close to equal-amounts-per-
capita has clearly meaningful redistributive implications 
(cp.  also methodology of redistributive power  developed in 
Chapter  5 ). 
(J) Redistributive power  of the grants measured  by  the reduction in 
personal income  differentials between regions due  to the grant 
programme  under the  assumption of a  regionally neutral financing 
of these  payments  (i.e. proportional to income). It is equal to 
the deviation from  neutrality- measured  by  the difference  between 
one  (neutral case) and  the elasticity - multiplied by  the 
equalisation volume  as a  percentage of personal income. 
(4)  A modified income  is calculated by  adding to personal  income  per 
capita grants per capita and  subtracting amounts  representing 
the regional  breal:::do>m  of the neutrally financed national total 
amount  of grants.  The  Gini-coefficient of this modified  income 
is compared  with the Gini-coefficient  of personal  income. - 215-
Among  other programmes,  the  road grants are in effect allocated 
mainly on  the need  and  cost criteria, which  gives a  distribution 
unrelated to income  showing  up  in the  low  statistical significance 
of the elasticity. 
Canada  appears in an  intermediate position. As  shown  in Table  7 the 
overall redistributive power  of its specific purpose  grants is about 
1 %. 
The  groups'welfare'  and'regional and other'  show  a  substantial 
amount  of redistribution in the order of 2  %·  In the welfare  group 
populous Quebec  is the greatest beneficiary, in the  'regional and 
other'  groups it is small Prince Edward  Island.  This explains the 
difference between  the  two  measures of the redistributive effect. 
The  health programmes  also contribute a  substantial amount of 
redistributive power  (about 2.5% of income  differentials), mainly 
as a  result of elements in distribution formulae  that are based 
on  national average  cost calculations (i.e. equal amounts  per capita). 
The  education programme  is approximately proportional to income  in its 
distri  biltion, as a  result of formulae  based on flat percentage federal 
contri  butione. 
Australian specific purpose  grants  show  overall a  quite high-powered 
progressive redistributive effect (with a  redistributive  power  of 
at least 10 %  in relation to  personal income  differentials). 
About  half of this result is obtained through road grants,  under which 
the  large and  least populated states of Western Australia,  Southern 
Australia and  Queensland are highly favoured in relation to the smaller 
highly~opulated and  richest states of Victoria and  New  South Wales. 
The  health and  welfare  programmes  appear also to be  highly progressive 
in their distribution, although they are quite  small in volume  and 
therefore modest in redistributive power.  The  important education 
programme  is not significantly related to income  differentials at all. 
For Germany  the overall result, for the total of the conditional 
grants for which  a  distribution by  Lander was  possible, is that only 
a  slight progressive redistribution of 1 %  - 2 %  takes place.  The 
tendency is for the amount  of grants per capita to  be  invariant to 
per capita income  differentials, i.e. to be  equivalent to  the result 
of using a  population key.  These  findings  are  broadly consistent 
with  those  of Reissert.(l) 
This overall result is the combination of the  effect of the regional 
policy programmes  and  offsetting effects arising from  the other 
programmes.  As  might  be  expected,  the regional policy programmes  are 
sharply negatively correlated with income  percentage although their 
weight is rather small.  The  negative elasticity is even greater if the 
city states of Bremen  and  Hamburg  (which  benefit from  the  ur'!?an 
development  programme)  are disregarded. 
(1)  B.  Reissert,  Die  finanzielle Beteiligung ••• ,  op.  cit.  pp.  64-65 130 
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The  programmes  for ~  and  housing appear approximately invariant 
to personal income  differentials,  which is what one  would  expect from 
the  population key elements present in the distribution formulae. 
Their slight redistributive effect is offset by  the education and 
transport programmes,  which  clearly favour  the rich Uinder  (this 
is even  more  pronounced if Hamburg  and  Bremen  are excluded).  For 
education this is due  to  the  higher proportion of universities 
and  for transport the higher proportion of  'Autobahnen'  built in the 
riche.r states. 
5.  Allocative Effects 
The  allocative effects of specific purpose  grants are much  more 
difficult to identify in a  simple  w~y·  The  fact that the  funds 
are  ear-marked  by  function tells very little about what  resources 
the state and  local governments  would  otherwise have  allocated 
to the functions in question. It is even more  difficult to demonstrate 
whether federal contributions in given specific purpose  grant 
programmes  corresponded or not to such  theoretical concepts as 
spillover correction. 
Very  substantial research efforts have  nonetheless been made  in the 
United States to  throw  light on  these  questions - since specific 
purpose  grants are essentially aimed  at allocative objectives.  A 
valuable  review article by  Gramlich draws  on  over sixty studies.(l) 
In synthesising this vast literature, Gramlich  polarise& 
intergovernmental grants into three  types: 
- unconditional grants 
- open-ended conditional grants 
- closed-ended conditional grants 
('Unconditional' is here  termed  'general purpose',  'conditional is 
here  termed  'specific purpose'.) 
In each case an attempt is made  to assess the effects on  total 
spending at the  state/local government  level, be  it financed by 
state/local or federal funds. 
As  regards general purpose  grants the  broad finding  (based on  the 
experience of u.s.  block grants and  revenue  sharing) is that there 
tends to be  a  substantial leakage of federal funds  into local tax 
cuts (of perhaps a  third or a  half)  with the remainder of the  funds 
resulting in expenditure increases.  These  grants are interpreted as 
having essentially an income  effect on  the local governments,  and 
the effect on  public expenditure is therefore analysed in terms of 
income  elasticities of demand. 
(1)  Edward  M.  Gramlich,  Intergovernmental Grants  :  A Review  of the 
Empirical Literature,  paper prepared for the  ISPE  conference  on 
fiscal federalism,  Berlin,  January 1976. - 219-
'!he  open-ended  specific purpose grants  (which are few  in number  in 
the United States, but more  used in Canada)  are  seen as achieving a 
relative price reduction for  the function in question,  and  the 
effects on  expenditure are accordingly interpreted in terms of the 
price elasticities  of demand.  The  broad finding indicates price 
elasticities of demand  for most  services somewhat  below  unity, 
although  the  expenditure increase resulting from  the grants tends 
to be  substantially greater than for the general purpose  grants. 
The  most  complex  category,  and that most often used in practice, is 
the closed-end specific  purpose  grants.  These  can be  interpreted in 
terms of a  price reduction effect up  to the  size of the fixed 
allocation  ;  this interpretation can be  consistent with the minimum-
standard objectives to which  specific purpose  grant· programmes  are 
often addressed.  Whether  these price effects take  place,  however, 
will depend  on  two  main  factors. 
(a)  whether  the  money  is allocated for narrowly controlled types 
of projects, or more  simply distributed on  the  basis of 
formulae  for broad  programme  categories, and 
(b)  whether  the amount  of the grant is a  small or substantial part 
of the  programme  that the  local government would  have  implemented 
in any case. 
Where  (under  (b))  the federal funds are only small,  Gramlich 
concludes that the  "grant money  will probably get lost in the 
shuffle anyway  and it may  as well simply avoid administrative hassles 
by  converting the grants to  • •  (the  unconditional)  form".  In these 
circumstances,  the  closed-end grants should be reinterpreted as 
having the  income  effects that are usually ascribed to general 
purpose  grants. 
In his review  of econometric analyses of closed-end specific purpose 
grants,  Gramlich  notes that several studies have  pointed to very 
high elasticities (of between 1  1/2 to 2  1/2) in the growth of 
expenditure with respect to  the federal  grants.  While  discounting 
some  of these  findings for reasons of upward  bias (in econometric 
techniques), his overall conclusion.is that the  amount  of spending 
induced by  these grants tends to be  close to unity (as large as the 
grant itself or a  little more)  and  therefore  somewhat  more  than for 
the  open-ended  specific purpose  grants.  This is attributed to the 
higher elasticities of demand  for the  services for which  (in the 
U.s.)  this type  of grant is used,  or the effort maintenance 
provisions in the conditions. - 220-
6.  Concluding Remarks 
Specific purpose  grants in the four federations predominate in the 
fields of education, health, welfare,  transport and regional policy. 
These  are sectors very often lying to a  large degree in the hands 
oflower levels of government,  but in which  there is a  national 
interest for reasons of economic  development,  or to assure minimum 
standards in certain public services. 
Many  different types of specific purpose grants have  been described, 
and  there is a  continuous spectrum of degrees in which  policy control 
can· ,be  shared between the' federal or lower levels of government. 
The  distribution of power  can therefore  be  tailored to constitutional 
and  political objectives.  However,  the  weaker  the federal or central 
power,  the more  will be  the  tendency for the grant to have  only 
income  (redistributive) effects,  to  the detriment of allocative 
objectives  ;  unless the open-ended  form  of 'price-reducing'  grants 
is used,  but this tends to be  unpopular with the grant-giving 
governments  because  of its uncertain financial implications. 
It is not impossible  to combine  allocative and  redistributive 
objectives in specific purpose  grant programmes  through using certain 
types of formulae,  (examples  have  been  given above  of variable 
matching ratios,  target population keys,  weighting factors inversely 
related to personal income  etc.). However,  there are  serious pitfalls 
(causing for example,  perverse redistributive results)  to  be  avoided 
if this approach is adopted.  From  the  purely economic  standpoint 
there is much  to be  said for a  clear-cut separation of functions 
between allocative specific purpose  grants and redistributive 
general purpose  grants.  Where  this is politically not possible or 
appropriate,  and  combined  objectives have  to be pursued,  great care 
has to be  taken in the design of the grant formulae  and  rules to 
avoid  unintended or incoherent results. 
The  Community  - which  operates programmes  of specific purpose  grants 
and  loans in the fields of social,  regional,  structural and 
agricultural policy - could  no  doubt usefully apply the  techniques 
of economic  appraisal that have  emerged  in the experience of the 
federations here reviewed.  Various further ideas for Community 
financial intervention, for example  in unemployment  benefits  (as 
in the  'Marjolin'  report),  cross-frontier transport infrastructure 
(Channel  Tunnel)  and  education facilities for migrant families, 
could also suitably be  formulated in terms of the  theory and 
practice of inter-governmental grants. - 221-
TABLE  A 1 
Federal  S12ecific  !':!E:I2ose  Grants 12er  Head1  by Region, 
U,S,A,  {:21  re~ons~ 1214  U, S,  ~ per annum 
Total  Health  ~  ~ 
Economic  T(an 12o)  Others  f!  pOp 
OJ2J20rtuni t;y:  S 
Maine  229  10  18  76  24  26  76  4012  1050 
New  Hampshire  165  7  20  42  13  28  56  4577  810 
Vermont  283  11  24  84  23  54  88  4123  . 470 
Massachusetts  192  7  18  77  20  15  56  5111  5800 
Rhode  Island  233  4  20  77  24  34  74  4769  940 
Connecticut  192  5  15  53  17  16  86  6074  3090 
New  York  248  5  22  122  21  13  65  5579  18110 
New  Jersey  152  4  13  53  19  16  48  5820  7330 
Per!nsyl  vania  172  6  17  56  13  18  62  4985  11830 
Ohio  140  4  13  39  13  16  56  5116  10730 
Indiana  109  3  12  27  11  18  37  4964  5330 
Illinois  174  3  14  69  14  18  55  5877  11130 
Michigan  170  4  14  68  16  19  49  5432  9100 
Wisconsin  145  4  12  60  15  15  38  4914  4560 
Minnesota  190  4  16  60  16  28  66  5086  3920 
Iowa  175  5  15  81  12  17  45  5181  2850 
Missouri  155  7  17  37  17  24  54  4628  4780 
Kansas  145  6  22  36  14  24  43  5216  2270 
Nebraska  147  6  19  41  13  26  42  5037  1540 
South Dakota  267  17  31  43  21  57  96  4493  680 
North Dakota  198  10  25  41  20  40  62  5339  640 
Delaware  178  8  19  40  16  37  59  5952  570 
Maryland  155  8  16  44  11  19  57  5569  4090 
Virginia  164  4  25  41  11  31  53  4998  4910 
West  Virginia  290  9  17  41  23  101  99  3902  1790 
North Carolina  157  6  25  40  12  16  58  4355  5360 
South Carolina  180  6  23  32  17  18  86  4069  2780 
Georgia  210  6  20  70  13  21  80  4465  4880 
Florida  264  6  17  26  95  22  100  4811  8090 
District  of Columbia  537  31  104  130  81  22  169  6246  720 
Kentucky  218  9  24  50  18  24  93  4111  3360 
Tennessee  176  7  25  40  14  19  71  4213  4130 
Alabama  204  7  26  51  15  27  78  3877  3580 
Mississippi  257  8  50  60  20  19  100  3417  2320--
Louislana  215  5  22  57  17  32  83  4075  3760 
Arkansas  203  8  26  55  19  16  78  3906  2060 
Oklahoma  200  6  47  66  18  18  65  4394  2710 
Texas  157  5  18  44  13  19  58  4775  12050 
Montana  249  11  30  39  26  74  69  4704  730 
Idaho  197  5  23  39  23  55  53  4781  800 
Wyoming  248  13  27  24  34  96  55  5389  360 
Colorado  181  11  21  53  15  25  56  5200  2490 
Utah  203  13  24  44  18  54  49  4250  1170 
Nevada  256  5  18  28  31  61  112  5810  570 
Arizona  185  9  28  27  25  38  59  4723  2150 
New  Mexico  258  11  27  50  29  42  100  3898  1120 
California  195  5  17  89  21  16  47  5571  20910 
Oregon  182  7  16  47  24  28  60  4947  2270 
Washington  200  10  18  58  24  31  59  5161  3480 
Alaska  691  17  145  46  58  248  176  6764  340 
Hawaii  269  12  44  63  18  52  80  5670  840 
United States  184  19  61  17  22  60  5053  211380 
United States  38894  1268  4016  12894  3593  4650  12683  1068103 
(absolute) 
Ran.<;e  of index  58/154  57/303  63/159  39/200  54/480  60/475  61/183  68/120 
numbers 
Grants as %  of PI  3. 7  0,1  0.4  1.20  0.4  0.4  1.2 
Elasticity  - 0.68  - 1.85  - 1.69  0,51  - 0,14  - 2.01  - 1.17  -48  States 
Statistical  ~ignifi- 0.161  0,182  0.372  0,039  0.001  0,066  0,246 
canoe R 
Redistributive power  6,2  0,3  1.0  0,6  0,4  1.3  2.6 
Change  in Gini- 3.8  0,3  0,8  - 1,3  0,6  1.1  2.5 
coefficient 
Range  of index  59/375  55/538  61/756  39/214  64/562  59/1145  62/293  68/134 
numbers 
Grants as %  of PI  3.6  0,1  0,4  1,2  0.3  0.4  1.2 
Elasticity  0,789  0,336  2.027  0,608  1.194  2,024  0,061 
Statistical signifi-
canoe  R2  0,046  0,003  0.060  0.054  0.031  0.026  0,000  -51  states 
Redistn  buti  ve  power  0.77  0,08  - 0.39  0.47  - 0,06  - 0.44  1.12 
Change  in Gini- 0.79  - 0.14  - 0.33  - 0,16  - 0,25  0.74  0.97 
coefficient Schleswig-Hal 'tein 
Ni edersachsen 
Nordrhein-westfalen 
Hassen 
Rheinland-Pfalz 
Baden-Wurttemberg 
Bay  ern 
Saarland 
Hamburg 
Bremen 
Berlin 
BRD 
BRD  (absolute) 
Range  of index numbers 
Grants as %  of PI 
Elasticity 
Statistical significance R2 
Redistributive power 
Change  in Gini-coefficient 
-Jlew "South  Wales 
Victoria 
Queensland 
South Australia 
Western  Australia 
Tasmania 
Australia 
Austraha  (absolute) 
Range  of index numbers 
Grants as %  of PI 
Elasticity 
Statistical significance R2 
Redi et ri  but  i ve  power 
Change  in Gini-coefficient 
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Federal Specific  Purpose  Grants per Head,  by Region, 
Germany  (BRD)  1973 
Total  Health  ~  Housing  Regional  &  T(anspo) 
structural  S 
17.8-'  15  19  45  84  16 
183  16  39  44  57  28 
153  15  50  39  13  37 
166  16  42  40  23  44 
141  17  27  41  35  21 
159  15  43  47  25  29 
170  16  39  45  41  30 
140  21  29  32  41  17 
173  19  53  41  7  54 
152  16  56  45  11  23 
164  23  48  41  7  45 
163  16  42  42  30  32 
10123  994  2608  2608  1863  1987 
86/113  93/144  46/126  76/111  23/279  49/138 
1.5  0,2  0.4  0.4  0.3  0,3 
0,10  0,12  1.30  0.14  -3.38  1.68 
0,025  0,023  0.477  0,044  0.422  0,457 
1.4  0,1  -{),1  0.3  1.2  -{),2 
2,0  0.2  -{),2  0.4  1.9  -{),3 
Federal Specific  Purpose  Grants per Head1  !?;r  Region, 
Australia l:l13L14 
Total  Health  Education  Welfare  ~ 
other 
S 
80  3  44  2  21  10 
85  3  52  2  18  10 
107  4  41  3  34  25 
112  6  57  3  27  20 
131  8  57  4  48  14 
96  6  43  3  35  9 
94  4  48  26  14 
1247  53  637  226  345  186 
85/139  75/200  85/119  80/200  69/185  64/179 
4.2  0.2  2.1  0,1  1,2  0,6 
- 1.68  - 4.89  - 0,03  - 5.45  - 3.  75  - 2,21 
0.421  0.533  o.ooo  0,615  0.478  0,162 
11.2  1,0  2.2  0,6  5.5  2.0 
14.2  1.0  3.3  0,5  5.3  3.8 
DM  per annum 
f!.  POP 
10053  2580 
9951  7259 
11005  17246 
11253  5584 
10183  3701 
11750  9239 
10296  10853 
9310  1112 
14966  1752 
12627  729 
11384  2048 
10914  62101 
677770 
85/137 
Aus,  ~ per annum 
f!.  POP 
2673  4916 
2622  3617 
2368  1945 
2342  1309 
2350  1083 
2228  398 
2542  13268 
33727 
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TABLE  A 3 
Federal  S:eecihc  Pu!J20Se  Grants  :eer Head1  per Region, 
Canada  121~LH  Can.  %  per  annum 
Total  Health  Educat1on  Welfare  Reep.onal 
IT  .!:Q!:  &  other 
NewfoWldland  209  113  22  48  26  2039  541 
P;.'ince  Edward  Island  279  91  18  45  124  2305  115 
Nova  Scotia  192  97  44  35  16  2775  805 
New  Brunswick  210  98  25  49  38  2517  652 
Quebec  233  103  54  53  23  3315  6081 
Ontario  185  99  51  27  8  4376  7939 
Manitoba  204  107  38  40  19  3590  998 
Saskatchewan  183  98  30  40  15  3312  908 
Alberta  203  104  57  33  9  3868  1683 
British Columbia  166  91  34  36  5  3998  2373 
Canada  200  100  47  38  15  3748  22095 
Canada  (absolute)  4419  2209  1038  840  331  82812 
Range  of index numbers  83/139  91/113  38/121  71/139  33/827  54/117 
Grants  as %  of PI  5.3  2.  7  1.3  1.0  0.4 
Elasticity  - 0.36  - 0.04  1.16  - 0,63  - 6.52 
Statistical sigruficance R2 
0.327  0.017  0,658  0.519  0.442 
Redi at ri  but i ve  power  7·2  2.8  - 0,2  1.7  3.0 
Change  in Gini-coefficient  7.9  2.9  o. 7  2.5  1.7 
Federal  S:eecific  Pur12ose  Grants 12er  Head1  b~ Re~on, 
u.s.A.  (2  re~ons) 1214  u.s. %  per  annum 
Total  ~  Educat1on  Welfare  Economic  T(ans12o) 
o:e:eortWl1  t~  roads 
Other  IT  POP 
New  England  201  7  17  68  19  20  70  5161  12150 
Middle Atlantic  204  6  19  88  18  15  59  5437  37270 
East  North Central  153  4  13  55  14  18  50  5352  40860 
West  North Central  161  6  18  42  15  26  54  4969  16690 
South Atlantic  170  6  21  41  13  25  63  4748  33190 
East  South Central  203  8  29  48  16  22  82  3959  13390 
West  South Central  173  5  20  49  14  20  64  4510  20590 
MoWltain  194  10  23  39  21  43  59  4791  9390 
Pacific  197  6  19  78  21  22  51  5487  27850 
u.s.A.  184  19  61  17  22  60  5053  211380 
u.s.A.  (absolute)  38894  1268  4016  12894  3593  4650  12683  1068103 
Range  of index numbers  83/111  67/163  69/150  64/146  79/127  69/198  83/136  78/109 
Grants  as  %  of PI  3.6  0.1  0.4  1,2  0.3  0.4  1.2 
Elasticity  - 0,069  - 1.39  - 1,881  2,037  0.636  - 1,125  - l.  300 
Statistical significance R2  0,004  0,242  0,695  0,466  0,120  0,089  0,602 
Redistnbutive  power  3.9  0.3  1,1  - 1,2  0.1  0,9  2. 7 
Change  1n Gini-coefficient  2.2  0.2  0.9  - 2.4  - 0,1  1.0  2,6 - 224-
Sources of Tables 2  to 6 
1.  United States 
(a)  Specific purpose  grants,  by  function,  from  Sophie  R.  Dales, 
Federal grants to state and  local governments,  fiscal year 
~.  Social Security Bulletin, September 1975,  Tables 2  and 4 
The  composition of grouped grants can  be  found  in Sophie  R. 
Dales,  Federal grants to state and  local governments,  fiscal 
year 197'3; 
Social Security Bulletin, October 1974,  p.  J4-J6. 
(b)  Personal income  p.c.  from  Survey of current business, u.s. 
Department of Commerce,  August  1975,  Table  2 
2.  Australia 
(a)  Specific purpose  grants from  Payments  to or for the states 
and  local government authorities 1974-75,  1974-75 Budget  paper 
No  7,  Canberra 1974,  Tables 87 and 95. 
(b)  Personal income  p.c.  from  Grants Commission,  Forty-first 
Report 1974  on  Special assistance for states, Canberra 1974, 
Table  12. 
J.~ 
(a)  Specific purpose  grants from  Federal-provincial fiscal 
relations in Canada,  An  overview,  Department of Finance, 
Ottawa,  September 8,  1975,  Table I. 
(b)  Personal income  p.c.  from  Economic  Review,  April 1975, 
page  115. 
4.  Federal Republic  of Germany 
(a) Total Federal transfers from  Finanzbericht 1976,  Ministry of 
Finance,  Bonn,  October 1975,  Table  5,  p.  166-167. 
(b)  Constitutional classification of specific purpose  grants from 
an unpublished working paper for the Commission  on  Constitutional 
Reform,  document  No  lJ7, February 27,  1975 
(c)  Own  functional classification - 225-
(d)  GDP  p.c.  from  Statistisches Jahrbuch 1974,  p.  513 
(e) 
and Chapter  8 
REGIONALISATION  OF  FEDERAL  OR  CENTRAL  GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE  IN  SEVEN  INTEGRATED  ECONOHIES 
(working paper) - 229-
1.  Methodology  of Regional Distribution 
This  cha~ter sets out estimates of the inter-regional redistributive 
effect of federal or central government expenditure.  For the  four 
federations,  Germany,  Australia,  Canada  and  the  United States, 
chaDters 6  and  7 above  have  already analysed general and  specific 
purpose grants in detail  ;  these grants are  therefore not 
systematically covered in the  present chapter.  The  data presented 
here are based  on  various studies and  statistical sources which 
have  been  published elsewhere.(l)  As  in the  case of taxes treated 
in chapter 9,  the regional distribution of expenditure can be 
approached  in two  w.ays,  by  considering either  : 
- the regional disbursement of expenditure,  or 
- the regional benefit which  residents of a  region derive from  the 
expenditure. 
The  benefit approach is the more  appropriate for  the  evaluation of 
the redistributive effect of public expenditure.  For salary and 
wage  payments  and  social security and  other transfers this approach 
is followed  by allocating them  as far as possible to  the  region 
of residence rather than,  for example,  the  region of employment. 
Attempts to regionalise  the benefits from  expenditure  on  goods 
(1)  Quite detailed studies on  the regionalisation of expenditures are 
available for France  :  BETURE  (Prud'homme,  Nicolet Rochefort), 
Repartition spatiale des fonds  budgetaires,  Commissariat du  Plan 197J 
Italy  :  cp.  Chapter 4  ;  the  United Kingdom  :  V.H.  Woodward,  Regional 
Social Accounts for  the  United Kingdom.  NIESR,  Regional Papers I, 
Cambridge  J.970  ;  and  the  United States  :  I.M.  I.abovi tz, Federal Revenue 
and  Exnenditure Estimates for States andRe  ions  :  Averages for the 
Fiscal Year  1969-71  Congressional Research Service  :  in preparation); 
House  of ReDresentatives,  Federal Revenue  and  Expenditure Estimates for 
States and  Hegions,  Fiscal Years  1965-67.  ~Tashington 1968  ;  and 
National Journal,  Federal Spending  :  The  North's loss is the  sun belt's 
gain.  Special Report 61261/76.  For Germany  there exists an official 
statistical source  for the regionalisation of total current and  social 
security  ex~nditures :  Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen  der 
Utnder,  Heft  2 : Entstehung,  Verteilung und  Verwendung  des Sozialprodukts 
in den landern,  Standardtabellen 1960-1970.  For Australia and  Canada 
data sources only exist for  the  regionalisation of social security 
exnenditures, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Authorities of Australian 
Government,  No  12  (197J-74)  and  unpublished material provided  by  the 
Canadian Federal Statistics Office. - 230-
and  services encounters  two  major  problems.  (1) First,  there is 
the  familiar characteristic of  'pure'  public  goods.  (e.g.  defence 
and  general administration)  that their benefit accrues  'indivisibly' 
to  the whole  population.  Secondly,  even for expenditure which  is more 
readily localisable  such as regional aids or education,  their welfare 
impact may  be  different and  more  diffuse  than  the  place of disbursement. 
In the  studies for France,  Italy,  the  United Kingdom  and  the  United 
States different approaches are used in the  face  of these problems.(2) 
For the regional breakdown  of expenditure in France  15 different 
alternatives are offered by  dividing expenditures into rather 
homogenous  groups and  using different keys for groups with uncertain 
regional impact,  some  of them  being closer to  the  disbursement,  others 
to the benefit concept.(J)  Since  no  single alternative can be 
identified as representing unambiguously  the benefit concept,  the 
average of the 15 alternatives is used  in this paper. 
A detailed description of the allocation procedure for Italy can be 
found  in Chapter 4.  (4)  In general,  expenditure  on  goods  and  services 
is allocated to  regions where  the disbursement are made. 
In the  United  Kingdom  the  public goods  problem  is dealt with  by 
excluding from  the  analysis central government  expenditure  on 
administration,  defence and  capital formation related to trading 
services  (5)  The  remaining  'beneficial'  expenditure is allocated to 
the region where  the money  has been  spent. 
In the  study by_  Labovi tz for the United States "estimates of 
expenditure impacts generally represent allocations of Federal 
expenditure  to States where  services are rendered or goods are 
(1)  These  problems also occur in studies of redistribution of money 
between  income  grouns,  cp.  A.  Peacock,  The  Treatment of Government 
Expenditure in Studies of Income  Distribution, in Public Finance 
and  Stabilisation Policy.  Essays in House  of R.A.  Musgrave,  ed.  by 
W.L.  Smith  and  J.H.  Culbertson,  Amsterdam  1974. 
(2)  For Germany  the official statistical source relies partly on  original 
data, and  partly on  distribution keys.  It is not clear how  far the 
benefit approach is followed in the distribution of expenditures on 
goods  and  services.  For Australia and  Canada  data exist only on  the 
regional allocation of social security expenditures. 
(J)  Cp.  Chapter 2  on  France, 
(4)  Cp.  Chapter 4  on  Italy, 
(5)  Implicitly it is thus assumed  that this expenditure has  no  redistributive 
effect.  Since its allocation according to  the  population key resulting 
in equal amounts  per capita for  al~ regions is a  sensible alternative 
with a  considerable redistributive effect,  the  exclusion of  thee~ expen-
ditures might be  thought of as understating-the redistributive effect 
of total public expenditures in the United Kingdom. - 231-
produced"  (1);  in the National Journal study expenditures  on  goods 
and services are allocated to regions where  they are spent. 
In both  studies expenditures on d3fence  and  general administration 
are.included in regionally allocated amounts.  For expenditure on 
general administration the redistributive power  results will not be 
severely distorted since Washington D.C.,  Alaska and  Hawaii  are, 
as highly exceptional cases,  excluded from  the analysis.  Expenditure 
on  military contracts,  on  the other hand,  has been allocated to  the 
region where  it is spent.  As  will be  seen,  this is a  decisive 
influence on  the overall redistributive effect of federal expenditure. 
The  statistical material for the regionalisation of central or 
federal expenditures is presented in unified form  in Tables Al-A4 
in the Annex. 
2.  Redistributive Effects 
The  redistributive effects of federal or central expenditure are 
set out in  : 
- Table  1  which  gives (i) in per capita index  for~ the  minimum  and 
maximum  values for expenditures allocated  (range of index numbers), 
(ii) expenditure as a  percentage  of personal income,  (iii) the 
elasticity of expenditure with respect to personal income,  (iv) 
its statistical significance,  (v)  the  redistributive power,  and 
(vi) the  change  in Gini-coefficients due  to expenditure. 
- Charts 1 and  2,  which  plot for each country total allocated central 
or direct federal expenditure in per capita index form  against 
personal income  in per capita index form. 
The  overall redistributive  power  varies in the European  countries 
between about 20  %and  50%,  (2)  with an average  of about 35  %.  For 
Australia and  Canada  social security expenditures  show  a  redistributive 
effect of respectively about 10 %  and  5 %.  (3) 
(1)  House  of Representatives,  op.  cit. P•  5· 
(2)  For  methodology  of redistributive power  see  chapter  5• 
(3) If other direct expenditures in Australia and  Canada  were  actually 
distributed on  a  per capita basis, as they turn out to be  approximately 
distributed in the  other countries,  they would  have  a  redistributive 
power  equal to their share in personal income ,  which  for 1973/74  in 
Australia and  1973  in Canada respectiyely are .about  13  %  and  21  cjo.  In 
this case total direct  expenditure  in·both countries would  have a· 
redistributive power  of approximately 25  %. - 232-
1!:2l!..1  :  Redistributive Power of Federal or Central Expenditures 
ii  iii  iv  v  vi 
Range  of  Expenditure  Elasticity of  Statistical  Redietri- %  ohange 
index  volWDe  as  expenditure  significance  butive  in Gini 
nWDbers  %  of personal  with  respect  of elutici  ty  power  (3)  coeffi-
income  to personal  (2)  cient  (4) 
income  (1) 
Direct  consumption  93/125  10.2  - 0.03  0.002  10.5  14.2 
Genaany  Socl.al eecuri  ty  81/140  13.2  0.49  0.152  6.8  11.8 
10  Lllllder  1973  Total  current  Berlin excluded  expendi  turee  88/126  23.4  0.26  0.113  17.3  25-4 
CUrrent  and capital 
France  1970  expenditures  83/130  28.1  0.11  0.019  25.2  23.0 
21  regions  Social eecuri  ty  63/120  16.3  0.54  0.263  7·4  7-0 
Total  90/112  44·5  0.27  0.293  32.6  31·7 
CUrrent  and capital 
France  1970  expenditures  89/106  28.1  0.10  0.052  25.3  26.2 
8  regions  Social security  79/118  16.3  0.42  0.267  9-4  8.1 
Total  93/109  44·5  0.22  0.437  34o7  33·3 
CUrrent  74/119  27·5  0.34  0.243  18.1  18.0 
Wages  and salaries  23/186  1·9  - 0.28  0.057  10.0  10.4 
Italy  1973 
Goods  and services  16/283  2.2  1.29  0.231  - 0.6  o.o 
Transfers  87/113  12.9  0.25  0.662  9.6  9.0  20  regions  Capital  67/227  9.8  - 1.10  0.228  20.6  19.2 
Social security  78/122  19.1  0.59  0.609  7·8  6.5 
Total  82/123  51·9  0.07  0.026  48;4  45·3 
Beneficial  current 
expenditures  90/107  12.2  0.13  0.135  10.5  10.2 
United  Kingdom  1964 
Beneficial  capital 
expenditures  86/163  3·1  - 1.00  0.479  6.1  4·7 
10  regions  Agricultural sub-
38/420  sidies  1.0  - 4·90  0.519  6.0  3.5 
Other grants  89/117  11.0  - 0.21  0.169  13.3  14·4 
Total  91/114  27.2  - 0.32  0.423  36.0  32.9 
Australia  1973/74  Social security  91/115  1·5  - 0.59  0.345  11.8  9.0  6 provinces 
Canada  1973  Social security  93/138  4.8  -0.39  0.319  6.7  5·1  10  provinces 
Pay to personnel  30/348  5·4  - 0.23  0.003  6.6  6.3 
Transfers  74/127  8.0  0.19  o.o60  6.4  4·5 
Direct expenditure 
United States  1969/71  excluding military 
73/186  48  states  contracts  14-9  0.18  o.o17  12.1  9·9 
D.C.,  Alaska,  Military contracts  14/311  4-8  1-75  0.257  - 3.6  - 2.0 
Hawaii  excluded  Total direct 
expenditures  66/169  19·7  o.57  0.152  8.5  5·7 
Grants  61/217  3.2  - 1.12  0.283  6.7  3.8 
Total  expendl.tures  68/157  22.9  0.33  0.072  15.2  8.5 
Pay to personnel  49/187  5·6  - 1.18  0.115  12.2  12.9 
Transfers  86/111  8.o  o.sa  0.645  3o4  2.4 
United States  1969/71 
Direct  expenditures 
axel  uding military 
77/123  9  census  regions  contracts  15.1  - 0.01  o.ooo  15.2  14·7 
Military contracts  60/164  4·9  1.23  0.178  - 1.1  0.2 
Total direct 
expenditures  73/132  20.0  0.30  0.044  14.1  12.3 
Grants  73/132  3.2  - o.65  0.202  5·3  ).6 
Total  expenditures  73/131  23.3  0.17  0.016  19.4  15.2 
Direct expenditures 
excluding defence 
60/161  United States  1975  contracts  11·5  0.07  0.002  18.8  14.0 
48  states  Defence contracts  23/392  ).8  1.22  0.061  - o.8  - 3.6 
D.c., Alaska,  Total direct 
Hawaii  axel  uded  expenditures  67/153  21.3  0.15  0.011  18.0  8.3 
Grants  65/156  4·7  - 0.58  0.150  7·4  3.6 
Total  expenditures  71/145  26.0  0.02  o.ooo  25·4  11·5 
Direct expenditures 
excluding defence 
contracts  78/134  18.4  -0.38  0.052  25.2  25-4 
United States  1975  Defence  contracts  48/190  3.8  - 1.48  0.101  - 1·5  - 3-8 
9  census  regions  Total direct 
sxpendi  turea  73/128  22.2  -0.07  0.002  23.7  19.9 
Grants  86/115  4·7  -0.04  0.002  4·9  2.9 
Total  expenditures  75/124  26.9  - 0.07  0.002  28.6  20.7 - 233-
Footnotes to Table 1 
(1)  Examples  of elasticity coefficients  : 
2.0 - per capita expenditure differentials twice  as big as  per 
capita personal  income  differentials  (negative  redistributive 
effect - regional  inequalities are  increased by expenditure 
programme) 
1.0 - per capita expenditure proportional  to personal  income  per 
capita (no  redistributive effect) 
0.0 - per capita expenditure equal  for all regions  (redistributive 
effect. proportional to volume  of programme) 
- 1.0 - per capita expenditure inversely proportional to personal 
income  per capita (strong redistributive effect) 
(2)  An  elasticity coefficient of almost  zero  is statistically insigni-
ficant by the usual tests;  however,  for the purposes  of the present 
analysis  a  distribution close to equal  amounts  per capita has 
clearly meaningful  redistributive implications  (cp.  also methodology 
of redistributive power  developed in Chapter 5). 
(3)  Redistributive power of the expenditure measured by the reduction 
in personal  income  differentials between regions  due  to the expen-
diture programme  under the  assumption of a  regionally neutral 
financing of these  payments  (i.e. proportional  to  income).  It is 
equal  to  the deviation from neutrality - measured by the difference 
between one  (neutral  case)  and  the elasticity- multiplied by the 
equalisation volume  as  a  percentage of personal  income. 
(4)  A modified  income  is calculated by adding to personal  income  per 
capita expenditure per capita and subtracting amounts  representing 
the regional breakdown of the neutrally financed national total 
amount  of expenditure.  The  Gini-coefficient of this modified  income 
is  compared  with  the Gini-coefficient of personal  income. - 234-
For the  United States direct expenditure  shows  a  redistributive 
power  of about 10% for  the  average  1969-71 and  20% for 1975  (1). 
Inter-country differences are to a  large degree due  to different 
shares of expenditure as percentages of personal income,  whereas 
the elasticities vary much  less  •. 
Indeed,  the most  striking feature of the redistributive characteristics 
of total allocated expenditures is the similarity of the elasticity 
of expenditure with respect to personal income  in such 
constitutionally different countries as Germany,  France, .Italy and 
the  United States.  For  these countries  the elasticity varies 
around  the value  of 0.20,  meaning  that on  average expenditure  per 
capita income  will benefit from  federal or central spending only 
to  the extent.of about 4%  of average.  · 
The  plausibility of these overallresults is reinforced by  the 
similarity of the results obtained for the main  components  :  in 
Germany,  France  and  Italy social security payments  have  an  elasticit~ 
close  to 0.5, whereas current plus capital expenditure per capita (2) 
are nearly equally distributed, i.e. the elasticity is close  to 
zero.(J) 
Social security expenditure in Australia and~  shows  a 
different pattern compared  to  the European countries,  being higher 
per capita in the  poorer regions,  thus achieving a  sizeable 
redistributive power  with  small volumes. 
In the  United  Kingdom  beneficial current expenditure  per capita is 
on  average  nearly equal for all regions  (the elasticity being O.lJ) 
The  other categories show  a  negative elasticity with high values for 
agricultural subsidies (- 4.  9)  and  beneficial capital expenditures 
(-1.0).  Total beneficial expenditure has  thus also a  negative 
elasticity with respect to  personal income.  (4)  With  a  volume  of 
beneficial expenditure  of 27% of personal income,  this gives a 
redistributive power  of about 35  %· 
(1)  For the 48  states version  :  direct expenditures excluding defence 
contracts  (cp.  Table  1) 
(2)  Direct consumption in the case of Germany 
(J)  The  United States case will be  treated separately in greater detail 
below. 
(4)  The  difference of these results from  those of other countries might 
partly be  due  to  the exclusion of non-beneficial expenditures. - 235-
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For  the  United States four sets of results exist depending on  the 
year  (avera~e 1969-71  and  1975)  and  the regional breakdown 
(48  states (1)  or 9  census regions).  Grants are included as a 
crosscheck on  the  results in Chapters 6  and  7 on  general and 
specific purpose  grants.  The  figures obtained there refer to 
the  years 1972  and  1974.  The  results are summarised  below 
Redistributive effect of total federal  grants in 
the United States 
Year 
48 states 
9 census 
regions 
1972-74 
(1)  (2) 
Average  1969-71 
(1)  (2) 
1975 
(1)  (2) 
1·4 
4·9 
(1)  Redistributive  power  (cp.  footnote J,  Table  1) 
(2)  Percentage change  in Gini Coefficient (cp.  footnote 4,  Table  1) 
~  :  Table  1; Chapter 6,  Table  10  J  Chapter 7,  Table  7 
The  summary  suggests that the  introduction of  'revenue-sharing'  in 
1972  seems  to have  had  no  significant impact on  the overall 
redistributive effect of total federal grants,  though  the grant 
volume  increased from  J·O %  in 1969-71  to 4.2 % in 1975• 
In 1969-71  and  1975 direct expenditure in the  United  States had 
a  redistributive power  of approximately 10 %  and  20  %  respectively 
(see  the different variants in Table  1).  Defence  contracts - the 
only common  subcomponent  for both years -exhibit an indeterminate 
redistributive pattern, with a  redistributive effect varying 
between  - J.8 %  and  + 0.2 %  (including both measures).  Analogous 
to results for Germany,  France  and  Italy pay  to personnel has 
a  substantial redistributive effect, while this is much  less so 
the  case for transfers. 
(1) Washington,  D.C.,  Alaska and  Hawaii  are excluded  because  the  exceptionally 
high federal spending in these rich states would  distort the 
redistributive power  measure  (cp.  the analogous discussion for specific 
purpose  grants in Chapter 7) - 239-
The  low statistical significance of most  of the elasticity results 
indicates that in very few  cases  does  regional  income  turn out to be 
a  major determinant of regional public spending (1). Nevertheless, 
the actual  outcome  of federal  or central spending does  on  average 
have  a  definite redistributive effect,  though  the variance of this 
effect between regions is much  greater than in  the  case of most 
taxes and  general purpose  grants. 
The  preceding discussion refers to the average redistributive effect 
and  as such conceals exceptions in that some  regions are treated 
favourably and  others unfavourably.(2)  In the case of favourable 
treatment,  the relative  (3)  public finance  outflow is modest 
relative to  the average in rich regions and  the relative public 
finance  inflow greater than average in poor regions;  in the case 
of unfavourable  treatment,  the  outflow is substantial and  the  inflow 
modest relative to  the average. 
In Germany  the rich  'Stadtstaaten'  Hamburg  and  Bremen  receive 
preferential treatment since  the  'Bund'  expenditure is almost 
proportional to their personal per capita income.  Relative  to  the 
average  pattern rich Baden-WUrttemberg is clearly disfavoured mainly 
due  to  low  social security receipts because of the  low  percentage 
of  peo~le over 65  in its total  ~opulation. The  poor  ~nder Saar 
and  Schleswig-Holstein are in an outstandingly positive position 
For the  Saar this is mainly due  to social security receipts because 
of retired coal-miners,  whereas in Schleswig-Holstein much  direct 
consumption at the  federal level is at least partly due  to its 
coastal position implying expenditure for harbours,  coastal protection, 
navy,  etc. 
In France  two  regions - Bourgogne  and  Limousin  - seem  to be 
treated"extremely favourably  :  Limousin and  Bourgogne  received 
res~ectively the highest current and  capital expenditure per  ca~ita 
(at l.J times  the national average)  and  social security expenditure 
benefits (at 1.2  times the national average)  ;  the case of 
Bourgogne  can  partly be  explained by  a  relatively high percentage 
of  ~eopJe over 65  (lo.8 %  compared  to the lJ.J %  national average). 
Three  reeions,  with a  per capita expenditure  index of 91,  are 
siBTiificantly disfavoured  :  PicaJ.die  since it has the  lowest current 
and  caDital expenditure  per capita (0.8 of the national average)  and 
Alsace  and  Franche  Compte  scoring low  on  both types of expenditure. 
(1)  cp.  footnote  2,  Table 1. 
(2)  The  exceptions  can be  identified by using Chart 1,  and part of the 
discussion is based on  Tables Al-A4  in the Annex. 
(3)  The  concept  of relative outflow or inflow is appropriate because  the 
national budget as  a  whole  can be in overall deficit or surplus. -UO-
In Italy the  most  strikine examples of favourably treated rich 
regions are Valle d'Aosta,  l·iguria,  lazio and  Toscana.  For Valle 
d'Aosta this can be  explained by its mountainous  characteristics 
and  the  fact that it is thinly populated.  In tl1e  case of Liguria 
the relatively favourable  position can be  explained by  the 
'overstatement'  of primary income  which is explicable by  two  main 
factors  - tourism and  probably revenue  from  oil excises  (via Genova) 
Lazio  owes  its apparently preferential position to  the  simple  fact 
that it contains  the  seat of central government  (Rome)  and  thus 
benefits from  high expenditure  on  administration.  The  reasons 
underlying Toscana's favourable  position are partly historical 
and  partly demographic.  Before  the unification of Italy this 
region had  numerous  small states and  a  large  number  of public 
employees  and  this has remained  the  case ever since.  The  percentage 
of people  over 55  is lJ.9 %  compared  to 10.9% national average. 
Of  the  poor regions Sardegna is clearly treated favourably,  whereas 
Veneto  and  Trentino benefit from  public expenditures less than 
the average.  For Trentino no  obvious explanation suggests itself. 
In Sardegna  the high per capita expenditures are due  to  the  size 
of the  territory and  a  low  population density.  Veneto  has a  re-
latively high population density and  thus receives proportionally 
smaller amounts  of public expenditure per capita.  In addition,  a 
relatively low  percentage of people  enjoying pensions reduces  the 
benefits from  social security expenditures. 
In the  United Kingdom  the  south,  Scotland and  Wales  are in a 
favourable  position compared  to  the rest of Great Britain.  This 
is especially pronounced when  comparing Scotland and  the  North. 
In the South this is due  to high expenditures in the capital 
(London).  Scotland and Wales  are  regions with large sparsely populated 
areas and  a  strong movement  towards  autono~y. - 241-
TABLE  A 1 
Federal  Ex:J2endi ture 12er  Head1  ~  Reg!on1 
German:~:  (BRD)  1210  DM  per annum 
Total  Public  Social 
consum12tion  securi  tv 
Schleswig-Holste1n  2241  1114  1127  7810  2924 
Ni edersachsen  2050  961  1089  7847  7082 
Nordrhe1n-Westfalen  2068  835  1233  8951  16914 
Hess  en  2003  888  1115  9228  5382 
Rheinland-Pfalz  1952  939  1013  7887  3645 
Baden-WUrttemberg  1802  869  933  9504  8895 
Ba,yern  1920  900  1020  8111  10479 
Saarland  2380  880  1500  6919  1120 
Hamburg  2582  963  1619  11845  1794 
Bremen  2309  948  1361  9653  723 
Berlin  2897  846  2051  8809  2122 
BRD  2047  894  1153  8725  60650 
BRD  (absolute)  124150  54221  69929  529171 
Range  of Index numbers  88/126  93/125  81/140  79/136 
Expenditure  as %  of  PI  23.4  10.2  13.2 
E1astlcity  0.26  - 0,03  0.49 
Statistical signif10ance R2  0,113  0,002  0,152 
Redi stn  but1  ve  power  17.3  10.5  6,8 
Change  1n G1ni -coefficient  25.4  14.2  11.8 
Central  Ex12endi ture 12er  Head1  ~  RefE:on 1 
France  (8  refE:Ons)  1no  FF  per  annum 
Total  Current  &  Social 
ca12i tal  secur1 tr 
Region Parisi  enne  5917  3629  2288  16731  9638 
Bass1n Parisien  5055  3170  1886  11312  9360 
Nord  5388  3050  2338  11164  3864 
Est  5706  3510  2197  11098  4803 
Ouest  5186  3483  1703  10505  6636 
Sud-<luest  5380  3799  1581  10806  5440 
Centre Est  5053  3173  1880  11751  5921 
Medi terrannee  5397  3499  1897  11102  5368 
France  5411  3422  1989  12174  51030 
France  (absolute)  276123  174625  101498  621239 
Range  of 1ndex numbers  93/109  89/106  79/118  86/137 
Expenditure  as %  of PI  44.5  28.1  16.3 
Elast1ci  ty  0,22  0,10  0,42 
Statistical signif1cance R2 
0.437  0.052  0,267 
Redistri  but1  ve  power  34.7  25.3  9.4 
Change  1n Gini-coefficient  33.3  26,2  8.1 
Central  Ex12endi ture 12er  Head1  b~ Re~on, 
United Kingdom  1964  lo  per annum 
Total  Current  Ca121 tal  Ac;Ei cult  ural  Other  IT  ~  Ex]2endi ture  subsidies 
North  120  51  13  5  51  350  3270 
Yorkshire  and Humbers1de  117  52  12  4  50  418  4713 
North West  116  53  12  2  50  409  6635 
East  Midlands  116  49  16  6  46  405  3203 
West  Midlands  110  50  13  4  43  462  4877 
South East  119  57  13  3  47  527  18295 
South  West  124  54  14  8  49  419  3555 
Wales  134  58  16  6  54  362  2671 
Scotland  137  56  16  7  57  377  5208 
N,Irela.nd  138  50  22  19  47  306  1458 
U.K.  121  54  14  5  49  443  54033 
U, K.  (absolute)  6538  2918  756  270  2648  23937 
Range  of index numbers  91/114  90/107  86/163  38/420  89/117  69/119 
Expenditure as %  of  PI  27.2  12.2  3.1  1.0  11,0 
Elasticity  - 0,32  0,13  - 1.0  - 4.9  - 0,21 
Statlstical significance R2  0.423  0,135  0.479  0.519  0.169 
Redistributive power  36,0  10.5  6,1  6.0  13.3 
Change  1n Gini-coefficient  32.9  10.2  4·7  3.5  14.4 - 242-
~ 
Central  Ex]2endi ture 12er  Hea.d1  12er  Reg!  on, 
France  {21  re~ons} 1210  FF  pe:r:  annum 
Total  Current  &  Social 
f!.  POP  Ex]2endi ture  ca]2i tal  security 
Region Parisienne  5917  3629  2288  16731  9638 
Champagne  5174  3089  2086  11482  1315 
Picardie  4853  2868  1985  11099  1623 
Haut e-Normandi e  5196  3216  1980  11869  1547 
Centre  5083  3326  1757  1_1275  2056 
Basse-Normandie  5388  3050  2338  10788  1285 
Bourgogne  6063  3678  2385  11316  1534 
Nord  5402  3248  2154  11164  3864 
Lorraine  5332  3500  1831  10934  2323 
Aleace  4939  3336  1603  11729  1454 
Franche-<Jomt e  4933  3209  1724  10574  1026 
Loire  5492  3851  1641  10613  2637 
Bretagne  5155  3365  1790  10286  2503 
Poi  t ou-<Jharent ee  5119  3285  1835  10680  1496 
Aquitaine  5121  3352  1769  11072  2492 
Midi-Pyrenees  5160  3356  1804  10590  2208 
Limousin  5702  4444  1259  10558  740 
Rhone  Alpes  5087  3163  1924  12073  4592 
Auvergne  5033  3140  1893  10640  1329 
Languedoc  5066  3166  1900  10619  1742 
Provence-cote  d •  Azur-<Joree  5556  3659  1896  11335  3626 
France  5411  3422  1989  12174  51030 
France  (absolute)  276123  174625  101498  62/239 
Range  of index numbers  90/112  83/130  63/120  84/137 
Expenditure as %  of PI  44·5  28.1  16.3 
Elasticity  0.27  0.11  0.54 
Statistical significance R2  0.293  0.019  0.263 
Redistri  buti  VB  power  32.6  25.2  7.4 
Chan~ in Gini-coefficient  31.7  23.0  7.0 
Central  Ex]2endi ture 12er  Head1  bl Regj,on, 
!tall 1212  Lire per annum 
Total  Current ·• wages  +  goo~s & +transfers Ca]2i tal Social  t 
--- ~  ---- eecur1  y  f!.  fQE 
Valle d 1Aosta  612565  210515  18756  3658  145767  230630  228788  1854537  112 
Piemonte  560766  303550  60728  35896  149736  82488  238749  1745146  4489 
Lombardi  a  507969  270081  55156  17242  142214  76775  228715  1825083  8712 
Trentino Alto Adige  438515  252630  70878  7191  130893  74403  154876  1472130  856 
Veneto  470503  257297  82958  18960  124689  69117  173644  1297060  4211 
Friuli Venezia Giulia  526778  286533  78205  11906  142688  68066  237932  1579009  1233 
Liguria  590073  336610  86083  32154  148329  76279  255731  1838372  1869 
Emllia Romagna  527258  280665  64225  24236  138734  75878  234258  1533252  3900 
Toscana  549169  300617  82866  20579  141169  80253  226754  1436290  3527 
Umbria  539460  273900  80031  15396  141048  85378  239958  1123842  786 
Marc he  511956  259137  75810  9994  135048  100358  192220  1147938  1375 
Lazio  654161  428834  150784  62809  129759  87808  176464  1503424  4810 
Abruzzi  561663  251552  79197  8287  125825  171444  171377  983431  1192 
Moliee  515789  240124  84783  7444  125761  131914  174964  748687  326 
Campania  473272  250435  86309  21534  115409  100476  153903  846801  5177 
Puglia  525157  257743  90885  14992  119595  125197  162030  897856  3647 
Basilicata  589886  231114  77824  7280'  127066  225094  171336  744695  609 
Calabria  489609  235056  81036  6471  125567  118367  154595  696922  2009 
Sicilia  578696  242989  74249  7957  124279  198315  165519  881531  4772 
Sardegna  588870  265182  90302  13558  123676  187862  155289  964295  1515 
Italy  533660  282696  80864  22159  132651  101219  196499  1330487  55153 
Italy (absolute)  29432949  15591532  4459892  1222135  7316100  5582531  10837509  73380349 
Range  of index numbers  82/123  74/119  23/186  16/283  87/113  67/227  78/122  60/134 
Expenditure as %  of PI  51.9  27.5  7.9  2.2  12.9  9.8  19.1 
Elasticity  0.07  0.34  -{).28  1.29  0.25  - 1.10  0.59 
Statistical significance R2  0.026  0.243  0.057  0.231  0.662  0.228  0.609 
Redistributive  power  48.4  18.1  10.0  - o.6  9.6  20.6  7.8 
Change  in Gini-coefficient  45.3  18.0  10.4  o.o  9.0  19.2  6.5 New  South Wales 
Victoria. 
Queensland 
South Australia. 
Western Australia 
Tasmania. 
Auatrali/J. 
Australia (absolute) 
Range  of index numbers 
Expenditure as % of PI 
Elasticity 
Statistical significance R2 
Redistributive  power 
Change  in Gim-coeffic1ent 
Newfoundland 
Prince Edward  Island 
Nova Scotia 
New  Brunswick 
Quebec 
Ontario 
Manitoba 
Saskatchewan 
Alberta 
British Columbia. 
Canada 
Canada  (absolute) 
Range  of index numbers 
E:x:p_enditure  as% of PI 
Elasticity 
Statistical significance R2 
Redistributive  power 
Change  in Gini-coefficient 
New  England 
Middle Atlantic 
East  North Central 
West  North Central 
South Atlantic 
East  South Central 
West  South Central 
Mountain 
Pacific 
u.s.A. 
U,S,A,  (absolute) 
Range  of index numbers 
Expenditure as % of PI 
Elasticity 
Statistical significance R2 
Rediatri  buti  ve  power 
Change in Gini-coefficient 
Total 
- 243-
Federal  Expenditure per Head,  by  R~gion, 
Australia 1973-1974 
Social 
E:!tpendi ture  security 
169  169 
164  164 
181  181 
168  168 
154  154 
194  194 
169  169 
2242  2242 
91/115  91/115 
7.5  7.5 
- 0.59  - 0.59 
0.345  0.345 
11.8  11.8 
9.0  9.0 
Federal E:x:pendi ture per Head1  ~Region, 
Canada 1973 
Total  Social 
J1l!penditure  aecuri  ty 
173  173 
248  248 
208  208 
199  199 
167  167 
176  176 
211  211 
225  225 
170  170 
191  191 
180  180 
3977  3977 
93/138  93/138 
4.8  4.8 
- 0.39  - 0.39 
0.319  0.319 
6. 7  6.7 
5.1  5.1 
Federal Expenditure per Head1  by Region, 
u.s.A,  (9  regions)  1969-71 
Total 
~  Direct  ~  ~  Ex:pendi ture  personnel 
964  121  842  155  325 
809  120  689  123  324 
629  87  542  100  280 
771  108 
~~ 
147  309 
1015  116  386  280 
752  151  601  193  262 
880  124  757  229  253 
899  157  743  303  268 
1121  145  976  296  318 
858  119  739  207  294 
174925  24244  150651  42199  59934 
73/131  73/132  73/132  48/187  86/111 
23.3  3.2  20,0  5.6  8.0 
0.17  - 0.65  0,30  - 1.18  0.58 
0,016  0.202  0,044  0,115  0,645 
19.4  5.3  14.1  12.2  3.4 
15.2  3.6  12.3  12.9  2.4 
Aus.  ¢ per annum 
f!.  fQf 
2368  4916. 
2339  3617 
2071  1945 
2068  1309 
214-4  1084 
1972  398 
2558  13269 
29961 
87/105 
Can ¢ per annum 
f!.  POP 
2039  541 
2305  115 
2775  805 
2517  652 
3315  6o81 
4376  7939 
3590  998 
3312  908 
3868  1683 
3998  2373 
3748  22095 
82812 
54/117 
u.s, ¢  per armum 
Mili  ta.rx  pireot leas 
f!.  fQf  ~  military 
297\  545  3967  11875 
169  520  4140  37255 
115  427  3956  40302 
158  505  3481  16357 
176  723  3350  30890 
108  493  2734  12862 
222  535  3131  19392 
L'4  619  3345  8362 
;,:)8  688  4032  26564 
:81  558  3690  203859 
36898  100998  752240 
60/164  77/123  74/112 
4-9  15.1 
1,23  - 0.01 
0,178  0,000 
- 1.1  15.2 
0,2  14.7 - 244-
~EA4a 
Federal !!e5Eendi ture :eer Head1  ]?z  Re&!E:on, 
u.s.A.  (~1 reg!onsl  1262-11  U.S.  ~per annum 
Total 
~  Direct  ~  ~ 
Mili  ta.ry  Direct  less 
.E!  !!Qf  ex:eendi  ture  :eersonnel  contracts  mili  ta.ry 
Maine  728  124  E\04  177  322  62  542  2921  "1000 
New  Hampshire  804  101  703  195  297  167  536  3487  742 
Vermont  799  186  613  85  317  164  449  3040  446 
Massaohusett  s  940  124  816  155  336  258  558  3994  5704 
Rhode  Island  986  132  854  332  349  136  718  3642  947 
Connecticut  1142  106  1036  94  306  551  485  4616  3035 
New  York  853  141  712  108  332  182  530  4361  18238 
New  Jersey  778  90  688  16o  306  161  527  4393  7198 
Pennsylvania.  759  105  654  125  323  154  500  3645  11819 
Ohio  664  84  580  116  272  149  431  3874  10663 
Indiana.  668  71  597  92  271  195  402  3634  5198 
Illinois  646  93  554  127  285  84  469  4308  11119 
Michigan  571  93  478  74  280  79  399  4011  8893 
11'-isconsin  568  83  485  60  293  86  399  3536  4428 
Minnesota  705  114  591  83  289  166  425  3583  3814 
Iowa  610  91  520  78  320  78  442  3455  2831 
Missouri  908  111  797  177  312  254  543  3505  4683 
Kansas  837  101  735  227  321  143  592  3572  2247 
Nebraska  691  93  598  165  318  75  524  3547  1491 
South Dakota  725  156  569  188  313  30  539  2874  669 
North Da.kot a.  893  148  744  257  296  156  588  2961  622 
Delaware  747  97  651  179  275  85  566  4329  550 
Maryland  1325  97  1228  688  255  210  1018  4079  3937 
Virginia.  1272  101  1171  681  244  207  964  3461  4662 
West  Virginia  698  185  513  76  354  44  469  2703  1753 
North Carolina  663  104  559  210  219  102  457  3053  5093 
South Carolina.  722  112  610  289  226  75  535  2788  2599 
Georgia  880  123  757  291  216  220  537  3162  4703 
Florida.  907  77  830  208  372  145  685  3371  6837 
District of Columbia  3940  558  3382  1569  634  1031  2346  4666  756 
Kentucky  705  151  554  205  282  - 33  522  2855  3233 
Tennessee  675  127  548  146  257  119  429  2887  3941 
Alabama  850  153  697  252  253  124  573  2693  3459 
Mississippi  802  188  614  165  254  171  442  2354  2229 
Louisiana.  715  149  566  143  233  119  448  2908  3652 
Arkansas  651  145  506  120  307  58  448  2548  1930 
Oklahoma  898  161  738  312  294  92  646  3040  2569 
Texas  969  103  866  257  241  314  552  3347  11241 
Montana.  823  198  625  221  308  51  574  3167  700 
Idaho  631  134  497  167  273  26  472  3052  720 
Wyoming  924  253  671  238  286  61  610  3472  334 
Colclrado  943  135  808  354  255  127  681  3622  2222 
Utah  975  154  821  379  235  179  642  3040  1070 
Nevada  821  149  672  310  257  63  610  4278  494 
Arizona  914  127  786  264  291  187  600  3378  1797 
New  Mexico  970  217  75~  346  255  118  635  2840  1025 
California  1164  145  1019  278  321  334  686  4127  19997 
Oregon  682  146  536  131  327  49  486  3438  2101 
Washington  970  120  850  305  334  176  674  3739  3399 
Alaska  2373  418  1955  1296  170  397  1559  4478  305 
Hawaii  1372  153  1220  785  209  188  1032  4314  762 
u.s.A.  858..  119  739  207  294  181  558  3687  203859 
u.s.A.  (absolute)  174925  24244  150651  42199  59934  36898  100998  751628 
Range  of index numbers  68/157  61/217  66/169  30/348  74/127  14/311  73/186  64/125 
Expenditure as %  of PI  22.9  3.2  19.7  5.4  8.0  4.8  14.9 
Elasticity  0.33  - 1.12  0.57  - 0,23  0,19  1.  75  0.18 
Statistical significance R2  0.072  0.283  0,152  0,003  0,060  0.257  0.017 
tl.edistri  buti  ve  power  15.2  6. 7  8.5  6,6  6.4  - 3.6  12,1 
Change  in Gini-coefficient  8.5  3.8  5. 7  6.3  4.5  - 2.0  9.9 - 245-
TABLE  A !lb 
Federal  ~endi  ture :ear Head1  £I Rag!on, 
u.s.A.  (:21  rag!ons~ 1212  u.s. ¢ per  annum 
Total 
~ Direct  Military·  Direct  less  eXJ?endi ture  contracts  . military  IT  ~ 
Maine  1206  309  897  54  843  4104  1059 
New  Hampshire  1399  215  1184  244  940  4656  818 
Vermont  1360  376  984  262  722  4290  471 
Massachusetts  1456  266  1190  314  876  5393  5828 
Rhoda  Island  1342  31T  1025  90  935  5078  927 
Connecticut  1663  255  1408  763  645  6257  3095 
New  York  1449  341  1108  213  895  5869  18120 
New  Jersey  1154  212  942  146  796  6014  7316 
Pennsylvania  1241  238  1003  135  868  5205  11827 
Ohio  1010  193  817  124  693  5377  10759 
Indiana  1027  158  869  164  705  5127  5311 
Illinois  1230  240  990  60  930  6205  11145 
Michigan  996  234  762  89  673  5642  9157 
Wisconsin  966  209  757  55  702  5134  4607 
Minnesota  1144  261  883  114  769  5272  3926 
Iowa  970  185  785  67  T!-8  5416  2870 
Missouri  1500  211  1289  305  984  4802  4763 
Kansas  1398  200  1198  244  954  5462  2267 
Nebraska  1193  207  986  52  934  5731  1546 
South Dakota  1395  360  1035  49  986  4531  683 
North Dakota  1734  277  1457  315  1142  5425  635 
Delaware  1145  244  901  90  811  6308  579 
Maryland  1933  216  1717  231  1486  5896  4098 
V:irginia  1809  211  1598  297  1301  5166  4967 
West  Virginia  1318  380  938  60  878  4134  1803 
North Carolina  1124  211  913  87  826  4346  5451 
South Carolina  1240  234  1006  98  908  4047  2818 
Georgia  1402  270  1132  167  965  4479  4926 
Florida  1379  163  1216  137  1079  4733  8357 
District of Columbia  13957  690  13267  1706  11561  6676  716 
Kentucky  1327  286  1041  76  965  4094  3396 
Tennessee  1296  234  1062  93  969  4268  4188 
Alabama  1374  268  1106  167  939  4019  3614 
Mississippi  1599  342  1257  446  811  3514  2346 
Louisiana  1236  293  943  171  772  4260  3791 
Arkansas  1202  261  941  63  878  3780  2116 
Oklahoma  1443  259  1184  128  1056  4447  2712 
Texas  1296  205  1091  192  899  4965  12237 
Montana  1512  322  1190  78  1112  4970  748 
Idaho  1358  256  1102  51  1051  4535  820 
Wyoming  1569  307  1262  109  1153  5645  374 
Colorado  1646  231  1415  161  1254  5377  2534 
Utah  1449  265  1184  169  1015  4445  1206 
Nevada  1544  248  1296  105  1191  6014  592 
Arizona  1639  224  1415  325  1090  4751  2224 
New  Mexico  1974  325  1649  124  1525  3989  1147 
California  1700  258  1442  396  1046  5887  21185 
Oregon  1282  240  1042  45  997  5016  2288 
Washington  1968  258  1710  494  1216  5616  3544 
Alaska  3736  753  2983  531  2452  8704  352 
Hawaii  2347  324  2023  408  1615  5964  865 
u.s.A.  1412  247  1165  201  964  5253  213121 
u.s.A.  (absolute)  300927  52641  248286  42837  205449  1119525 
Range  of index numbers  71/145  65/156  67/153  23/392  60/161  67/120 
Expenditure as %  of PI  26.0  4·7  21.3  3.8  17.5 
Elasticity  0.02  - 0.58  0.15  1.22  0.07 
Statistical significance R2  o.ooo  0.150  o.o11  0.061  0.002 
Redistributive power  25.4  7.4  18.0  - o.8  18.8 
Change  in Gini-coefficient  11.5  3.6  8.3  - 3.6  14.0 - 246-
TABLE  A 4c 
Federal  expenditure per capita by region  ¢  US  per annum 
United States  (9 reP.ions)  197'5 
~  1  Direct less  ex- Military 
1 pen'dit'ure  Grants  Direct  'contracts  1  military  PI  PUt' 
New  England  1470  272  1198  382  816  5385  12198 
Middle Atlantic  1325  283  1042  175  867  5687  37263 
East  North Central  1064  212  852  96  756  5602  40979 
West  North Central  1287  225  1062  177  885  5206  16690 
South Atlantic  1719  230  1489  194  1295  4817  33715 
East  South Central  1377  275  1102  169  933  4027  13544 
West  South Central  1295  234  1061  167  894  4650  20856 
Mountain  1615  258  1357  174  1183  4897  9645 
Pacific  1745  265  1480  382  1098  5820  28234 
u.s.A.  1412  247  1165  201  964  5253  213121 
U,S,A,  (absolute)  300927  52641  248286  42837  205449  1119525 
Range  of index numbers  75/124  86/115  73/128  48/190  78/134  78/111 
Expenditure as %  of PI  26.9  4o7  22.2  3.8  18.4 
Elasticity  r- 0,07  - 0.04  - 0.07  - 1.48  - 0.38 
Statistical significance R2  0,002  0,002  0,002  0,101  0,052 
Redi st  ri  but  i ve  power  28,6  4o9  23.7  - 1.5  25.2 
Change  in Gini-coefficient  20.7  2.9  19.9  1- 3.8  25.4 Chapter  9 
REGIONALISATION  OF  FEDERAL  OR  CENTRAL  TAX  BURDEN 
IN  SEVEN  COUNTRIES 
{working paper) - 249-
1.  Incidence Assumptions and Regional Distributors (1) 
'!he  present paper is concemed with the regional origin of federal 
or central ta.x  revenues.  The  regional distribution of taxa. tion can 
be done  in two  ways,  by considering either 
- regional tax collection, or 
the regional incidence of tax burden, i.e. the amount of tax 
revenues that is effectively bome  by residents of the region. 
Since the aim of this :r:aper  is to deal with  the redistributive power 
of tax revenues and not with financial flows,  we  are concerned with 
the  location of the effective burden of the  taxes, and  so  the approach 
of regional incidence analysis is used. 
Table  1  shows  the assumptions underlying the regional incidence 
analysis.  The  spectrum of assumptions made  by the authors gives a 
ra. ther true reflection of the state of the  theoretical and empirical 
evidence available in tax incidence analysis. 
For personal income  tax all authors assume  that no  shifting takes 
place.  Since, furthermore,  regional  tax  collections a.re  available for 
all countries,  no  problems arise with this source of federal tax revenue.(2) 
For the general sales taxes,  excises and  import duties all authors 
assume  that these  taxes are borne by  consumers,  but the degree of 
disaggregation and  the availability of distributors differs among 
countries.  In all countries "general" sales taxes in fact apply 
multiple rates according to products,  so that using total consumption 
or retail sales as a  distributor can only be an approximation due  to 
the lack of more  detailed data.  Fortunately a  rough estimate of the 
degree of error likely to arise in such a  global regional allocation 
is available .from the .French  atudy, in which a  thorough breakdown 
of TVA  was  made.  '!he  difference in the results, as between the 
detailed  ~llocation and a  global allocation according to.household 
consumption, is below 2.4% f'or· all but· one of 21 regions with an 
average difference of 1.1 %  (excluding the exceptional case which 
(1)  For France, Italy,  the United Kingdom,  Canada and  the  United States 
the regiona.lisation is largely based on published and  unpublished 
studies on  the subject  ;  for Germany  and Australia no  such studies are 
available.  For these  two  countries the regionalisation of revenue is 
directly obtained from statistical sources. 
(2)  Commuting  between work  and  living places over regional boundaries 
is accounted for in Germany  by the  "Zerlegung" but ignored in all 
other countries, but this should not affect the results severely since 
the overall importance is quite small (see Chapter 5). ~
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gave  a  12.1 %).  This indicates that the approximation due  to the 
glol:al approach is sufficiently good. 
For excises it was  possible in all countries except Germany  to 
allocate  the  taxes  accordi~ to  the  consumption  (or some  close proxy) 
of the  product in question.(!) 
For corporate income  tax the assumptions range  from  50  %  borne  by 
shareholders and  :fJ  % by  consumers  (u.S.A.),  to 100 % borne  by 
capital owners  (United Kingdom).  In the light of the recent 
controversy over the incidence of the corporate income  tax this is 
not surprising.  As  regards the  likely impact of this controversy on 
the results, it is to be  expected that the more  the  tax is  supposed 
to be  borne  by  consumers  the more  equal will be  the distribution 
of tax burden,  since in general consumption is more  evenly spread 
than di  vidend.s  or profits. 
With  respect to social security contributions all authors assume 
that employees  bear their p1rt of the contributions, whereas  there 
is a  total difference of opinion as regards the employers'  part  : 
for  the  U.S.A.  100 % is assumed  to be  shifted forward  to consumers, 
for Canada  §J  % is assumed  to be  borne  by consumers  and  :JJ  % by 
employees,  and for Germany  and  the United Kingdom  100 % is assumed 
to be  shifted backward  to employees.  The  impact of the different 
assumptions is not obvious since it is uncertain whether consumption 
or social security contributions are  spread more  evenly between 
regions. 
These  are the most  important federal or central taxes in all countries, 
but there exist other taxes of some  significance in terms of revenue 
and  Appendix  1  shows  how  these are treated. 
2.  The  Regional Distribution of Federal or Central Tax Burdens 
For  the five major  taxes considered, and  total  federal or central 
taxes,  the regional distribution or revenue  per head in national 
currency can be  found  in detail in Appendix  2, Tables Al  - M.• 
Table  2  summarises  the results of Tables Al  - A4  in giving the range 
of index numbers  for tax revenues,  the average  tax rate as a 
percentage of personal income,  th2 elasticity of tax revenues with 
respect to personal income,  the R  ,  the redistributive power 
and  the change  in the Gini-coefficient due  to tax revenues. 
(1)  As  it follows from  the later analysis,  the global allocation 
approach for excises in Germany  is likely to overstate  the amount 
of redistribution due  to  tax payments. - 252-
Recb.stributive  Power  of Federal or Central  Tax  and Social Secunty Burdens 
Elasticity 
Range  of  Average  of tax with  Stat1st1cal  Redistn  but1  ve  %change 
Index  tax rate  respect  to  signihcance  Power  in G1ni-
Numbers  (1)  personal  of elastic1  ty  (3)  Coeffic1ent  (4 
income 
Germany  PIT(5)  70/176  4.2  1.96  0.954  4.1  3.0 
10  Lander  CIT(6)  59/152  0.8  1.53  o. 713  - G.4  0.9 
Berlin  GST~~j  92/126  5.0  0.58  0.880  - 2.1  - 3.0 
excluded 
:6(9) 
92/126  4.3  0.58  0.880  - 1.8  - 2.6 
1970  88/142  14.8  1.01  0.856  0.1  - 1.2 
Total  89/142  30.6  1.03  0.920  0.8  - 3.0 
France  PIT  59/210  4.6  2.  73  0.966  8.0  7.  7 
21  CIT  60/160  3.2  l.  79  0.691  2.5  2.0 
regions  GST  82/133  12.2  0.53  0.299  - 5.8  - 5.9 
1969  EXC  74/117  3.2  0.31  0.193  - 2.2  - 2.4 
sse  66/171  16.6  1.82  1.000  13.7  14.0 
~  73/159  42.8  1.43  0.955  18.5  18.6 
France  PIT  65/210  4.6  2.  73  0.953  8.3  7.  7 
8  regions  CIT  66/160  3.2  1.62  0.808  2.0  1.9 
1969  GST  90/134  12.2  0.68  0.738  - 4.0  - 5.8 
EXC  74/lll  3.3  0.23  0.117  - 2.5  - 2.3 
sse  70/171  16.6  1.80  1.000  13.8  13.9 
Total  75/159  42.8  1. 51  0.955  22.4  20.7 
Italy  PIT  20/193  5.0  2.10  0,818  5. 3  6.2 
20  CIT  65/126  0.6  0.68  0.867  - 0.2  - 0,2 
reg1ons  GST  61/134  7 .o  0.89  0.891  - 0.8  - 1.5 
1973  EXC  66/218  3.9  0.86  0.388  - 0.5  - 1.3 
sse  47/140  15.8  0.61  o. 570  - 6.1  - 5.0 
~  44/151  40.0  0.96  0.879  - 1.6  - 1.8 
Un1ted  PIT  51/136  11.7  1.65  0.963  7.6  8.5 
K1ngdom  CIT  56/124  3.0  0.86  0.435  - 0.4  - 1.4 
10  G~T  ~  reg1ons  80/109  16.2  0.55  0.842  - 7.2  - 8.5 
1964  EXC 
sse  61/llS  5.8  1.06  0.891  o. 3  - 0.3 
Total  66/119  36.8  1.00  0.926  0.2  - 1.8 
Australia  PIT  81/110  14.2  1.44  0.966  6.3  9. 3 
6  CIT  86/107  5.6  l.OA  0.895  0.2  - 0,2 
ProVlnces  GST  89/108  2.5  0.94  0.904  - 0.2  0,6 
1971/72  EXC  87/108  6.2  0.46  o. 317  - 3.4  0.2 
sse 
Total  86/108  29.5  1.09  0,925  2. 7  9.4 
Canada  PIT  55/135  9. 3  1,61  0.921  5.  7  7.0 
6  CIT  60/188  3.5  1.25  0.286  0.9  - 0.2 
reg1ons  GST  84/116  4.0  0.60  o. 722  - 1.6  - 1,6 
1969  EXC  82/109  2.9  0.46  0.747  - 1.6  - 1.9 
sse  81/116  3.1  0,68  0.925  - 1.0  - o. 7 
~  68/129  23.1  l.ll  0,839  2.4  2,6 
United States  PIT  42/144  u.s  1.64  0.942  7 ·5  6.0 
48  States  CIT  54/187  4.3  1.50  0.581  2.1  l.  7 
D.C  Alaska  GST 
Hawa1  excluded  EXC  84/166  2.1  0.36  0.154  - 1.4  - 1.6 
Average  sse  61/125  4-7  1.06  o. 798  0.3  0.3 
1969-71  Total  53/143  24.7  1.35  0.928  8.5  6.6 
United  PIT  63/119  11.7  1.53  0.949  6.2  5.5 
States  CIT  63/135  4.3  1.48  o. 753  2,0  1.6 
9  GST 
regions  EXC  86/112  2.1  0.29  0.278  - 1.5  - 1.8 
Average  sse  81/117  4·  7  1.14  0.880  0.7  0.9 
1969-71  Total  69/119  24.4  1.32  0.946  7.  7  6.9 - 253-
Footnotes to Table  2 
(1)  National percentage  share of tax and/or social security in 
:personal income 
(2)  Examples  of elasticity coefficients 
2.0 - :per  capita tax differential twice as big as :personal 
income  differential (regionality :progressive  tax) 
1.0 - :per  capita tax differential equals :personal income 
differential (regionally neutral tax) 
0.0 - :per  capita tax completely equal as between 
regions  (regionally regressive  tax) 
(J) Contribution of tax to  the total redistributive effect of the 
budget measured  by  the reduction in personal income  differentials 
between regions due  to  the tax under  the assumption of 
regionally neutral spending of national tax revenues  ;  it is 
equal to the deviation of the  tax from  neutrality- measured 
by  the difference between  the elasticity and  one  (neutral case)  -
multi~lied by  the average  tax rate. 
(4)  A modified  income  is calculated by  deducting per capita taxes 
from  personal income  ~r capita and  adding amounts  representing 
the regional breakdown  of the  total national amount  of taxes 
spent  neutrally.  The  Gini-coefficient of this modified  income 
is compared  with  the  Gini-coefficient of personal income. 
(5)  PIT  - :personal income  tax 
(6)  CIT  - corporate  income  tax 
(7)  GST  - general sales tax 
(8)  EXC  - excises and  import duties 
(9)  sse  - social security contribution 
Source  :  Tables Al  - A4 - 254-
'Ihe  following part of this chapter is an interpretation of the 
range  of index n'Wftbers.  '!he  use  of the tem "equal" in this context 
relates to per capita values of the variable in question and  is not 
to be  confused with the question of regressivity or progressivity of 
taxes which  is dealt with in the next chapter. 
The  rsonal income  r  head differentials are substantial in all 
countries but Australia.  1  The  ratio of income  per head in the richest 
to that in the  poorest area (mini-max ratio) varies between  1.  7 and 
2.1 with an  extreme  value for Italy with 2.7.  In France and  Germ~y 
the high mini-maxi  ratio is due  to the existence of a  particularly 
rich region  :  Region  Parisienne for France and  Hamburg  for Germany, 
whereas in the  United Kingdom  and  Canada it is due  to the existence 
of particularly poor regions  :Northern.Ireland for the  United Kingdom 
and  the Atlantic Provinces for Canada.  In Italy and  the u.s.A.  there 
exist several relatively poor and rich states. In the  u.s.A.  income 
differentials narrow considerably if the  states are aggregated into 
nine big geographical regions.  The  extent of apparent income 
differentials is more  sensitive to  the  size of the regions  considered 
in the  case of the  U.S.A.,  compared  to France  where  the aggregation 
of departments does not yield significantly different results. 
Personal income  tax revenues per head,  compared  to income,  show  a 
substantial increase in regional variation with  'mini-maxi'  ratios 
up  to [J.?J,  This fact reflects the  progressiveness of the  personal 
income  tax1s a  very powerful factor in reducing pre-tax income 
differentials. 
In discussing the regional variation of corporate income  tax burden 
per head it has to be  kept in mind  that different incidence 
assumptions have  been  made.  For Germany  corporate income  taxes  show 
an even greater regional variation than personal income  taxes. 
Since  corporate income  tax is proportional,  this must  be  due  to 
a  very high concentration of the headquarters of enterprises subject 
to corporate income  tax in high income  areas.,  which is only partly 
equilibrated by  the  "Zerlegung".  For Canada  and  the u.s.A.  a  similar 
picture of the relationship between regional differences in the  tax 
burdens emerges as for Germany,  but the reason for this is different. 
In Canada  and  the  U.s.A.  part of the  tax burden was  distributed in 
proportion to dividend payments.  Thus  the  regional variations of the 
corporate income  tax burden indicate an even  wider divergence in 
the regional distribution of dividends per head,  since  the other 
distributor used •  namely  consumption expend.i ture,  shows  a  much 
smaller regional variation as was  noted above.  In the  United Kingdom 
(1)  Compare  Tables Al  - A4 - 255-
and  France  the regional distribution of the corporate income  tax 
burden is more  equal than that of personal income  tax revenues, 
indicating a  more  equal regional distribution of wealth compared  to 
the u.s.A.  and Canada. 
Since  the general sales tax burden is in most  cases allocated in 
proportion to consumption expenditure,its regional distribution is 
equal to that of consumption expenditure,the per capita differentials 
being significantly less than for personal income  in all countries 
but France  and  Australia.  The  mini-max  ratio is reduced  to about 
1.  4  for Gennany,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Canada,  which  compared  to 
the income  ratio means  a  reduction of 20  %  (for the United Kingdom 
and Canada)  and  :JJ  % (for Germany) • 
The  burden of excises is, except for some  special cases (e.g.  D.C. 
and Nevada  in the u.s.A., and  Nord  in France),  the most  equally 
spread of all. 
For Germany,  the United Kingdom  and  Canada,  the regional distribution 
of the  burden of social security contributions is - as expected -
more  equal than the distribution of personal income  tax burden.  For 
the U.S.A.  the situation is not as different as Table  2  seems  to 
indicate since D.C.  is an exception,  the next highest being Illinois 
and  Connecticut with 126. 
'Ihe  regional distribution of the  burden of total federal or central 
taxes is a  compound  of the distribution of the five major taxes 
discussed and  the remaining federal or central taxes which are of 
varying importance. 
).  The  Regional Redistributive  Power  of Federal or Central Taxes 
The  range  of index numbers  offers  already some  insight into the 
likely narrowing of income  differentials due  to federal or central 
taxes.  In the other columns  of Table  2  an attempt is made  to 
evaluate the redistributive power  of federal or central taxes more 
precisely.  The  budgetary redistributive power  of a  tax is defined 
as the percentage change  of post-tax income  differentials relative 
to pre-tax income  differentials, under the assumption of regionally 
neutral spending of national tax revenues  (1). 
As  a  first step,  the index numbers  of regional per capita. tax burdens 
were  regressed on  the  index numbers  of regional personal income. 
In Table  2, column  (J), the regression slope is shown,  i.e. the 
parameter showing  by  how  many  percentage points the tax burden per 
head is above  average if the personal income  per head is one 
percentage  point above  average.  This parameter can be  interpreted as 
a  measure  of the regional progressiveness versus regressiveness of 
(1)  For comparative  purposes the percentage change  in Gini-coefficient 
of inequality is computed  as explained in Footnote 4  of Table  2  and 
given in the last column  of Table  2. - 256-
the  tax.  If the  slope is greater than one  the  tax is regionally 
~regressive, if it is less than one  it is regressive.  As  can be  seen 
from  Table  2,  total federal or central taxes are approximately neutral 
(range of elasticities between  0.96 for Italy and  1.11 for Canada) 
for all countries except France and  the United States where  they are 
progressive  (elasticity about 1.5 and 1.3).  The  rather close results 
obtained for the  two  different regional partitions in France and  the 
U.S.A.  show  that the sensitivity of the results with respect to 
different definitions of regions seems  to  be  small,  thus adding to 
the reliability of the results obtained. 
The  character of the total taxes is an aggregate of the character of 
the five most  important taxes and the other more  or less important 
taxes.  Personal  ineome tax is regionally progressive in all countries, 
the degree of progressiveness varying between 1.4 for Australia and 
[2. 7]for France.  In France the high regional  progressivity is due  to the 
difference in tax regimes concerning farm  and non-farm income  and not 
so  much  to a  high tariff progressivity.  For corporate income  ta.x  a 
similar answer is obtained  :  the tax is progressive in all countries 
except  Italy and the United Kingdom  with small variations between these 
countries.  This variation is still smaller (Australia and Italy 
being exceptions)  for general  sales taxes which  show  a  significant 
degree of regressiveness.  Not  surprisingly the most  regressive taxes 
are excises.  Social  security contributions are regionally either 
slightly progressive or slightly regressive,  France with a  significant 
progressiveness  and  Canada  and Italy with significant  regressiveness 
of social security contributions being exceptions. 
These  results alone are net sufficient to evaluate  the redistributive 
Dower  of the  taxes,  since this de-pends  not only on  the  character of 
the  tax but also  on  its im~ortance. This importance  measured  by  the 
share of national tax revenue  per head  in national income  per head 
is shown  in column  2  of Table 2.  From  the values in columns  2  and 
3 of Ta,ble  2  the redistributive power  ca.n  be easily computed. (1) 
Column  5 in Table  2  shows  the final results of the analysis of the 
redistributive power  of federal  taxes.  For  the  five  most  important 
taxes a  fairly reliable pattern evolves from  these results. 
The  nersonal income  tax  shows  a  high-powered effect in equalizing 
regional pre-tax differentials with a  relatively small variation of 
the  redistributive fOwer  between 6.2 and 8.3 per cent if Germany  and 
Italy are  excluded  \2). 
(1)  c.~.  Footnote  (3)  in Table  2 
(2)  Germany  and Italy represent special cases.  In Germany  only 4J  ~ of total 
income  tax revenues are allocated to  the  federal level, whereas  the  other 
federations allocate at least 70  ~~  to  this level.  In Italy the  personal 
income  tax is of relatively small importance  :  this is also  true for 
France,  but the  high elasticity (2.7)  compensates for the  small volume. - 257-
The  statistical reliability of these results  meas~ed by  the 
coefficient of determination of the regression  (R  )  is with about 
0.95 very high for a  cross-section analysis. 
Despite different assumptions  concerning the  ~c~o~r~or_a~t-e-r~~~~-
the results for this tax are also quite  satisfactory.  the 
statistical reJiability is J.oVTer  than for  the  personal income  tax, it 
is eenerally still statistically significant.  The  redistributive power 
is positive but considerably smaller than for  the  personal income  tax. 
The  apparent difference  between the North American  countries on  the  one 
hand  and  the European  on  the  other, reflects the  fact that the 
corporate  income  tax has a  greater importance  in Canada  and  the  u.s.A. 
This difference  between  the  European and  North American countries is 
even more  signi.ficant when  looking at the general sales taxes and 
excises.  For the European countries a  very similar pattern emerges,  both 
taxes tending strongly to aggravate  pre-tax income  differentials.  The 
negative redistributive power  varies (for the  sum  of both  taxes) 
between 4%  for Germany  to 8% for France  (excluding again Italy). 
For Canada  the  federal general sales taxes are of small importance 
compared  to  the European countries with about the  same  degree of 
regressiveness,  such  that the redistributive  power is much  lower. 
For the  U.S.A.  no  federal general  sales taxes exist.  Thus,  the  negative 
redistributive power  of excises is, in North American  countries,  lower 
than in Europe,  either because  the  taxes  there are less important or 
because  of their weaker regressiveness.  Not  too much  weight  should  be 
placed  on  the reliability of the  regression results for excises since 
the fit is generally quite  poor. 
Though  the redistributive power  of social security contributions has 
opposite  signs for different countries,  the absolute difference  between 
countries  (excluding France  and Italy) is not bigger than for the  other 
taxes.  For France  the results apply in fact to  the  year 1962  and  are 
only for comparative  purposes  transfered to  1969.  Nevertheless the 
figures indicate the characteristic already discussed of regional 
versus tariff progressivity due  to different structural mixes  of 
regional income.  In terms of statistical reliability the regression 
rzsults for the  social security contributions are satisfactory with 
~  values around 0.8. 
The  results obtained by  the  redistributive power  measure  and  the change 
in Gini-coefficients are generally quite  similar but there are cases 
where  differences in the  order of more  than 2  percentage  points occur, 
the  most  important being the  personal income  tax and  exaises results 
in Australia, where  9% instead of 6 %  and  0 %  instead of - J %  are 
(1)  Italy and  the  United Kingdom  are exceptions for which  the results are 
difficult to explain on  the  basis of the assumptions ffiade. - 258-
obtained.  The  difference between the  two  measures is mainly due  to 
the different weighting given to the relatively unfavourable tax 
payment  position of Tasmania,  which,  in the redistributive  power 
calculations is weighted  strongly since its personal income 
differential is largest, whereas  the  reduction in the Gini-coefficient 
gives it a  smaller weight because of its relatively small population. 
The  difference  between  the  redistribution power  and  the  Gini  measure 
for total revenues  is substantial only for Australia and  Germany.  For 
Australia the  above  explanation for single taxes  carries over to the 
•total'. The  difference  (even in sign)  in the  German  case  can be mainly 
attributed to  the different weighting given to  the  low  tax  payments 
in Baden  WUrtemberg  and  the high  payments  in Hamburg  (both rich 
Lander).  The  Gini  measure  weights  Baden-\1/'Urtemberg  more  because 
of its greater population,  whereas  the redistributive power 
weights Hamburg  more  because  of its extreme richness. 
The  most  important explanation of the  inter-country differences 
seems  to  be  simply the varying weights of the  individual taxes in 
the  total-which is commented  on further below.  Statistical 
anomalies have also  to be  considered.  The  results should certainly 
be  interpreted with care  since  they apply to  one  rather arbitrarily 
chosen year only and  the  reliability of the results is questionable 
in some  cases.  For France  the reliability of the results for all 
single  taxes  seems  to be quite  satisfactory,  (l)except for the  social 
security contributions already mentioned.  For Germany  the  only 
major drawback would  seem  to be  the  likely understatement of 
regressivity of excises.  For the  United Kingdom  the implicit 
assumption about corporate  income  tax incidence is atypical. 
For Australia the  proxy for dividends is questionable.  In the 
Canadian results there  seems  to be  no  major drawback. 
(1)  As  is always  the  case,  the assumptions concerning corporate income 
tax are questionable,  but only extremely different assumptions from 
the  reasonable  one  taken would  seriously affect the  overall picture. 140 
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The  differences in the redistributive power  of total taxes are  to a 
certain degree caused by  constitutional differences in tax 
arrangements of the federations.  In the  U.S.A.  no  federal general 
sales taxes exist and  the  personal and  corporate income  taxes are 
federal to about 90  %,  thus  tending to allocate the  progressive 
taxes to the federal government and  the  regressive ones  to the 
lower levels.  (1)  For Germany  the constitutional arrangements in 
1970  were  just the other way  round,  i.e.  the  progressive  taxes 
(personal and  corporate  income  tax)  were  only 4J% and  50% 
allocated to  the federal level,  whereas  the  70  %  of general sales 
taxes and all excises were  federal.  This explains the rather 
striking difference between  the  regional incidence results for 
Germany  and  all other countries.  Taking  these factors into 
account,  therefore,  the  present study gives a  coherent set of 
results for total taxes as well as for the  individual taxes. 
4.  Conclusions 
( 1 'I 
-J 
A reasonably coherent  ~icture of the regional incidence of federal 
or central government  taxes emerges  from  the  present study.  The 
findings are  presented with quantitative indicators of the 
redistributive effect of taxes. 
As  regards the individual main  tax categories,  the results show 
a  very consistent pattern of redistributive effects.  The  personal 
income  tax has in all cases a  high-powered effect in reducing 
regional ,re-tax income  differentials - by  between 4  to 9  per cent. 
The  corporate  income  tax also has an equalizing effect,  but only 
This fact also helps  to explain the difference of the results obtained 
for regionaJ  tax incidence versus  the results obtained by  the  usual 
househola  tax incidence studies, which  for the  U.S.A.  indicate a  mildly 
rep,ressive overall tax  system,  cf.  e.g.  J.A.  Pechmann  and  B.A.  Okner, 
Who  bears the Tax  Burden  ? ,  Washington,  D.C.,  1974 - 263-
about one  quarter to one  half of that for personal income  tax. 
These  effects are offset,  to varying degrees and  usually 
incompletely,  by  the regressive  incidence of general sales taxes and 
excise duties.  The  effect of social security contributions is, 
except for France, small and has different signs for different 
countries. 
The  principal differences between countries,  in the regional 
pattern of incidence of ~  taxes,  reflect the varying relative 
importance of the regressive general sales taxes and  excise duties, 
compared  to  the  progressive income  taxes and  the varying degrees 
of progressivity or regressivity of these  taxes.  There  is a 
cleavage in this respect between the North American  and European 
countries,  the latter making  a  much  heavier use  of the indirect 
taxes and  so  offsetting a  larger proportion of the  progressivity 
of the  income  taxes. 
These  comments  on  the  regional incidence of federal or central 
tax systems are not to be  confused with  the more  habitual 
descriptions of the  general progressivity or regressivity of the 
whole  tax system with respect to income  differentials.  This point 
is best illustrated in considering the results for two  federal 
countries  ;  the  United states'federal taxes appear to reduce 
regional income  differentials substantially by  about 10  per cent, 
whereas in Germany  a  very slight reduction of about 1  per cent is 
obtained. 
These  important differences seem  to be  explained to a  considerable 
degree  by  basic constitutional choices made  in the  two  countries in 
assigning given taxes,  or shares of taxes,  to the  upper or lower 
levels of government.  In the  U.S.A.  a  high percentage of progressive 
taxes are federal and  there are no  federal general sales taxes 
(which  would  normally be regressive).  In Germany  the  opposite was 
true in 1970:  70  %  of general sales taxes and  only 4J%  of personal 
and  50  %  of corporate income  taxes were  federal.  Thus,  in the  U.S.A. 
there is a  tendency for the regressive  taxes  to be internalised at 
the  level of the state economies,  and  so  progressive redistribution 
occurs at the federal level  ;  in Germany it is the  progressive 
taxes that tend relatively to  be  internalised at the  level of the 
state economies,  and  so it seems  that regressive redistribution 
occurs at the federal level. - 264-
Appendix  1 
Incidence Assumptions  and  Distributors Used  in Studies of Tax 
Regionalisation in Seven Integrated Economies 
For France,  the regional allocation of taxes was  made  by  Morin  (1) 
for the year 1969.  In his study Morin  made  use  of two  earlier 
studies by  Bobe  and  Prud'homme  et. al.,  (2)  which  provided  the 
methodological basis.  For social security contributions other 
sources will have  to  be  employed  since  they are excluded from  the 
Morin  study. 
For the  personal income  tax  (IRPP  et TC),  the  assumption is made 
that the  person who  pays  the  tax has to  bear it. Accordingly the 
personal income  tax is allocated to  the  region where it is paid. 
Data on  this are directly available.(;) 
The  corporate income  tax is assumed  to  be  borne  partly (75  %)  by 
shareholders and  partly (25  %)  by  consumers.  The  incidence  on 
share-holders is approximated by  the  key  :  "revenues des capitaux 
mobiliers des menages",  whereas the incidence on  consumers is 
approximated  by the key  :  "consommation des menages"  (4) 
For the  regional distribution of the value  added  tax  (TVA)  - by far 
the  most important single  tax in France  - Morin  chose  a  rather 
sophisticated approach.(5)  In this,  TVA  is split into five  broad 
cate~ories.  One  category (5.6  % of total TVA)  is not regionalised, 
one  (26.) %)  is allocated in proportion to household expenditures 
on  consumption,one  (8.) %)  in proportion to household  savings,  one 
{6.7  %)  in proportion to capital expenditures,  and  the final one 
(53.1 %  ) in proportion to  the  consumption of eight groups of 
products.  If one  takes the  usual approach of allocating TVA  in 
proportion to household expenditure  on  consumption instead of the 
Morin  approach,  the difference is below  2.4 % for all but one  of 
21  regions with an average  of 1.1% (excluding the exceptional case 
which  gave  a  12.1% difference). (6) 
(1)  J.  Morin,  Fiscalite et redistribution spatiale,  unpublished 1975. 
(2) 
(J)  Morin,  ibid.,  p.  20 
(4)  ibid.' p.  20  ff. 
(5)  ibid.' p.  )5 ff. 
( 6)  ibid.,  P•  XIII  (Annex). - 265-
Selected excise  taxes are assumed  to  be  borne  by consumers  and 
accordingly regionally allocated in proportion to the relevant 
consumption goods·  Where  a  specific key  was  not available,  the 
distribution was  made  in proportion to overall consumption of house-
holds,  as wa.s  the  case with import duties  (1). 
The  remaining tax revenues making  up  12.8 %  of the  total revenues 
are  partly allocated to  the  region where  they are  paid  (timbre et 
enre  'strement, etc.): 48  %,  partly in proportion to  total 
consumption  taxe  sur salaire  taxe  sur conventions d'assurance, 
etc.  :  J8  %),  and  partly in proportion to specific keys  prelevement 
liberatoire, imp8t sur operations de  bourse, etc.  :  14 %).  (2) 
If the Morin  study is simplified by  using only two  distribution keys 
(revenue  des ca itaux mobiliers des mena  s  and  consommations  des 
menages  besides the  orin allocation of IRPP,  excises on  tobacco, 
alcohol,  and  oil products,  and  TVA,  the regional differences -
as compared  to  the more  sophisticated method  described - vary 
between 0.1% and  11% with an average  of 3.5 %-(3)  This suggests 
that the sensivity of the results to the  choice of assumptions is 
rather low. 
The  regionalisation of social security contributions is for 1962 
directly available from  a  French regional accounts study made  in 
1966  (4), which  was  not repeated in that form in later years.  The 
progressivity characteristics in 1962  are  transfered to 1969  and 
scaled up  sueh  that the actual national total in 1969  is obtained. 
(1) ibid., p.  29  ff. 
(2)  ibid.,  p.  41  ff. 
(3)  own  computations 
(4)  INSEE,  Etudes de  Comptabilite Nationale,  No  9  Comptes  Economiques 
Regionaux,  Paris 1966,  p.  157 (1) 
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Germany 
For Germany  no  study of regional tax incidence was  available, but 
since  there exist good  primary sources  (1)  in Germany it was 
possible  to  undertake a  study directly. 
Personal income  taxes were  assumed  to  be  borne  by  those  on  whom  they 
are  levied.  The  regional division of personal income  taxes is 
available on  a  collective base  from  the "Steuerllaushalt von  Bund, 
Lander  und  Gemeinden~• Since  the  place of tax  payments is the  location 
of a  firm, it is recognised  that a  correction had  to be  made  in order 
to get the regional burden distribution.  This correction called 
"Zerlegung"  started in 1970,  so  that data from  official but 
unpublished  sources were  available  (see Chapter  16) 
The  incidence assumptions concerning the  corporate  income  tax is 
that 75  % is borne  by  the  owners  of equity capital and 25%  is 
shifted forward  to consumers.  This 25  % is distributed in 
proportion to consumption expendi  tures.For the  capital owners' 
burden an approach analogous  to tnat for the  income  tax was  taken 
with  "Zerlegung" figures again proportional  to  1970  official 
figures. 
Because  of the  lack of detailed regional consumption data for 
single  products,  TVA,  excises and  import duties were  distributed 
in proportion to  consumption expenditures. 
Social security contributions are assumed  to  be  borne  by  employees. 
The  regional partition is directly available  from  the 
"Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Lander,  Heft  5". 
Besides these  taxes  there are  two  other important sources of federal 
revenue  :  the  Kapitalertragsste~~r, and  the  ~r~~~sabgabe. The 
Kapitalertragssteuer is treated in a  similar way  to  the  corporate 
income  tax,  but since a  forward  shifting seems  to be  less possible 
it is apportioned on  the assumption that 87.5% is bOrne  by  capital 
owners and  12.5 %  borne  by  consumers.  The  Erga.nzungsabgabe is 
distributed according to  the distribution of the  tax to which it is 
a  supplement.The  small amount of other federal  taxes is distributed 
in proportion to  consumption  expenditures. 
Statistisches Btindesamt  Wiesbaden,  Fachserie  1  :  Finanzen und  Steuern, 
Reihe  2  :  Steuerhaushal  t  von  Bund,  Liinder  und  Gemeinden,  4.  Vierte  ljahr 
und  Jahr 1970  ;  Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen  der Lander, 
Heft 5  :  Entstehung,  Verteilung und  Verwendun&  des Sozialprodukts in 
den tandem,  Standardtabellen 1960  bis 1970  ;  and  unpublished Federal 
Ministry of Finance  sources. - 267-
Details of the regionalisation procedure  for Italian taxes are 
given in Chapter  4 
United Kingdom 
For the  United Kingdom  the regionalisation of taxes was  done 
by  Woodward.(l)  The  regional division of personal income  taxes and 
surtaxes is directly available from  the Inland Revenue  survey.  The 
regional division of personal  taxes on  expenditures was  achieved by 
a  breakdown  of expenditures into different items and  estimating 
the appropriate  taxes on  these  items.(2)  The  regional split of the 
expenditure items was  made  by  using the Family Expenditure surveys.(J) 
The  amount  of income  and profits taxes paid by  firms in each industry 
on  the  national level was  est1mated from  the  Inland Revenue  Annual 
Report.  The  regional distribution of tax paid by  each industry 
was  assumed  to  be  proportional to its gross profits.  (4)  The 
regional distribution of gross  ~rofits, in turn,  was  achieved by 
using Census  Production data (5).  Indirect taxes on  intermediate 
products purchased by  industry were  allocated to consumers' 
expenditures. ( 6) 
One  part of the  national insurance and  health contributions - the 
employers'  contributions in total - were  divided regionally in 
proportion to  the  wage  and  salary bills estimated for the regions 
the  other half was  divided in proportion to  the  number  of employees 
excluding married women  working part-time. 
(1)  V.H.  Woodward,  Regional Social Accounts for  the  United Kingdom 
In  :  National Institute of Economic  and  Social Research.  Regional 
Papers I, Cambridge  1970,  pp.  61-174. 
(2)  ibid  ••  p.  149 
(J) ibid  ••  PP•  147-48 
(4)  ibid  ••  p.  170 
(5)  ibid  ••  p.  119  ff 
(6)  ibid  ••  p.  170 - 268-
Australia 
For Australia no  study of regional tax incidence was  available,  but 
since  there exist good  primary sources  (1) it was  possible to 
undertake a  study directly. 
Personal income  taxes were  assumed  to be  borne  by  those  on  whom  they 
are  levied.  The  state breakdown  of personal income  tax payable per 
head of population is available from  the  Grants Commission  Report  (2). 
The  incidence assumption concerning the  corporate income  tax is that 
50  %  is shifted forward  to  consumers.  The  first 50  %  are distributed 
in proportion to the  category "All other income"  (J),  the  largest part 
of which  would  seem  to be  income  from  incorporated enterprises.  The 
shifted part is allocated proportionally to consumption expenditures  (4). 
Oil,  tobacco  and alcohol excises are distributed proportionally to  the 
private state consumption of these  products.(5) 
All other taxes are allocated proportional to consumption expenditures. 
(1)  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Authorities of Australian Government, 
197J-74,  No  12, Canberra 1975  ;  Australian National Accounts,  National 
Income  and Expenditure 197J  - 74,  Canberra 1975,  and  Grants 
Commission,  41.  Report 1974  on  Special Assistance for States. 
(2)  Grants Commission  Report p.  127 
(J) Australian National Accounts,  pp.  68-70 
(4)  Grants Commission  Report  p.  129 
(5)  Australian National Accounts,  PP•  77-79 (1) 
(2) 
(J) 
(4) 
(5) 
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Canada 
The  allocation of taxes  to  pl.  ·rinces on an incidence basis was  done 
for Canada  by  l~slove.(l) For  the  personal income  tax no  proxy 
distribution series was  needed  since  (a} it was  assumed  that the 
incidence is at the source,  and  (b)  the distribution of tax receipts 
to the  provinces was  directly available from  Taxation Statistics and 
Financial Management  series.  (2) 
The  incidence assumption concerning the corporate income  tax was  that 
7  5 % is borne  by  the owners  of equity capital ;  of the owners' 
portion of the  tax,  J5 %  is deemed  to  be  paid by foreign owners,  the 
rest - 65 %  - is distributed in proportion to dividends  ;  and 
25%  is shifted forward  to consumers  and distributed in proportion ·to 
retail sales. (J) 
The  federal general sales tax is assumed  to  be  borne  by  consumers  and 
allocated in proportion to retail sales.  The  selective excise taxes 
are handled in the  same  manner  :  federal excise taxes are allocated 
in proportion to the relevant consumption item, alcohol and  tobacco 
taxes in proportion to alcohol/tobacco consumption,  and  the other 
relatively.unimportant  f~deral excise taxes in proportion to retail sales 
the proxy chosen  for provincial consumption.  Import duties are  a~so 
assumed  to be  passed fully to  consumers  and  thus allocated in proportion 
to retail sales.(4) 
For social security contributions except public service costs,  the 
assumption regarding final incidence is that employees  bear their own 
share  plus one-half of the  employers'  share  that is shifted backward. 
Therefore  three-quarters are distributed to provinces in proportion to 
wages  and  salaries.  The  other half of the  employers'  share is assumed 
to be  shifted forward  to consumers  and  hence  distributed in proportion 
to retail sales.  Contributions of public service employees are 
assumed  to be borne  by  the  employees  and  therefore allocated among 
the  provinces by  the provincial distribution of federal government 
employees.(5) 
A.  M.  Maslove,  The  Pattern of Taxation in Canada,  ~conomic Council of 
Canada,  Ottawa  1972 
ibid., p.  .54 
ibid  ••  p.  5J  ff 
ibid.,  p.  55  f 
ibid.' p.  57.  60  f. - 270-
All other taxes amount  to only 6 %  of all allocated taxes,  the  more 
important being natural resources taxes,  business taxes,  succession 
and  estate duties and  motor vehicle taxes, which  are allocated either 
in proportion to consumption  expenditures, i.e. retail sales, or to 
the  province in which  they are collected.(!) 
u.s.A. 
For  the  United States Labovitz's estimates of the regionalisation of 
federal revenues have  been used.(2) 
"In the  revenue allocations,  reported collections are used for only a 
few  minor items.  Instead,  total Federal receipts from  each  type of 
tax are attributed to states on  the basis of distribution factors that 
reflect as nearly as practicable the  broad assumptions  summarised 
below  •••• 
Assumptions for the major types of taxes are as follows, 
(1)  Individual income  taxes are  borne  by  the individuals on  whom 
they are initially imposed. 
(2)  Employment  taxes levied on  employers are shifted to consumers 
Employment  taxes levied upon  employees  and  self-employed are 
borne  by  them. 
(3)  Corporation income  taxes are borne  one-half by  shareholders and 
one-half by  consumers. 
(4)  Estate and gift taxes are derived from  the  state of residence 
of the decedent or donor. 
(5)  Excise  taxes levied upon  business or collected through business 
enterprises are  borne  by  consumers.  Other excise  taxes are borne 
generally by  the persons  from  whom  they are collected by  the 
Government. 
(6)  Custom  duties are  borne  by  consumers."(J) 
(1)  Maslove,  op.  cit., p.  58  f, 60,  61  f 
(2)  I.M.  Labovitz,  Federal Revenue  and  Expenditure Estimates for states and 
Regions  :  Averages for the Fiscal Years 1969-71  (Congressional Research 
Service  :  in preparation) and  House  of Representatives,  Federal Revenue 
and  Expenditure Estimates for States and  Regions,  Fiscal Years  1965-67, 
Washington 1968.  Hereafter cited as FREE.  · 
(J)  FREE,  op.  cit.  p.  15  f. (1) 
(2) 
(J) 
(4) 
(5) 
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Following these  assumptions,  the following regional distribution keys 
are used  : 
For the individual income  tax simply the  amount  of income  tax after 
credits by state was  used as distributors.  (1) 
The  social security contributions of employees were  directly 
available for state allocation.  Employers'  share of social security 
contributions were  allocated in proportion to retail sales.  (2) 
One-half of the  corporate income  tax was  distributed in proportion to 
dividends  received by individuals,  the other half in proportion to 
retail sales. (J) 
Estate and  gift taxes are allocated to the state where  they are paid. 
(4) 
For the  compound  "excise  taxes and  customs",  a  detailed breakdown 
into various components  was  made for each  component and  the allocation 
to states  is in proportion to  the- releYant consumption patterns 
by  states.  Where  no  specific consumption  distributio~ was  available 
several proxies were  chosen. 
(1)  retail sales (e.g.  for customs,  lubricating oils (non-highway 
portion)). 
(2)  selected retail sales (e.g.  for radio,  television, etc., sugar) 
(J)  population (e.g. for transportation of persons by  air) 
(4)  property income  (e.g.  for documents,  playing cards). 
Furthermore,  some  excises were  distributed to  the  state where  they 
were  paid  (e.g. retailers' excises  (jewelry,  furs,  etc.)) club dues).[5] 
ibid.'  P•  40. 
ibid.,  p.  40 f. 
ibid.,  p.  41 
ibid. 
ibid., p.  41  ff. - 272-
TABLE  A 1 
Reg,j,ons  of Ori!2;n Federal  Tax  Revenue  12er  Head1  b:r:;  Source, 
Germ~! (BRD)  1210  DM  per annum 
Total  !TI  ill  GST  ~  sse  IT  POP 
Sc hl  e'swi g-Ho 1 st  ei  n  2398  293  43  435  378  1140  7810  2494 
Ni edersachsen  2412  293  61  425  369  1153  7847  7082 
Nordrhein-Westfalen  2792  398  71  445  386  1366  8951  16914 
Hessen  2780  386  97  435  377  1348  9228  5382 
Rhe~nland-Pfal  z  2383  289  63  408  354  1156  7887  3645 
Baden-WUrtt em berg  2764  399  91  444  385  1322  9504  8895 
Ba,yern  2455  339  62  415  360  1169  8111  10479 
Saarland  2368  257  56  400  347  1199  6919.  1120 
Hamburg  3792  649  110  550  477  1827  11845  1794 
Bremen  3133  484  66  476  414  1564  9563  723 
Berlin  2787  192  45  541  469  1391  8809  2122 
BRD  2669  362  72  440  382  1291  8725  60650 
BHD  (absolute)  161875  21955  4367  26686  23168  78299  529171 
Range  of  ~ndex numbers  89/142  70/176  59/152  92/126  92/126  88/142  79/136 
Average tax rate  30.6  4.2  o.8  5.0  4.3  14.8 
Elasticity  1.03  1.98  1.53  0.58  0.58  1.01 
Stat~stical signihcance R2  0.920  0.954  o. 713  0.880  0.880  0.856 
Redi st ri  but  i ve  power  0.8  4.1  - 0.4  - 2.1  - 1.8  0,1 
Change  in  Gin1-coeff~c1ent  - 3.0  3.0  0.9  - 3.0  - 2.6  - 1.2 
Re~ons of Ori£2:n  Central  Tax  Revenue  12er  Head 1  b;y  Source, 
France  (8  re!2:on~  FF  per  annum 
Total  PIT  CIT  GST  EXC  sse  PI  POP 
Region  Paris~enne  7483  1070  560  1790  370  3123  15174  9438 
Bassin  Parisien  4271  400  340  1270  350  1581  10142  9232 
Nord  3811  350  280  1210  260  1541  10023  3837 
Est  4146  380  240  1300  330  1596  10202  4727 
Ouest  3512  330  230  1320  320  1272  9206  6586 
Sud-Ouest  3832  340  260  1440  350  1412  9620  5403 
Centre  Est  4384  440  300  1250  340  1764  10637  5811 
Med1 terrannee  4353  420  360  1290  390  1563  10210  5284 
France  4696  510  3~0  1340  350  1826  10652  50315 
France  (absolute)  236279  25661  17610  67422  17610  91875  535955 
Range  of index numbers  75/159  65/210  66/160  90/134  7 4/111  70/171  86/142 
Average  Tax  rate  42.8  4.6  3.2  12.2  3.3  16.6 
Elasticity  1.51  2. 73  1.62  0.68  0.23  1.80 
StatLstica1  s~gnificance R2  0.955  0.953  0.808  o. 738  0.117  1.000 
Redi st  ri  but  i ve  power  22.4  8.3  2.0  - 4.0  - 2.5  13.8 
Change  in GLni-coefficLent  20.7  7.  7  1.9  - 5.8  - 2. 3  13.9 
Re£2:ons  of Ori!2;n  Central  Tax  Revenue  12er  Head 1  b;y  Source, 
United Kingdom  1264  Pounds  per annum 
Total  PIT  CIT  GST  +  EXC  ~  IT  POP 
North  134  35  12  66  22  350  3270 
YorkshLre  and Humbers1de  150  43  15  66  26  418  4713 
North  West  154  42  16  71  25  409  6635 
East  M1dlands  147  41  14  67  24  405  3203 
West  Midlands  174  51  17  77  29  462  4877 
South East  194  70  15  78  31  527  18295 
South West  143  47  10  64  21  419  3555 
Wales  134  36  ll  65  22  362  2671 
Scotland  146  43  12  68  22  377  5208 
N.  Ireland  107  26  8  58  16  306  1458 
U.K.  163  52  14  72  26  443  54033 
U.K.  (absolute)  8807  2810  756  3890  1405  23937 
Range  of index nwnbers  66/119  51/136  56/124  80/109  61/118  69/119 
Average tax rate  36.8  ll.  7  3.0  16.2  5.8 
Elashcity  1.00  1.65  0,86  0.55  1.06 
Statistical s1gnif1cance R2  0.960  0.963  0.435  0.842  0.891 
Redistributive  power  0.2  7,6  - 0.4  - 7.2  0.3 
Change  Ln  G1n1-coeffic1ent  - 1.8  8.5  - 1.4  - 8.5  - 0.3 - 273-
TABLE  A 2 
Re![!;ons  of  Ori~n Central Tax Revenue  12er  Head1  by Source,  FF  per annum 
France  (21  re~E:ons)  1262 
~  PIT  CIT  GST  EXC  sse  !1.  POP 
RegJ.on  Parisienne  7483  1070  560  1790  370  3123  15174  9438 
Champagne  4444  38o  350  128o  330  1724  10612  1296 
Picardie  4064  400  290  1220  320  1544  10018  1601 
Haute-Normandie  4365  460  290  1260  350  1705  10543  1522 
Centre  4381  400  460  1260  360  1551  10038  2027 
Basse-Normandie  4068  380  240  1240  340  1438  9682  1273 
Bcurgogne  4255  38o  320  1350  38o  1535  9998  1517· 
Nord  3811  350  28o  1210  260  1541  10023  3837 
Lorraine  3942  370  240  1230  320  1602  10234  2289 
Alsace  4292  420  210  1330  330  1702  10537  1432 
France"""omte  4392  360  320  1440  330  1432  9650  1006 
Lo2re  3572  340  210  1550  310  1342  9361  2608 
Bretagne  3418  320  240  1170  310  1198  8889  2486 
Po2 tou"""harent es  3670  330  220  1170  340  1370  9462  1491 
Aqui ta2ne  3881  360  270  1730  370  1481  9820  2475 
Midi-Pyrenees  3792  320  260  1220  340  1362  9341  2190 
Limousin  3834  300  240  1110  320  1384  9512  738 
Rhone  Alpes  4407  470  330  1250  350  1827  10943  4491 
Auvergne  4138  330  210  1270  320  1406  9588  1320 
Languedoc  4011  310  320  1270  360  1441  9677  1736 
Provence"""ote  d 'Azur"""orse  4581  470  370  1300  410  1681  10472  3548 
France  4696  510  350  1340  350  1826  10975  50315 
France  (absolute)  236279  25660  17610  67422  17610  91875  552207 
Range  of 2ndex numbers  73/159  59/210  60/160  82/133  77/117  66/171  85/138 
Average  taxe  rate  42.8  4.6  3.2  12.2  3.2  16.6 
Elastic2  ty  1.43  2.73  1.  79  0.53  0.31  1.82 
Statlstical s2gn2hcance R2  0.955  0.966  0.691  0,299  0,193  1.000 
Redi st ri  butl  ve  power  18.5  8.0  2.5  - 5.8  - 2,2  13.7 
Change  2n  Gini-coefhcient  18.6  7. 7  2,0  - 5.9  - 2.4  14.0 
Rei[!;ons  of  Or2~n Central  Tax  Revenue  12er  Head 1  b:t:  Source, 
~  Lire per  annum 
Total  PIT  CIT  GST  EXC  sse  PI  POP 
Valle d'Aosta  495500  47110  6413  92851  87869  208717  1854537  112 
hemonte  544488  74710  7125  83650  45431  217125  1745146  4489 
Lombardi a  567960  100562  7415  83746  42529  226955  1825083  8712 
Trent1no Alto Adige  379607  41746  6290  72742  51676  168847  1472130  856 
Veneto  404919  38799  6513  71724  42246  151748  1297060  4211 
Fnuli  Venezia G2ulla  426450  53202  6608  79907  38213  195144  1579009  1233 
Liguria  487354  81626  7958  96685  47986  210312  1838372  1869 
Fm21la Romagna  486651  51708  7659  84607  50827  175190  1533252  3900 
Toscana  447825  49229  7161  82076  49664  161081  1436290  3527 
Umbr2a  388507  29771  6206  69953  43016  143901  1123842  786 
Marc he  403062  30067  6129  75964  44805  129933  1147938  1375 
LaZ1o  473357  84658  6824  85301  46598  200010  1503424  4810 
Abruzzi  292580  19333  6262  59474  39599  100909  983431  1192 
Mollse  259990  10390  4697  48787  33972  77050  748687  326 
Campania  271341  21659  4764  53126  27531  108526  846801  5177 
Puglla  281967  18195  4936  50148  31506  111958  897856  3647 
Basillcata  252474  13570  4676  46815  28581  94290  744695  609 
Calabria  341179  10330  4106  44056  26413  90691  696922  2009 
S1c2lla  276697  22096  5069  57776  29355  115105  881531  4772 
Sardegna  294021  23709  5629  58432  32986  116698  964295  1515 
Italle  411364  51874  6338  72123  40253  162728  1330487  55153 
Italie  (absolute)  22687958  2861007  349560  3977800  2220074  8974937  73380349 
Range  of index numbers  44/151  20/193  65/126  61/134  66/218  47/140  60/134 
Average  tax rate  40.0  5.0  0.6  7.0  3.9  15.8 
Elasticity  0.96  2,10  0,68  0.89  0.86  0,61 
Stat1stica1  s2gnif2cance R2 
0.879  0.818  0,867  0,891  0.388  0.570 
Redistr2  but1  ve  power  - 1.6  5. 3  - 0,2  - 0.8  - 0.5  - 6.1 
Change  2n  Gini-coefhcient  - 1.8  6.2  - 0,2  - 1.5  - 1.3  - 5.0 - 274-
TABLE  A  3 
Reg!ons of OrJ.![!n  Federal  Tax Revenue  :eer Head,  ~  Source, 
Australia 1211-12  Aus.  ¢ per annum 
Total  PIT  CIT  ~  gg_  .El  POP 
New  South Wales  664  325  122  57  141  2196  4798 
Victoria  641  309  126  53  135  2180  3535 
Queensland  528  249  102  48  113  1893  1851 
South Australia  543  252  104  47  123  1891  1184 
Western Austraha  601  286  118  52  128  1982  1047 
Tasmania  538  240  103  47  134  1791  392 
Austral~a  616  297  118  53  130  2090  12896 
Australia (absolute)  7944  3830  1522  683  1676  26953 
Range  of 1ndex numbers  86/108  81/110  86/107  89/108  87/108  87/105 
Average tax rate  29.5  14.2  5.6  2.5  6.2 
Elastlci  ty  1.09  1.44  1.04  0.94  0.46 
Statishcal s1gmf1cance R2  0.925  0.966  0.895  0.904  0.317 
Red1stn  butl  ve  power  2.  7  6.3  0.2  - 0.2  - 3.4 
Change in G~ni-Coefhcient  9·4  9.3  - 0.2  0.6  0.2 
Re12:ons  of Ong!n Federal  Tax Revenue  :eer Head,  b;~::  Source, 
Canada 1262  Can.  ¢ per  annum 
Total  EIT  CIT  ~  EXC  sse  .IT  POP 
Atlantic  Provinces  415  137  56  88  63  66  1739  2028 
Quebec  479  168  60  94  77  74  2323  5984 
Ontario  734  335  101  116  79  95  3178  7386 
Mani toba-Saskatchewen  533  189  111  93  67  70  2288  1937 
Albert  a  636  255  102  117  76  79  2640  1559 
Bnhsh Columb1a  787  316  174  123  83  86  2898  2106 
Canada  611  248  93  106  76  82  2650  21000 
Canada  (absolute)  12831  5208  1953  2226  1596  1722  55650 
Range  of 1ndex numbers  68/129  55/135  60/188  84/116  82/109  81/116  70/118 
Average tax rate  23.1  9.3  3.5  4.0  2.9  3.1 
Elasticity  1.11  1.61  1.25  0.60  0.46  0.68 
Stat1stical  signif1cance R2  0.839  0.921  0,286  o. 722  o. 747  0.925 
Red1 st  ri  but  1 ve  power  2.4  5. 7  0.9  - 1.6  - 1.6  - 1.0 
Change  in G1ni-coefficient  2.6  7 .o  - 0.2  - 1.6  - 1.9  - o. 7 
Regions of Ong!n Federal  Tax Revenue  :eer Head1  b;~::  Source, 
u.s.A.  (2  re12:ons)  1262-11  u.s. ¢ per annum 
Total  PIT  91!  EXC  sse  .IT  POP 
New  England  1066  515  213  so  193  3967  11875 
Middle Atlanhc  1070  514  197  74  203  4140  37255 
East  North Central  966  486  157  76  198  3956  40302 
West  North Central  798  366  139  77  162  3481  16357 
South Atlantlc  813  375  150  80  147  3350  30890 
East  South Central  617  273  99  67  133  2734  12862 
West  South Central  715  338  118  75  142  3131  19392 
Jl!ounta1n  768  347  139  82  140  3345  8362 
Pacific  966  467  158  86  178  4032  26564 
u.s.A.  900  431  157  77  174  3690  203859 
u.s.A.  (absolute)  183473  87863  32006  15697  35471  752240 
Range  of 1ndex numbers  69/119  63/119  63/135  86/112  81/117  75/113 
Average tax rate  24.4  11.7  4.3  2.1  4. 7 
Elastic1  ty  1.32  1.53  1.48  0,28  1.14 
Statistical sigmficance R2  0.946  0.949  o. 753  0.278  0,880 
Redi st ri  buti  ve  power  7.  7  6.2  2.0  - 1.5  o. 7 
Change  in  Gin~  -coeffic1  ent  6.9  5.5  1.6  - 1.8  0.9 - 275-
TABLE  A 4 
Re!!ons of Ori!!n Federal Tax  Revenue  l2er  Head 1  E,z  Source, 
u.s.A.  {21  re!!onsl  1262-11  u.s. ¢ per annum 
~  .IT!'_  CIT  EXC  sse  !!I  f2f 
Maine  739  319  157  11  141  2921  1000' 
New  Hampshire  885  391  162  104  169  3487  742 
Vermont  798  331  171  87  146  3040  446 
Massachusetts  1034  503  199  76  196  3994  5704 
Rhode  Island  904  416  152  71  187  3642  947 
Connecticut  1360  687  293  85  218  4616  3035 
New  York  1148  545  219  76  214  4361  18238 
New  Jersey  1091  549  190  19  194  4393  7198 
Pennsul  vania  933  444  167  68  189  3645  ll819 
Ohio  928  472  152  72  197  3874  10663 
Indiana  865  423  132  73  186  3634  5198 
Illinois  1079  557  179  79  218  4308  llll9 
Michigan  990  496  157  78  198  4011  8893 
Wisconsin  834  390  140  76  166  3536  4428 
Minnesota  824  379  143  11  172  3583  3814 
Iowa  767  353  127  72  159  3455  2831 
Missouri  864  398  155  80  177  3505  4683 
Kansas  766  359  126  13  147  3572  2247 
Nebraska  838  377  154  84  161  3547  1491 
South Dakota  592  253  104  14  ll2  2874  669 
North Dakota  610  255  103  74  127  2961  622 
Delaware  1298  545  352  97  200  4329  550 
Maryland  1004  525  160  11  157  4079  3937 
Virginia  191  393  130  75  132  3461  4662 
West  Virginia  672  309  105  62  145  2703  1753 
North Carolina  700  299  122  82  147  3053  5093 
South Carolina  602  257  93  73  131  2788  2599 
Georgia  726  339  ll9  75  141  3162  4703 
Florida  871  391  206  84  137  3371  6837 
District of Columbia  1401  515  243  140  332  4666  756 
Kentucky  647  294  107  1~  131  2855  3233 
Tennessee  695  315  llO  66  153  2887  3941 
Alabama  596  264  90  63  130  2693  3459 
Mississippi  481  186  84  65  107  2354  2229 
Louisiana  628  292  102  70  130  2908  3652 
Arkansas  563  237  93  68  120  25.48  1930 
Oklahoma  695  319  115  76  129  3040  2569 
Texas  774  374  127  11  153  3347  11241 
Montana  725  313  126  84  137  3167  700 
Idaho  684  268  124  74  161  3052  720 
Wyoming  886  372  189  104  148  3472  334 
Colorado  803  379  150  80  149  3622  2222 
Utah  668  287  111  63  137  3040  1070 
Nevada  1157  626  160  129  171  4278  494 
Arizona  808  353  165  81  140  3378  1797 
New  Mexico  610  275  96  81  98  2840  1025 
California  988  475  165  89  182  4127  19997 
Oregon  849  396  136  82  167  3438  2101 
Washington  920  459  140  76  170  3739  3399 
Alaska  946  506  85  80  152  4478  305 
Hawaii  930  465  152  10  152  4314  762 
United States  900  431  157  11  173  3687  203859" 
United States  (absolute)  183473  Fl7863  32006  15697  35268  751628 
Range  of index numbers  53/143  42/144  54/187  84/166  61/125  64/125 
Average tax rate  24.7  11.8  4.3  2.1  4.7 
Elasticity  1.35  1.64  1.50  0.36  1.06 
Statistical significance R2  0.928  0.942  0.581  0.154  0.798 
Redi stri  buti  ve  power  8.5  7.5  2.1  - 1.4  0.3 
Change  in Gini-coefficient  6.6  6.0  1.7  - 1.6  0.3 B.  STUDIES  ON  THE  PERSPECTIVES  FOR  THE 
PUBLIC  FINANCE  FUNCTIONS 
OF  THE  C  O.MMUNI TY Chapter 10 
FISCAL  FEDERALISM  IN  THEORY  AND  PRACTIC~ 
APPLICATIONS  TO  THE  EUROPEAN  C0r1MUNITY 
by 
Wallace  E.  Oates - 281-
Introduction 
The  purpose  of this report is to probe  the  literature on  fiscal 
federalism and  the  experiences of various federal nations to 
seek out insights into intergovernmental fiscal relations in the 
emerging European Community.  Over  the past two  decades,  a 
substantial economics  literature has developed which attempts 
to determine a  set of basic principles of federal finance  (1). 
At  the  same  time  a  large number  of studies have  explored the 
working of federal fiscal institutions in several different 
countries.  The  result is a  rich collection of analyses of the 
theory and  functioning of federal fiscal systems,  a  literature 
which  should provide  some  useful lessons for the structuring of 
intergovernme?tal fiscal relations in Europe. 
This report comes  in three distinct parts.  Part I  explores the 
problem  of macroeconomic  stabilization policy within an 
explicitly multi-tiered government.  Using  the fiscal-federalism 
literature as  ~ckground, the  paper surveys  the current wisdom 
on  stabilization policy in a  federal  system  and  then examines  the 
applicability of this material to  the  particular circumstances in 
the European  Community.  The  analysis takes a  concrete focus in the 
consideration of a  specific policy alternative for central 
government  stabilization policy  :  the manipulation of the  VAT  rate 
to regulate aggregate demand. 
Part II of this report addresses the redistribution function of 
the  public sector.  Once  again,  I  proceed by  summarizing  the 
relevant literature on  fiscal federalism  to serve as a  point of 
departure for an exploration of redistributive policies in Europe. 
The  general thrust of the argument is that there exists a  wide  range 
of options for redistributive programs  in Europe  with the appropriate 
type  and  scope  of redistributive activities depending largely on 
the extent of social and  economic  integration that the Community 
desires. 
Part III turns to a  set of fiscal instruments that have  come  to 
play a  central role in federal  (and,  as well,  in many  unitary) 
fiscal systems  ;  intergovernmental grants.  Such  grant programs 
constitute a  primary policy tool for  th~ realization of central-
government  allocative and  redistributional goals.  After exploring 
the diverse forms  that such grants may  take in order to realize 
differing policy objectives,  the paper examines  the  potential for 
these  grants in the European  setting. 
(1)  For a  survey of this literature,  see my  Fiscal Federalism  (New  York 
Harcourt Brace  Jovanovich,  1972) - 282-
I.  On  Macroeconomic  Stabilization Policy in the European  Community 
After some  introductory remarks  on  current views regarding 
stabilization policy in Section 1,  I  will summarize  in Section 2 
the  thrust of the fiscal-federalism literature on macroeconomic 
stabilization policy.  This will lead,  in Section 3 through 6,  to 
an investigation of stabilization policy in the European Community 
and  to an examination of a  specific tax proposal as one  element of 
a  countercyclical fiscal program at the  central-government level. 
1.  Any  discussion of macroeconomic  stabilization policy must,  at this 
moment  in time,  acknowledge  the divergence of views  concerning both 
the relative efficacy of different policy tools and  the desirability 
of active countercyclical measures.  At  the risk of some 
oversimplification,  I  will characterize this divergence in terms of 
a  "monetarist" position and  a  "nee-Keynesian"  perspective  (1). 
The  first source of dispute is the effectiveness of monetary  policy 
relative to  that of fiscal policy in the regulation of the  level of 
aggregate  demand.  It is the monetarist's contention that changes in 
the  nominal  stock of money  exert far and  away  the  predominant effect 
on  the  level of money  expenditure.  Changing  the  level of debt-
financed  public expenditure will have  little impact on  the  level 
of total demand,  since it will tend  to  "crowd  out" an equal amount 
of private expenditure. It is thus  the  monetary authority,  not  the 
Treasury,  who  has  the real power  to influence aggregate  spending. 
In contrast,  the  neo-Keynesians  see a  more  positive role for fiscal 
policy.  In particular, their claim is that the displacement of 
private  spending by  government expenditure is far from  complete  so 
that bond-financed  spending has a  significant expansionary impact 
on  the  level of aggregate demand.  It should  be  emphasized,  moreover, 
that the  neo-Keynesians also admit  to important effects from 
monetary policy  ;  their view is that an effective countercyclical 
policy will consist of a  balanced use  of both fiscal and  monetary 
policies so as to complement and  reinforce one  another. 
The  second  set of issues relates to  the desirability of trying to 
influence aggregate demand  in the short run.  In this debate,  the 
monetarists have  stressed the  long  time  lags inherent both in the 
decision process and in the  response of the  economy  to actual changes 
in policy variables.  These  lags,  combined  with  the uncertainty 
surrounding both  the forecasts of future  economic  conditions and  the 
estimates of key  parameters in the  system,  have  given rise  to deep 
(1)  For an excellent analysis of the issues summarized  in this section, 
see Alan s.  Blinder and  Robert M.  Solow,  "Analytical Foundations of 
Fiscal Policy",  in A.  Blinder~., The  Economics  of Public  Finance 
(Washington,  D.C.  :Brookings Institution, 1974),  pp.  3- 118 - 283-
skepticism as to the capacity of public policy to  smooth  out short-
run fluctuations in the  level of economic  activity.  Some  monetarists 
have  claimed that public policy tends to exacerbate, rather than 
reduce,  these fluctuations.  From  this perspective,  the monetarists 
have  tended  to support proposals that eschew  short-run stabilization 
objectives and  emphasize,  instead,  a  stable framework  for longer-run 
growth  (proposals  such as a  fixed rate of growth of the  nominal 
money  supply). 
The  neo-Keynesians,  in contrast, are a  good  deal less pessimistic 
about the  scope  for an effective countercyclical policy.  While  there 
are few  remaining supporters of a  detailed "fine  tuning" of the 
economy,  the view is that discretionary stabilization policy has 
real potential for reducing the severity of flucutations in economic 
activity. 
There is a  large existing literature which  explores the  implications 
of time  lags and  of uncertainty for  the  effectiveness and desirability 
of countercyclical policy.  (1)  I  think that it is fair to say,  however, 
that this literature has not  reached a  consensus on how  damaging these 
problems are  to the case for an active stabilization program.  In 
fact, certain lag structures can  even  enhance  the effectiveness of 
countercyclical measures. 
These  differences in perspective on  stabilization policy are of 
obvious importance for the  design of fiscal and  monetary institutions 
in the European Community.  If one  has monetarist inclinations, one 
is likely to put a  primary emphasis  on  monetary unification and  on 
the development of longer-run guidelines for the  growth of the stock 
of money.  (2)  Fiscal integration will hold little interest in terms 
of macroeconomic  policy.  For the  nee-Keynesian,  however,  fiscal 
institutions, as well as monetary integration, become  a  basic part 
of the  Community  structure for stabilization policy.  Moreover,  he will 
look to a  positive role in the  short run for the  use of both 
monetary and fiscal instruments to regulate aggregate demand. 
This paper,  as will become  clear, adopts something closer to the 
nee-Keynesian  stance,  The  unaerlying premises are  that both fiscal 
and  monetary measures matter and  that discretionary policy to  stabilize 
aggregate  demand  has a  real capacity to improve  the  performance  of the 
economy  in terms of limiting the extent of unemployment  and  reducing 
the  intensity of price inflation over  the  course of the business 
cycle. 
(1)  See  Blinder and  Solow,  op.  cit., for a  summary  of this literature and 
for references. 
(2)  For one  intriguing proposal in this spirit, see  "  The  All Saints" Day 
Manifesto for European Monetary  Union,  "The  Economist,  November  1, 1975, 
pp.  33  - )8. - 284-
2.  With  this general perspective on  stabilization policy,  I  turn next 
to  the  implementation of this policy in a  multi-level government 
system.  The  fiscal-federalism literature has addressed  this matter(l) 
but it is important to  stress the institutional framework  for this 
analysis.  In particular,  the  "federal system"  is envisioned as an 
existing and  well-defined entity with a  central government  along 
side of a  set of decentralized levels of the  public  sector. It is 
a  single currency area in which  the central government is presumed 
to have  the  ~wer to create or destroy money,  to  undertake  spending 
and  levy taxes and  to issue  non~monetary debt  ;  decentralized 
governments  have  only the fiscal prerogatives of expenditure and 
taxation  (along,  perhaps,  with  the power  to issue bonds). 
Within this institutional framework,  the  thrust of the  literature 
is that the central government must  assume  the  primary responsibility 
for the  stabilization function in the  public sector. First, and most 
obvious,  the central government exercises control over the  size 
of the money  supply.  This must  be  so  within a  single-currency area, 
for the incentives for "localities" to create money  with which 
to acquire real resources from  their neighbors would  be  irresistible, 
if individual local governments  could create money,  we  would  have 
essentially a  fixed exchange-rate  system  with each  jurisdiction 
possessing,  for all practical purposes, an infinite stock of reserves. 
~ach locality could  simply print money  and  purchase  goods  and  services 
from  other jurisdictions with no  effective budgetary constraint. 
The  exercise of monetary policy must,  therefore,  rest with  the 
central government. 
Second,  the  governments  of small and  highly-open  jurisdictions will 
tend  to be  highly restricted in the  scope  for an active 
countercyclical fiscal policy.  The  relatively high marginal propensity 
to import implies that injections of new  spending into the  local 
economy  will rapidly dissipate  themselves into flows of spending 
into other areas.  As  a  result,  the  expenditure multiplier (the 
reciprocal of the  sum  of the marginal  prop~nsi  ty to  save  and  the 
marginal propensity to import) will tend  to  be  quite small.  Professor 
Brown  has stressed these and other leakages in the  regional economy 
in a  recent report to this Study Group  in which  he  estimates a 
typical regional export multiplier for the  United Kingdom  of about 
1.2.  (2).  This implies only the most  limited capacity for influencing 
the demand  for locally produced  goods  and  services through an active 
local fiscal policy.  A local or regional tax-cut multiplier, for 
example,  could well be  less than unity. 
It is als0 worth  noting that,  to  the extent that a  local or regional 
government attempts to use  debt-financed spending to  stimulate its 
(1)  See,  for example  my  Fiscal Federalism,  Chapters 1, 5 
(2)  A.J.  Brown,  Chapter 1. - 285-
economy,  it will generate what is largely an "external debt" for its 
residents.  Hany  of the  bonds it issues will flow  into the  hands  of 
residents of other jurisdictions so  that later repayment of principal 
and  interest will imply a  transfer of real income  from  the residents 
of the  locality to outsiders.  In contrast, most  of the debt created 
by  the central government is typically held domestically and,  thus, 
constitutes an internal debt. 
Finally,since the localities or regions within a  federation are 
normally tightly linked in terms of economic  flows,  movements  in levels 
of economic  activity will transmit themselves rapidly among  the 
jurisdictions.  Contractions or booms  in one  area will make  themselves 
felt quickly in other localities through a  depressed or expanded 
demand  for  the latters'  exports.  The  result is that cyclical movements 
in the  level of economic  activity will tend  to be  federation-wide  ; 
as such,  they are best dealt with by  countercyclical policies operating 
at the federation level. 
The  fiscal-federalism literature thus contends  that the central 
government  must assume  primary responsibility for the macroeconomic 
stabilization function  ;  decentralized levels of government  simply do 
not possess the capacity to regulate effectively levels of aggregate 
demand  within their respective  jurisdictions.  r1oreover,  if one  looks 
at the actual experience within various countries,onefinds that, in 
fact,  central governments~taken the  lead in the formulation and 
implementation of countercyclical programs.  Both  in terms of 
constitutional provisions and  of actual economic  policy, central 
governments  have  assumed  the  task of stabilizing the economy  (1). 
It remains,  however,  to  explore  the  relevance of all this for the 
European Community  with its unique  institutional setting. 
J.  At  this  juncture,  the European Community  differs from  the model  of 
the  fiscal-federalism literature in two I'undamental ways.  First, it 
is not yet a  well-defined structure with an established central 
government.  The  upper-tier of the  public sector is in the  process of 
emerging as a  distinct level of government with independent  taxing 
and  expenditure authority.  This is important,  because it means  that 
fiscal institutions are  themselves variables  ;  the central government 
is not yet locked into a  carefully specified role by  a  permanent 
consitution. 
Second,  and  of obvious  relevance  to  the .stabilization function,  the 
t~uropean 0:> mmuni ty,  unlike individual nations,  is not (as yet) a 
single-currency area.  Each  member  country has retained its own 
currency along with the  power  to regulate its own  money  supply.  vJhile 
at some  ~oint in the future  monetary unification may  become  an 
accomplished  fact, it seems  unlikely in the near term.  This creates 
the rather peculiar prospect of a  federation in which  some  measure 
(1)  For a  survey of stabilization policy in some  federal countries,  see 
Fiscal Federalism,  Chapter 5. - 286-
of fiscal integration will precede  monetary unification.  The  relevant 
"model"  for the European Community,  at least for  the short term, is 
thus one  in which  the central government has fiscal powers  including, 
perhaps,  the  capacity to issue non-monetary debt to finance  budgetary 
deficits, but in which  the  monetary  prerogatives rest with decentralized 
levels of government. 
The  case for centralization of monetary policy followed naturally in 
the fiscal-federalism model  from  the  premise of a  single-currency area. 
Circumstances are obviously a  good  deal more  complicated in the 
European Community  with the continued existence of national currencies. 
Unlike  a  single currency area, decentralized monetary authorities do 
not have  access to what would  constitute an essentially iPfinite stock 
of international reserves  ;  their limited holdings of foreign 
currencies and  other reserves place a  blance-of-payments "discipline" 
upon  their monetary activities. A monetary authority which  engages in a 
rapid expansion of the domestic money  supply can  expect this  to 
generate a  deterioration in the balance of payments within a  short 
time. 
Even  though decentralized levels of government retain monetary 
authority, it is clear that a  growing  interdependence or integration 
of goods and  financial markets lessens the  scope for an independent 
monetary policy.  (1)  In the limiting case of perfect capital mobility 
among  jurisdictions, it can  be  shown  that the local monetary authority 
may  totally lose control over the  size of the  money  supply in its 
jurisdiction (2).  Thus,  even  though decentralized, or in this case 
national,  governments  have  constitutionally independent monetary 
powers,  the high degree  of economic  interdependence within the  Community 
does  severely restrict the  scope for its exercise. 
But I  really don't want  to digress here into the issue of the case 
for and  against monetary union.  Rather,  I  wish  to  pose  another question 
In the absence of monetary unification but with a  central government with 
fiscal powers,  does it make  sense  to  pursue a  Community-wide  stabilization 
policy at the federal level  ?  My  own  response is a  qualified "yes" and  I 
will present a  tentative proposal for  purposes of discussion in the 
concluding section of this report. 
(l)For a  useful survey of the  literature dealing with these issues,  see 
Marina  von  Neuman  Whitman,  Policies for International and  External 
Balance  (Princeton,  N.J.  :  International Finance Section, 1970). 
(2)The  above  discussion assumes  a  regime  of fixed exchange rates.  There 
is admittedly greater range for an independent monetary policy under 
a  system of flexible  exchange  rates  ;  however,  there does  seem  to be 
strong sentiment both among  academics and Community  decision makers 
that stable exchange  rates are needed  to facilitate  the  integration 
of the European Economy. - 287-
4.  In a  "federal system"  characterized by a  high degree of economic 
interdependence,  cyclical forces operating on  the  level of economic 
activity quickly spread this impact from  any local source  to  the 
federal economy  as a  whole.  Surges in spending in one  area result in 
sizeable increases in imports from  ,  and  hence  an increase in 
aggregate demand  in, other jurisdictions ;  likewise, declines in 
expenditure in one  region mean  reduced exports and  output elsewhere. 
In view  of the relatively large marginal propensities to import 
among  different regions within the federal system,  these  trade 
linkages are both large in magnitude  and  quick to manifest themselves 
so that alterations in economic  activity in one  area transmit 
themselves rapidly to others. 
This is not to say that economic  conditions will be  identical 
everywhere  or that the  policies appropriate  to  one  region will 
perfectly suit the needs of another.  We  are all aware  that cyclical 
movements  superimpose  themselves on  longer-term trends in the 
economy.  Some  regions constitute relatively depressed areas because 
of certain structural characteristics that require development efforts 
over a  larger period.  Moreover,  certain localities will have  a  larger 
share of industries which  are  the more  sensitive to cyclical changes 
in the  level of aggregate demand.  More  on  this later. 
The  point here is simply that the  extent of economic  interdependence 
that typically characterizes a  federal  system is quite substantial 
so that we  can identify periods during which,  from  the  perspective 
of the  system as a  whole,  there exists either excessive or deficient 
aggregate demand.  There is, as I  see it, a  real role for a  central 
government,  using if need  be fiscal tools alone,  to counteract these 
excesses or deficiencies. 
There  are a  number  of policy tools  (and  they are  certainly not 
mutually exclusive)  that the central government  could use  for 
countercyclical purposes.  One  recent report makes  an interesting 
proposal for a  Community  program  for unemployment  benefits (1). It 
is clear that a  harmonization of national Unemployment  schemes  has 
much  to commend  it, and  a  Community  program might be  an extremely 
effective way  to achieve this.  There  are,  however,  a  number  of 
administrative and  definitional problems  to be  overcome.  While  by  no 
means  excluding this proposal as an element in a  Community 
stabilization program,  I  want to examine  in this part of the  paper 
another proposal for a  traditional sort of countercyclical policy 
the adjustment of tax rates, more  specifically VAT  rates,  to 
stabilize  the Community  economy. 
Tax  cuts during times of recession (or, alternatively,  tax increases 
in periods of excessive  spending)  constitute a  standard prescription 
(1)  Report of the  Study Group,  "Economics  and  Monetary  Union  1980," 
Brussels  (March  1975),  EftiU-6). - 288-
for countercyclical policy.  There  would  seem  to  be  some  potential 
for a  discretionary use  of tax policy to  promote  macroeconomic 
stability in the European Community.  What  is needed is a  broad-based 
Community-wide  tax over which  the  central government  could exercise 
some  control.  By  reducing rates during times of economic  contraction, 
the central government could bolster disposable  income  and help to 
maintain levels of private expenditure  ;  conversely, during periods 
of excessive  spending,  the central fiscal authority could raise 
rates to restrain spending by private economic  units. 
The  VAT  is, for at least three reasons,  a  very attractive candidate 
for an instrument through which  to implement  such a  countercyclical 
tax policy.  First, it is a  tax that is already widely used in the 
Community  and  one  which  the central government already plans to  use 
a  source of its own  revenues.  There  do  remain,  however,  two  real 
administrative obstacles to its use as a  Community  countercyclical 
device.  Both  the rate structure and  definition of the base vary 
across member  countries resulting in some,  as yet unresolved 
harmonization  ~roblems. In addition,  the central government  plans, 
at present,  to use  VAT  as a  basis for assessing charges against member 
governments  ;  if if is used  in this way,  changes in VAT  "rates" by  the 
central fiscal authority might not reflect themselves in changes in 
national VAT  rates with  the desired impact on  disposable  incomes and 
prices.  I  will return to  this issue shortly.  For now,  I  simply want 
to note  that, at least in principle,  the central government could 
"piggyback" a  Community  VAT  rate on  top of the national rates and 
periodically adjust this rate in response  to  changes in levels of 
economic  activity. 
Second,  the  VAT  promises  to  be an effective countercyclical tool 
because it is generally viewed as a  kind of broad-based sales tax. 
Increases in VAT  rates are commonly  viewed  by producers as increases 
in their costs and  are  pushed  forward  in the  form  of higher prices. 
A temporary increase in VAT  rates,  thus,  tends  to manifest itself 
as a  temporary increase in the  level of prices,  while  a  short-run 
decrease in VAT  rates will be  interpreted as giving rise to a 
temporary reduction in prices.  This  provides a  direct incentive  to 
economic  units to  increase purchases when  VAT  rates (and  prices) are 
low  and  to avoid  ~urchases when  these rates are temporarily at a 
higher-than-normal level.  In addition to  the  income  effects 
associated with  increased or reduced real purchasing power,  temporary 
changes in VAT  rates also generate an intertemporal substitution 
effect that would  be  stabilizing in character. 
Tax  cuts in the form  of reductions in VAT  rates to stimulate the 
level of economic  activity, for example,  would  not only increase 
peoples'  real disposable  income  but would  also give  them  an incentive 
to make  purchases during the current period in which  prices are 
temporarily lower than normal. - 289  -
This is an important feature  of a  countercyclical tax policy.  There 
was,  for example,  considerable  concern in the  United  States over the 
apparent failure of the  temporary tax surcharge  on  income  taxes in 
1968  to restrain private expenditure  to the  predicted extent.  There 
now  seems  a  widespread feeling that part of this can be  understood 
in terms of the  temporary nature of the  surcharge.  Since  individuals 
saw  the  surcharge as only temporary,  they did not view it as having 
a  significant impact on  their permanent  incomes  ;  as a  result,  they 
tended  to maintain current levels of spending,  and  the  surcharge 
reflected itself to a  large extent in a  reduced  level of saving. 
In response  to this experience and  various other bits of evidence, 
macroeconomists have  become  a  good  deal more  skeptical over the 
likely effectiveness of temporary alterations in income-tax rates 
for stabilization purposes if they are truly believed to  be  only 
temporary,  they may  not exert much  impact on  levels of spending. 
In contrast,  the  temporary character of countercyclical changes in 
sales tax rates appears to contribute  to their efficacy, for private 
economic  units have  an  incentive  to  take advantage  of low  tax rates 
(during recession)  by  increasing their purchases of goods  and 
services and  to avoid  postponable  e~enditures during times of high 
tax rates  (periods of boom).  This  suggests that the  VAT,  rather than 
some  form  of income  tax, is the appropriate instrument for 
countercyclical tax policy (1). 
A third appealing characteristic of the  manipulation of a  central VAT 
rate for countercyclical purposes is, perhaps,  more  a  political than 
an  economic  one  :  its visibility.  By  raising or lowering the  VAT  rate, 
the central fiscal authority takes an explicit policy stance  on  the 
short-run macroeconomic  position of the European economy.  Not  only 
does  this influence disposable  incomes  and  prices as noted earlier, 
but it provides a  signal to national authorities, a  kind of rallying 
point for a  coordinated macroeconomic  policy between  the center and 
the  individual member  countries.  The  use  of VAT  may,  in this way, 
facilitate an integration of community  stabi~ization policies. 
(1)  One  important qualification to the  force of this particular argument in 
support of VAT  concerns magnitudes.  If we  are considering periodic 
alterations in the Community  VAT  rate of,  say,  only one  percentage point 
or so,  the  intertemporal substitution effect may  be  quite modest  ;  it 
could easily be  swamped  by  other influences on  the  price level.  This 
suggests one  interesting alternative.  In most  member  countries  there 
exists a  structure of VAT  rates with higher rates applicable  to certain 
durable and  luxury goods  ;  many  of these  goods,  including such  items as 
motor vehicles and appliances, are precisely those for which  the  timing 
of purchase is relatively flexible.  These  are  the  goods  for which  the 
intertemporal effects are potentially important.  In consequence,  the 
central fiscal authority might choose  to piggyback a  sizeable central 
VAT  rate only on  such a  designated class of durable  commodities.  In this 
way,  countercyclical changes in the rate could be  of a  considerable 
magnitude  and  ,  at the  same  time,  address  themselves  to  those  commodities 
for which  a  significant response  can  be  expected.  I  advance  this  proposal 
with some  caution and  misgivings.  In particular it is hard for an  econo-
mist  to be  overly enthusiastic over a  program  which  involves  further dis-
tortions  in relative prices.  Yet  it i~ I  thi~ at least worth  some  thought. (1) 
(2) 
(J) 
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The  proposal that I  put forth here for purposes of discussion is, thus 
one  under which  the central government,  in times of recession, would 
cut VAT  rates and  push  its budget in the direction of an increased 
deficit, and,  conversely in times of excessive demand,  would  raise 
VAT  rates and  push  the  central budget  toward  surplus.  This raises the 
issue of debt instruments.  How  should  the central government  finance 
these countercyclical deficits in its budget  ? 
There  are various ways  in which  this could be  handled.  The  member 
countries of the Community  could,  for example,  supply the  central 
government  with their own  debt according to  some  prescribed formula. 
In short,  the central government  could conduct  its fiscal activities 
in terms of debt instruments issued by  the  member  countries. 
Alternatively,  the central government  could be  empowered  to issue its 
own  bonds.  It could  then finance its own  deficits by  issuance of a 
Community  debt. 
This latter approach  offers,  I  think,  some  compelling advantages. 
Of  major  importance, it would  contribute to the  integration of 
Community  securities markets.  (1)  within  a  single country,  securities 
issued by  the central government,  because of their familiarity, 
standardization, and  typically low  risk,  tend to become  readily 
acceptable in all regions.  The  formation of a  truly national market 
for these securities helps to integrate  the markets for other 
"regional" securities, for the debt issues of the central government 
may  be  substitutable for  these  other securities, where  many  of the 
latter may  not be  directly substitutable with one  another (2). 
In the  United States, for example,  James  Ingram  (among  others)  has 
stressed the important role that federal securities have  played in 
integrating securities markets across  the nation (J) 
On  this issue, see Polly Reynolds  Allen,  Or  nization and  Administration 
of a  Monetary  Union  (Princeton,  N.J.  International Finance Section, 197  ) 
In addition to the  basic conceptual issues,  this monograph  focuses on 
the European Community. 
Perhaps, it would  be  worth  considering the establishment of a  kind of 
"super financial intermediary",  whose  function it would  be  to issue 
Community  debt instruments.  This agency might hold, as part of its own 
portfolio, securities issued by  other governmental units in the  Community. 
"State and  Regional  Payments  Mechanisms",  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
7J  (November  1959),  pp.  619-6)2. - 291-
The  existence of Community  debt should thus enhance  the mobility 
of capital across the member  countries.  Finally, in the  event of 
monetary integration,  the  union monetary authority could use  these 
securities for open market operations,  rather than being in the 
position of having to support one  national government relative to 
another. 
5.  In this section,  I  want  to address  two  further matters relating to 
the  implementation of the  VAT  proposal  :  the  integration of 
explicitly national or regional policies with central fiscal 
measures,  and  the  mode  of administering the  tax.  As  emphasized 
earlier,  the  case for a  heavy reliance on  central-government 
stabilization policies rests, in large part,  on  the  close economic 
linkages among  the various regions.  These  linkages imply  the rapid 
transmission of cyclical movements  in economic  activity among  the 
regional economies  so  that,  roughly  speaking,  there will exist 
a  coincidence in the  general tendencies  toward  booms  and  recessions 
in the  system as a  whole  to which  the central government  can respond 
with  (among  other things)  policies to influence  the overall level 
of demand. 
This coincidence is not,  however,  to be  exaggerated.  In economic 
systems  the  size of the European Community  (or of the  United States 
for that matter),  we  can expect significant differences in regional 
economic  conditions.  First,  there  may  exist some  important time  lags 
in the  recovery process  (or the  slump).  As  we  have  seen recently 
in Europe,  some  countries and  regions have  rebounded  from  recession 
much  more  quickly and  with much  greater vigor than others  ;  this has 
given rise to  concern over excessive inflationary tendencies in some 
countries, while others are still primarily occupied with unused 
ca~city. Second  (and closely related to  the first point) are the 
structural problems  which  plague certain regions.  The  failure of 
these regions to  achieve a  satisfactory economic  performance is not 
the result of inappropriate, short-run macroeconomic  policies, but 
rather a  problem  in longer-term economic  development.  The  kinds of 
policies needed  to build up  the  economic  structure of a  region 
obviously extend well  beyond  short-run stabilization measures. 
Third,  there  may  well exist some  national or regional differences 
in preferences concerning the desired degree  of expansionary push. 
Some  may  prefer to tolerate a  bit more  inflation to reduce further 
the  level of unemployment,  while others may  place a  relatively 
greater premium  on  price stability. As  we  have  discussed,  the  scope 
for the  successful implementation of differing macroeconomic 
policies is certainly limited by  the  interdependencies among  the 
regions,  but it is not altogether absent, especially in a  system 
like the European Community  where  the individual "regions"  possess 
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The  thrust of all this is that there will exist a  continuing need 
for national  (or regional)  policies to be  superimposed  upon  a 
Community  macroeconomic  policy.  The  central fiscal authority can 
determine,  for example,  a  VAT  rate appropriate  to the  general 
conditions in the Community  as a  whole,  a  kind of "mean"  tax rate  ; 
however,  national authorities must  supplement  such a  policy to  the 
extent that their respective economic  conditions deviate  somewhat 
from  the  mean. 
This  brings us to the  issue of the  administration of VAT.  The 
~receding section assumes  that the central VAT  rate is piggybacked 
on  the  individual national rates so  that changes in the central rate 
reflect themselves in corresponding changes in each of the  national 
rates.  Note  that this does not require that the  national VAT  rates 
all be  the  same  ;  what it does  imply is that, if the central authority 
raises the  VAT  rate by  one  percentage  point,  the rates in each  member 
country go  up  by  one  percentage  point regardless of the initial rate 
(and  in the absence  of offsetting policies by  national authorities). 
The  point is that central adjustments to the  VAT  rate directly 
affect prices in the  shops  so  that they  generate  the desired 
effects on disposable  income  and relative prices over time. 
Unfortunately,  under  the  current design of European  taxation, this 
direct effect of the central VAT  rate on  the  actual prices of goods 
and  services is not assured.  Under  the existing structure,  the 
central rate is used  to apportion contributions from  the  member 
states.  The  European authority will effectively apply the central 
VAT  rate to  the  tax base for each country to determine  a  tax  ,bill 
for submission to each  national fiscal authority. Each of the  member 
nations will then decide  upon  the appropriate means  to  generate 
the needed  revenues  (which  may  or may  not involve  the  use  of VAT.) 
This  structure of administering the  VAT  can obviously blunt 
somewhat  its effectiveness as a  countercyclical policy tool, although 
it doesn't entirely nullify its effects.  Consider,  for example,  the 
case where  the central fiscal authority raises the  VAT  rate  to offset 
excessive inflationary pressures in the Community.  Under  the 
existing plan,  this would  generate  increased tax bills from  the 
center to each of the  member  states.  The  national authorities, in 
turn,  could respond either by raising additional tax revenues 
(~erhaps, but not necessarily,  by  increases in their own  VAT  rates), 
or by  borrowing the  needed  funds  through  the  sale of government 
securities.  In the first instance,  higher taxes would  serve  to 
dampen  spending somewhat  ;  in the  second,  the additional pressures 
in credit markets would  tend to push  up  interest rates and  thereby 
discourage  private expenditure.  In either case,  there are 
deflationary effects associated with  the rise in the central VAT 
rate.  However,  the effects operate  through somewhat different 
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The  potential of VAT  as an instrument for central stabilization 
policy is clearly greatest when  adjustments in the rate directly 
affect retail prices.  For this reason, it would  be  most desirable 
to administer  the  tax in such a  way  as to achieve  this result. 
The  first-best solution, it seems  to me,  would  be  to reform the 
method  of administration so  that the central VAT  was  effectively 
a  tax on all persons in the European Community,  rather than a  levy 
on member  governments.  This would  imply that the  VAT  in each member 
state would  be  composed  of two  parts  :  the national rate and  the 
central rate, with  the  portion of revenues attributable to  the 
latter going directly to the central government.  In this case, 
adjustments in rates by  the central government would  result in 
corresponding changes in the rates in member  countries, except in 
cases where  the national government  took explicit action to nullify 
the adjustment in the central rate by  an offsetting change  in the 
national :rate. 
If such  reform is not feasible,  a  second-best solution would  be 
an agreement among  member  states to  pass along adjustments in the 
central VAT  rate  to their individual rates.  There  would  thus be 
a  presumption,  for example,  that, if the central fiscal authority 
raised the central VAT  rate by  one  percentage  point,  member 
countries would  respond  by  passing this along in the  form  of a  one 
percentage  point increase in their own  VAT  rates.  The  difficulty 
with this second approach is that explicit affirmative action is 
required on  the  part of each member  state to validate the  policy 
of the central authority,  under  the "first-best" technique, 
explicit action is necessary to offset this policy. 
6.  In concluding Part I, I  want  to  stress that the  preoccupation with 
fiscal policy is not a  matter of preference,  but rather a  reflection 
of the  circumstances in Europe,  which  make  monetary unification in 
the  near term  appear unlikely. It is clear that the  use  solely 
of fiscal measures is distinctly inferior to a  balanced and 
coordinated application of both fiscal and  monetary policy.  This 
cannot be  overemphasized,  and  hence  the  conclusion of this paper 
should again underline  the  importance of the issue of monetary 
integration. 
In the absence  of such integration,  however,  there remains  the 
matter of the response of the national monetary authorities to 
central fiscal measures.  One  would  hope  that the central fiscal 
authority could obtain a  certain degree of cooperation from  the 
various central banks  so  as to reinforce its countercyclical 
policies.  As  an example,  suppose  that the central fiscal officials 
instituted a  cut in VAT  rates to  stimulate a  depressed Community 
economy  and  that this tax cut required deficit finance.  The  fiscal 
authority would  have .to enter Community  financial markets  to sell 
securities to fund  the deficit.  However,  this would  tend  to put 
upward  pressure  on  interest rates and  to  crowd  out a  certain amount 
of private expenditure,  thereby_offsetting some  of the  expansionary 
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at least some  part of the  securities to  member  central banks, it 
could effectively generate a  supporting monetary expansion that 
would  ease  the upward  pressures on  rates of interest.  In this way, 
some  degree  of coordination between fiscal and  monetary  policy 
might  be  achieved  even in the absence of monetary union. 
Finally,  I  want  to point out that this paper has been  premised on 
the more  traditional view  of stabilization policy  :  that it is 
primarily a  matter of regulating aggregate demand.  I  think that 
we  are coming  to  the  position that this is a  much  too narrow 
perspective on  countercyclical activities.(l) However,  the 
regulation of total demand  will surely remain an important dimension 
of the  problem and,  in this sense,  the discussion here  can be 
viewed  as addressing one  element of a  Community  stabilization 
policy (2). 
(1)  See,  for example,  William Fellner,  "Theoretical Formulations of the 
Failure of Demand-Management  Policies  :  An  H:ssay,  "  Journal of 
Economic  Literature ,  14  ( t1arch  1976) ,  pp.  J4-53  ;  and  Assar Lind  beck, 
"Stabilization Policy in Open  Economies  with Endogenous  Politicians," 
American  ~conomic Review  (May,  1976),  PP•  1- 19. 
(2)  I  might  note here  that I  have  placed  primary emphasis on  tax, rather 
than expenditure,  policy for a  couple of reasons.  First is the matter 
to start up  and  shut off spending programs  in response  to  business 
conditions  ;  the  time  lags inherent in.the activation and de-activation 
of most  expenditure  projects makes  their value as countercyclical 
programs  dubious. at best.  My  own  judgement is that decisions on  public 
spending should  be  made  on  grounds of their desirability in allocative 
terms with little consideration to  short-run stabilization objectives. 
My  second  concern relates to the  ~uropean situation. It is not clear 
at this point that the direct expenditure role of the upper-tier 
government will (or should  be)  a  large one.  I  should  be  very hesitant 
to  see a  substantial and  additional absorption of resources  by  the 
public  sector on  the  grounds  that this is required for central 
stabilization policy.  I  should much  prefer to  see  such policies operate 
through  changes in taxes which  would  not themselves necessitate  the 
transfer of real resources  to  the central government. - 295-
II.  Public Policy for the  Redistribution of Income  and  Wealth 
As  in Part I, I  shall begin with a  summary  of the  fiscal federalism 
literature on  the redistribution function.  The  later sections of 
Part II then explore  this issue in terms of the  emerging 
intergovernmental structure in Europe.  As  in the  case of stabilization 
policy,  there are  some  fundamental differences between  the federal 
model  and  the European institutional setting that, at the least, make 
any direct and  simplistic translation of federal  principles into 
European  policy highly tenuous.  However,  an explicit consideration 
of these differences does,  I  think,  provide  some  insights into  the 
character of the redistribution problem in Europe. 
1.  At  the outset, it is important to note  three,  often implicit, assumptions 
in discussions of the  economics of redistributive policies in federal 
systems.  First,  such analyses typically cast the  "federal model"  in 
terms of a  static structure with a  certain geographical integrity. 
By  this I  do  not mean  that the  literature takes all jurisdictional 
boundaries as predetermined variables  ;  in fact,  the determination 
of the  optimal-size  jurisdiction to  provide a  particular service is 
a  central problem of the analysis.  What  is taken as given is the 
geographical totality of the  federation.  Moreover,  the analysis of 
jurisdictional structure is not put into any kind of dynamic, 
evolutionary framework  ;  it proceeds as if the  federal system had 
always existed.  In short,  the  fiscal-federalism literature does not 
address  the  problems  inherent in the  formation and  the  sustaining 
of the  federal  polity.  There  is no  threat,  for example,  of the 
seccession of a  particular state or region in response  to an unpopular 
policy.  (1)  This, as I  will suggest later, is an important omission 
for purposes of understanding the redistribution problem in the 
emerging European Community. 
Second,  this literature assumes  that the  central government has,  in 
principle,  the  power  of direct taxation of the individual citizens. 
It can,  for example,  levy taxes on  the  incomes of every person in the 
federation.  This contrasts sharply with a  "confederal model"  in which 
the  central government  submits tax bills to  the  individual states 
rather than to  the citizens themselves.  This is of obvious relevance 
to  the European  system  under which  existing plans will have  the  upper-
tier government  use  the  base  of the value-added  tax simply to apportion 
its marginal  revenue  requirements  among  the member  states. 
Third,  the federal model  is premised  on  a  high degree of mobility 
of individual households among  jurisdictions. If a  particular individual 
is dissatisfied with the provision of local services and  the associated  ------
(1)  In contrast to  the economics  literature, political scientists have 
devoted considerable attention to  problems of the stability of 
federal systems.  See,  for example,  R.J.  May,  Federalism and  Fiscal 
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level of local taxation,  he  can always  seek out another community 
with a  fiscal package  better suited to his tastes.  This mobility 
assumption figures critically in discussions of redistributive policies. 
Within this analytical framework,  a  central tenet of the  literature is 
that the central government must  assume  the  primary responsibility for 
the redistribution function.  (1)  The  problem is that the mobility 
of individual economic  units establishes fairly narrow bounds  on  the 
capacity for "local" income  redistribution.  An  aggressive policy 
for example,  to redistribute income  from rich to  poor in a  particular 
locality may,  in the end,  simply chase  the relatively wealthy to 
other jurisdictions and attract those  with  low  incomes.  The  outcome 
may  well be  a  community  homogeneous  in poor residents  (an unappealing 
prospect to most  local officials). 
Note  that this argument  for  the centralization of redistributive 
programs does  not depend  upon  any notion of a  superior set of values 
or a  more  egalitarian propensity on  the  part of the  upper-tier level 
of government.  Rather, it stems  simply from  a  behavioral constraint on 
local policies.  The  ability to redistribute income  to a  significant 
extent is typically dependent on  substantial impediments  to mobility, 
which  may  be  non-existent in a  federal system.  There is, moreover, 
considerable  evidence  that points to a  growing predominance  of central 
governments  in the area of redistributive policies.  vlhile  there have 
obviously been a  number  of factors which have  encouraged this 
tendency, it is also  the  case  that improved  transportation and 
communications have,  in recent decades,  enhanced  the mobility of 
households in the  industrialized nations with a  consequent tightening 
of the constraints on  local capacities for income  redistribution. 
At  any rate,  studies of the incidence of public budgets seem  to indicate 
that, in general,  the  tax-expenditure  packages of central governments 
have  much  more  pronounced  income-equalizing effects than those at 
decentralized levels  (2). 
In addition·to the level of government best  suited~ pursue  society's 
redistributional objectives,  there is the.matter of the appropriate 
fiscal instruments.  To  the  extent that the equitable distribution of 
income  is defined over individuals,  the  necessary redistribution of 
income  and  wealth is best accomplished  by  central-government taxation 
and  transfers directly to individuals,  not indirectly by 
intergovernmental grants.  The  problem is that such  grants are  transfers 
from  one~  of people  to another.  If, for example,  the central 
government attempts to redistribute income  from  rich to  poor by 
(1)  ~1ark Pauly has argued that there  may  be  a  modest role for local 
redistributive policies,  See  his "Income  Redistribution as a  l...Ocal 
Public Good,"  Journal of Public Economics,  2(197J),  pp.  J5-~ 
(2)  See  Oates, Fiscal Federalism  (New  York  :  Harcourt Brace  Jovanovich 1972), 
Chapter 5  ;  and  Werner  Pommerehne,  "Quantitative Aspects of Federalism 
A Study of Six Countries," in w.  Oates  (ed.),  The  Political Econom~ of 
Fiscal Federalism  (Lexington,  Mass.  :  Heath-Lexington,  forthcoming  • - 297-
transferringfundsto the  governments  of poorer  jurisdictions, it 
is bound  to find itself engaging in some  perverse  transfers,  because 
there will,  no  doubt,  be at least a  few  low-income  individuals in the 
wealthy locality and  some  high-income  persons in the  poorer 
jurisdiction. Equalizing intergovernmental grants are not an adequate 
substitute for a  federation-wide  negative  income  tax. 
There  are, however,  other justifications both on equity and  efficiency 
grounds  for central-government programs  to even out the fiscal capacity 
of decentralized jurisdictions.  One  is an extension of the principle 
of horizontal equity to a  federal  system.  '!he  maxim  that "people 
in equal positions should be  treated equally" is one  of the  traditional 
canons  of equitable  taxation.  However,  James  Buchanan  pointed out some 
years ago  that decentralized finance is likely to violate this 
principle  (1).  since  the  size of the  tax base  per capita will vary 
from  one  jurisdiction to the next, it follows  that different tax rates 
will be  required to raise the  same  amount  of revenue  per head.  A 
resident of a  locality with a  relatively large  tax base will thus 
face  a  lower  tax rate and  have  a  lower  tax bill than his counterpart 
in a  district with a  smaller tax base.  Buchanan  concluded  that the 
central government  could introduce either a  geographically 
discriminating income  tax or,  preferably,  a  set of unconditional 
grants to local governments  to restore  the  equal treatment of equals. 
There  is one  important assumption implicit in all this  :  the absence 
of significant consumer  mobility.  If we  pose  this problem  in terms of 
the mobility model,  we  find that it resolves itself.  Suppose,  for 
example,  that one  jurisdiction possesses a  notable fiscal advantage 
over  the  others  ;  this could  take  the form  of a  relatively large 
tax base,  or, alternatively,  superior efficiency in the  provision of 
a  public output  (such as the  lower cost of maintaining' clean air 
in a  town  located on a  hill.) In an environment of mobile  individuals, 
the value of such differences will be  capitalized into local property 
values.  Consumers  will bid for places in the fiscally advantaged 
community  until the increased price of property exactly offsets the 
fiscal gain.  f'lobili ty thus ensures that equals will be  treated 
equally,  for whatever fiscal advantages are  enjoyed will be  paid for 
in the  form  of a  higher actual (or imputed)  rent.  In the mobility model, 
horizontal equity is self-policing. 
If we  examine  the actual functioning of intergovernmental fiscal 
systems,  we  find  that in addition to equalizing fiscal capacity,  a 
second  objective is frequently cited as a  justification for programs 
of equalizing bloc grants to  subcentral governments  :  the  provision 
of certain minimally acceptable  levels of public outputs in all 
jurisdictions.  The  economic  rationalization for this objective is 
not wholly clear ;  it seems  to draw  to  some  extent on  both efficiency 
(1)  "Federalism and  Fiscal .il:quity,"  American Economic  Review,  40  (19.50), 
pp.  JSJ-599. - 298-
and  equity arguments.  On  the  efficiency side,  one  can argue  that many 
of these  services have  substantial spillover effects ;  it is in my 
interest, for example,  that all residents of the country attain a  basic 
proficiency in reading and  writing.  Moreover,  guaranteed  service levels 
can have  an "option value" in that I  may  find it desirable at some 
future date  to reside in another community  (although  the force  of this 
argument is blunted if there exists a  wide  choice among  local 
jurisdictions). 
In terms of equity,  the  basic notion seems  to be  that everyone  should 
be  assured a  certain minimum  level of public  services  ;  to deprive  an 
individual of adequate  schooling opportunities or safety is to do  him 
an injustice.  This is typically interpreted to mean,  not that all 
localities should provide identical levels of services,  but rather 
that each must  meet at least a  certain prescribed minimum. 
While  a  society may  deem  such  minimum  service levels an explicit 
objective of economic  and  social policy,  the curious part is that in 
many  countries, this objective has been pursued  through  the use  of 
essentially lump-sum  grants.  Such  grants may  serve  to  equalize  the 
fiscal capacity to  provide  such  services,  but they certainly do  not 
ensure  the attainment of the  minimum  level of public outputs.  This 
requires further  measures  prescribing standards with which  the 
localities must  comply.  Here  we  find a  basic source of tension in a 
federal system between economic  efficiency on  the  one  hand  and  equity 
considerations on  the other:  efficiency points in the direction of 
a  wide  scope  for decentralized choice in the  public sector, while 
the desire to  guarantee  "adequate"  service levels in all jurisdictions 
motivates centrally imposed  constraints on  local fiscal behavior. 
In concluding this summary  of the fiscal-federalism literature on  the 
distribution function,  I  want  to return briefly to  the critical role 
of the  mobility assumption,  for this is obviously of questionable 
validity in the European context.  In particular, recall, first, that 
the case for centralization of income  redistribution rests on  this 
premise.  Second,  the  self-policing of horizontal equity in a  federal 
system  likewise depends  on  a  substantial degree  of mobility of 
households.  In the absence of such mobility,  unequal  treatment of 
equals may  persist.  In fact, if one  examines  the  motivation for 
intergovernmental grants in many  countries  the constitutional or 
legislative authorization for these  programs  typically carries some 
reference  to assistance which  permits all jurisdictions to  provide 
an adequate  level of services with an effort not appreciably different 
from  the others.  As  Russell Mathews  described it in his paper for this 
group,  "Fiscal equalization is intended to make  it possible  ••• 
for governments  •••  to  provide a  standard range  and quality of  ••• 
services for their citizens while  maintaining comparable  fiscal 
effects ••• "  (1) 
(1)  See  Chapter  13. - 299-
2.  The  existing structure of the European Community  does not appear 
to fit the  federal model  very well on  several counts.  First, a 
central fact of the European  system is its evolving character 
in contrast to  the more  static perspective inherent in the fiscal-
federalism literature.  This has some  particularly important 
implications for redistributive activities at the upper-tier level. 
The  process of economic  integration,  while it may  well confer net 
gains in the  aggregate,  does not necessarily raise  the  economic 
welfare of all members. 
The  changing patterns of production and  exchange  in response  to 
the  trade creation and diversion that characterize an integrating 
community  typically bring gains  to  some  but losses to others.  To 
make  integration acceptable  to all participants may  thus require 
an explicit redistributive mechanism  to divide  the  gains from 
integration in a  politically acceptable way.  The  failure  to  attsnd to 
this matter may  obviously result in sessission and  the dissolution 
of the federation. 
During this formative  stage intheevolution of a  federal  system,  the 
central government will typically have  to engage  in redistributive 
policies to allocate both  the gains and  costs of economic  integration 
among  the  participants.(l) This need  not,  incidentally,  involve  the 
use  solely of taxation and  transfer payments.  Expenditure  programs 
or even various regulatory activities may  provide  the  most  expedient 
vehicle for obtaining consensus among  the  members.  !1ore  on  this later. 
Second,  unlike  the  federal model,  the central government in the 
European Community  will not,  on  the  basis of existing plans for  the 
medium  term,  possess major  tax instruments that reach directly to  the 
the individual economic  units in the  system.  The  central budget will, 
instead,  be  financed  from  levies on  the  member  states.  This rules 
out the  preferred fiscal program  for the redistribution of income  in 
a  federal  system  :  a  negative  income  tax at the  upper-tier level. 
The  European  intergovernmental fiscal structure will be  more 
"confederal" in spirit, at least in its earlier years.  This suggests 
that redistributive activities to generate a  more  egalitarian 
distribution of income  (to the  extent that they operate  through 
conventional taxes and  transfer payments)  will have  to rely more  on 
intergovernmental grants to poorer member  states financed  from 
revenues generated largely from  wealthier members.  Redistribution 
by  explicit  tax and  transfer programs  (if it exists at all) will 
tend  to  take  the  form  of net transfers between  member  states with  the 
states themselves then intervening to determine  the final impacts 
on  individual economic  units. 
(1)  This  type  of activity may  extend well beyond  the  formative  stage as 
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Third,  the high degree  of mobility that serves to frustrate 
redistributive  programs  at decentralized levels in a  federal 
system is surely less of a  constraint in the European context.  The 
mobility of economic  units between  the  member  countries in the 
European Community  is obviously much  less than that among  localities 
within a  single nation.  Important cultural and  linguistic differences 
(among  others)  impede  the movement  of households in response  to 
fiscal differentials.  This is not to say that such mobility is 
totally absent,  but it is probably not so  pervasive a  phenomenon 
as  to place  serious limitations on  redistributive  programs  within 
the member  countries.  This implies that, within the  European  system, 
there remains  plenty of scope  for independent redistributive objectives 
and  programs at the  level of the  individual member  state. 
The  situation in Europe  at present is thus quite different in 
certain  essentials from  that envisioned in the federal model  of the 
economic  literature.  In particular,  these differences suggest that  : 
(1)  The  redistributive role of the  central government  must  encompass 
the allocation of the  gains and  costs from  economic  integration 
with particular attention to  the compensation for losses that could 
otherwise  threaten the political stability and  integrity of the 
European Community. 
(2)  The  central government will have  only a  very limited capacity 
(at least over the  medium  term)  to redistribute income  directly 
through  tax and  transfer programs  from  hieher-income  to  poorer 
economic  units. 
(J)  JV:ember  states, unlike  subcentral units in many  federal countries, 
will have  the  capability to effect substantial redistribution of 
income  among  individuals,  should  these  states desire  to do  so. 
J.  In the  concluding section,  I  want  to explore a  bit further some  of 
the implications of these  propositions for redistributive policies in 
the European Community.  At  the outset,  however,  it is important to 
stress that economic  analysis cannot dictate what  the general structure 
and  objectives of redistribution in Europe  should  be.  There,  in fact, 
exists a  broad  range  of alternative intergovernmental organizations 
for redistribution purposes.  At  one  end  of the  spectrum is the 
"confederal" model  under which  the  primary role for effecting income 
redistribution among  individual economic  units rests with  the  member 
states.  From  this perspective,  the  redistributive function of the 
upper-tier level of government  (if any)  is mainly that of some 
intergovernmental grants perhaps  supplemented  by  certain federation-
wide  policies (e.g.  for economic  development)  that have  some  indirect 
effects on  the distribution of income.  At  the  opposite pole is a 
tightly knit federal organization under which  the  central government 
assumes  the  primary responsibility for the redistribution function. 
There  are, of course,  a  wide  range  of intermediate possibilities 
representing to a  greater or lesser degree  a  sharing of redistributive 
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The  point,  however,  is that it is up  to  the  people of Europe, 
through their elected representatives,  to determine  the  nature of 
European  integration. It can take  the  form  of a  loose organization of 
member  states with explicit redistributive policies among  individuals 
left to  the  states themselves;  alternatively, a  greater thrust toward 
unification can give rise to a  more  pervasive role for the  central 
government  in which  tax and  transfer instruments could  be  employed at 
the upper-tier level to achieve  the desired distribution of income 
defined over the  Community  as a  whole.  All this, however,  is a  matter 
of the objectives of integration,  not of economic  principles. 
The  discussion in the earlier sections of Part II seems  to  suggest 
that, for  the  short term at least,  the  confederal model  provides the 
better approximation to European goals and  fiscal structure. It does 
not appear,  for example,  that the central government will have 
access to  the direct taxation of economic  units  (although this could 
certainly change). 
In this spirit, the central government will have  to design 
redistributive policies in the context of an emerging and,  as yet, 
politically unsettled union,  which  means  allocating the  benefits 
and  costs of integration in such  a  way  as to satisfy the  member 
states and ,preserve  the existence of the  community.  This can,  in some 
instances,  take  the  form  simply of direct payments  to  those  who 
suffer losses as the result of economic  union.  In fact,  economic 
analysis would  in general support compensation in the form  of direct 
payments  rather than alternative devices such as price  supports which 
typically introduce allocative inefficiencies.  The  gains and  costs 
of integration must  be  shared in an equitable and  politically 
acceptable way,  and  direct transfers among  member  states operating 
through  the central budget is an appealing method  (on economic  grounds 
at least) for setting up  these claims. 
Although  the  tendencies at this juncture may  be  more  in the direction 
of the confederal model,  this certainly doesn't rule out all Community 
policies with  some  redistributive objectives.  The  Commission,  for 
example,  has  expressed interest in the harmonization of social-security 
policies among  member  states and  has already made  a  proposal  to 
extend social-security schemes  to  persons not at present covered. 
Horeover,  a  number  of programs with  important allocative  purposes also 
have  redistributive dimensions.  The  European Regional Development 
Fund  seeks  to assist investment to encourage  the economic  development 
of lagging regions.  One  of the  basic criteria for the allocation of 
these  funds is need,  which  implies that aid should go  to  the  poorer 
areas.  As  another-illustration,  the  efforts under the  ~uropean Social 
Fund  to encourage  vocational training and  enhance  the mobility of 
workers have  obvious redistributive, as well as allocative,  impacts. 
Hhile  we  may,  for analytical purposes,  distinguish between  the allocative, 
distributive and  stabilizing functions of the  public sector,  this 
senaration of objectives is much  less tenable when  we  examine  actual 
:policies. - 302-
The  central government has and  will,  no  doubt,  engage  in a  wide 
variety of programs with  some  redistributive objectives and  impacts. 
However,  I  find it hard at this  juncture  to envision a  major central 
role over the  medium  term in the redistribution of income  among 
individual economic  units in the Community.  The  member  states have 
the capacity to establish their own  redistributive goals and  to 
design and institute the policies to achieve  them.  This Hill probably 
account for the lion's share of redistributive activities in Europe 
over the  next couple  of decades.  Over  the  lone;er  run  ,  it is 
obviously much  harQer  to  say;  here it depends  on  the  extent of and 
the  commitment  to,  unification of econ01aic  and  social policies in 
:!<~urope. 
Should  the decision be  made  to  press for an  enlarged role for central 
redistributive programs,  there are  two  directions  (as noted earlier) 
that these efforts may  take.  The  first, in the  confederal spirit, 
would  be  the introduction of a  system of equalizing intergovernmental 
grants under which  the upper-tier would  seek to reduce  the differentials 
in the fiscal capacity and  performance of the  governments across 
Euro~e.  The  second  approach,  following  the federal model,  would 
require  the acquisition of a  set of fiscal instruments with which  to 
effect direct transfers from  wealthier economic  units in Europe  to 
poorer ones.  This would  require  the imposition by  the  center of 
wealth or income  taxes directly on  individuals accompanied  by  a 
standardized schedule  of payments  to  poorer households  throughout the 
Community.  The  latter seems  quite ambitious in view  of the existing 
degree of integration of social and  economic  policies, but over time 
changing conditions and attitudes could render it a  politically viable 
alternative. - 303-
III,  On  the  Use  of Intergovernmental Grants 
The  purpose  of Part III is to explore  the various rationales for 
intergovernmental grants and  to try to determine  the appropriate 
form  of grant for each  purpose.  I  shall begin in section one  with 
a  treatment of the  theory of intergovernmental grants.  Economic 
theory does  suggest certain important roles for grants from  one 
level of government  to another  ;  moreover, it has very specific 
implications for the form  these grants should  take.  The  theory can 
take us  some  distance in understanding the actual use  of 
intergovernmental grants in federal and  nonfederal countries,  but 
there remain  some  striking anomalies that suggest either some 
inadequacies of the  theory or some  rather misguided  choices of 
policy instruments.  Sections two  and  three deal with these matters 
the former  exam1nes  the  range of justifications for these grants 
in different countries, while  the latter explores one  particular, 
and  rather curious,  forms  of grant  :  the variable-matching grant. 
The  concluding section looks at the  possible uses of intergovernmental 
grants in the  emerging European  community. 
1.  The  taxonomy  of grants distinguishes between  two  basic classes of 
grants  :  conditional and  unconditional.  As  the  term indicates, 
conditional grants require  some  specified response  on  the  part of the 
recipient.  Unconditional  (  or lump-sum  )  grants come  with no  strings 
attached  ;  more  formally,  they are grants whose  size is in no  way 
dependent on  a  particular response  from  the grantee.  Within  these 
two  broad classes of grants,  there are further distinctions of 
some  importance.  In particular, conditional grants may  be  of a  fixed 
sum  (e.g.,  bloc grants for certain broadly defined purposes)  or, 
alternatively, of the matching variety.  Each  of these forms  of grants 
obviously has different implications for the  budgetary behavior of 
recipients, and  it remains  to see how  they can be  employed  to realize 
the  policy objectives of the  public sector. 
Economic  theory suggests three basic roles for intergovernmental 
grants,  and  I  want  to examine  them  in turn.  In each case, it is 
important to specify the  particular malfunction or other problem in 
the  economic  system  that requires repair and  then to determine 
the grant instrument appropriate  to  the task. 
1.1.  Inter.jurisdictional spillover effects in the provision of public 
services. 
A basic case for the  use of intergovernmental grants may  exist where 
the  ~revision of services in one  jurisdiction confers spillover 
benefits on  residents of other areas.  This is simply an extension 
of the  Pigouvian prescription to an intergovernmental setting.  (1) 
(1)  A.C.  Pigou,  The  Bconomics  of Welfare,  4th ed.  (London  :  Macmillan, 
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As  Pigou argued,  in the  case where  an activity of an individual 
decision- maker  (for example,  his level of consumption of a 
particular commodity)  influences the  welfare  of other persons outside 
the  scope of the  market system,  there exists the  presumption that the 
individual,  ignoring the  spillover benefits or costs he  generates, 
will engage  in inefficient levels of the activity.  Pigou's 
prescription for curing this malady is that, in the case of external 
benefits,  the  economic  unit generating the  spillover should receive 
a  unit subsidy equal to the  value at the  margin of the spillover 
benefits it creates.  In this way  the decision-maker will have  an 
incentive  to  take  into account the  external effects of his behavior.(l) 
To  prevent any misunderstandings from  diverse  terminology, it should be 
noted here  that Pigouvian unit subsidies are equivalent to matching 
grants.  If, for example,  the  cost per unit of the  good  is one  hundred 
dollars and  the spillover benefits per unit of output are worth forty 
dollars,  the efficient subsidy to  the  economic  unit consuming  the  good 
is forty dollars per unit  ;  this implies that the  effective unit cost 
of the  good  to the  grant recipient will be  sixty dollars.  Note  that 
this subsidy is -precisely equivalent to an open-end matching grant in 
which  the contributions of the grantor and  the  recipient are  two-fifths 
and  three-fifths, respectively, or, in other words,  to a  grant program 
with a  forty-sixty matching formula.  (2) 
(1)  One  important qualification to  the Pigouvian solution has its source 
in the work  of Ronald  Coase.He  points out that,  under certain 
circumstances,  voluntary collective action can  remove  the inefficiencies 
normally associated with external effects.  In particular,  the  existence 
of externalities implies  the  presence of potential gains-from-trade, 
and  these gains provide  an incentive for mutually advantageous 
agreements  to reach a  state of Pareto efficiency.  If the activity of one 
economic  unit confers benefits at the  margin on  another, it is in the 
latter's interest to encourage  (perhaps  by  a  formal  contract involving 
payment)  an increase in the  level of  the activity by  the  generator of 
the externality.  Coase  demonstrates  that, in.the absence of decision-
making costs and strategic behavior,  maximizing  behavior will lead to 
joint action to establish an efficient allocation of resources.  The 
implication of the Coase  analysis is that, where  negotiations among  the 
affected parties are likely,  the  government may  do  better to  encourage 
joint  ~lanning and  decisionmaking  than to  provide  incentives in the  form 
of grants to  the individuals themselves.  See  Coase,  "The  Problem of 
Social Cost," Journal of Law  and  B~conomics, vol.  J  (Oct.,  1960),  pp. 
l  - 44. 
(2)  If marginal cost is not constant,  as assumed  in this example,  a  given 
unit subsidy is clearly no  longer equivalent to a  uniform matching-
grant program;  maintaining this equivalence would  then necessitate 
a  variable matching formula,  one  in which  the  shares of the  grantor 
and recipient varied with  the  level of the  subsidized activity. (1) 
(2) 
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While  the  Pigouvian theory of unit subsidies and  taxes is typically 
treated in terms of the  behavior of individual consumers  or producers, 
it can easily be  extended in principle  to  the  case  where  public 
economic  activity in one  jurisdiction generates spillover benefits 
or costs for residents of other localities.  Assuming  that the  "local" 
government  extends  the  provision of the  good  to  the  point where  the 
sum  of these  marginal benefits equals  the marginal cost to  the  local 
treasury,  a  Pigouvian subsidy equal  to  the value  of the spillover 
benefits conferred at the  margin  on  outsiders will induce  the  locality 
to  provide  the efficient level of output.  (1) 
While  this extension of Pigouvian prescriptions  to  intergovernmental 
grants is, in principle,  perfectly legitimate,  there are  reasons  to 
be  more  uneasy about the  likely efficacy of such  subsidies in the  case 
where  the recipients are  government  units rather than individual private 
units,  for the analysis assumes first that local governments  know  the 
preferences of the  individuals who  make  up  their constituencies,  and 
second that these  governments act to maximize  the  economic  1-relfare 
of their respective residents.  These  are,  however,  somewhat  tenuous 
assumptions.  In the first place, while  the  private  sector can register 
the  preferences of consumers directly in their buying and  selling 
of goods  and  services,  governments  must  seek other means,  such as voting 
systems,to determine  the  preferences of their constituents.  These 
mechanisms  typically exhibit certain imperfections  ;  for example, 
incentives for strategic behavior may  lead individuals to misrepresent 
their true tastes, or perhaps not even  to vote at all.  (2)  ~'loreover, 
even if all preferences are  known  with  perfect accuracy,  the  government 
may  well seek to achieve  objectives other than the  maximization of 
the welfare of its constituency.  Anthony  Downs,  for example,  has 
explored  the implications of government behavior directed toward  the 
objective of maximizing  the  number  of votes received at the  polls and 
has  shown  that it will typically result in some  misallocation of 
resources.  (3) 
This suggests that intergovernmental grants may  not lead recipients to 
provide precisely the appropriate  level of output.  However,  my  own 
feeling is that a  strong case for  such  grants remains.  \1here 
interjurisdictional cooperation is absent,  we  can expect decentralized 
provision of public  goods  to reflect primarily local preferences with 
little consideration given to  any existing external effects. And  there 
I  use  the  term "local" in this paper  to refer generally to 
decentralized levels of government  ;  it also encompasses  state 
governments,  provincial governments,  etc. 
See,  for example,  Richard Musgrave,  The  Theory of Public Finance 
(New  York  :  Me  Graw-Hill,  1959),  chs.  4 and 6 
(J)  An  Economic  Theory of Democracy  (New  York  :  Harper  Row,  1957). - 306-
exists a  strong presumption that the failure  to  consider,  for example, 
significant external benefits will result in distorted patterns of 
resource  use  involving less than efficient levels of the  good.  There 
is,  therefore,  good  reason in such instances to adopt programs  that 
provide  incentives for expanded  levels of activity  ;  intergovernmental 
grants represent a  policy tool capable of creating just such  incentives 
There are admittedly real obstacles to determining the.precise set of 
grants necessary to  induce efficient behavior,  but there is at least 
a  presumption that the effects of such  programs  are in  the  proper 
direction. 
The  presence  of external effects thus consitutes one  rationale for 
intergovernmental grants.  Note,  moreover,  that it has a  very specific 
implication for the appropriate grant instrument  :  open-ended matching 
grants to  those  jurisdictions that generate  the  spillover benefits.(l) 
1.2.  Equalization of fiscal capacity 
A second  justification for intergovernmental grants has its source in 
equity considerations.  Nany  countries rely,  to a  greater or lesser 
extent,  on  "  equalizing" grants to  compensate  for perceived 
geographical inequities.  The  basic objective of these grants is to 
permit all jurisdictions to  provide a  satisfactory level of key 
public  services with a  "fiscal effort" that does not vary 
discernibly among  areas.  To  this end,  these  grants typically 
incorporate variables to reflect "need"  and  "fiscal capacity" in an 
attempt to reduce  the differences among  jurisdictions in their 
ability to  provide acceptable  levels of public outputs. 
Russel Hatthews  has already provided an excellent study of fiscal 
equalization so  that it is unnecessary to  pursue  this issue in depth 
here  (2).  However,  it is important  to stress the  grant instrument 
appropriate  to fiscal equalization  :  unconditional  (lump-sum)  grants 
As  Matthews  stresses, fiscal equalization implies grants to 
jurisdictions that vary with  need  and  fiscal capacity,  but are 
invariant to  the fiscal response  of the recipient.  Our  second 
rationale for intergovernmental grants  thus establishes a  role for 
unconditional grants. 
l,J.  Revenue  Sharing 
The  case for revenue-sharing grants to decentralized levels of 
government  stems  largely from  imperfections in tax instruments at 
"local" levels.  The  problems of the efficiency and  incidence of a 
tax are typically a  good  deal more  complicated at the  local,  than 
(1)  Note  the  stipulation that these  grants  be  open-ended.  Closed-end grants 
may  amount  to little more  than unconditional grants with only income, 
and  no  price effects. 
(2)  See  Chapter  13. - 307-
at the central,  level because of the effects of the tax on  the 
interjurisdictional flows of commodities and  factors of production. 
Horeover,  these flows  impose  certain types of constraints on  local 
taxation that may  not exist for  the  central government. 
I  have  stressed in Part II the inability of a  local government  to 
employ  strongly redistributive tax measures  because  of the 
resulting outmigration of the heavily taxed individuals.  To  the 
extent that we  desire significantly progressive  taxation,  we  must 
look primarily to  the central government.  Moreover,  local governments 
may,  with a  little ingenuity,  be  able  to shift a  substantial portion 
of their tax burdens  onto residents of other jurisdictions.  The 
taxation of certain locally produced  goods  may,  for example,  be 
largely borne  in the  form  of higher prices paid by outsiders. 
One  particular favorite is the heavy  taxation of tourists with 
excise  taxes on  hotel and  restaurant bills and  on  other services to 
finance  a  major portion of the  local budget.  This  "exporting" of 
local taxes appears not to  be  a  trivial  phenomenon  :  Charles 
McLure  has estimated that,  in the  United States,  approximately 20  to 
25  percent of state taxes are shifted onto  the residents of other 
states.  (l) 
In addition to  these issues of incidence,  local taxation has a 
relatively high potential for the distortion of patterns of resource 
use.  'The  supply of capital, for example,  may  be  quite price inelastic 
for the country as a  whole  so  that centraltax:ationof capital will 
involve only minor deadweight losses.  In contrast,  the  supply of 
capital to a  single local  jurisdiction is likely to  be  highly 
elastic  ;  the  same  tax at the  local level will divert units of 
capital elsewhere where  they have  a  lower marginal product.  Another 
interesting example  involves heavy reliance on  local sales taxes. 
To  the extent that one  jurisdiction pushes its tax rate above  that 
of neighboring localities, it creates an incentive for consumers  to 
waste  the additional time  and  resources  to travel elsewhere  to 
purchase  items available  locally.  There  is, in fact,  some  evidence 
for the  United states suggesting that everi:relatively small 
differentials in local sales tax rates have  had  noticeable effects on 
the  geographical purchasing patterns of consumers.(2) 
(1)  "The  Interstate ,::".:xporting  of State and  Local Taxes  :  J£stimates for 1962," 
National Tax  Journal,  23  (1970),  pp.  206-13. 
(2) In a  study of sales taxation in New  York  City, Hilliam Hamovitch 
estimated that increases in the city's sales tax rate of one  percentage 
point had  led,  on  past occasions,  to declines of about 6  percent in 
taxable  sales.  Likewise,  a  cross-sectional econometric  study of 173  u.s. 
metropolitan areas by  John  Nikesell revealed that an increase of one 
percentage  point in the differential between city and  suburban  sales 
taxes is associated,  on  average,  with approximately a  7 percent 
reduction in retail sales in the  central city.  See  Hamovitch,  "Effects 
of Increases in Sales Tax  Rates on  Taxable  Sales in New  York  City," 
in Research Report of the  Graduate  School in Public Administration, 
New  York  University,  Financing Government  in New  York  City  (New  York 
New  York  University,  1966),  PP•  619-33;  and Mikesell,  "Central Cities 
and  Sales  Tax Differentials  :  The  Border City Problem," National  Tax 
Journal  (1970),  PP•  206-13 - 308-
What  all this suggests is that the design of an efficient and 
equitable  system of local taxation is an extremely demanding 
task.  In  ~rticular, we  may  expect  the  usual sorts of income  and 
commodity  taxes to generate greater deadweight losses per unit of 
revenues at the  local,  than the central,  level and,  in addition, 
to  induce  certain anomalies in incidence  through  such  things as 
tax exporting. 
The  central government,  largely free  from  some  of these constraints, 
has distinct advantages in the field of taxation.  Besides the 
capacity for a  more  progressive revenue  structure and  the  avoidance 
of certain deadweight losses because  of "national" uniformity, 
centralized taxation typically results in some  costsavings from 
economies of scale in tax administration.  In the  United  States, 
for instance,  the administrative costs of the federal individual 
income  tax amount  to only about 1/2 of one  percent of revenues  ; 
in contrast, at the state level,  these costs for income  or sales 
taxation are  roughly  l  to 2  percent of tax receipts  (1). 
One  way  to realize  some  of these advantages of centralized taxation 
without relinquishing decentralized expenditure authority is 
through  revenue  sharing  ;  the central government can effectively act 
as a  tax collection agent for local governments.  From  this 
perspective,  revenue  sharing is best seen as a  substitution of 
centrally raised tax receipts for local revenues.  The  national 
revenue authority simply collects a  prescribed level of taxes 
which it then distributes in the  form  of lump-sum  grants to  local 
governments.  It is important,  however,  that decentralized 
authorities continue  to raise  some  significant portion of their 
own  revenues,  for at the  margin fiscally responsible choice requires 
that each  jurisdiction finance its own  expenditures. 
The  popular case for revenue  sharing has,  however,  taken a  rather 
different tack  ;  it has  stressed the  so-called "fiscal mismatch" 
between central and  local governments.  This argument focusses  on 
the constraints on  local budgets imposed  by  the relative income 
inelasticity of their tax systems.  Because  of growing demands  for 
local services and  their rising relative costs,  the  expansion in 
local spending necessary  to keep pace  with  the  growth in demand 
(1)  Joseph  Pechman,  Federal Tax  Policy,  Rev.  Ed.  (Washington  :  Brookings 
Institution,  1971),  p.  53  ;  James  Haxwell,  Financing State and  Local 
Governments,  Rev.  Ed.  (Washington  :  Brookings Institution,  1969),  p.  102. - 309-
for public outputs is more  than proportionate  to  the  growth  in 
income.  However,  most  local revenue  systems exhibit an income 
elasticity not much  in excess of unity so  that revenue  "needs" 
expand  more  rapidly than actual receipts at existing tax rates. 
The  result is the  persistent recurrence of a  "revenue  gap"  with 
the  implication that political obstacles to raising tax rates 
or instituting new  taxes result in a  systematic  underprovision of 
public  services. 
Walter Heller made  this point quite eloquently in the  United States 
during the  1960's  : 
At  the Federal level,  economic  growth  and  a  powerful 
tax system,  interacting under modern  fiscal management, 
generate  new  revenues faster than they generate  new 
demands  on  the  Federal purse.  But at the  state-local 
level,  the  situation is reversed.  Under  the whiplash 
of prosperit1• responsibilities are outstripping 
revenues.  (lJ 
From  this vantage  point,  the appeal of revenue  sharing is that 
it puts the highly elastic central revenue  system at the  disposal 
of decentralized governments  :  it "matches"  growth in expenditure 
needs with an  automatic  growth  in revenues and  thereby moderates 
the  revenue  gaps and  associated "fiscal crises" besetting local 
governments. 
The  difficulty with this argument is that its premise  implies 
some  rather strange  behavior on  the  part of the  taxpayervoters. 
We  normally assume  that an individual's demand  for public  services 
(as for other commodities)  depends  on  his tastes, his level of 
income,  and  the cost (here,  a  "tax-price")  to him  of these 
services.  There is no  reason,  in principle,  to  think that an 
individual's demand  for public outputs is a  function of the  income 
elasticity of the revenue system. But this is l,rhat  the fiscal-mismatch 
argument  seems  to  imply  :  people will support increases in the 
public  budget if they can  be  funded  without increases in tax rates 
(that is, from  increments  to  revenues resulting solely from 
growth in income),  but they will not support this sam8  budgetary 
expansion if it requires a  rise in tax rates.  In brief,  the 
implication is that what  people  care about is not their tax bill, 
but rather their tax  rate·~  J.irom  this perspective,  the  areume~ 
simply is not consist"ffiitHith our usual models  of rational 
(l)  New  Dimensions  of Political Economy  (Cambridge 
Press,  1966),  p.  118 
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consumer  behavior  ;  instead, it implies the presence of a  form 
of "fiscal illusion."  (1) 
The  proposition is, however,  an empirical one  :  does a  higher 
income  elasticity of the  tax structure result in a  more  rapid 
expansion over time  in the public  budget  ?  To  test this hypothesis, 
I  have  examined  the  growth in state and  local budgets in the 
United  States over the decade  of the  1960's,  a  period of 
extraordinary budgetary increases,  to  see if those  states and 
cities with relatively income  inelastic tax systems experienced 
comparatively small rises in expenditure.  The  approach was  to 
take  two  samples  (one  consisting of the  48  coterminous states and 
the  other of 33  large central cities) in which,  after controlling 
for the effects of o'ther explanatory variables by  multiple-
regression analysis,  I  examined  the partial association between 
the  growth  in expenditure  per capita over the  decade  1960-70  and 
a  prox~ variable for the  income  elasticity of the  state's (or 
city's) revenue  system.(2) 
The  findings  showed  a  statistically significant positive 
coefficient on  tax variable  (at a  .05  level of significance) 
P.roviding  support for  the  hypothesis that the  income  elasticity 
of the  tax structure does  have  some  effect on  the growth  in the 
public  budget.  However,  the magnitude  of the  estimated effect was 
not very large.  Among  the  states, for example,  the estimated 
coefficient indicates that a  state government  which  generated 
35  percent of its revenues  through individual income  taxes would, 
other things equal,  have  experienced an expansion in spending per 
capita over the  period 1960-70 of roughly~ 35 more  than a  state 
v1hich  relied wholly on  sales and  excise  taxes.  However,  this 
compares  to a  mean  increase in state expenditure per capita of 
~ 228  for the  decade.  It would  be  difficult, in my  judgement,  to 
regard this as a  "large" effect, hardly of sufficient size  to 
justify major fiscal reform. 
If, as I  am  inclined to believe,  the effect of revenue  sharing 
on  the  size of public  budgets is quite modest,  then the appropriate 
perspective on  revenue  sharing is to regard it as a  substitution 
of central taxation for locally raised revenues.  To  evaluate  the 
merits of the  program,  we  must  then look  to  the altered pattern of 
(1)  It is P.Ossible  to  try to rationalize this fiscal illusion in a  kind 
of Downsian  model  of rational political ignorance.  See  my  "Automatic 
Increases in Tax  Revenues  :  The  l~ffect on  the  Size of the  Public Budget," 
in Oates,  ed.,  It,inancin  the  New  Federalism  Hevenue  Sharin 
Conditional Grants,  and  Taxation  Baltimore  :  Johns Hopkins  Press,l975), 
pp.  139  - 60 
(2)  For a  detailed description of the  approach  and  findings,  see  Oates, 
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incidence,possible reductions in deadweight losses, and  the cost-
savings from  administering a  more  centralized system of taxation. 
Finally,  there is one  further aspect of revenue  sharing on  which 
a  "narrow"  economic  view  may  be  less than adequate.  An  implicit 
assumption in the analysis is that the central government  can act 
as a  tax collector for local governments without impairing the 
local expenditure  prerogative.  So  long as  the  transfers of funds 
to  local governments are  truly of a  lump-sum  form,  there is no 
reason,  in principle,  why  the recipient should feel any constraints 
as to how  he  employs  these  resources.  This,  however,  is no  doubt, 
rather naive  ;  so  long as the  central government is a  major 
supplier of local funds,  political realities can be  expected  to 
induce  the  central government  to use  this leverage  to achieve  some 
of its own  objectives.  In the  United Kingdom,  for example,  central 
government grants  (primarily of a  lump-sum  form)  now  account for 
approximately two-thirds of local authority revenues,  and  this has 
given rise to widespread concern over  the  "erosion of local 
autonomy"  and  has generated renewed  interest in additional sources 
of tax revenues  at the  local level.Important as it may  be,  this 
particular dimension of revenue  sharing is difficult to incorporate 
into a  purely economic  analysis. 
At  any rate,  the  substitution of centrally raised tax revenues for 
decentralized taxes provides a  third possible rationale for 
intergovernmental grants.  As  in the  case  of fiscal equalisation, 
the appropriate form  of grant is an unconditional one.  A program 
of lump-sum  grants from  the  central government with relatively 
generous  sums  to  those  jurisdictions with  the greater needs and 
lesser  fiscal capacity can serve  both  to  provide fiscal equalization 
and  to shift a  larger share of the  taxation function onto  the 
central government. 
2.  The  theory of intergovernmental grants can provide a  number  of 
insights into existing programs.  Host federal countries have  made 
extensive  use  of both conditional and  unconditional grants to more 
decentralized levels of government.  The  former are  typically used 
to encourage  spending on  such items as education and  roads,  which 
involve  significant interjurisdictional external effects,  or in 
some  cases to  support explicitly  redistributive  programs  for which 
the central government usually must  assume  a  primary responsibility. 
Moreover,  one  finds that these  grant programs  frequently involve 
equalizing provisions so  that poorer jurisdictions receive  more 
generous  support.  In fact many  of these  programs  incorporate 
explicit provisions to account for the particular expenditure 
requirements,  or "need",  of each  jurisdiction in addition to its 
"fiscal capacity"  to meet  that need.  In fact the  constitutions of 
many  federal countries explicitly charge  the  central government with - 312-
the responsibility for providing financial assistance  to fiscally 
weak  jurisdictions.(l) 
In some  instances,  however,  the grant instruments adopted  to meet 
these objectives have  not been  those  implied by  our theoretical 
analysis.  Theory  suggests, for example,  that the  proper form  of 
grant to internalize external effects is an  open-end matching 
grant.  Matching grants have,  in fact,  been widely used 
(particularly in the  United States)  to  encourage  particular 
activities,  but other grant instruments have  also been  employed  to 
this end.  Two  types of conditional lump-sum  grants are of special 
interest  :  relatively small grants of a  specified  sum  to  underwrite 
the  cost of a  particular project and  large bloc grants to  support 
a  broadly defined  range  of activities. 
For the first of these,  we  can,  I  think,  find  some  economic 
justification, but not so  for the  second.  Bloc  grants amount,  in 
nractice,  to  unconditional grants,  and  any attempt to  justify them 
in terms of supporting a  particular set of functions is 
essentially an illusion.  The  problem is one  of the fungibility of 
funds.  The  central government may,  for example,  designate a  certain 
grant of funds for expenditures on education,  but there is really 
no  way  to determine whether these funds are actually spent on 
education.  The  recipient can easily report compliance with  the 
stipulation of the  grant but can  simply use  the grant funds  to 
replace  own  monies  that would  have  been expended for education  ; 
these  own  monies are  then available  to  be  spent for other things 
(including,  possibly,  reductions in taxation).  (2) 
An  interesting example  of this phenomenon  is the  case of revenue 
sharing in the  United States.  When  the u.s.  Congress first 
enacted revenue  sharing by  the federal government with both state 
and  local governments in 1972, it stipulated that local governments 
must  use  these monies  on(y for programs  for certain designated 
high-priority functions  health,  police protection, recreation,  and 
few  others).  In particular,  these  funds,were  not to be  used for 
local tax reductions.  I.ocal  governments  were  thus required  to render 
fiscal reports indicating hovf  they had  expended  their revenue  -
sharing funds.  But it was  obviously a  simple  matter for a  local 
government,  for example,  to use its revenue-sharing monies  to meet 
(l)  For  such  excerpts from  the  constitutions of Australia,  Canada, 
Switzerland,  and  ~!est Germany,  see  my  Fiscal Federalism  (New  York 
Harcourt Drace  Jovanovich,  1972)  pp.  85-6. 
(2)  For a  formal  treatment of all this,  see  my  Fiscal Federalism,  pp  75-8. 
The  grantor may  attempt to  tighten controls by  requiring these  grants 
to  take  the  form  of increments to existing expenditure.  This  might 
have  some  effect initially, but during periods of expanding budgets, 
it too is likely to  prove  ineffective. - 313-
an increase in the  payroll of its policemen  and  firemen,  which 
otherwise would  have  necessitated increases in local taxes.  (1) 
In short,  the  funds  from  the central government permitted a 
reduction in local taxes relative  to what  they would  have  been in 
the  absence  of revenue-sharing.  'I'he  general recognition that such 
budgetary requirements are, in practice,  unenforceable  led the 
Congress  to delete  these  constraints on  the  local use  of these  funds 
in the  revised revenue-sharing bill enacted in 1976. 
In contrast,  there is somethinr',  of a  p:r_'a/}"'.a"Lic  case  to be  made 
for certain, highly specific conditional grants of a  lump-swn  form. 
In some  instances,  the central government  may  want  to  sponsor a 
kind of demonstration -project or experimental undertaking  ;  if the 
particular function which  encompasses  this project falls under  the 
jurisdiction of decentralized level of government, it may  make  best 
sense for the  central government  simply to fund  the  project in total. 
More  generally,  lump-sum  grants for specific projects permit a  degree 
of flexibility that a  rigid matching-grant formula excludes.  In 
particular,  the  grantor and recipient can negotiate  the  size of the 
grant so  as to divide  the  costs in an equitable manner.  Horeover, 
the grantor may,  in this case,  be  in a  position to  screen project 
applications and  select those  with  the  greatest expected return, 
rather than funding all projects selected by  the  recipients at a 
designated matching rate.  For  such highly specific sorts of 
funding,  there  may  thus be  some  justification for the  use  of lump-
sum  conditional grants. 
A further issue in the design of intergovernmental grants is the 
insertion of "fiscal-effort" terms into  the  grant formulas.  Under 
the general revenue-sharing program  in the  United States, for 
example,  a  jurisdiction's receipts depend  upon its level of tax 
effort (defined as its own  tax receipts as a  fraction of its 
aggregate  personal income)  :  the  higher its tax effort,  the  more 
revenue-sharing funds it receives.  The  case for such fiscal-effort 
provisions strikes me  as a  highly dubious one.  First, if the  grant 
contains any fiscal-equalizing provisions,  then fiscal-effort terms 
are, at least in part, redundant,  since  the latter involves a 
measure  of fiscal capacity in the denominator.  Second,  fiscal 
effort terms  provide a  direct incentive for increased expenditure 
(1)  There is some  evidence  that, in the first year or  so  of revenue 
sharing,  some  local governments  used  their revenue-sharing funds 
to increase expenditures in those areas designated  by  the  Congress 
(e.g., on  purchases of shiny new  fire  engines).  However,  there is 
every reason to believe  that,  over  time,  as revenue-sharing funds 
become  a  regular input into local budgetary decisions,  they will be 
treated as essentially a  lump-sum  increment to existing receipts. 
On  this see Richard  Nathan,  et. al.,  ~1oni  toring Revenue  Sharing 
(Washington  :  Brookings Institution, 1975). - 314-
on  the  part of the recipient ;  this presumes  that, in the absence 
of this incentive,  spending would  be inadequate.  If the grant is 
an unconditional one,  this would  seem  a  highly suspect assumption 
(are  the  budgets of decentralized governments  too  small  ?)  ;  if 
it is for a  particular activity that generates external benefits, 
then a  simple matching formula  would  seem  most appropriate. 
In brief,  I  see  no  legitimate role for such  provisions. 
J.  In this section of the  paper,  I  want  to explore a  rather 
intriguing form  of intergovernmental grant which  attempts to 
integrate  some  of the  allocative and  distributive objectives of 
the grants we  have  examined  earlier  :  the variable-matching grant. 
Under  this technique,  the  grantor matches  the expenditures of the 
reci~ient at some  defined matching rate.  However,  the  matching rate 
itself varies among  recipients.  In particular, the central government 
will normally try to  supplement more  generously  the expenditures 
of those  jurisdictions with the  greater need  and  lesser fiscal 
capacity.  The  result is a  schedule of matching rates that exhibit 
fiscal-equalizing properties. 
On  first glance, variable matching appears  to have  real attractions 
On  the  one  hand,  the  grantor can employ  these  grants  to stimulate 
spending on  programs with external effects and  thereby further its 
allocative objectives.  On  the other, it can achieve, at the  same 
time,  a  degree  of fiscal equalization and  thereby promote  its 
distributional goals.  In fact, if the variable-matching rates are 
designed  properly,  the central government can  equalize  "tax-prices" 
for  the relevant activities across all jurisdictions  ;  it can 
create a  fiscal environment in which  the  same  "local" tax rate would 
generate essentially the  same  level of local services in any--
locality. 
There  are,  however,  real difficulties with all this (as there 
normallyarewhen one  attem~ts to achieve multiple objectives with 
a  single policy instrument).  From  an allocative perspective, 
matching rates should reflect the external benefits associated with 
a  particular activity so  that the  incremental cost facing a  local 
jurisdiction is marginal cost net of spillover benefits to other 
areas.  If, however,  matching rates vary across  jurisdictions in 
accordance with need  and  fiscal capacity,  they are most  unlikely 
to  give  the  appropriate allocative signals  ;  they may  achieve  a 
certain measure  of fiscal equalization but they cannot, at the 
same  time,  indicate marginal costs net of spillovers.  In brief,  one 
set of matching rates cannot realize  two  distinct sets of objectives. 
Likewise,  from  the distributional perspective,  variable-matching 
grants for specific functions or programs cannot provide for full 
fiscal equalization.  Complete  equalization implies that a 
jurisdiction should be  able to  provide  a  full range  of public 
services at tax rates in line with  those  elsewhere.  This condition 
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provision of a  select group of services.  (In fact it has been a 
frequent complaint in the  United states that in poorer areas the 
bulk of locally generated revenues are directed into matching-grant 
programs  with little remaining for  the  support of other state and  local 
services). 
The  central government  may  thus  be  able  to use  variable-matching 
grants to go  some  distance  toward  their allocative and distributive 
objectives,  but such  an approach does have  some  serious,  inherent 
imperfections.  Variable matching is not a  perfect substitute for a 
set of conditional grants for allocative  p~r.poses supplemented  by  a 
set of unconditional  grants  to achieve fiscal equalization. 
In much  more  pragmatic  terms,  hm-1ever,  a  central government  may  find 
that variable-matching grants offer a  way  to use its limited grant 
dollars to  the  largest effect.  Suppose  that central officials have 
a  number  of hieh-priority grant programs in areas where  central 
stimulus to local expenditures is viewed as highly important.  In 
addition,  the  objectives of the  central government often include 
the  achievement of certain minimum  levels of key  public  services 
in all jurisdictions.  Hatching grants are inherently an imperfect 
mechanism  for realizing specified levels of services because actual 
output depends  on  the fiscal response  of the recipient government 
unit.  To  ensure  that all jurisdictions achieve  the desired minimum 
level of operation for a  specific program, it is generally sufficient 
for  the  central government  to  provide all the  funds.  If however,  the 
central government finances all the costs of realizing the  prescribed 
program  level in all jurisdictions, it is possible that the  central 
authorities will exhaust their available  funds  on  a  few  programs. 
This could  well mean  the failure of the central government 
to  stimulate  spending on  a  large number  of other important public 
goods.  From  this vantage  point, it may  make  more  sense  to attempt 
to ascertain just how  big a  central-government share is necessary 
to induce recipients to  provide  the desired program  level. 
If, for example,  a  50-percent central share is sufficient to meet 
this goal,  then the  remaining 50  percent of the  funds  becomes 
available for use  in other programs.  For this reason matching grants 
may  be  an effective instrument for allocating scarce central-
government  funds. 
There  is reason to believe,  moreover,  that variable matching,  where 
the grantor's share is larger for  poorer  jurisdictions, is likely to 
be  more  effective than uniform-matching grants in conservinG central-
government  funds.  In general,  one  can  expect that poorer areas will 
require more  assistance in attaining a  specified program  level than 
will relatively wealthy areas  ;  rich jurisdictions simply tend,  in 
the absence  of assistance,  to  provide higher levels of public  services 
than do  poorer ones.  Where  a  JO-percent central government  share  may 
be  sufficient to induce wealthy localities to reach the desired level 
of provision, it may  require,  for example,  50-50  matching  to pull up 
the  levels of services in poorer areas  ;  in the  interest of conserving 
its own  scarce funds, it would  make  sense in this case for the central - 316-
government  to  employ  a  variable-matching formula in which  the 
grantor's share is JO  percent for rich  jurisdicions and  50  percent 
for poorer localities.  Variable-matching grants may  in this way 
allow  the  central government to get the  maximum  stimulative effect 
from  a  given amount  of grant funds.  Thus,  variable matching has a 
real attraction in terms of realizing minimum  activity levels for a 
number of programs.  (1) 
The  discussion in this section suggests that we  can best regard 
variable-matching grants as a  kind of second-best alternative to a 
comprehensive  system of unconditional equalizing and  uniform-matching 
grants.  Variable matching can provide  both a  stimulus to activity 
levels and  some  redistribution toward  poorer jurisdictions (although 
the  attem~t to do  both simultaneously does introduce  some  real 
imperfections).  Moreover,  from  the  perspective of a  central official 
trying to stretch a  limited budget of grant dollars, variable matching 
may  provide  the  most  "cost-effective" of the available means  to bring 
all jurisdictions up  to a  satisfactory level of certain basic 
public services. 
4.  The  design of an appropriate  system of intergovernmental grants for 
the  emerging European  Community  requires a  reconsideration of the 
theory of grants and  of their use  in mature  federations against the 
institutional setting in Europe.  Two  aspects of the existing, 
~uropean structure strike  me  as particularly relevant.  The  first is 
the  dominant position of the  individual nation-states with their 
substantial range of fiscal autonomy  and  responsibility,  the 
counterpart to which is relatively modest fiscal power  of the  upper-
tier level of government.  The  second is the  dynamic  character of 
European  economic  integration involving changing patterns of production 
and exchange  with  consequent  gains  and  losses  to various  members  of the 
Community. 
(1)  A variable-matching formula of the  type discussed here  may  also make 
some  sense  in terms of our discussion of interjurisdictional spillover 
effects.  Suppose,  for example,  that the  marginal value of the 
spillover benefits from  the  provision of a  local public  service 
declines as the  level of the activity increases.  In this case  the 
subsidy for marginal units should presumably  decline with the  level 
of the  provision of the  good.  Since,  however,  poorer jurisdictions 
typically provide  lower  levels of consumption of most  public goods  for 
their residents than do  wealthier communities, it follows  that the 
unit subsidy,  or grantor's share,  should generally be  larger for a 
marginal unit in a  poor locality than in a  rich one.  The  most direct 
way  to deal with  this problem,  is, of course,  for the  government 
providing the grant to allow its share  to decline with the recipient's 
level of activity,  but a  grant formula  under which  this share varies 
inversely with  the  level of per capita income  in the  recipient 
jurisdiction will at least tend  to work  in the  same  general direction. - 317-
The  first condition suggests that,  over the  near-term at least, 
there will probably not be  a  major role for purely unconditonal grants 
for  purposes of fiscal equalization or revenue  sharing.  As  suggested 
in  Ch.  14,a Gomprehensive  program  of fiscal equalization is more 
properly an objective of a  mature  federation characterized by  a 
high degree  of economic,  social, and  political interdependence  and 
a  high  level of mobility of households.  In such an environment, 
substantial differentials in fiscal performance  are readily perceived 
and decried.  Moreover,  mobile  households are likely to have  an interest 
in the maintenance  of a  satisfactory quality of public  services 
throughout society, for  they will, at different times,  consume  these 
services in a  variety of jurisdictions.  Individuals may,  in this sense 
be  said to place an "option value"  on  the  levels of public  services 
elsewhere. 
All this seems  much  less compelling at this  juncture of 8uropean 
integration.  The  nation-states of Europe  exhibit far more  social 
and  political independence  than the  states or provinces in existing 
federations.  In addition,  there exists much  less mobility across 
national boundaries in the  European Community  than across 
jurisdictional lines in the  typical federal state.  As  a  result,  the 
political and  economic  pressures for a  greater equalization of 
fiscal performance  should  be  correspondingly less.  Finally, it is 
worth noting that,  as Chapter  14  on  simulations reveal,  fiscal 
equalization  can  be  a  quite expensive  undertaking. It could require 
a  substantial extension of central taxation  (unless handled 
horizontally as in ;~est Germany). 
Likewise,  the  case for revenue-sharing grants is less convincing 
in the  current and  near-term  J~;uropean context than in rna ture 
federations.  In the latter,  the  constraints placed on  decentralized 
taxation by  mobile  economic  units resulting in resource  misallocation 
and  tax competition suegest a  role for the  central government as a 
tax-collecting agent for local governments.  However,  these constraints 
are much  less serious in the European  CoJTUllunity.  Horeover,  past and 
existing efforts to harmonize  national tax structure suggest that 
the nation-states can continue to  perform effectively in the  field 
of taxation.  They  have  access to  the main forms  of broad-based  taxes 
and  can presumably administer  them  without special difficulties that 
a  central government  could  circumvent. 
The  evolving character of the European Community  does,  however,  suggest 
one  role  for centrally administered unconditional  grants  :  to 
compensate  the  losers from  integration.  I  have  developed  this point 
in Part II.  3uffice it here  to  say that,  to maintain  the viability 
of the  emerging federation,  the  central government  may  need  financial 
instruments with which  to apportion fairly the  eains and  losses 
associated with economic  integration.  Unconditional grants can  serve 
as a  needed  instrument for compensation. 
In contrast to  the  very limited role for purely lump-sum  grants, 
the central government is likely to find certain forms  of conditional 
grants to  be  highly effective and appropriate  instruments for  the 
realization of the Community's objectives.  We  have  noted earlier 
the rationale for matching grants to  stimulate  levels of activities 
generating external benefits.  Where  programs  in one  country provide - 318-
benefits to other members  of the  Community,  there exists a  case for 
central subsidization in the  form  of a  matching grant.  Such  grants 
can serve  to encourage  a  diverse  range  of activities.  The  ~.c. 
Social Fund,  for example,  seeks  to assist migrant workers and  to 
provide vocational training to develop a  skilled and mobile  labor 
force in Europe  through .a  system of grants.  I,ikewise,  rna tching 
grants can  stimulate research and  development efforts.  In some 
instances,  such grants may  provide  an alternative to  the direct 
assumption of the function by  the  central government. 
In most  instances,  matching grants should  be  the appropriate policy 
instrument.  However,  as noted earlier,  there may  be  a  case with 
certain highly specific programs for lump-sum  conditional grants. 
The  purpose  would  be  to maximize  the flexiblity of the grantor in 
seeking out the  most  productive application of the available grant 
funds  and  negotiating the  terms with  the recipient.  This kind of 
flexibility may,  for example,  be  valuable in allocating scarce 
developmental  funds for  the  creation of social-overhead capital. 
Matching grants,  however,  should  prove  to  be  the  primary grant 
instrument for  the  central government.  Horeover,  there is much  to 
be  said in the European  context for an extensive reliance on variable 
matching.  I  argued earlier that variable-matching grants are a  clear 
second-best to a  comprehensive  program of unconditional and 
uniform-matching grants.  However,  it appears doubtful that, at this 
juncture,  the  Community  would  choose  to institute a  program of 
fiscal-equalizing,  lump-sum  grants.  In their absence,  variable matching 
would at least provide  a  means  to get some,  if admittedly,  an 
imperfect system of,  eqyalization.  By  requiring a  smaller matching 
share  on  the  part of the  poorer members  of the  Community,  the central 
government  could both provide a  greater stimulus where  program  levels 
are,  in all likelihood,  relatively low  and, at the  same  time,  ease 
fiscal burdens most where  fiscal capacity is least.  Particularly in 
view  of the highly limited budget  to which  the  upper~tier is likely 
to have  access,  variable matching may  permit the  most effective use 
of highly scarce  grant funds in generating acceptable  levels of certain 
important services. 
Regardless of whether  the Community  selects uniform or variable 
matching,  there is one  danger with a  system of conditional grants 
the  proliferation of these  grants into a  maze  of confusing and  often 
overlanping programs.  By  the  late 1960's,  the  system of special 
nurpose  grants in the  United States had evolved into a  chaotic mass 
o~ regulations  ;  no  one  really knew  how  many  federal programs  existed, 
except that it numbered  in the hundreds.  The  sheer complexity of the 
system meant  that local public administration became  largely a  game 
of "grantsmanship";  local officials had to  go  to great lengths  to 
discover what  programs  existed and how  to apply for federal  funding. 
This  trend has  been reversed in the 1970's by the  establishment of 
a  series of bloc grants  which  have  consolidated large numbers  of the 
special-purpose grants.  I  have no  simple  method  for avoiding such a 
proliferation of programs  as  took place  in the United States  ;  they 
seem  to have  resulted from  the  independent  action of a  multitude of 
public agencies  with  each establishing its own  grants  (with  the 
approval  of the  Congress).  The  apparent  moral  is that some  sort of 
central  coordination of grant  programs  is in order. Chapter  11 
PRINCIPLES  FUR  THE  ASSIGNMENT  OF 
PUBLIC  ECONOMIC  FUNCTIONS  IN  A 
SETTING  OF  MULTILAYER  GOVERNMENT 
by 
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1.  Levels  of Government 
The  analysis  of assignment  to the various  levels  of government  of 
functions  entailing public spending (henceforth called "LG  assignment") 
has  recently been elaborated as  a  federal  theory and also as  a  regional 
theory.  Earlier it had been developed mainly as  a  local finance  theory. 
It thus  seems  that there is a  plasticity in this body of research. 
Under  a  two-level,  local and central system of government  the lines  and 
criteria of analysis  may  appear to be  the same  - even if the focus  of 
research is not identical - if one  looks  to devolution down  or to devo-
lution up.  However,  innovation,  in the  two  cases,  takes  place at a 
different level of government,  and this may  play an  important role  • 
. Moreover,  the conceptual  framework  is further complicated when  there are 
three or four levels.  The  two  lines of research,  up  and  down,  thus have 
more  than one starting point.  As  regards  a  supra-national federal  layer, 
the analysis for devolution up tries to see when  and why  the  jurisdiction 
of the nation state is "too small" while  the analysis for devolution down 
tries to see when  and why  the  jurisdiction of the federal state is  "too 
big".  As  for a  "regional" s tru.cture,  on  the other hand,  it is the analy-
sis of devolution down  that tries to see when  and  why  the  jurisdiction 
of nation state is "too big" while  the analysis for devolution up  tries 
to see when  local  governments'  jurisdictions are  "too small".  Assign-
ment  criteria thus  may  be  applied to the same  entity (e.g.  a  given 
nation state)  in opposite directions.  The  same  nation state could be 
considered appropriate for public spending for scientific research 
because  of its size when  compared with the regional state,  while this 
may  not be so when  compared  with a  (new)  supra-national  federation. 
In some  cases,  assignment  criteria are utilised for the same  type of 
devolution analysis  (e.g.  "devolution up")  with reference to different 
entities:  e.g.  local authorities versus  regions or the traditional nation 
state versus  a  (new)  federation. 
Here  a  new  issue enters  the picture:  that of a  higher versus broader 
level of government.  The  two  normally coincide at least in modern  times 
in a  two-layer system where  the broadest  jurisdiction (i.e. that with 
the largest geographic extent)  is also  the highest level of government 
(i.e. that with the  ''ultimate" political powers).  This  is so because 
in modern  times  local  governments  are not  considered as  the true source 
of political power of the  country.  But with  three levels,  the layer 
with ultimate powers  does not need to coincide with broadest  jurisdiction. 
In a  federation,  member  states may  be  the highest level  even if they are 
not the broadest.  As  we  will see,  this may  be  important in the assign-
ment  analysis  on  the  expenditure side,  under the heading of the "homo-
geneity" criterion.  It should be  added that it is of more  general  im-
portance for the assignment analysis  on  the  revenue side:  the highest - 322-
level of government  is that where  the ultimate tax power lies and  thus 
has  the right to enter in any sphere of taxation and public debt  which 
has not yet been given to the other levels of government.  For public 
expenditures  there may  be a  similar distinction.  The  highest government 
may  be allowed to spend where  it likes, unless  the contrary is specified, 
while the other may  be prevented from  doing so.  But  there are differ-
ences  too.  There  may  be residual powers  of spending at more  than one 
level since double spending is not  considered a  big issue,  while double 
taxation is.  There might  be  a  constitution which  provides  for the 
assignment of the "ultimate" and of the "residual" powers  in the area 
of taxation and of spending.  In this  case,  irrespective of whether the 
constitution operates at the broadest level and  is formed  (and changed) 
through direct representation at that level,  the highest level will 
still be that to which  the constitution gives  these powers.  This  govern-
ment  is so,  because  the constitution is "above"  the  various levels of 
government. 
Another important difference in LG  assignment  analysis has  to do  with 
the number  of entities in the given  l~ers: it is different to decen-
tralize to five  regions  or to twenty-five;  and it is different to unify 
in a  federation of five states or twenty-five states.  In the second 
case,  there is a  dramatic difference in size;  in the first there is not. 
Some  arguments  relating to externalities,  coordination,  indivisibility, 
and  economies  of scale which  are clearly relevant in the second case may 
not be equally relevant in the first. 
Whether  the analysis  concerns  two  or more  levels,  one  should distinguish 
the federal  and  regional  assignment  theory from  that pertaining to state 
or regional  finance  versus  local finance.  To  include  in economic  fede-
ralism or regionalism local finance  theory as  a  sub-case is too much, 
even if they have several  elements  in common  and  seem  to form  part of 
a  more  general  theory relating to diversification of levels of govern-
ments.  The  differences  do  not relate to  issues of size but to issues 
having to do  with the nature of governments.  First and most  important, 
local  governments  have to do  with the life of particular urban or rural 
communities  while the other governments  do  not.  Secondly,  local  govern-
ments  lack some  legal political powers  because they are not  considered 
autonomous  "political" bodies.  For this reason they are inappropriate 
for the assignment  of certain functions,  while because they are related 
to a  given urban or rural settlement they are appropriate for others. 
Urban  economics  here enter into the picture.  On  the other hand,  one  can 
conceive a  federal state where  defence or an  important part of it is 
left to  the states;  and also a  federal state where  an  important part of 
stabilization policy is left to  the states, but not a  unitary state 
where  local authorities have  defence or stabilization policies, since 
normally local bodies  do  not have political relevance in security 
matters,  nor enough  monetary and fiscal  powers  to attempt to control 
the economic  trend. - 323-
What  are the  characteristics which  distinguish a  federal  structure or 
a  regional structure from  a  structure with simple decentralization? 
Political autonomy  is more  than decentralization and  includes ·a power 
of setting laws,  i.e. legislative rules.  This  may  imply rules for 
public services and also other important regulatory activities performed 
through legislation.  There is a  federal or a  regional structure,  in 
contrast with a  merely decentralized structure, if there are significant 
legislative powers  at both levels of government.  To  be "significant" 
they must  have not only an  important content,  they must  also ·have  a 
compulsory  character,  rather than simply be  guidelines  (as  energy saving 
and  environment  protection guidelines  of the EEC). 
A debatable question is whether these powers  to originate a  federal 
structure should be attributed to the citizens or to the states:  clearly 
the power  of the federation is much  stronger in the first case,  where 
it can appeal directly to the people.  In several  instances  the change 
from  "guidelines" to effective intervention may  be  done  through financial 
intervention.  Here  also there is a  question of autonomy  and size of 
powers.  One  must  distinguish between  a  tax power  whose  exercise can be 
limited by rules by other layers of government  and  a  tax power  which 
cannot be thus  limited,  and has  its limits  only in a  "constitution" or 
in a  general treaty. 
Some  aspects  of the distinction between political autonomy  and  decen-
tralization as  the difference in character between  economic  federalism 
(inclusive of regionalism)  and  local finances  seem  to escape rigorous 
analysis,  at least from  the  economist's  viewpoint.  A pure  theory of LG 
assignment  must  necessarily overlook them. - 324-
2.  Contents  of the Allocation Function 
The  study of LG  assignment  in public expenditure  theory has been mostly 
developed with reference to the supply of public goods  in the narrow 
sense.  However it can,  and should,  fruitfully be  extended,  as  a  unitary 
body,  to the entire spectrum  of public functions:  whatever can be in-
cluded under allocation,  distribution,  stabilisation and  employment. 
But  in addition allocation must  be  viewed  more  broadly than the mere 
problems  of supply of public goods  in the narrow sense.  Under this 
broad expression one  should distinguish four headings: 
(a)  functions  relating to the efficiency of the market  economy,  i.e. 
measures  to ensure efficiency in production,  trade and  other 
tertiary services  and finance; 
(b)  functions  relating to the final destination of resources  in the 
market  process,  i.e. measures  influencing the level of different 
kinds  of consumption  and  the level of consumption as  a  whole; 
(c)  functions  consisting of the supply of public goods  and services; 
(d)  functions  related to economic  growth,  i.e. to  the  investment  and 
structural policies of enterprises,  and to  the  productive invest 
menta  of government.  (1) 
It is  thus  clear that allocation functions  do  not  include only the 
supply of public  goods  and services,  to which  the literature of LG 
assignment mostly refers  (2),  but also governmental  measures  relating 
to allocative aspects  of the market  process. 
These  functions  may  be realised either through regulations,  or through 
positive transfers  (normally conditional  grants),  or negative transfers 
(indirect taxes,  corporation taxes  and related allowances,  personal in-
come,  taxation of dividends,  etc.), or through monetary and related 
powers.  Also  the supply of public goods  and services may  be  instrumen-
tal to  the functioning of the market  process because there are regulatory 
public services which  constitute the  framework  in which  the market oper-
ates.  This  is  important for the  LG  assignment analysis,  particularly 
when  focussed,  as  in the present paper,  on supra-national  federal  issues, 
because the most  important feature of such  a  federation is normally a 
new  "common  market"  (3).  To  unify the national markets  and to maintain 
their unitary operation is an  important task for a  federation. 
( 1)  Obviously this group of functions  can be logically reduced to the 
previous  three groups:  however,  as  a  "complex"  may  deserve  an 
autonomous  consideration in modern  public policy. 
(2)  Bu.t  see Ren' Frey,  Gregory Meugebauer,  Marcel  ZumbUhl,  Der Schweiz-
erische  ~deralismus aus  ~konomisches Sicht,  Institut fttr Sozial-
wissenschaften,  Universit~t Basel,  1975• 
(3)  We  do  not need to review here the reasons  why  a  "common  market" 
may  be desirable. - 325-
We  thus  need now  to  consider a  second distinction within the allocation 
function which has  to do  with the supply of public goods  and services. 
Among  these functions  may  be distinguished the supply of economic  goods, 
and  the supply of regulations for the  economy  and society and their en-
forcement.  For enforcement  one  requires  goods  and  manpower,  i.e.  com-
modities  and  (personal)  services.  But  the  essence  and  importance of the 
regulatory activities does  not  consist in the  goods  included in the 
enforcement activities, it consists  in the  power  embodied  in them  at 
each stage.  One  may  conceive of the functions  of regulation being car-
ried out at  one  level,  and its enforcement  through bureaucracy,  police 
and  courts  at other levels. 
Regulatory activity,  carried on  either through legislative or quasi-
legislative norms  (rules)  or through administrative specific acts 
(authority)  and  through  judicial decisions,  refers  to  the most  diverse 
aspects  of life:  from  distributional  issues  (such as  those having to do 
with property rights,  minimum  wages,  inheritance laws,  the  right to 
strike and  so  on),  to  individual  and family rights  (the various  personal 
freedoms  and rights,  marriage  and  divorce  laws,  abortion laws  and  so on), 
to moral  and  religious matters,  to ruling of the market,  to ruling for 
the supply and utilisation of public  goods  and for the  general  organi-
sation of governments.  Within the broad realm of the functions  consis-
ting in regulations,  one  can  thus  disentangle those having to  do  with 
the market  process,  both in its  (productive)  efficiency and  in its final 
destination of resources  (consumption)  aspects. 
As  we  shall see,  there are  reasons  why  in seeking to identify the func-
tions  proper to the  (supranational)  federal  level  one  should think of 
regulatory activities more  than as  the supply of goods  in the narrow 
sense,  as  well  as  of ruling the market  processes  in general.  It is there-
fore interesting to consider the overlapping between allocation through 
ruling the market  and allocation through the supply of regulation activi-
ties.  This  overlapping (it may  be said with a  degree of simplification) 
regulation 
regulations  regulations  allocational 
affecting non- affecting  measures  re-
allocational  allocation  lating to the 
aspects  of society  (e.g.  monopoly  market  other 
(es.  divorce and  consumption  than regulation 
abortion)  protections) 
allocation 
gives  the area whiCh  fits conveniently as the core of a  federation 
scaree of financial  resources but rich in well-founded ambi tiona. - 326-
3·  Criteria for Assigement  of Functions by Level  of Government 
But let us  come  back to the general framework  of the LG  assignment 
analysis relating to public expenditure.  (1) 
The  basic assignment  criteria may  be grouped as  follows: 
(a)  externality 
(b)  indivisibility and  fixed costs  economies  and  diseconomies  of 
scale in the supply and  delivery of public goods  and  policies 
(c)  unification,  uniformity,  coordination (as referred to the market, 
to social life or to public goods  supplied) 
(d)  democratic control and flexibility:  i.e. satisfaction of indivi-
dual  and  small  groups'  preferences with a  minimum  of frustration; 
information and  checks  between the constituency,  the political 
class and  the administration;  flexibility and speed in satisfying 
the emerging needs 
(e)  innovation,  comparison  and  competition in the performing of 
existing functions  and  in developing (or choosing not to be 
developed)  new  functions 
(f)  political homogeneity,  i.e. necessity or compatibility of the 
function with  the political powers  of the  LG  considered. 
These  criteria should not necessarily be  considered "all or nothing" 
criteria.  They  might  lead to the "partial" assignment  of a  function 
or a  set of activities within a  function to a  given  LG  rather than to 
"complete" assignment.  Furthermore,  their results may  not be  clear-cut 
and  may  be divergent so that one  may  distingu.ish  "weak"  and  "strong" 
assignment  cases.  Finally,  conflicts and  changes  may  develop and solu-
tions may  be unstable. 
These  criteria may  lead to the  creation of a  new  level of government: 
or,  conceivably,  to the  impoverishment  and disappearance of an existing 
level of government. 
(1)  Remember  that here we  do  not deal explicitly with the revenue side 
of the assignment analysis.  Matters relating to revenues enter 
here indirectly because they are related to fisoal and monetary 
policy for stabilisation and employment.  Tax  regulation-harmoniz-
ation is one  of the market  ruling activities. - 327-
4•  Criteria for Public Goods 
Before analysing these criteria in relation to allocational functions, 
it is important to consider those criteria which  make  a  good  "public" 
As  we  shall see,  there are differences between the criteria for the 
publicness  of goods  and  the  LG  assignment criteria: but  consideration 
of these differences is a  fruitful starting point for deepening our 
analysis  of LG  assignment. 
One  must  distinguish criteria through which  a  good  must  be public from 
criteria through which  a  good  may  be public.  --
In essence,  a  good!!!! be public when  it 
(a)  can only be supplied by a  public institution because of its 
political nature;  enactment  and  enforcement of laws  is a  signi-
ficant  example;  but also defence  is relevant here,  even if it 
comes  also under the next heading;  (1) 
(b)  cannot be divided in selling units,  or the amount  which  can be 
appropriated to the supplier is small  in comparison with the 
cost and this  cannot be further reduced through the fractioning 
of supply:  the externality argument; 
(c)  there is no  private demand,  even if the  community believes  that 
there should be  some:  merit  goods. 
Largely but not completely similar criteria can be used,  to  argue  when 
goods  may  be public: 
(a)  some  goods  are better supplied by public institutions,  because 
given their "public" nature,  they ensure  (or are supposed to 
ensure)  a  given quality:  e.g.  independence  from particular 
(1)  It should be noted that this "institutional" argument  can also be 
applied to show  why  some  goods  "must" be private:  while  criminal 
justice and defence  "must" be public services,  associations  of 
entrepreneurs  and workers  unions  cannot be of the  government be-
cause  a  "state" labour union is no  more  a  union.  Similarly one 
can argu.e  for "professional associations". - 328  -
pressure groups,  and uniformity of standards;  (1) 
(b)  some  goods  are supplied by public institutions in a  better 
quantity and  qu.ali  ty because  they can take account of indi  vi-
sibility and  of external  economies  and diseconomies  arising 
from  the suppliers' behaviours; 
(c)  for some  goods  there is not  enough  market  demand  for distri-
butional  reasons  and because of "wrong"  judgement  by the 
consumers; 
(d)  the size and scope of government  may  make  possible,  or more 
efficient, activities which  need a  very large scale,  a  central 
coordination," a  big financial  base to cover very large risks. 
These  later reasons  are also relevant to explain public sector activities 
which  are not public goods  proper,  because  they are sold at a  price and, 
therefore,  cannot be defined as  free  goods.  An  important class of these 
public activities are those  in the area of infrastructural services: 
railways,  postal services,  local transport services,  tolls.  These  public 
infrastructures may  be characterised by externalities and  great risks 
of monopoly  exploitation if left to the private sector.  Transfers  and 
regulations,  however,  may  be able to take  care of these  "market failures", 
better or as  well  as direct intervention by public enterprises. 
The  theory of public goods,  following Samuelson,  emphasises  the  joint-
ness  of the source of benefits,  in the sense that one unit of supply 
affects simultaneously several people.  But what  really matters -for 
the good  to be public- is the indivisibility in selling units,  not the 
indivisibility of the source of utility.  It is true that it is often 
this  characteristic of the source of utility (jointness)  that leads  to 
the non-exclusion;  or that makes  profitable a  collective free supply, 
so  that even if it is not necessary,  it becomes  sufficient to have a 
public good.  Exclusion may  be  possible,  in spite of  jointness,  but it 
may  be  very costly and/or it may  involve  a  large waste of (unused)  re-
sources. 
(1)  This  line of analysis may  also be  applied in reverse to  justify 
why  a  good  may  conveniently be supplied privately rather than 
publicly:  e.g.  in a  state where  religious differences  are rele-
van~ the quality of certain kinds  of private education may  not 
be  granted by the public authority.  Instead of direct supply by 
the government  of public goods,  one  might  resort to public trans-
fers  to private persons  who  are enabled to  consume  given goods 
and  to  choose  the kind of supply they prefer.  But there may  be 
also  room  for privately financed  consumption,  alongside with those 
financed by the  government;  a  private doctor may  provide a  person-
alised service that publicly financed doctors  are not able to 
provide. - 329-
In the theory of public goods  the  concept of jointness receives  very 
much  attention because it explains the advantage  of replacing the market 
supply by a  free public supply and because it is crucial to the problem 
of distribution of tax burdens,  i.e. to the issue of sharing the rents 
of public services.  But,  as noted,  jointness is not a  necessary con-
dition for assignment to the public sector. 
This  jointness, however,  is a  fundamental  issue in the  LG  assignment 
theory,  because it leads to the territorial map  of the benefit of the 
public services  considered. 
5·  Assignment  of the Allocation Function 
(a)  Externality or spillovers 
There  are collective goods  with a  cosmopolitan or international 
influence;  others with a  national or regional  or local influence. 
Public goods,  from  the point of view of the extension of the bene-
fit,  may  be of different types.  The  first is a  Samuelsonian "universal" 
pure public  good,  where  everybody shares in equally and  with its consump-
tion does  not  reduce that of others.  (Fig.  1) 
level of 
consumption 
0 
number  of consumers 
A more  frequent  case of a  pure public good,  however,  is that of a 
limited number  of consumers  who  are in a  given territorial area.  The 
good  is still "pure"  (everybod~ shares  in it equally without  interfering 
with  the consumption of others)  but not  "universal". - 330-
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The  area may  be determined by the technological  characters of the 
good  (a lighthouse or an  elementary school)  which  cannot  give its sez-
vices beyond  a  certain territorial sphere;  and/or by regulations  (laws, 
byelaws  and administrative decisions)  on  its supply (a polioe service 
which  is operating within a  given  jurisdiction dealing with given of-
fences  or offenders,  a  higher education school  which  enrolls students 
coming from  a  given district);  or by regulations  and  contracts  (a 
scientific research programme  whose  know-how  is reserved to a  defined 
group of members,  the  others  who  do  not sign the contract,  being ex-
cluded by the patent law);  or by political commitments  (a national 
defence system may  protect a  given list of allied nations). 
But  this was  still the hypothetical  case of a  "pure" public good 
where  the  consumption is equal for everybody and  the addition of new 
consumers  does  not affect the level  of consumption of the others.  More 
realistically,  consumption declines with the distance of the  consumers 
from  the place where  the good  is supplied or originates.(1)  Here it is 
more  difficult to identify the  proper territorial area.  (Fig.  3) 
( 1)  When  it is the  consumer that has  to move  to  get the  good  (as  in 
the  case of school  and medicare services),  one  may  argue that the 
amount  of consumption does not decline with the distance:  it is 
its utility which  declines,  because of the cost of movement.  How-
ever,  we  can also say that consumption net the transfer costs, 
i.e. the net amount  of resources available to  the  consumer,  dec-
lines.  We  find this approach more  convenient,  since in this way 
we  keep as  separate the question of different marginal utility of 
consumption of identical units of goods  by different peoples. - 331-
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But  the individual's  consumption may  be  reduced also by the number 
of additional  consumers:  here the extent of the area served has  an  effect 
not only of reducing the consumption of the more  distant  consumers,  but 
also of reducing the level of consumption of those  who  are closer to the 
centre of supply.  (Fig.  4) 
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Assuming  a  given expenditure,  the individual level of consumption 
may  be given by the lines originating in f  or f' or f"  • • •  rn  according 
to different degrees  of congestion,  due  to the different extent of the 
area served. 
If one  could always  consider the supply of a  definite,  indivisible 
amount  of a  given good  or if one  could assume  that marginal  costs are 
constant as  a  function of the size of the expenditure,  the problem of 
the proper size of the  good  supplied would not complicate the picture 
of the choice among  different levels of jurisdiction.  But in real life 
often there are increasing and  decreasing costs.  Thus  the question of 
the proper size of the  good  supplied becomes  important. 
Suppose  that with a  given amount  of expenditure E and  a  given level 
of individual.consumption fin the centre of supply,  the number  of con-
sumers  is OA  and with  2  E  they are OB  (  = 2  0  A) 
level 
of 
consump-
tion 
0 
Fig.  5 
X. 
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Suppose  further three different cases  for the supply of AB:  the 
curve of available levels of consumption is alternatively f  for f  f' 
or f  f".  In the third case decreasing returns  make  it unprofitable to 
move  the service to a  broader jurisdiction,  in the second returns are 
constant for 0  A and 0  B (1).  In the first case,  returns  increase from 
OA  to OB  and it is likely that OB  should be preferred. 
(1)  If utilities of peoples  in different areas differ,  obviously OB 
could give either>  or < . - 333-
From  the point of view of the analysis of the territorial map  of 
their benefits  and  the possibilities of exclusion of members  of other 
jurisdictions, public goods  may  be distinguished according to whether 
they primarily give a  direct technological quantifiable  (tangible) 
benefit to somebody or consist of Joint  consumption of externalities 
as  such.  The  first kind of goods  llet us  call them  T goods)  can be 
consumed  either through individual  consumption  (T.  goods)  or through 
"collective"  (normally quasi  collective), i.e. "j6int" consumption 
(T j  goods).  In the  case of the second kind of goods  (let us  call them 
E  goods),  there is no  specific physical relation between the receivers 
of the benefit and  the supply of the good,  so  that the  consumption or 
the benefit of each subject is not quantifiable. 
There  are a  number  of cases  in which  the  consumption consists of 
a  basket of T.  and  T.  goods,  e.g.  schools.  T  goods  may  cause  intangible 
spillovers  (E
1spillo~ers) through  the fact that they may  give also an 
indirect intangible benefit,  either technological but not quantifiable 
or pecuniary.  The  territorial map  of the T benefits and of theE spill-
overs  do  not necessarily coincide:  normally the second is much  broader 
than the first and less easy to draw  than the first, because  these spill-
overs  are generated not only through actions  of the  receivers  of the 
direct benefits but also through actions  of persons  and entities coming 
in relation with them.  Education and  care of infectious diseases  are 
examples  of this.  Most  T public goods  have spillovers:  if not of a 
technological kind,  in the sense that,  because of the  (free)  supply of 
public goods,  supplies of other commodities  may  become  better and  chea-
per (though taxes to pay for these  goods  have  a  contrasting,  compensating 
effect,  their territorial map  may  be different). 
Education has  physical technological spillovers which  normally en-
close the entire area of mobility of educated labour supply.  It can be 
the entire market;  but it can also be less than it if different languages 
are spoken in its different areas  in a  monopolistic way;  and it can be 
more  than the given market if emigration outside it is relatively easy. 
This,  again,  among  others,  is related to languages. 
Apart  from  "intangible" spillovers,  whose  area may  be very broad 
and not precise,  T goods  may  give also  "tangible" spillovers of a  direct 
type,  i.e. T spillovers:  local highways  may  be used also by transit 
traffic,  thus  giving tangible benefits outside the  community;  repopula-
tion of game  and fish may  benefit other areas;  lew price or free museums 
may  be visited by outsiders,  and so forth.  This  concept of "spillovers", 
unlike the other,  is  conventional.  It is relative to the sphere of 
jurisdiction of the  government  which  supplies  the service.  The  smaller 
the  jurisdiction,  the greater will be the spillover.  The  former concept 
of spillover was  in the nature of the  goods.  No  matter how  large the 
government's  jurisdiction,  there are B goods  which  entail external eco-
nomies,  in the form  of intangible benefits for others  than their direct 
consumers. - 334-
As  said,  there are also public goods  (we  called thea E  goods) 
which  primarily consist of intangible externalities as  such:  defence 
or crime  prevention are examples. 
S.ome  E  goods,  however,  from  time  to time materialize also in some 
T  goods:  in the case of public order,  people whose  life or property 
have been endangered by a  crime  may  receive specific services  through 
the public action,  even if the  true essence of the service consists of 
discouraging crimes  and it is  thus  jointly consumed  in an  immaterial 
way  by the entire community. 
In the  case of E  goods  the territorial map  of the "spillovers" is 
conventional  since it related to the area of legal-political action of 
the  considered level of government.  This  area normally - but not neces-
sarily - identifies with its  jurisdiction.  Defence  may  be granted by 
a  government  not  only to the territory of its  jurisdiction but also to 
those of other countries  in which  it has  a  strategic interest.  One  can 
then say that,  while  the benefits  given to the first community by its 
defence  are the  consumption of an E  good  by its members,  the E benefits 
accruing  to second  communi ties are spillovers.  Much  the same  may  be 
true with ET  goods:  prosecution of criminals  who  are  found  in a  given 
area and  commited  their offences  in other areas,  may  give T and  E spill-
overs  to  the members  of this other area.  This  is an important  reason 
why  public order activities tend to develop at the broader level of 
government:  i.e. that which  has  jurisdiction on  the entire common  market, 
if this is really characterized by free movement  of persons,  i.e. abo-
lition of the internal borders.  Other public order activity at the 
broader level  in the  realm of justice,  may  be  justified with  a  similar 
argument:  the territorial indivisibility of theE part of the  considered 
ET  or E  good.  Violations  of regulations  relating to the entire area 
affect its enforcement  everywhere  and  therefore should be  judged at the 
broader level.  Here,  however,  another argument  enters  the picture: 
that of the uniformity of the service.  Suppliers at lower levels may 
lack uniformity,  and  this, because  of the amplitude  of theE components 
of the public good,  may  interfere with  the unification of the area. 
It may  be  very hard to define  the broader E area of E or ET  goods 
in a  permanent  and  less  than approximate way,  since much  depends  on  the 
scope of the regulations  and  policies relating to their supply. 
What  from  the point of view of public sector assignment theory is 
a  mere  problem of externality,  from  the point of view of the  LG  assign-
ment  theory may  become  a  problem of  jointness:  it may  be that exclusion 
of other communities  is possible,  as  for most  scientific research,  where 
patents  and secrecy of know-how  may  "exclude" most  benefits  from  those 
who  are not members  of a  given initiative;  or as  in the  case of military 
powers,  where  the territory "protected" may  be  formally defined in a  way 
to exclude  those  who  do  not share its costs.  But it may  well be that 
appears  more  profitable to  increase the size of the  "club" of communities 
involved,  to take advantage  of  jointness  and  reduce  the share of fixed - 335-
costs  apportioned to  each participant  (as it may  be  in such  research 
projects  as  those of aerospace,  atomic  energy and new  sources  of energy, 
or with missiles  and nuclear systems  of deterrents). 
Spillovers in the supply of public goods  are nearly always  unavoid-
able.  However,  this does  not imply that there is always  a  condition of 
undersupply and small  consumption if the  goods  are supplied through  a 
"wrong"  level  of government.  This  is because  one  should distinguish 
three kinds  of spillovers.  Those  which,  because  of their relative size, 
do  not allow the  good  to be supplied at all;  those  which  because of their 
importance at the margin of decision cause  an undersupply;  and  those 
which  have distributional  implications but  do  not  influence the rise and 
the size of the supply. 
Suppose  that with a  given indivisible amount  of public expenditure 
E,  there are supplied to the members  of the  community  c,  OA  units of 
joint usage  of a  given public good  x  with the utility represented on  y 
by 0  e  A.  Suppose  further that other OB  units are supplied with the 
same  utility (0  e  B area)  as  a  spillover to members  of another community 
c•.  Suppose  that the  expenditure of E,  evenly distributed among  the 
beneficiaries of OA,  gives  them  a  utility loss of 0  e  Af.  Clearly there 
is no  reason to supply that good  under a  rational decision-making by 
members  of C.  However,  if members  of C'  were  called to share  in the 
costs  and had the  same  utility for money,  an  equal  personal distribution 
of the  costs  would lead to  f'Af'~ e  A (the aggregate utility of C+C'). 
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Thus ,  if the  jurisdiction covers  only C and not also C '  the  good 
will not be supplied at all.  But it will be supplied if thJ  jurisdic-
tion covers  C+C'.  Suppose  now  that the utility to  C of xis 0  e'  A~ 
0  e  fA,  the  good  will be supplied even if the  jurisdiction is limited 
to c.  Since  the  good  x  is indivisible,  there will not be  any marginal 
under-supply and under-consumption by C arising from  the external bene-
fits  given to c•,  which  does  not  contribute to the  cost 0  e  fA. 
Actually,  it may  be  that on  the whole  there will be  excess  of sup-
ply of the  good  considered.  Namely,  suppose that C can  exclude  C'  from 
a  large part of the benefits  of x,  which  remains  in the 0  e" B (this may 
be  the case with scientific research and also with defence  a.nd  several 
other public goods).  In principle C'  should try to buy from  C the bene-
fits  from  which it is  excluded.  But it may  be that,  because of the 
diffioulties of the bargaining and  of the uncertainties of the arrange-
ment  through which  c'would be  admitted to share in the benefits, it 
prefers  to  develop its own  supply of x,  which,  if the utility of x  for 
c•is 0  e' B,  gives it an  excess  of benefits  on  the  costs,  in spite of 
the spillover generated for c.  Other  communities  may  be led to the same 
action.  Thus  excess  capacity will be  generated with what  Liebenstein 
calls x  inefficiency:  since x  could be  provided,  with a  common  programme, 
through a  lower cost for each  community. 
It is also  easy to figure  cases  in which  under-consumption and 
excess  of supply exist.  Assuming,  as  is more  realistic, that x  has  some 
degree of divisibility,  and that it is possible to provide less of x 
with an expenditure  E•~E, it may  be that the net benefit (i.e. the - 337-
benefit in excess  to the cost)  will increase for  C spending E',  so  that 
it prefers  this smaller supply of x  to E,  leading to a  smaller consump-
tion of x  by C.  But it may  be that,  on  the Whole,  taking account  also 
of the external  economies  which  may  be  given to c•,  if x  was  made  freely 
available to it, and  was  called to share in the cost,  the net benefit of 
E  would  be  greater and E would be  chosen.  This  case is represented in 
Fig. 7,  where  two  expenditures E  and E'  are assumed.  Under the first 
the benefit for C is 0  e  A and  the cost,  if equally and  completely dis-
tributed on  c,  is ff ~Costs  and benefits balance and  the supply of 
xis barely convenient for c.  Reducing the expenditure toE', the bene-
fit decreases  to 0  e'  A but the  cost decreases  to f'f'OA.  The  net bene-
fit now  exceeds  the  cost.  Thus  this alternative is preferable for c, 
under the  assumption of no  sharing by C'  in the utility and cost of x. 
But  assuming that there was  a  full sharing by c•,  then forE there would 
have been a  (sizeable) net benefit;  and E•  would  have  given a  smaller 
net benefit than E.  This  is so because with two  communities  C and  C' 
(assumed  for simplicity identical),  with a  diminution  of expenditure 
for semi-indivisible goods,  the diminution  in the  cost per person de-
creases  by half in respect  to  the  case where  only one  community  C is 
considered,  while the net benefit per person decreases  exactly as  before. 
(b)  Indivisibility and economies  of scale 
Externalities arising from  joint supply of public goods  imply an 
"indivisibility" of a  fixed cost.  On  the other hand,  indivisibility of 
costs  may  or may  not  lead to  effective externalities and/or to try to 
internalize them  is sometimes  too  expensive or awkward.  Thus  there is 
an  ambiguity in referring to  one  or the other concept  as  LG  assignment 
criteria.  In LG  assignment  analysis  one  may  agree  to  consider as  "in-
divisibility" the situation of joint supply of public goods  where  ex-
ternality,  i.e. inability to exclude,  is not absolute  and  to  consider 
as  "externality" the opposite case.  (1) 
Jointness  of supply of T goods  may  imply elements  of congestion 
which  makes  their indivisibility of supply different from  the  pure 
jointness,  typical of E  goods.  Economies  of scale are,  conceptually, 
a  sub-case of indivisibility where  this is not  complete  and  can be dealt 
with accordingly as  an  LG  assignment  criterion.  Absolute indivisibility 
implies  a  finite good  of a  given size,  while  economies  of scale imply 
the possibility of varying the size of the  good.  To  break the clarity 
of the distinction,  however,  there may  be  the possibility of duplicating 
the  good  of the given size:  which  may  lead to economies  of scale for the 
addition of the second good  to the first,  in relation to general  supply 
expenses.  The  lumpiness  of this  process  obviously implies  that the 
first unit of consumption of the second good  entails  increasing rather 
than decreasing costs;  however,  after this marginal  costs  are decreasing. 
(1)  Remember,  however,  what  has  been observed at p.  329. - 338-
This  is normal  with fixed costs.  If the size of the  goods  is not fixed, 
this may  lead to  goods  of different size and  thus  to the assignment  to 
different levels of government  of supplies of a  given class of goods. 
That  the addition of other uni~s of supply to  the first ones  implies 
economies  of scale of administration is a  proposition that needs  careful 
specification.  It seems  to be true until a  given size and thus,  for 
instance,  may  be  an argument  to prevent  too small units of government. 
However,  after a  given size,  which  may  correspond to relatively small 
governments,  costs of administration may  increase because of the 
technical problem of coordination and of the difficulties of trans-
mission of information in a  big organisation and, more  important, because 
the bigger the bureaucracy,  the larger is the  incentive to shirking and 
resistance to  change.  Moreover,  quality of the  goods  supplied inclusive 
of the adherence  to the variability of needs  may  be  lower for larger 
organisations.  Quality may  decrease when  a  large organisation supplies 
the  goods,  because it is more  difficult to manage  and  control  a  large 
bureaucracy.(1)  Note,  however,  that this  is not necessarily an argument 
for devolution to  lower levels of government.  It is properly an  argument 
for reducing the size of the  government under criticism.  Thus  it may 
also lead to devolution to a  new,  higher level  of government  whose 
bureaucracy is smaller than that of lower levels:  as it may  be  the  case 
for a  new  federal state  vis-~-vis the national states;  or for a  new 
regional  government  vis-~-vis big,  local  governments  ruling on  large 
metropolitan areas.  And  devolution from  the given level  to  a  higher 
level  of government  may  be better than devolution to  lower levels,  where 
indivisibilities in administration costs  are relevant. 
Diseconomies  of scale of administration may  be  important for speci-
fic functions  where  there are repetitive unity of the service,  without 
a  greatly relevant  problem of coordination between  them,  so that  the 
increased cost  of administering them  through  a  highly centralised system 
is not  (appreciably)  compensated by decreasing supply cost per unit or 
by  the possibility of more  efficient and  less  expensive  coordination 
(elementary schools  and health and hospital services may  be  the case). 
However,  this  may  also  lead to a  dual  partition in the exercise of a 
function  in question:  general  regulation and basic choices  to  one  higher 
LG  and  implementation to  lower  LGs. 
A peculiar case of economies  of scale is that relating to bargain-
ing power.  A bigger organisation or entity may  have more  bargaining 
power  than a  set of smaller entities whose  aggregate dimension  equals 
its size.  This  is an  important  argument  for the devolution to higher 
levels of government  which  represent  a  larger jurisdiction of some  func-
tions  which  imply to deal  with other governments  (as  in the matter of 
international  agreements). 
(1)  Note,  however,  that some  of these shortcomings  may  be lessened 
through "decentralising" the  large organisations.  See  p. 344. - 339-
Indivisibilitiea and  economies  of scale are at times  argued not 
to be  an  issue per se in the  assignment  analysis  since  through "trans-
actions" or organisational activities among  the  various  governments, 
the proper size may  be reached.  Surplus  capacities of the supply of a 
given good  by a  given unit of government  may  be allocated either hori-
zontally to other governments  at the same  level  or vertically to lower 
or higher levels of government.  However,  this will not  always  be  the 
case.  A first reason  why  not is that  there are services which  cannot 
be shared because they imply a  direct exercise of the decision-making 
power.  A small  government  cannot share in most  of the  administration 
activities of larger governments,  because  they would  then be managed 
by these  others  in a  tutorial way.  A second reason is that there are 
services  which  imply a  delicate problem of power,  that neither party 
would  like to share:  a  government  cannot lend (nor another hire)  its 
police services while it can lend  (or hire)  its fire protection services. 
A third reason is that a  prestige element may  be associated with a 
given service:  it is not the same  thing for a  given  community  to have 
its own  university or hire the services of another community.  A fourth 
related reason is that this hiring and  lending may  require the dislo-
cation of the services to other places,  non  central for both  jurisdic-
tions. It is true  that if the service was  devolved  to  a  higher level 
of government  the same  problem would  arise.  However,  psychologically 
these distant users  of the service of a  broader  jurisdiction would  not 
feel hurt as  much  as  those  who  are obliged to  go  outside "their terri-
tory" to benefit  from  a  given service which  is provided by their 
government. 
In many  cases  of  joint usage,  there is the question of setting the 
plans  and  the  rules  for the service.  If they are different for the 
different governments  this  may  lead to very difficult situations for 
sharing in the service.  Finally,  those  governments  who  hire the  goods 
or services  of another are not  certain whether in the  future  they will 
be able to get  them.  The  agreement  may  not be stable.  And  certainty 
may  be an essential character for some  public services,  including those 
having to do  with bargaining power. 
Costs  are,  in any case,  involved in the  transaction designed to 
make  the sharing possible;  and bargaining among  the interested parties 
may  rule it out  even if it is  convenient to both parties,  because  they 
do  not  reach  agreement. 
In addition,  it is likely that intergovernmental sharing of pro-
vision of public  goods  and  agreement  for common  activities takes  place 
on  a  much  smaller scale than that which  could be  justified,  because of 
jealousies of their apparatus  and  their ambition to  expand their size 
and  autonomous  power.  These  motives  obviously should not be  considered 
relevant,  but rather opposed by the  citizens  and  their  re~resentatives. 
The  same  point  can be made,  however,  as  for the  resistanc.r,  to devolution 
to different  (new)  governments  or functions  of a  given LC. - 340-
(c)  Uniformity and  system of services 
A peculiar case of indivisibility has  to  do  with the need for 
certainty and uniformity of the service rendered.  This  need in turn 
may  be found both in the supply of goods  in the narrow sense and  in 
the supply of regulatory services.  The  chief justification of it is 
to avoid geographical distortion in the allocation of resources  arising 
from  unequal  supply of goods  and  services  instrumental  to production. 
Here  one  may  observe,  again,  that the issue of certainty and uniformity 
as  a  case for LG  devolution may  simply resolve itself in the problem of 
transaction or organisational  costs,  because  the  various  governments 
may  permanently and generally agree  on  providing "the same  service" 
and in harmonizing,  in the same  permanent  and  general  way,  their acti-
vities with  those of the  others.  But  to be sure of this result,  one 
must  count  on  superior power  (i.e. a  higher LG)  which  permanently en-
forces  this  "uniformity through harmonization".  The  problem here is 
not only that of organisation of the uniformity and its stability: it 
is also that of choosing the ones  who  must  renounce their preferences 
and be  compelled to  do  so  continuously. 
Thus,  if what  is  involved is a  complex regulation with a  wide 
element of discretionary power  in a  dynamic  changing situation,  true 
uniformity can be better assured by the superior government  by direct 
action.  Otherwise it would  be  obliged to perform detailed controls of 
inferior government  activities,  which  may  be  time-consuming and  cause 
too much  interference with  the service itself. 
Lack  of uniformity of the service may,  in some  case~ be tolerated 
or even be  considered a  positive value,  to make  life more  varied. 
However,  regulation  may  play a  role with another aspect of indi-
visibility, i.e. strong interdependence of given activities,  performed 
in different parts of the given area which  may  be  viewed as being ele-
ments  of a  system whose  efficiency will  increase if they are actually 
integrated.  Coordination by a  broader  LG  should be weighed against 
direct authority.  Thus  railways,  postal services,  airlines and high-
ways  of different countries  closely related may  be  coordinated with 
each  other or unified in a  unitary system at the highest LG.  If the 
autonomous  entities to be  coordinated are too many  and  each perform too 
many  activities,  coordination may  become  too difficult a  job;  fUrther-
more,  the superior authority,  being external,  may  not have  enough 
detailed knowledge  and effective power  to perform the task. 
An  important  concept  in the  LG  assignment  (leading to higher, 
broader LGs)  is that of a  "system" of services requiring coordination 
and some  certainty and uniformity.  This  may  have  to do  with a  "com-
plex" of goods  or with a  sphere of regulatory powers  or with a  combi-
nation of them.  The  "system"  concept may  lead to the fact that an 
activity which,  per se,  could be most  properly assigned to  a  given LG, 
is better assigned to another because it is part of a  system of which 
the other already takes  care. - 341-
Among  these  "systems"  emerges  that of the  complex of rules for 
assuring the functioning of the market.  This  complex  includes  the 
rules for assuring uniformity of institutional conditions  (taxes  and 
other burdens  and benefits by governments)  in competition;  the rules 
for protecting the  consumer  in an identical way  everywhere;  the rules 
for insuring the  freedom  of movement  of labour,  capital and  commodities 
and of settlement of new  initiatives;  rules  and authority for business 
entities  (corporations  and the like)  and for financial  markets;  rules 
for standardization of products.  One  may  develop these sets of regula-
tions separately in the various  countries belonging to  the same  market 
to satisfy different preferences  and traditions  of different communi-
ties.  But if the  idea of a  unified market  has  some  overriding impor-
tance,  they should be at least harmonized under the same  power  to avoid 
contradictions  and  inconsistencies;  and this  can be  done  properly only 
at the level  of the  government  which  covers  the entire market  area. 
Sometimes  a  two  level  regulations  system may  be  too  complicated and 
the  case  may  be made  for complete devolution of this ruling complex  to 
the broadest  LG. 
In addition to allocative geographical neutrality,  "basic rights" 
may  be  another important  frame  of reference to nuclearize "system"  of 
regulations  and  of services which  require coordination and  some  degree 
of uniformity.  Thus  a  system may  be  that relating to  the effective 
possibility of circulation to peoples  within a  given community:  which 
has  to  do  both with  the rights  to move  and with the  provision of  commu-
nication and transportation facilities.  Another system may  be that 
relating to the  freedom  of expression and of communication of thought 
and of information;  and here  again both the protection of basic rights 
and services  are  called in.  It should be noted that the facilities  in 
question may  not be  public  (or freely provided);  but  they are,  in any 
case  from  this point of view,  a  matter of public  concern for regulation. 
Other basic rights  may  be  those  of basic education and basic 
health protection.  Here distributional  arguments  enter strongly into 
the picture together with straight externality arguments  particularly 
for education.  But  what  we  are  considering at this point is not whether 
the  goods  should be publicly provided and  which  government  can  more 
properly take  account of the map  of the benefits.  We  are  considering 
the  theme  of "uniformity" as  a  character of the services  conceived as 
"system". 
Inequality of proV1s1on  of these final  consumption public goods 
in different areas  may  violate allocational efficiency since it may 
create distortions  in the allocation of population,  artificially stimu-
lating migrations  to more  affluent areas  where  a  better level of these 
services  (among  others)  is granted.  This  apart,  it may  appear unjust. 
It may  be  thought  that each  citizen of a  given  community should be  en-
titled to  a  given share of some  goods  designed to provide him  with  a 
starting point in his life and activity and to satisfy his basic needs. 
It should be  observed that unification of these provisions will normally cost 
and 
price 
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result in an average  increase in the level of supply,  since  one  can 
scarcely conceive that the harmonization could take place not only 
raising the less  favoured  areas  to a  "normal" standard but also deter-
iorating the standards  already granted to some  more  favoured population. 
It should be  observed,  however,  at this point that this movement 
to  insure uniformity in satisfaction of basic needs  may  be  an  insidious 
movement.  Bureaucracies  and personnel  involved in the provision of 
these services  may  be  interested in emphasizing the social virtues  of 
their supply in satisfying "basic needs",  in order to  increase their 
output  as  far as  possible. 
q 
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In Fig.  8A  a  normal  collective demand  curve  for a  given public 
good  is depicted,  with  cost  (assumed to be  constant)  crossing it at OQ, 
leading to  consumption OQ  which  is  much  less  than what  citizens would 
consume  at  zero price.  With  a  "social" collective demand  curve  as 
depicted in Fig.  8B,  the quantity consumed  with the same  price  (and 
cost)  is OQ',  which  is nearly the amount  consumed  at  zero  price.  This 
"plateau" demand  curve  implies,  however,  that each  "need"  covered by 
it is  a  "basic" need for which  everybody is entitled to satisfaction and 
the  community,  because  of its inherent  value,  is  ready to pay a  much 
higher price than its unit cost.  Where  this  "plateau" demand  curve 
exists,  it may  be  easy to  argue that a  zero price does  not  lead to 
allocative distortion.  And  the  cost may  also be substantially increased 
- as  may  happen  through  a  centralization which  increases  the standards 
of the services uniformly to the higher standards -without affecting 
the size of the  supply,  which  appears  justifiable. - 343-
In general,  it may  be said that the uniformity and  coordination 
criterion,  prima facie,  leads  to centralization while that of democra-
tic control  (as  we  will see later) entails a  presumption of decentral-
ization.  But  there is more  than one  line of argument  that prima facie 
leads  to the  centralization of allocative activities relating to  the 
market process  and  to general life.  We  have  already partly discussed 
them  in the  course  of the previous  pages,  but it is now  convenient to 
review them  together. 
uniformity:  a  unified area cannot be regulated in different ways 
in its different parts if it is to be  conceived as  a  unitary 
market;  if basic rights  are  to be  generally assured;  if prin-
ciples of a  basic equality of treatment are to apply.  This 
principle applies  also  to market  regulations affecting specific 
sectors  (e.g.  agriculture or steel); 
coordination:  services unifying the area must  be  coordinated 
in a  unique network; 
externality:  allocative activity which  channels  resources  to 
less  developed or declining regions  of the  area has  a  positive 
external  effect on  more  developed regions  also  in other nations 
because it increases  investment  opportunities  for the  capital; 
increases  the possibilities of selling and mutual  gains  from 
trade within the  community;  increases  the possibility of  (or 
reduces  the deviations  from)  a  monetary union,  thus  increasing 
the benefits of the integrationj  some  allocative activities 
relating to given industries  (e.g. oil) may  entail spillover 
for the entire  community  through  a  cheaper and safer supply; 
manpower  training and labour mobility policies may  spill their 
benefits  around; 
indivisibilities and  economies  of scale:  some  regulatory 
activities which  imply important  research and  technical  know-
how  (e.g.  standards  of health,  and of safety of foods)  can 
be more  conveniently carried on  at a  broader LG;  as  for the 
external  relations  (in the areas  of trade and so  on)  unitary 
action at a  broader LG  may  provide substantial  increase of 
bargaining power. 
(d)  Democracy  and  the decentralization theorem 
The  democratic  control  argument  entails a  presumption of decen-
tralization.  In this  connection has  also been formulated a  "decentral-
ization theorem".  However,  the  issue is a  complex  one  and must  be 
analysed in its different elements.  These  appear to be:  the flexibi-
bility of "delivery";  the  expression of diversified preferences  (or 
minimization of frustration);  the feed-back between preferences, 
choices  and results  of action taken;  and  a  better check on  the effic-
iency of public administration. - 344-
The  first argument  is rather obvious:  the  closer a  government  is 
to the area where  the needs  arise,  the quicker and  more  accurate its 
administration will be  in satisfying these needs;  the more  flexible 
will be  the service to  the variation of the needs.  This,  however, 
applies  only to some  public goods.  An  analogy here  may  be  drawn  with 
business  operations,  having to do  with  certain kinds  of market  orien-
tated industries,  where  a  high degree of decentralization is needed to 
cope  with  the varied and ramified demands.  But  the  same  analysis 
suggests  that this  is not necessarily an  argument  in favour of a  lower 
LG;  it may  simply be  an  argument  for territorial decentralization of 
the structure of a  given activity of a  higher LG.  Just as  there are 
large national  corporations  which serve local  consumers  in diversified 
markets  through  a  high degree  of decentralization,  the  same  may  be 
conceived for a 1arge national  (or federal)  government.  Or  one  may 
conceive  the  lower government  as  a  mere  executor of the higher level 
of government,  which  appears  useful  only because  of its capillarity. 
The  second argument  is much  more  important.  It is certainly true 
that if smaller communities  are more  homogeneous  in tastes  and  criteria 
of choice,  due  to the  impact  of the  common  environment  and  cultural 
tradition,  than the larger communities  of which  they form  a  part,  the 
"frustrated" minority will be smaller,  since it will be  possible to 
differentiate  (subject to  the constraints  of the  "uniformity"  criterion 
for the larger community)  the public supplies  to adhere  to  the differ-
ent tastes  and  criteria of choice of the different  communities.  In 
addition,  those  who  want  to  join a  majority in a  large  community  may 
be  obliged to  renounce  the peculiarities of their preferences.  However, 
there are functions  where  differences  in tastes  and  in criteria of choice 
are not related to the differences  in the environment  and  cultural 
traditions of the different territorial communities,  but  to differences 
in income,  sex,  age  class,  ethnic beliefs,  education,  profession,  and 
several other factors  which  are dispersed on  the territory of the 
broader community.  In this case,  the frustrated minority may  not be 
smaller in the smaller community.  Furthermore,  there is a  problem 
which  is very difficult to solve,  in considering the degree  of frus-
tration,  i.e.  the  intensity of frustration versus  the number  of frus-
trated people. 
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Suppose first that the number  of frustrated people  is ~with a 
unit  (or per head)  degree of frustration~ referring to their loss 
of utility as it can be  observed.  Suppose  then that the number  of 
frustrated people  is on'  = 2  on,  while their unit degree of frustration 
is of= 1/2 of'. According to the assumption that lower governments 
are better because  they frustrate less people,  the  degree  of frustra-
tion should be measured only in terms  of numbers  of people:  thus  the 
second case  (where unit frustration is ~) should always  be  considered 
worse  than the first (where unit frustration  is~).  But  this is a 
faulty reasoning.  Nearly all citizens have  some  degree  of frustration 
even if they belong to the ruling majority,  because their preferences 
cannot be fully reflected in the standardized supply of public services 
or activities.  Thus  by necessity one  must  introduce the notion of in-
tensity of frustration.  Then,  however,  one  should consider that with 
a  more  heterogeneous  majority,  as  the large size communities  are  as-
sumed  to be,  a  less sharp contrast between majority and  minority will 
exist and  a  lesser degree of frustration of the minorities  may  emerge. 
Obviously if there is  a  very high mobility,  frustration may  be  reduced 
through  changes  in residence  (voting by foot),  as  in the familiar Tiebout 
theorem.  Mobility decreases  as  the extension of the  community  increases. 
To  sum  up,  the thesis that "minimization of frustration" supports 
devolution to a  lower  LG  does  not  always  appear true or unambiguous: 
the degrees  of frustration of different people must  be  assessed and 
weighed  one  against the other.  However,  this thesis retains  important 
elements  of validity. 
Against  the proliferation of small units  of government,  however, 
another point should be made:  democracy entails a  "cost of partici-
pation" for those  involved in it, if nothing else at least through the 
time  and attention required to "participate".  Since for some  services, 
economies  of scale, spillovers, need of uniformity point to larger units 
of government,  the  argument  for minimization of the degree of frustra-
tion would  lead to a  large nlll!lber  of governments  to which  the  individual 
should participate.  Ideally,  one  might  conceive  a  multiplication of 
government  to  take account  of the  variation of preferences  which  leads 
to decentralization together with the factors  which,  in many  cases, 
lead to  centralization.  However,  this multiplicity entails  costs  of 
participation and therefore must  be limited.  The  same  argument  applies 
also for other benefits of decentralized or participatory democracy 
which  we  are  going to  explore now. 
The  "decentralization theorem"  states not  only that at the  lower 
levels it is easier to deliver a  service  complying with  preferences 
because  the  government  and  its administration is  closer to  the  people 
and  that  there may  be  a  lesser degree  of frustration.  It adds  that it 
is  easier to  obtain services  and policies  closer to  the  preferences  and 
more  consistent and  informed  choices because  those  who  consume  the  pub-
lic supply can better control whether what  is supplied corresponds  to 
them  and  is really satisfactory.  Small  size bureaucracies  may  also be 
better controlled by politicians,  and  small  governments  by the  elec-
torate. - 346-
This·is often true.  However,  the  argument  is not without limits. 
First of all, it should be noted that it does  not necessarily work 
"in a  continuum"  from smaller to larger size jurisdictions.  There 
may  be  a  level at which  the size is large enough  to exclude  a  "personal" 
relationship between the citizens  and the  government.  A big munici-
pality may  already be  in that range.  At  the broader levels of a  feder-
ation in relation to large national states,  the difference of size may 
no  more  be  relevant.  Furthermore,  the  degree  of this relationship 
depends  also  on  the institutions  and  on  the degree  of participation. 
An  active federal  parliament where  interest groups  cannot  easily com-
bine may  perform a  more  efficient control  than defective representative 
bodies  of a  large local administration. 
In addition,  one  must  distinguish between T goods  and E  goods. 
The  first,  because  they give  a  tangible benefit,  may  be  the  object of 
material  check by the local  consumers.  They  are mostly "localized" 
goods  which  operate with  a  distribution on the territory according to 
the  places  where  their users  are resident,  live or work.  Thus  the 
check by the local  consumers  is also  (even if not  always  because  of 
commuters,  tourists,  and  transit traffic)  a  check by the  voter of the 
local  community. 
But  forE goods  the situation is different.  Very often consumers 
do  not enter into tangible  contact with their supply and  therefore 
they cannot  express  judgements  by direct experience.  When  they enter 
into tangible  contact  as it may  be  the  case  of public order and  judi-
ciary services it may  be  an occasional  experience which  leads  to a 
distorted balance of assessments.  A technical,  informed intermediation 
by a  political class,  by the parliament,  by the press,  by professional 
people  involved in this activity may  thus  be  the  most  relevant or even 
the only relevant  element  for effective,  informed choice  and  control. 
And  there is no  reason to  imagine  that this  is  done better at the local 
level.  In such technical  areas  as  monetary policy or external defence, 
the  technical qualifications  may  be  lacking here.  Furthermore,  they 
may  have  a  territorial distribution which  does  not  coincide with the 
local  community  where  the  contact with the  tangible  components  of the 
benefits is realized (e.g.  justice,  much  of police,  scientific re-
search):  and  therefore decentralization is not  a  legitimate choice 
system.  Finally,  as noted,  broader governments  need not be  "bigger" 
governments. 
(e)  Innovation and  competition 
An  important  argument  favouring the development  of a  number  of 
governments  (i.e. of regions  or of a  federation),  as  against unitary 
states,  is  that of innovation and of comparison.  Competition among 
different governments  may  lead to more  innovation,  both  in the quality 
and kind of services  and  in the efficiency of performance  and  adminis-
trative aspects.  Improvements  may  be  obtained through  comparison 
(relative innovation).  The  argument  may  also be  applied to local 
bodies,  even if here  there may  be less scope for  innovation,  because 
of their limited autonomy. - 347-
The  argument  may  be used to favour the assignment  to a  multipli-
city of governments  of functions  formerly or elsewhere assigned to  one 
government;  and therefore also to favour  the  creation of a  new  level 
of government  with many  entities which  take over functions  from  the 
superior layer.  It might  appear that it cannot be used to favour the 
emergence  of a  federal  level of government,  since in this  case functions 
which  formerly were  given to several  governments  will be assigned to 
one  government  alone.  However,  this is not  correct.  If devolution 
does  not  concern an  entire function but only a  part or an  aspect,  what 
really takes  place in respect to that function is the  increase  in the 
number  of governments  involved in it and  therefore the  energy potential 
devoted to  innovation.  Furthermore,  there are general  aspects  of 
government  and administration in which  a  fresh unit of government,  cre-
ating new,  modern  criteria, may  offer important  elements  of comparison. 
More  generally,  innovations  depend  also on  the  capacity of inno-
vating.  The  scale of technical qualification of government  may  be an 
important  element in it together with its age.  The  innovative  charac-
teristics of the u.s.  federation in respect of its states has  often 
been recognized. 
Thus  also some  degree of centralization (in a  broader layer of 
government),  particularly if related to a  (level of)  government  which 
is young and  therefore more  modern  and elastic,  may  be  conducive to 
innovation and fruitful  comparison. 
(f)  Political homogeneity 
Economic  and  collective choice  arguments  in favour of devolution 
of a  given LG  may  run counter to an  important  "homogeneity"  argument 
which  is often overlooked by economists:  that of political compatibi-
lity or political necessity of a  given function for a  given level  of 
government.  This  argument,  in a  sense,  relates  to  "constitutional" 
choices rather than to the specific choices under a  given constitut-
ional  frame.  The  term,  however,  is used here not  to mean  a  written, 
rigid pact on  a  constitution. 
Nobody  would  leave defence  and related foreign policy matters  to 
regional  governments.  This  is because defence is  thought to be  the 
task of the level of government  which  has more  political powers.  A 
similar case arises for the devolution of defence  to an economic  union 
which  does  not appear politically ripe to have more  powers  than the 
national states.  The  same  reasoning is relevant for general  powers 
of taxation as  contrasted with specific tax powers  in given areas. 
Political necessity may  require that a  given LG  has  at least some 
functions  in areas  endowed  with significant political powers  in order 
to give it the required political status.  So  if a  federation cannot 
be  given defence  and  related foreign affairs, it should be  given at 
least some  other important foreign affairs,  because  a  state cannot be 
considered such if it has  no  foreign policy.  This  may  be an  important 
argument  to give foreign aid to the EEC  (federal)  level.  (1) 
(1)  We  will see that is not the only one. - 348 -
Political homogeneity may  change  through time:  a  new  central 
federal  government  may  gain the  confidence  of its citizens  through 
time  and  thus  may  be  granted some  powers,  as  those  in the area of 
defence  and  money  which  appeared  improper to it before.  But  this 
process  implies  also a  change  in the hierarchical levels,  through 
which  the member  states become  not only a  smaller but also  a  lower 
level  in respect to  the federal state. 
Increased trust in a  new  government  over time  may  be  a  factor 
conditioning assignment  to it of functions;  citizens may  wait  to see 
how  its bureaucracy is able to administer its affairs,  how  the parlia-
ment  and  government  is able  to interpret their choices,  how  they are 
able  to control its activity.  Resistance  to  innovation may  be  won 
through  time.  Still, the political homogeneity argument  implies  some-
thing more:  it requires qualitative  change,  i.e. something like a 
change  in the  constitutional  (even unwritten)  pacts. 
6.  Assignment  of the Stabilization and Employment  Function 
Allocative functions,  as  is well  known,  are only a  part of the list of 
functions  of a  government;  LG  assignment must  deal  also with distribu-
tional  objectives  and stabilization and full  employment  functions. 
The  LG  assignment  analysis  can follow here  the  spectrum of criteria 
that  we  have  sorted out for allocation.  All  of them  seem  relevant both 
for full  employment  and stabilization,  and for distribution.  But  what-
ever the specific criteria in these  cases,  one  cannot  overlook the 
connection of these functions  with  the allocative ones.  A too small 
federal  government  may  not have  enough  scope  to  perform stabilization 
and full  employment  activities;  thus  arguments  for the  assignment  of 
allocative functions  with  an  important spending effect to a  new  broader 
central  government  may  be derived from  the opportunity of enabling it 
to perform stabilization functions  which  are better suited to this 
level.  On  the other hand,  a  sub-federal state may  be so big and  may 
cover so  large a  share of the  common  market  as  to be able to carry out 
its fiscal  policy,  even if it may  be  thought better to have  this func-
tion performed mostly at the  central-federal level.  As  we  will see, 
there are also specific  reasons  why  national  governments  may  be pre-
served or granted functions  in the area of stabilization and full 
employment  policy. 
Allocative functions  may  have  an  important  impact  on  distribution. 
This  fact may  provide  the  government  which  performs  them  with  good 
arguments  to  justify its role  in distribution:  either to exploit  the 
opportunities  furnished by these effects or to  counteract  them,  if 
they are  considered to be  in the wrong direction. 
Finally,  growth  policies,  which  are  an  important part of allocative 
functions,  are strictly related to fiscal policies for stabilization 
and full  employment,  and  also with distributive functions,  particular-
ly in the area of regional  policies. - 349-
Several arguments  seem  to lead to devolution of fiscal  policy to the 
broadest level of government.  The  externality criterion requires  that 
stabilization policies would  be  done  at the broadest  LG  as  measured in 
relation to the extent of the market  area involved because,  as  is well 
known,  multipliers of fiscal policy actions  exert themselves  on  the 
entire market  area.  But  even more  important,  to  assign this  function 
to the broadest level of government  (i.e.  in an  economic  union to  the 
central-federal level)  is the unification and uniformity criterion as 
related to  the functioning of the market  economy.  If an effective 
fiscal  policy at this level  is not  carried out,  and  contradictory poli-
cies are  executed at the national levels,  the market  could be broken 
by changes  in currency parities and by  interference with movements  of 
commodities,  capital and labour within the area.  This  consideration 
provides also  important  reasons  to  carry on  regional  and sectoral poli-
cies for employment  and  growth at the central-federal level  in case 
they are not  enough  at the sub-federal states level:  without these,  it 
is likely that different national monetary and fiscal policies will be 
retained and waged  in conflicting ways,  thus  leading to lack of unifi-
cation and uniformity in basic monetary and  credit conditions,  and 
perhaps  to backward steps  in the functioning of the market.(1)  To  sum 
up,  to make  a  substantial devolution of monetary policy powers  to the 
central-federal level workable,  one  requires  regional  and sectoral 
employment  and  growth policies.  And  without  this monetary policy 
devolution,  one  cannot keep a  unified and uniform functioning of the 
market. 
The  innovation and competition criterion, however,  may  lead to some 
devolution down,  given the bad experiences  of "huge" national  govern-
ments  in these areas. 
In favour of devolution of monetary and fiscal  policy to a  broad "new" 
government  and  parliament such as  that of a  federal  European  Community, 
an  important  argument  may  be  that of fresh  ideas  and  energies  found 
here vis-h-vis  the existing states and parliaments.  But  this,  obvious-
ly,  is more  valid in comparison with some  of the member  countries than 
with others.  The  homogeneity criterion,  however,  may  contradict the 
others.  Monetary policy is a  jealous  prerogative~  which  politically 
may  appear inappropriate,  both to lower  (regional)  governments  as  well 
as  for broader new  federal  levels;  and  so also is fiscal  policy in its 
relationship with monetary policy (particularly public debt). 
(1)  As  seen in the discussion of allocative functions  relating to 
growth,  one  may  justify regional  policies also in terms  of ex-
ternality: because  to develop less  developed regions  may  reduce 
the  congestion and  external diseconomies  of more  advanced regions. - 350-
Also  the criterion of democratic choice  and  control  may  lead to refu-
sal of devolution from  the nation state to either lower or higher 
layers of government.  As  for the lower governments,  one  may  believe 
that they lack appropriate democratic control  on  fiscal  and monetary 
matters because  they lack a  skill in this area.  As  for the higher, 
new  federal  level of government,  one  may  recognize that they may  have 
the proper democratic decision-making bodies  only when  democratic 
structures such as  a  directly elected parliament are  created.  It may 
further be  recognized that they can acquire  the proper skills, but it 
may  be argued that basic differences  exist among  the preferences  of 
various nation states for the rate of inflation versus  the rate of 
employment,  for the rate of growth  and for the rate of inflation versus 
the  fiscal  burden,  and these factors  affect both the  conduct  of mone-
tary and fiscal policies  and their relationship.(1) 
Here  we  find a  dramatic problem of devolution theory which  has not 
been explored enough:  that of a  clash of criteria.  Disequilibrium 
may  emerge,  because of that clash,  if a  sharp solution is  chosen.  A 
second-best and weak  solution may  appear preferable,  thus  leading to 
partial assignment. 
7•  Assigrment  of the Distribution Function 
As  for distribution,  the externality argument  here applies  in several 
related ways:  the first is the "solidarity" among  individuals,  i.e. 
the altruistic disposition through which utility functions  of differ-
ent people are  interdependent;  the second is the  "public order" argu-
ment,  i.e. the egoistic motivation that redistribution prevents dis-
order and  thus  protects  from  violence  and disruption and fosters 
improvements  of inferior classes,  thus helping to promote better eco-
nomic  conditions  and hence more  trade;  the third is the  insurance or 
choice under the veil of ignorance  argument,  i.e. the uncertainty 
argument  about  the situation facing ourselves or our children in the 
future,  such as  for our income  and  our needs  (which  are also related 
to the health conditions).  Everybody else's altruism aids us  in sol-
ving these  problems,  as  our's  is aiding the others:  thus  a  prisoner's 
dilemma  may  arise,  since we  personally are a  small entity which  does 
not affect much  with its "avaricious" or "generous" behaviour the 
degree  of "solidarity" existing in society.  To  apply this reasoning, 
(1)  The  indivisibility or decreasing return argument  could be appli-
cable  to  the  centralization of fiscal  policy and sectoral policies 
for growth  and  employment,  only when  small  versus  large govern-
ments  are  confronted. - 351-
which  is an application of the externality theorem  (1)  to the broadest 
LG  relating to a  given  common  market  area,  one  has  to have  given con-
ditions under the  above  three arguments.  "Strong" solidarity may  be 
limited to our own  region or nation:  with  the more  distant populations, 
even if members  of the same  common  market  or economic  union area,  only 
a  "weak"  solidarity may  exist.  This  fact may  limit the willingness  to 
undertake  internal redistribution on  solidarity grounds.  However,  it 
does  not  constitute a  limiting factor as  for external solidarity, i.e. 
that vis-h-vis  the third world:  all nations  of the union are here  on 
the equal  footing of a  "weak"  generosity.  The  externality argument 
operates  in favour of doing this at the federal-central  level since 
here the external effects of behaviour of other nations may  be "inter-
nalized" and the prisoner dilemma  and  free rider problems  reduced.(2) 
Also  the  public order argument  may  apply in a  "weak"  way  to distant 
populations belonging to the same  market  area.  It may  be  objected that 
disruptions  of the existing order may  affect the union,  if they lead 
to separatism from  the  common  market.  But  one  may  reply that there 
are more  efficient methods  than mere  redistribution to  avoid this. 
One  perhaps  may  dare to say that the  consideration of this problem  may 
constitute a  case for the assignment  to  the central-federal level of 
sectoral and regional  policies  implying some  redistribution,  but  empha-
sizing allocational and stabilization objectives rather than mere  re-
distributive policies.  Clearly,  as  for international order problems 
outside the  economic unions,  nations will share a  common  interest: 
here  again the externality arguments  suggest assignment  of the distri-
butive functions  to  the  central-federal LG. 
The  "insurance"  argument  may  justify redistribution through  the  central-
federal  level if disequalities of  incomes  and  economic  opportunities 
among  the different regions  do  not appear stable and/or if very high 
mobility exists also  from  the rich to the poor areas.  This  may,  for 
instance,  justify a  central-federal  programme  for aid to unemploy-
ment.(3) 
(1)  Note  that "altruistic" people may  be happy to "give",  even if the 
others  do  not  give;  however,  they may  be reluctant in giving be-
cause  of fear that no  result will be  reached because  the  others 
do  not  give  (because  of the  same  fear).  If we  consider "egoistic" 
people  who  give for egoistic motivations  only,  an additional  "free 
rider" reasoning will be applicable:  they do  not  give because  they 
expect that all the others  will  give  and  the small addition of 
their gift will not add significantly to the total. 
(2)  Fear that the aid might be  "wasted" may  limit the solidarity. 
This  is a  delicate point in a  federation where  member  nations  who 
give are not  allowed to administer aid.  It is not  an  issue making 
for a  centralization of foreign aid. 
(3)  This  argument  is not relevant for foreign aid,  if consideration 
is limited- as  here - to that of aid from  developed to under-
developed countries. - 352-
The  indivisibility and  economies  of scale criterion is very important 
in justifying redistribution by a  higher level of government if speci-
fic projects have  to be undertaken,  whose  size overrides  the  capabili-
ties of  a  given smaller level  community.  Assignment  of foreign aid to 
the  central-federal  government  is  a  clear case here,  since there are 
many  nations  to be  aided and  "big pushes" are needed to reach signifi-
cant  results.(1)  This  may  also be  the  case for some  specific projects 
within a  given  economic  union,  even if one  should remember  that a  pre-
liminary condition must  here be  met,  i.e. that there is  a  willingness 
by the majority of the  community belonging to the union to do  so. 
Uniformity and coordination  (2)  may  be  a  strong argument  to centralize 
redistribution activities,  since many  governments  acting in this area 
may  lead to an overlapping of interventions  in favour of certain groups 
and areas  while others  are unequitably overlooked.  This  is a  powerful 
argument  for assigning the foreign  aid functions  to  the  central-federal 
level.  It may  also be  an  important  criterion for having the central-
federal  level  government  completing the member  states and  the lower 
LGs  in their redistributional activities,  in order to assure certain 
uniform standards.  It should be noted that disequality in distribu-
tional policies in different areas  of the same  community may  entice 
distortive emigrations  to the more  advanced areas,  thus artificially 
congesting them.  They may  also  increase the  room  for free  rider beha-
viour,  stimulating rich "egoistic" people to leave areas  with higher 
tax rates,  while  they still enjoy the benefits  of the redistribution 
made  possible with  the high  taxes  levied on others.  However,  it should 
be noted that if a  broader LG  "unconditionally"  completes  a  standard 
left incomplete by a  smaller LG,  this may  result in an  incentive for 
"egoistic" governments  at this other layer to  reduce  their standards. 
Political homogeneity is  involved in the redistributive issue indirect-
ly through the fact that spending requires  a  power to tax.  This  power 
may  not be  given to  a  new  government  for broad redistributive activi-
ties  (e.g.  to a  new  federal  government  which  may  be  given allocative 
or other "economic"  functions)  because it may  interfere too much  with 
given political equilibria and  property rights.  Redistribution may 
appear homogeneous  only if contained within given limits.  It should 
be noted that this  argument  is not  relevant for foreign aid by deve-
loped countries since it is already conceived as  a  function with  a 
rather limited scope. 
(1)  Note  that here the  issue of redistributions  changes  in a  problem 
of allocation of resources  for growth:  however,  what  matters  for 
the budget  of the  donor  countries  is  the distributional activity, 
since the allocative  functions  made  possible by it are done  in 
the recipient countries. 
(2)  The  unification of the market  criterion coincides with the  "public 
order"  argument  reviewed under the heading of "externality". - 353-
The  democratic control criterion,  as usual,  pushes  towards  "decentral-
ization".  Preferences  in such  a  delicate matter as  redistribution may 
be  very different as  between member  states.  However,  for foreign aid 
it seems  that what  generally exists is mostly a  "weak"  solidarity, 
together with limited appreciation of the public order argument.  Here 
homogeneity of preferences  is not much  related to  the territorial dis-
tribution of the population.  It should be noted that,  in this  area, 
control at the national or local level of the results  of the  expendi-
ture is not possible for those  paying for it, since the aid is spent 
outside the country,  while  as  for domestic  aid the  case is the  oppo-
site:  decentralization may  help in checking that the aid is not wasted. 
The  innovation and  comparison argument  may  allow distributive activi-
ties to be practised by a  number  of governments  and also by smaller 
LGs.  However,  one  must  remember  that the risk of waste is thus  increa-
sed.  This may  be  a  particularly important  consideration for foreign 
aid since the amount  that developed countries are willing to transfer 
is very limited in comparison to  that which  seems  to be  required by 
underdeveloped nations  for a  significant reduction in income  dispari-
ties. 
8.  Partial Assignment  Solutions 
Having explored the  LG  assignment  criteria one  may  come  to the  conclu-
sion that in many  instances no  satisfactory solution may  be found 
because  the different criteria support different conclusions.  To 
mitigate this pessimism,  however,  one  must  consider two  points.  The 
first is that every decision,  in general,  entails opportunity costs. 
Clearly in the area of private versus  public supply and  free offer 
versus  pricing for the public  good  it is so.  That  this is the  case 
with  LG  assignment  too,  therefore,  should not  constitute a  surprise. 
The  second point is that functions  may  be broken down  in different 
components  assigned to different levels of government.  Actually when 
they are performed entirely by a  given LG,  they are often carried on 
by different administrations. 
The  public expenditure  process  undergoes  many  stages.  In the  case of 
the  provision of goods  they are: 
1.  Decision-making at the basic level  and general  regulations 
2.  Planning of projects  and activities 
3.  Finance 
4•  Procurement of personnel 
5·  Procurement  of products  to be processed and/or to be  employed 
as  factors  of production,  or to be supplied 
6.  Procurement  of investments - 354-
7.  Maintenance 
8.  Day-to-day management  and administration 
9·  Delivery 
Also  transfer expenditures  and regulatory activities may  be broken 
down  into several stages,  repeating in a  simplified way  this classifi-
cation.  As  noted,  one  should distinguish between  complete and partial 
assignment  of a  function to a  given LG.  Participation in a  given func-
tion by different LGs,  i.e. partial assignment,  might  be the proper 
choice which  maximizes  the constrained objectives. 
We  may  distinguish between vertical and horizontal participation in 
assignment:  the first being that where  different stages of the  given 
activity are assigned to different LGs  in a  different position of power, 
and the second that where  different  LGs  cooperate in the same  function 
on  an  equal basis.  From  the first point of view,  the chief distinction 
is that between control  (such as  basic decision-making,  regulation and 
revision)  and  execution.  There are several ways  in which  control  may 
be  exerted: 
(a)  Conditional  finance:  either with a  simple  connection of 
a  given transfer to a  given function or with specific 
conditions attached to the transfer related to a  given 
function 
(b)  Power  to enact provisions  to regulate in a  general  way 
that function 
(c)  Supervision or actual realization of decision-making 
(d)  Simple  veto power 
(e)  A posteriori control  (auditing) 
One  may  define as  "active"  control, finance  with specific conditions, 
regulatory provisions,  supervision of actual realization of decision-
making;  and as  passive controls,  finance  for a  given function without 
specific conditions,  veto power  and auditing.  Some  of the criteria 
of assignment  may  be satisfied by simple negative controls:  externali-
ties often through  global  t.ransfer for the given activities generating 
them;  some  major aspects  of uniformity through veto  powers.  Others 
could be satisfied through active control:  thus  "system"  coordination 
and uniformity;  some  cases  of indivisibility. 
Horizontal participation may  take basically two  different forms: 
1)  Cooperation by different LGs  in the same  function,  by: 
(a)  each performing a  given activity or policy which  belongs 
or relates to that function  (education and social assis-
tance to the scholars); 
(b)  performing the given activity for a  given segment  of the 
population or a  given area; - 355-
2)  Participation by different LGs  in the same  activity or policy, 
in an equal  position: 
(a)  providing different factors  of production  (the teachers 
and  the school  premises)  or different components  of the 
same  good  (the building and  the furniture of the school); 
(b)  providing different stages of the supply:  investment, 
maintenance  and  repairs,  exercise,  materials  to be  pro-
cessed and  their processing; 
(c)  sharing the finance; 
(d)  sharing the planning and  the decision-making. 
An  assignment  of functions  table,  like that elaborated b~ Breton,  may 
thus  be built (in the positive or in the normative sense)  with further 
complications.  To  Breton's  cases 0  and  1,  which  indicate no  performance 
and  performance of a  function by the given government  (either in the 
positive or in the normative sense),  one  may  add  other cases relating 
to vertical  (1)  and horizontal  (2)  participation in a  function. 
(1)  The+ symbol  would  indicate active control and- symbol  passive 
control.  The  exercise of an active control function by a  govern-
ment  on  another,  in the box relating to the first government, 
will be indicated with a  + above  the symbol  of this other govern-
ment;  while  the exercise of a  passive control will be  indicated 
with a  - above  that symbol.  In the box for the government  under 
control  there will be the symbol  of the controlling government 
with sign- or+ above  the sign 1· 
(2)  Horizontal participation in a  function generates  a  number  of cases 
which  can be  easily dealt with  through adding a  subscript relating 
to the  government  sharing in the function with the  considered 
government,  to the number  1  with which  its performance  of the  given 
function is indicated.  Suppose  that the levels of government  are 
indicated in the  rows  with  Roman  numbers  I, II, III,  IV  ••• X and 
the functions  in columns with f 1,  f 2,  f_~  •••  f  •  Suppose  that 
government  II shares function  f  witn goverRment  III in a  hori-
zontal participation.  In the bo±  of f1 relating to  government  I 
we  will  then write 1II to indicate this  joint participation,  while 
in the same  column  for the  row  of government  II we  will write 1I· 
And  if government  III, for instance,  is controlling actively 
government  II,  we  will write III+.  If a  government  shares a 
1  II 
function with several others,  subscripts and  superscripts will be 
more  complicated. 
If fUnctions  are finely split, eaCh  box will contain one  symbol; 
but if they are presented synthetically, it will contain more  than 
one;  to make  the table clearer, it would  then be usetul.  to out 
each box in two  parts, one  for the  oases  of control functions  and 
the other for complete or partial performance of it in a  non-
control position. - 356-
The  assignment  table thus  modified can show  not only the presence  of 
the  various  governments  in the various  functions but also,  to  a  point, 
their degree of presence  and  autonomy  in its exercise,  and their regu-
latory and  financing activity as  contrasted with  the  execution of the 
functions. 
To  arrive at this functions  assignment table,  another kind of assign-
ment  table may  be  constructed,  i.e. the criteria of assignment  table. 
This  will  give  the various  LG  assignment  criteria in the  rows,  and 
the  various  LG  called in discussion for assignments  in the  columns, 
with the  various  types  of assignment under analysis:  complete or par-
tial assignment;  and in this second case,  assignment of a  controlling 
or an executive type.  For each case  one  must  distinguish at least two 
possibilities:  yes  or no.  But  the analysis might be refined distin-
guishing three  cases:  a  strong positive solution,  a  weak  positive 
solution and  the negative.  It is worth noting that one  does  not 
necessarily need to build an "assignment criteria" table  complete for 
all the levels  of government.  One  may  concentrate  on  a  given level, 
e.g.  the  central-federal,  leaving the others not distinguished.  (1) 
Similarly, it can be done  as  for the "assignment of functions"  table: 
even if this  approach may  be  objected to because  of its appearing as 
a  partial equilibrium analysis,  one  must  note that,  in a  dynamic 
setting,  it may  be  a  very useful  approach because it concentrates  on 
marginal  choices,  i.e. on  the  elements under  change,  rather than on 
the general  system. 
(1)  See  the criteria of assignment  table developed  in Chapter 12. Chapter 12 
PERSPECTIVES  FOR  THE  PlACE  OF  THE  EUhOPBAN 
Cm1MUNITY  IN  THE  SECTORAL  1£CONot1IC  FUNCTIONS 
OF  GOVERNHEN1' 
(working paper) - 359 -
l.  Introduction 
This chapter reviews what  economic  functions of government,  or parts 
of functions,  would  seem  plausible or implausible  subjects for E.C. 
level activity, based on  the  general criteria set out in Chapter 11, 
the existing objectives of the  Community  and  the  perspectives that 
may  open  up  with  the directly elected European Parliament. 
The  approach is summarised  schematically in Table  1, which  presents 
in matrix form  a  list of functions on  the  one  hand,  against the 
criteria and  instruments of possible intervention on  the other hand. 
About  7~ economic  functions are itemised in the list, grouped  under 
the  following.summary headings  : 
1.  general  ~ublic services (including administration, foreign affairs, 
law  and  order,  and  research) 
2.  defence 
J.  education 
4.  health 
s.  social security and  welfare 
6.  housing and  community  amenities 
7.  other community  and  social services 
8.  economic  services 
9.  other (including general purpose  intergovernmental transfers) 
This list and its detailed disaggregation,  follows as closely as 
possible  that generally used for international comparative  purposes 
-as will  be seen below  in statistical tables on  public expenditure 
in the  Community  and  certain federations.  (1) 
The  criteria used for considering whether there is a  case for an 
E.C.-yev~ctivity are mainly  : 
i.  the  presence  of externalities or spillover effects - i.e. where 
the effects of public policies, or their absence,  extend 
significantly beyond  the frontiers of member  states  ; 
ii. the availability of economies  of scale  beyond  the  national level; 
(1)  See  also Eurostat,  National Accounts  ESA  Detailed Tables 1970-1974, 
1975  Yearbook  ;  Ir~F,  Manual  on  Government  Finance  Statistics, 1974 - 360-
iii. the  case for technical uniformity or unity in systems of 
policies at the E.C.  level  ; 
iv.  the appropriate  level of government for the exercise  of 
democratic control  ; 
v.  the  sufficiency, at present or in sight,  of political homogeneity 
for an E.C.  level responsibility. 
The  range  of instruments considered are 
vi.  various forms  of policy-making,  ranging from  coordination to 
directly applicable  legislation 
vii.  various forms  of financial intervention,  including inter-
eovernmental grants as well as direct expenditures  (the  use 
of taxation,  however,  is not considered in this chapter,  but in 
chapter 16) 
A short explanation of the criteria and  instruments is given in the 
Notes  to  Table  l, and  a  full theoretical presentation is, as mentioned, 
eiven in Chapter 11. 
Section 2  of the  paper reviews,  in more  explicit terms  than is 
possible in Table  1,  the application of these  theoretical criteria 
to  the  list of sectoral functions,  viewed  from  the  Community-level 
standpoint. 
Section 3  provides financial data on  the amount  of public expenditure 
in the  Community  (mainly by  member  states,  but also,  where  significant, 
by  Community  institutions)  on  the  main  functional headings,  giving 
at the  same  time  some  information as  to  how  five  federations have 
clivided  these functions  by  level of covernment.  The  federations are 
Germany,  the  United States,  Canada,  Australia and  Switzerland. 
The  summary  and  conclusions of the  Group  drawn  from  the  material 
set out in this chapter are  found  in section 4.1.  of the  General 
Report. ~
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Explanatory Notes  to  Table  1 
(i)  Externalities or spillover effects.  ~xternal benefits or 
costs,  or spillover effects, arlse in the  present context 
when  public  economic  functions  necessarily have  a  significant 
effect across member  state frontiers.  An  example  of an external 
benefit is where  one  country's defence effort serves  to  protect 
another  ;  an example  of an external loss  (resulting from  the 
absence  of an adequate  environmental  policy)  is where  one 
country's factory pollutes the waterway of another country. 
Regional policy subsidies at the Community  level may  be 
thought of as avoiding certain external losses of migration by 
preventing congestion in immigration areas,  or as creating 
external benefits by  permitting trade  integration to advance 
further  than would  otherwise  be  possible.  Wherever  'externalities' 
are  important there is a  ~rima facie  case for  some  responsibility 
for  the function being attributed to a  level of government which 
encompasses  them.  Note  that for advanced  technology R & D 
expenditure, it is frequently  possible  to :prevent a  spillover 
of benefits because  the  technology can be  kept  as  a  commercial 
or military secret,  and  incorporated in  sales prices or 
licenses  (these cases are  indicated in the  table as 
'exclusion vossible'). 
(ii)  r.~conomies of scale.  Positive  economies  of scale are available 
when it is possible  to share  the fixed  costs of a  given 
function at a  broar1er  level, without incurring new  offsetting 
diseconomies  that  w~y result from  centralisation.  ~conomies of 
scale in  the  present context cover not only tangible  cases 
where  the  fixed costs consist of production facilities,  but 
also  the less tangible  (although here  more  important)  case 
of fixed costs that contribute  to effective bargaining  ~oHer 
in international economic affairs  ;  the  fixed costs may  in 
the  second  case consist of limitations of freedom  of political 
and  administrative action at the national level. 
(iii)  Uniformity or unity of systems.  There is first the case where 
certain technical uniformity requirements are  inherent in the 
function in question,  or extremely important to its efficient 
functioning.  Examples  are a  common  external tariff for trade 
negotiations,  or common  technical norms  for industrial goods. 
Secondly there is the  concept of unity in a  system of policies, 
where  unity under one  noJ.icy is important in order to  secure 
the  fulJ.  benefits availabJ.e  through  unity under another. 
The  interdependence  of trade aid  and  energy policies in 
international economic  diplomacy is an  example. 
(iv)  Requirements of democratic  control.  This criterion assesses 
the relative merits of exercising democratic control over 
given functions at different levels of government.  For 
example,  there is a  strong case for low  level democratic 
control wherever preferences by  region are profoundly different, - 366-
and  where  the differences are valued as such.  While  there 
is a  subjective element here,  one  can distinguish,  for 
example  between  'fundamental'  questions of choice of principal 
language  in schools and  'trivial' questions of whether 
regulatory electrical plugs should have  round or square holes. 
The  scope  for E.C.  level democratic control is enlarged by 
the  prospects of a  directly elected Parliament  (E.P.)  frgm 
1978  onwards.  In many  instances in the  Table it is envisaged 
that  ·~· (small)  or  ·~·  (somewhat  greater) degree  of 
E.P.  involvement is called for,  together with national 
responsibilities for the administrative  implementation of 
policies and  their differentiation in varying permissible 
degrees. 
(v)  Political homogeneity.  This column  seeks to record whether 
there exists already sufficient political homogeneity and 
legitimacy for the E.C.to  be  responsible,  partly or wholly, 
for the function in question.  Functions which  are plausible 
subjects for E.C.  level policies,  but in which  national 
governments have  not yet reached sufficient consensus,  are 
marked  :  ?. 
(vi)  Policies.  Graduations exist in the strength of E.C.  level 
involvement.  'Coordination'  is the weakest and  involves the 
largely unenforceable and  voluntary alignment of national 
policies.  'Harmonisation'  of national policies may  have 
a  stronger content,  and  is usually thought of as being subject 
at least to a  Directive to ensure  enforcement in ~oad terms 
although not in all details.  'Regulation' is Community 
legislation that is directly and  wholly applicable in member 
states ;  'regulations'  may  or may  not contain a  financial 
power.  The  term  'club'  refers to cases where  there are  strong 
tendencies for multi-national activity to be  organised on 
an ad  hoc  or specialised membership  basis outside  the Community 
institutions. 
(vii)  Finance.  The  main  forms  of financial participation are  : 
'direct exnenditure', where  the Community  budget finances  100% 
of given expenditure functions;  'specific purpose grants', 
where  the  Community  budget finances a  fixed share of the 
total  ~ublic subsidy for agreed classes of expenditure 
(usually in the  range  of 25  to 65% at present),  with the 
remainder matched  by  national government contributions  ; 
'general purpose  grants', where  the  Community  would  make 
financial grants to member  states without its being tied to 
any  particular expenditure function.  The  term  ·~ 
contributions'  concerns  the  financing of ad  hoc  or specialised 
multinational activities outside  the  Community  institutions 
(see also under 6 above). - 367-
·2.  Qualitative commentary  on  the list of sectoral functions  (1) 
2.1.  External  trade relations [l.J].  To  have  effective bargaining power 
at the world  level the  size o!'  the unit must  be  very large,  and 
the  formation of a  unit such as the Community  entails large fixed 
investments in a  political and  economic  system.  This is a  type  of 
economy  of scale, in which  the costs are mainly in  terms  of some 
degree  of freedom  of national action and  economic  adjustment costs 
for adapting to  the  competitive  conditions of the  common  market. 
2.2. 
2.J. 
Externalities at the international level are of major  importance, 
since many  countries -within and  outside  the  Community- stand 
to benefit or lose from  the world  trading climate negotiated 
essentially between  the  major trading blocs,  and  through  the 
existence of  'most-favoured-nation'  principles at the  GATT  level. 
The  existence of a  technically uniform  system  (common  external 
tariff, negotiating procedures) is essential to  the efficient 
functioning of a  trade bloc. 
No  public  exnenditure is involved,  except indirectly to  the  extent 
that redistributive policies are  nrompted  by  needs  to  balance  the 
distribution of gains from  internal and  external trade. 
Foreign nolicy [1.2J  Similar bargaining power  economies  of scale 
exist as for trade relations.  Externalities in the effects of 
~olicies are again of major  im~ortance, since  on  many  issues it 
is impossible or undesirable  to restrict the  benefits to single 
member  states.  There is less of a  technical uniformity requirement 
than in trade relations and  more  scope  for an a la carte selection 
of issues on  which  to act in concert - which is reflected in present 
methods  of Community  political cooperation.  But  there are major 
links,  of course,  in the  system with trade, aid and  energy ?Olicies 
which  increase  the ,otential benefits obtainable from  foreign 
policy cooperation. 
External develoT)ment  aid  D..4].  There  are major externalities in the 
benefits  (in  terms of world  economic  and  political order,  and 
humanitarian values),  and  some  bargaining· poHer  economies  of scale. 
~fficiency advantages  should accrue  from  the  possibility to concentrate 
the aid effort.  Further economy  of scale features are in administrative 
costs  (for donor and  beneficiary), in the  use  of uniform  policy 
criteria, and  in the value  of aid when  there is competition for 
procurement  throughout the  Community  rather than  tying to single 
member  states.  Tendencies in internal economic  diplomacy  (north-
south diaJ.ogue')  are  leading to an incre<'l.sing  integration of the 
system of trade, aid and  raw  materials policies. 
(1)  The  bracketed numbers  following  the headings relate to Table  1. - 368  -
Considerably increased  transfers of competence  for aid expenditures, 
notably for African,  Caribbean and  Pacific countries under  the  Lome 
Convention and  for Mediterranean countries, have  been organised 
since  enlargement of the  Community  in 1973.  Further transfers of 
competence  for public  expenditure in this field may  be  envisaged 
the  German  government has  proposed a  policy of progressive and, 
ultimately,  total Communitarisation of external development aid. 
2.4.  Justice,  law  and  order  8.5].  There are  no  general reasons for 
Community  involvement,  on  the  contrary,  much  of the diversity in 
national traditions is positively valued.  There  are,  however,  some 
exceptions where  specialised functions are  called for at the E.C. 
level, for example,  certain  'supreme'  Court of Justice functions in 
specialised fields of  jurisdiction (common  market law,  agreed areas 
of social policy),  and  coordination arrangements for certain types 
of international crime  (hijacking).  Note  that this entirely excludes 
the  enforcement functions which  entail significant public  expenditure 
(police,  prisons). 
2.5.  General research  [1.'~.)  This has  to  be  broken down  into several 
subcategories.  The  major economy-of-scale cases  (R  & Din military 
equipment,  aerospace,  nuclear energy)  do  not necessarily result in 
externalities at the E.C.  level to  the  extent that exclusion is 
possible and  practised  :  e.g.  the  companies  or governments restrict 
the diffusion of the  technology by  secrecy,  or patents and  licensing. 
Where  exclusion is possible  but very high level economies  of scale 
remain,  ad hoc  clubs tend  to  be  formed.  This is seen in the  several 
multinational civil and  military aircraft projects  (Concorde, 
Jaguar,  Airbus,  !•'ffir.A,  etc.), in the  space  research sector (European 
Space  Agency),  and  in nuclear energy groupings  (EURODIF,  URENCO,  etc.) 
These  kinds of groupings lack the  potential advantages of integration 
into  the Community  political structure  (improved  bargaining power 
vis-a-visthird countries,  and  greater assurance of markets within 
the Community)  ;  on  the  other hand,  they achieve  some  technical 
economies  of scale in the  sharing of fixed costs,  while  costing 
little in terms of loss of political freedom  of action for member 
states.  This  leaves scope for improved  economic  returns as and  when 
the degree  of political homogeneity in the  Community  may  increase, 
although  mainly for new  projects and  technologies,  since existing 
investments in national technologies are  sunken costs. 
In other fields of  :research,  such as  the arts,  social sciences and 
humanitarian sciences,  exclusion is either impossible  or considered 
unethical and  so  not practised.  F.conomies  of scale at the  supra-
national level are more  limited,  and  in any  case world  level 
specialisation is often effectively achieved by  voluntary coordination 
and  the  free dissemination of knowledge. 
This  leaves only a  much  reduced  share of the  research sector that, 
in the absence  of important poltical developments,would  seem  to 
~resent a  strong case for Community  responsibility.  There  are  many - 369-
Quite detailed but small projects serving the  existin~ sectoral 
responsibilities of the Community  (e.g.  agriculture,  technical and 
environmental standards).  In addition there are  some  major completely 
new  technologieR,  es~ecially in the  enerey field  (e.g.  solar and 
thermonuclear fusion).  There  are also peripheral areas of research 
(nuclear safety, data-processine software)  where  valuable  economies 
of scale can be  achieved without encountering the  political objections 
that limit common  research efforts in the central activities. 
2.~.  Defence  [2].  1bis is the  most  clear-cut case  where  the  economic 
arguments all massively vote in favour of the highest level of 
government.  L'~conomies of scale are strongly present both of the 
t,c:chnoloL,ical  and  bargaining  :~ower types.  ~xternali  ties are  powerfully 
-present in that s:rn.all  countries cannot be  excJ uded  fror.1  the  tenefi  ts 
of -reace  which ·result from  the  defence efforts of the  largest 
80untries  ;  'free-rider'  tendencies may  be  countered in some  degree 
by  ~:JressurP.s exercised through alliances as in NATO.  There  are a1so 
strong technical  reQuireme~ts for uniformity and  unity in the  system, 
in tPrns of standardised weaponry  and  the  command  structure  •  .uconomy 
of scEJ.le  considerations mean  that innovation in  -vwa~--:onry can virtually 
only take  ;:>lace  at the  largest government  levels. 
The  ~)oli tical -prerequisites of a  CoJ'iliTluni ty defence  function arc, 
however,  absent. 
:~ore  limited advantages in cost-effectiveness are available  by  pooled 
'_)rocurement  iJOlicies,  and  this takes  place  on  an ad  hoc  club basis, 
es:pecially for <drcraft  (either through  pooled  ~urchasing as in 
the  Renelux-Demnark-Horway  consortium for a  jet fit;hter in 1976,  or 
·;:>reduction  as in the  casE:  of the  British-German-Italian combat 
a,ircraft  '!·,~HCA')  ;  tJ1e  'Eurog.coup'  in NATO  is seeking to establish 
a  morA  5eneralised  system of pooled :procurement efforts. 
2.7.  B.:uu~  [J].  There  are  no  ?Ositive  economy  of scale arguments at 
the  Conu:mni ty level.  Diverse  national or sub-national traditions 
are  Dos:_i_ ti  vcly va:l uect  in  themselves,  and  also provide  a  testing 
ground for innovation.  Nore  limited Connunity desiderata are high 
standard of learning of foreign lancuages,  and  the mutual recognition 
of examination standards,  particularly for the  protected professions 
(doctors, architects,  lawyers,  accountants etc.), which calls for 
some  efforts of coordination at the  Community  level. 
;:;xterna,li ty considerations become  important  (as  they are,  for example, 
in the  United  ::Jtates)  where  mig:r.'e,tion  takes  place  on  a  large scale. 
For  iPlilligration areas there will be  :problems  of assimilation 
(disadvantaged minorities,  ghettos) if the  immigrants have  sub-
standard  levels of education and  culture.  For emigration areas there 
wi11  be  prob1ems  of losing the  public  investment i'!1  education.  These 
have  not so far been sirrnificant issues in  the  Com~~~ity as between 
member  nationals,  since  educational standards are  broaclly com:parable 
and  J'Tlir:ration  QUite  slight.  They  could become  very real issues, 
however,  in a  further enlarged  Community,  where  educational standards 
in the candidate states J'Tlay  lB  distinctly lower and  the  propensity - 370-
to migrate much  higher.  This might lead to pressure at some  stage 
for grants to aid minimum  standards in the  provision of educational 
services, and  large scale regional development aid to stem  excessive 
emigration. 
The  education of migrants from  third countries is already becoming 
a  Community-level issue where it is linked to trade, aid, and 
other foreign policy issues.  (See  also below  on  social security and 
housing). 
As  regards present member  states, it is not impossible  that a 
continued divergence of general economic  performance  could  lead to 
public expenditure cuts in the weaker  states of such  severity as 
to encroach  perceptibly on  existing standards of education,  to  the 
point of being considered a  question of solidarity over basic rights 
by  the European  Parliament,  or as being linked to  the macro-economic 
policy objectives of the Community. 
There  are a  small number  of specialised schools and  institutions that 
the  Community  may  finance  - e.g.  European schools, where  there are 
particular concentrations of migrant  children,  or European university 
institutes. 
2.8.  Health [4].  There  are no  economy  of scale considerations favouring 
~evel  undertakings,  except perhaps in certain highly specialised 
fields where  coordination activity may  suffice and in certain 
medical research undertakings.  There are  no  a  priori reasons why 
health services should be  organised in  a  uniform way,  although 
lessons can no  doubt be  learned from  comparing diverse systems. 
Problems  of financing minimum  standards could arise at some  stage 
in the future,  although  the externality effects of migration are 
weaker  than the case of education  :  health is more  of a  current 
service and  less of an investment compared  to education,  so  the  public 
investment losses of an emigration-region are less, and  the assimilation 
of immigrants to the  (higher)  standards of an immigration region 
easier. 
2.9.  Social security and welfare  (except unemployment)  (l) [5].  The 
arguments are similar to  the  education and  health cases in a  low-
migration rate Community.  But in addition there is a  sharper income 
distribution dimension,  which  should in general be  controlled 
according to the  preferences of national political systems.  Limitations 
to national responsibility for income  distribution issues would  only 
arise where  divergences in fiscal capacity resulted in differences 
in starrlards that similarly might become  a  major migration factor. 
Migration may  also act as a  constraint on national tax policies 
without this necessarily being a  reason for Community  involvement. 
(1)  See  below  with manpower  and  employment - 371-
The  Community  should be  seen as abstaining from  involvement 
in inter-personal income  distribution issues if it is to  pursl,~; 
confederal as opposed  to federal objectives, and  a  fortiori 
even more  so if the Community  is viewed as a  pre-federal entity. 
('!his does not mean,  however,  that the Community  should not be 
involved in inter-member state income  distribution issues where  these 
are relevant to its general economic  objectives -see further below 
and  Chapter 14). 
To  facilitate the free  movement  of labour there are many  technical 
requirements for reciprocal and  non-discriminatory coverage of 
migrants, and  possibly there will be  needs for financial compensation 
between  national social security systems with respect to the rights 
and  dues  of migrants and  their families. 
It may  also be  argued that the Community  should  seek to establish 
a  common  base of  'human rights' in the fields of social policy 
ana  social security ;  this will no  doubt be  a  subject of interest 
to the directly elected European Parliament.  This is already 
illustrated by  the equal pay directive  (for men  and  women)  and 
proposed  measures for the harmonisation of social security systems. 
However,  existing philosophies and  practises as between Community 
member  states already probably have  more  in common  than,  for 
example,  as between  some  of the states in the  U.S.  In addition,  there 
could be  dangers in the Community  at the  present stage in setting 
absolute  minimum  standards of social security benefits,  since this 
might  lead to negative work  incentives in poorer areas. 
2.10.  Housing and  community  amenities [6].  There are no  general reasons 
for a  Community  involvement.  However,  severe and  large-scale cases 
of urban  decay  may  be  considered as an aspect of regional policy, 
and in this context urban redevelopment programmes  could be 
candidates for specific purpose  matching ·grants similar to regional 
policy grants for industrial and  infastructural investment. 
Financial intervention to alleviate acute concentrations of migrant 
housing problems could also become  a  field for Community  participation, 
especially in the  event that such  cases were  identifiable with 
migrants from  third countries with which  the Community  had developed 
a  system of trade-aid-foreign policy relations. 
2.11.  Other communit  and  social services (recreation,  sport, culture, 
religion,  etc.  7]•  There  are in general no  reasons for Community 
involvement. 
Exceptional cases may  arise, for example  in the case of ancient 
monuments  in danger of irrecoverable loss, where  the cases in point 
were  important features in the European heritage, and  where  the 
financial resources of the memberaate were  inadequate- Venice 
might  be  an example.  The  benefits of such  expenditure  'spill over' 
national frontiers through  tourism.  Other miscellaneous cases with - 372-
strong 'spillover'  characteristics will arise (a minor  but clear-
cut example  is seen in the recently adopted directive for the 
safeguard of migratory birds). 
2.12.  Economic  services [o].  Here  there is a  long list of sub-functions, 
a  first group of which  are sectoral (agriculture, fisheries, etc.), 
a  second  group dealing with  the general regulation of industry and 
commerce  and  with semi-macroeconomic  policies  (manpower,  employment 
regional, etc.) 
Sector-specific policies 
2 .lJ.  Agriculture [8 .1]  Agricultural market support measures have  to 
form  part of a  uniform  system if a  common  market for the  produce is 
to function  ;  the Community  has a  uniform  system which,  however, 
has become  distorted, with a  system of double  exchange  rates 
supported by  border taxes and  subsidies.  The  maintenance  of excess 
(reserve) agricultural capacity may  be  seen as representing an  ' 
external benefit or cost, since the consumer  cannot exclude himself 
from  either the benefit (of a  margin of security of supply)  or its 
budgetary cost. 
Structural policy subsidies also aim at generating an external 
benefit (beyond  the farmers directly concerned)  by  lowering the 
price level at which  marginal production may  be  supplied. 
2.14.  Fisheries [8.2].  Off-shore fishing resources are a  rare  type of 
good  where  exclusion is difficult to enforce,  but where  there is 
'rival consumption'  :  hence  overfishing and  dangers of irrecoverable 
depletion of stocks.  These  are reasons for a  Community  level 
responsibility, especially when  combined  with  the  bargaining power 
advantage in negotiations with third countries. 
Structural and  compensatory measures,  of budgetary or regulatory 
(e.g.  quota)  form,  may  be  required to make  a  common  :policy 
acceptable. 
2.15.  Energy  [8.J].  In present circumstances all measures affecting ,the 
price or reliability of foreign energy supplies generate strong 
externalities beyond  the  member  state level in that no  country can 
be  excluded from  the benefits obtained by  other countries'  efforts. 
The  effective use  of bargaining power  relies strongly on  economy  of 
scale characteristics,  since no  individual country can by its efforts 
alone obtain a  strong leverage on  the conditions of foreign supplies 
Relevant measures  may  include negotiations with oil producers,  and, 
less directly,  measures  in member  states for energy saving,  stock-
holding and  domestic  production. - 373-
The  last two  cases may  involve Community  financial participation 
(for  exam~le, grants for aiding the costs of common  stock-holding, 
and  possibly at some  stage for supporting a  minimum  oil price). 
The  Community  in all these respects may  be  one  tier in a  broader 
grouping of industrialised countries, as in the International 
Energy Agency.  Cooperation at the higher international level does 
not preclude more  intense  policy integration at the Community  level. 
The  nuclear energy sector is basically controlled at the  level of 
the  larger member  states, reflecting their unwillingness to  proceed 
far with  the integrated approach  intended under the EURATOM  Treaty. 
Multinational efforts at present mainly follow  the ad  hoc  club 
pattern, with  licensing and  other commercial arrangements for 
excluded  parties. 
There  are, as mentioned above,  major economies  of scale  possible in 
R  & D on  new  energy technologies.  The  Community  is currently, for 
example,  negotiating investment in a  large  common  enterprise - the 
JET  thermonuclear fusion project. 
2.16.  Transport [8.4].  Certain infrastructure projects which  generate 
strong spillovers of benefits should be  eligible for partial 
Community  financing,  for example  where  cross-frontier motorway 
connections are  much  inferior to national network  standards and 
especially where  the benefits would  concern several member  states 
(coonerative bilateral arrangements  may  suffice for projects only 
interesting two  states).  Investment in roads  may  also be  considered 
for partial Community  financing in the  context of Community  regional 
uolicy (in addition to the  border region cases). 
The  main  international transport sectors - trucking, air and  sea -
tend  to  be  subject to  public regulation at the national level as 
to standards of service,  tariffs and  freedom  of entry  :  this leads 
to the  need  for an international dimension  to  prevent distortions 
of competition or erosion of conditions of service or employment. 
Inter-member state trucking licenses are  regulated at the Community 
level.  IATA  is an example  of regulation at the  global level which 
maintains important tariff discriminations to  the disadvantage of 
international versus national traffic.  The  objectives of the E.C. 
warrant regulation at the Community  level which  would  aim  to 
eliminate discrimination as regards national and  international E.C. 
traffic. - 374-
2.17.  Communications  [8.5).  The  technology of telecommunications,  especi-
ally as  regards  space satellites, offers  economies  of scale at the 
world level. Joint programmes  of  R & D among  Community  countries may 
reduce  exposure  to international monopoly.  The  club formula has  been 
attractive here,  as  exemplified by the European Space Agency,  whose 
particular form  of organisation makes  it a  'club of clubs':  different 
contribution formulae  are used for each of a  series of main projects 
(space  capsule,  various  communication satellites)  in which  West 
European states participate on  an  ~ la carte basis,  one  member  state 
assuming project leadership for each. 
An  example  of a  Community  sponsored project is EURONET,  under which 
a  consortium of PTT  administrations  agreed in 1975  to set up  a  common 
network for automatic telecommunication links between documentation 
and  data-bank systems. 
Broadcasting across national frontiers,  especially television,  could 
greatly improve understanding between the peoples  of member  states 
and so  increase political homogeneity in the  Community.  (The  European 
Parliament is seeking to  improve  the televised transmission of its 
debates  into all member  states.) 
2.18.  Problem sectors [8.6].  One  generic type is that of industries suffer-
ing from severe over-capacity at the  Community  level,  and  also 
possibly at the  global  level.  Current  examples  are seen in steel, 
shipbuilding and textiles. Economic  reasons  for  Community  involvement 
are,  firstly,  externality implications,  since the financial  gains  or 
losses  from  individual producers'  decisions  to reduce or expand 
capacity affect all producers.  This  points  to  international  coordi-
nation in general.  Secondly,  however,  E.G.  member  states may  improve 
their bargaining power by  common  organisation for negotiations with 
other major producing countries.  This  is related to  the  case for an 
integrated system of responsibility at the European  level  (with links 
to trade negotiations,  etc.), since this further increases bargaining 
power  vis-~-vis third countries,  and  gives broader possibilities for 
compensation arrangements  between member  states. 
Community  grant and  loan finance  may  be  called for to aid the restruc-
turing of  'problem sectors'  and for redeploying excess  labour.  The 
Coal  and Steel  Community  has  such financial  powers,  but other sectors 
are  confined to the limited resources  of the  Regional  and Social Funds, 
and of the European Investment Bank. - 375-
A second  generic  type  concerns  'growth industries of the future • , 
often with high R & D components  in their value added,  where  member 
states·and non-Community  countries are often involved in competitive 
promotion efforts.  Data-processing, electronics and  aerospace are 
examples.  Economy  of scale considerations here often point to a 
Community-level organisation of public involvement.  However,  the 
possibility of exclusion through commercial  secrecy and  licensing 
arrangements,  combined  with a  strong reluctance to relinquish 
national political control,  has resulted in a  predominance  of 
'club'  solutions. 
General industrial and  commercial  policies 
These activities, which  are not sector-specific, may  be  grouped 
under  two  sub-headings  : 
- general regulation of industry and  commerce  in the  sense of 
deepening the  common  market,  where  the budgetary implications 
are small,  and 
- semi-macroeconomic  financial intervention (e.g.  through manpower, 
employment  and  regional policies)  to help ensure  that the integration 
process produces a  balanced pattern of economic  development. 
2.19.  General regulatory activities [8.7].  The  list of general regulatory 
activities covers technical norms,  standards for safety and 
environmental purposes,  conditions of competition,  and aspects of 
company  and  commercial  law. 
Uniformity of regulation is, to some  extent, a  precondition of ef-
fective competition.  There  are also economies  of scale in the fixed 
costs of researching,  testing and  establishing standards (e.g. 
automobile  safety regulations).  However,  uniformity for its own  sake 
should  not be  advocated,  and  each proposed  legislative action must 
be  the  subject of a  cost-benefit appraisal including the costs of 
compliance  and  change  in established practices. 
In several of the  sub-categories in question there is considerable 
scope  for debate whether broad framework  directives arc adequate 
(leaving details open for national preferences) or whether directly 
applicable  regulation is necessary.  Company  law  and  patents give 
examples  of the  parallel development of directly appl~cable Community - 376 -
instruments  (European company  statute, patents office), which are, 
however,  optional alongside national legislation which  is only 
submitted  to framework  constraints from  the Community.  In compromise 
cases like these,  the  economy  of scale gains may  be  less or nil or 
even negative, at least in the short run,  but the  losses in terms 
of national preferences are reduced. 
The  whole  of this field has a  considerable administrative cost,  but 
almost no  other direct budgetary implications.  Indeed  the explicit 
principle in some  sectors is that the cost of conformity must  be 
internalised into  the  price of goods and  services (most clearly, 
for example,  in the polluter-pay-principle for environmental policy). 
Among  the regulatory functions listed in the Table,  one  that is 
highly political (as opposed  to technical) is the pursuit of common 
standards of industrial democracy  (worker participation).  Technical 
uniformity is not here required  ;  the argument is of the externality 
family,  notably that  'participatory'  industrial relations in all 
member&ates are required  to ease acceptance of structural economic 
changes,  that are in turn necessary to secure  the  economic  benefits 
of common  market integration.  (We  do  not here  imply a  view  on  the 
controversial question as to what  kind of participation system is 
to be  advocated). 
2.20.  Manpower  and  employment  policy [8.8] and  unemployment  benefits  [5.4) 
This concerns a  broad  family of policy measures,  of which  those with 
the main  budgetary implications include adult vocational training 
and  retraining,  labour mobility incentives,  temporary employment 
creation or maintainance measures,  permanent  employment  creation, 
aid for employment  of handicapped  persons,  and  unemployment  benefits. 
Both  the demand  for  such measures and  their supply have  strong 
externality implications of cause and  effect at the E.C.  level. 
The  case for a  degree of Community  responsibility for such  policies 
is based  on, first,  the  structural competition effects of the 
common  market,  and,  secondly,  the extent to which  the cyclical 
fortunes of each member  state are affected by  the Community  (or higher) 
level business cycle.  The  effects of Community  level financing should 
be  to  provide a  partial insurance cover for the  labour force of the 
Community,  at either national, regional or sectoral levels, against 
unfavourable  employment  trends by  comparison with  the Community  as 
a  whole.  Advantages accrue  to the  Community  as a  whole  by  helping 
to avert situations in which  the  economic  integration process would 
be arrested. 
The  measures  listed fall into three categories  : - 377-
- measures  to improve  economic  capacity permanently  (training, 
retraining, mobility), 
- contracyclical measures maintaining or creating employment, 
- purely compensatory measures  (unemployment  benefits) • 
2.21.  Regional policy [8.9].  This also concerns a  broad family of policy 
measures  including regional capital subventions,  interest rate 
subsidies,  fiscal exemptions,  and  employment  premiums.  The  subsidies 
may  in general relate to private industry as well as to  public 
infrastructure and  redevelopment programmes. 
The  first reason for a  Community  participation in regional policy 
comes  directly from  the basic political choice reflected in the 
preamble  to  the  Treaty of Rome  :  "anxious  to strengthen the unity 
of their economies and  to  ensure  their harmonious  development by 
reducing the differences existing between  the various regions and  the 
backwardness of the  less favoured  regions,  ••• ". 
Economic  reasons arise with externalities of two  kinds  ;  first,  the 
general welfare increases resulting from  integration are dependent 
upon  a  reasonably balanced regional distribution of these increases  ; 
secondly excessive  geographic concentrations of economic  development 
lead to congestion diseconomies that need  to be  countered by  a 
policy of regional taxes and  transfers particularly related to  new 
investment activities and  public infrastructure.  By  redressing· 
regional disparities in employment  levels it should  be  possible for 
the Community  economy  to run at a  higher overall level of output. 
2.22.  Disaster aid [9.1].  This would  reflect solidaristic and  humanitarian 
sentiment at the Community-level.  Disaster relief may  also have  the 
characteristics of regional policy aid, as has been recently illustrated 
in the  case of Community  aid following  the Friulia earthquakes. 
2·2J.  General  uurpose  inter-governmental transfers [9.2].  The  economic 
case for transfers of this kind is based  on  the notion that a  reasonable 
inter-member state distribution of the fruits of integration has  to 
be  assured if the  integration process as a  whole,  with  the benefits 
it provides in aggregate,  is to be  advanced  or be  maintained.  The 
first-round distribution of these benefits through  the  private market 
place  may  or may  not meet  these conditions.  (This  subject is further 
pursued in Chapter 14). - 378  -
3·  Quantitative information on  the  public expenditure functions  (1) 
This section sets out information on  the amounts  of money  spent on 
sectoral public expenditure functions  by all levels of government 
in the E.C.,  and  in five federations  (United States,  Germany, 
Switzerland,  Canada,  and  Australia), for which a  cross-classification 
by  level of government is also given. 
Total figures for public expenditure in the  Community  amounted  in 
1970  to about 250  billion EUR,  or 40  %  of GDP  at market  ~rices, this 
being the latest year for which  a  complete  estimated sectoral 
breakdown  can at present be  given - see  Table  2 at the  end  of this 
section.  By  1974  public expenditure  had  risen to 43%  of GDP, 
amounting at current prices to 394  billion EUR. 
For  the  federal states in question,  total public expenditure, as 
shown  in Tables  3  to ?,  (see  below)  amounted  in the  United States 
to J8  %  of GDP  in 1971/72,  in Germany  to 41%  of GDP  in 1971,  in 
Switzerland  to 40%  of GDP  in 1973,  in Canada  to 39%  of GDP  in 
1971/72,  and in Australia to 28  %  of GDP  in 1972/73·  (The  figures 
quoted  below  for these countries relate also to years just indica·ted). 
3.1.  International development aid [1.4]. In the  five  federations development 
aid expenditure is always entirely a  federal-level responsibility. 
Targets for development aid expenditure have  been adopted in 
international organisations  (OECD,  UNCTAD)  to which  E.C.  member 
states subscribe.  The  present target is that official development 
assistance  should reach 0.7% of GNP.  In 1974  E.C.  member  states' 
performance was,  by  comparison with other major donors,  as 
follows  :  (2) 
(1)  See  Annex 
(2)  Source  :  OECD,  Development Cooperation,  1975  Review E.C.  total 
4  larger member  states 
Germany 
France 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
5 smaller member  s ta. tes 
Netherland 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
United States 
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Official development assistance 
mill·  u.s. 
4,868 
J,994 
l,4JO 
1,615 
7Jl 
218 
874 
4J5 
271 
168 
J,4J9 
1,126 
s  %  GDP 
0.42 
0.40 
0.37 
0.59 
0.]8 
0.15 
0._54 
o.6J 
0.51 
0.55 
0.25 
0.25 
Ireland and  Luxembourg  are not members  of the  OECD  Development 
Assistance Committee,  and  do  not report their (small) aid 
expenditures to this body. 
The  aid payments  by  Community  institutions have  recently evolved 
as follows  : 
million u.s.  dollars 
1974  1975  1976 
estimate 
European  Development  Fund  141  279  J46 
Community  Budget  2'+2  419  246 
Euro-pean  Investment  Bank  JO  J8  148 
41J  7J6  740 
In 1974  this Community  aid amounted  to 8 % of the  total of national 
and  Community  aid  ;  in 1975  and  1976  this share rose  to about lJ %· 
Further increases will follow as a  result of the  Lome  Convention  and 
the  increasing network of agreements  with Mediterranean countries. 
Under  the  former  3,550  million EUA  is to be  made  available for the 
years  1976  to 1980  to 43  African,Caribbean and Pacific countries. - 380-
Under  the latter about 1,775 million EUA  will be made  available for 
Portugal,  the Maghreb  group  (Algeria,  Morocco  and Tunisia),  Malta, 
the Maschrek  group  (Egypt,  Syria,  Jordan and  Lebanon),  Israel, 
Greece,  Turkey,  Cyprus  and Yugoslavia.  The  Mediterranean agreements 
in general also cover a  five year period beginning after ratification 
- which  in most  cases  remains  (as  of January 1977)  to be  completed. 
No  precise  time path for these expenditures  can at present be fore-
cast. However,  as  very rough hypothetical orders  of magnitude,  it 
might be  supposed that in about  1979  the Lome  and Mediterranean 
programmes  could be disbursing aid at an annual  rate of one-fifth 
of the totals.  This  would  give  710  million EUA  for Lome,  355  million 
EUA  for the Mediterranean countries,  to which  may  be added other 
development  assistance from  the budget  (mainly food aid,  and  aid to 
non-associated countries)  which  has  been forecast at  650  million u.a. 
(1).  This  total might be  compared  with a  projected total aid effort 
(bilateral and multilateral)  of the  Community  and  its member  states 
of around 1 1/2 to 8 billion EUA  (2),  implying a  Community  share of 
around  20  to  25 per cent. 
3.2.  Justice,  law  and  order [1.5] This cost about 1 % of GDP  in the 
Community  member  states in 1970.  For the five federations similar 
orders of magnitude are found,  ranging from  a bout 1 to 1 1/2 % of 
GDP.  The  federal level generally accounts for only a  small share 
of direct expenditure. 
3.3.  Research  [1.61.  In 1971  7,100 m.u.a.,  or about 1% of GDP,  was 
spent on publicly financed research in the Community.  This was 
broken down  as follows  (in EUR)  :  (3) 
(1)  Triennial Financial Forecasts 1977-1978-1979,  Preliminary Draft General 
Budget,  1977. 
(2)  This is based  on  a  recorded figure of 4,868  m.  ¢in 1974,  or 4,726  m. 
EUA,  which at a  hypothetical growth rate of 10  % per annum  gives 
7,611  m.  EUA  in 1979. 
(3)  Source  :  Public Financin  of Research and  Develo  ment in the Communit 
lst report of the statistical sub-committee  to the Committee 
on  Scientific and Technical Research  (CREST)),  Brussels, 1976. - 381-
l!:.!!:..!.!.  ~ of total 
1.  Nuclear R & D (non-defence)  84J  12 
2.  Space  R & D  295  4 
;. Defence  1,743  24 
4.  Earth and its atmosphere 
(soil, mining,  seas, atmosphere 
etc.)  117  2 
;. Human  health  212  J 
6.  Human  environment 
(construction,  engineering, 
transport,  telecommunications)  177  J 
7.  Agriculture and  fishing  211  J 
8.  Industrial technology  771  11 
of which  : ci1il aeronautics  (414)  (6) 
9.  Computer  science and  automation  149  2 
10.  Social sciences and  humanities  148  2 
11.  General  ~remotion of knowledge  2,425  J4 
of which  :  natural sciences  ~65ll  ~jl  engineering sciences  224 
medical  sciences  422  6) 
social sciences  (266)  (4)  ---
Total  7,100  100 % 
---
For  the federations data on  a  comparable  basis is not available. 
General research  (excluding defence)  identifiable in the Tables 
below  amounted  to 0.2 % of GDP  in Australia, and  o.4 % of GDP  in 
Canada.  In the  United  States space research alone accounted for 
O.J% of GDP.  All this expenditure  took  place at the federal level, 
except in Germany  where  the federal share was  about three-quarters. 
As  regards private, industrial sectors for which  public funding 
of R & D is economically significant,  the following U.S.  data for 
1970  is quite revealing  : - 382-
Research Intensity of Major Industries in relation to Sales 
in the  United States, 1970 
(Research and  development  expenditure 
as per cent of sales) 
total 
aircraft and  missiles  18.3 
electrical equipment  7.5 
instruments  5·9 
non-electrical machinery 4.2 
motor vehicles  3·5 
chemicals  4.1 
rubber  2.1 
-petroleum,  stone,  clay~ 
glass,  metal products, 
non-ferrous.metals,  less than 
paper,  text1les and  2  0  clothings, food  .  • 
processing,  lumber and 
wood  nroducts 
company 
funded 
3.9 
J.6 
4.3 
3·5 
2.9 
J.7 
1.7 
less than 
2.0 
other (including 
public sector) 
funding 
14.4 
3·9 
1.6 
0.7 
0.6 
0.4 
0.4 
less than 
1.0 
Source  :derived from  Patrick and  Rosovsky ed., Asia's New  Giant 
How  the  Japanese Economy  works,  Brookings Institution, 1976, 
Tables 8-12. 
Total R & D expenditure exceeded 5%  of sales only in aircraft and 
missiles, electrical equipment  (including nuclear power  plants and 
computers)  and  instruments.  Public financing of R & D was 
outstandingly high for aircraft and  missiles  (14%  of sales)  ;  it 
was  also significant for electrical equipment  (3.9%  of sales), 
but of slight importance  for other sectors. 
3.4.  Defence  [2].  This is always entirely a  federal level function in 
the five federations studied. 
Defence  spending in 1974 is given below  for Community  member  states 
as well as for the  United  States and  an estimate for the  USSR  : - 383-
Defence  expenditure 
E.C.  total (1) 
4  larger countries 
Germany 
France 
United  Kingdom 
Italy 
5 smaller countries 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Luxembourg 
~(1) 
.!J.§§!l  ( 2 ) 
millions u.s. 
.39,298 
,34,947 
12,897 
8,5.3.3 
9,.387 
4,1)0 
4,.351 
2,2.38 
1,.37.3 
645 
79 
16 
84,680 
z  %  GDP 
J.6 
.3·7 
,3.6 
,3.4 
5.1 
2.8 
2.9 
,3.5 
2.8 
2 •  .3 
1.2 
0.8 
6.0 
l.J.l 
The  figures give  some  credence  to the  'free-rider'  theorem  to  the 
effect that smaller governments will tend relatively to under-supply 
a  public service for which  the benefits 'spill over'  frontiers to a 
large extent, especially when,  as is here  the case, this is 
combined  with major economy  of scale considerations. 
Compared  to the  United States defence effort of 6% of GDP  in 1974 
(against a  statistically uncertain estimate of 1.3%  for the  USSR), 
the Community  average was  3.  6 % of GDP,  with the four larger member 
states averaging ).7% of GDP,  and  the 5  smaller states 2·9% of GDP 
- with particularly low  figures for Ireland and  Luxembourg. 
Source  :  World  Armaments  and  Disarmament,  SIPRI  Yearbook  1975,  Stockholm. 
(1)  SIPRI  op.  cit., derived from  Table 6BJ,  p.  122 
(2)  SIPRI  op.  cit., Table  6B7.This is a  1973  figure,  giving the SIPRI 
estimate of the dollar-equivalent of Soviet military expenditure as 
a  percentage of official Soviet estimates of Soviet national income. - 384-
3·5·  Education [3].  Public  spending on  education amounted  to 4  1/4% 
3.6. 
of GDP  in the Community  in 1970,  and, as regards the federations, 
amounts  ranging from  4 % of GDP  in Germany  to  7 % of GDP  in Canada. 
The  federal level of government in all cases accounts only for a 
very small share of direct expend.i ture on  schooling, although its 
indirect financing through  intergovernmental grants tends to  be 
substantial, either through  budget equalisation grants as in 
Australia and  Germany,  or through specific purpose  grants as in 
the United  States.  Federal involvement in university financing 
tends  to  be  larger. 
Health [4]. Different forms  of organisation in this sector make 
statiStical comparisons difficult.  In the Community it is estimated 
that public expenditure on  health,  on  a  broad definition including 
social security reimbursements,  amounted  to 5·3%  of GDP  in 1970. 
Figures for the federations range from  around  1  1/2 %  of GDP  on  a 
narrow definition (e.g.  mainly hospital expenditure in Germany, 
United States),  to 5%  of GDP  in Canada  on  a  broad definition of 
health services. 
Direct expenditure  by  the federal level of government accounts for 
only a  small share of identified health expenditure,  ranging from 
1  to 3% in Germany  and  Switzerland,  to 20  to 24% in Australia, 
Canada  and  the  United  States. 
3.7.  Social security and welfare [5].  Simple  statistical comparisons 
are also very difficult in this sector.  For the Community  total 
expenditure is estimated to have  been 10  1/2% of GDP  in 1970, 
excluding the health benefits already mentioned.  The  most  important 
categories of benefit were  : 
old age  and  survivors 
family,  maternity and  child allowances 
invalidity, disability and  occupational 
injuries 
unemployment 
% of GDP 
5.8 
2.1 
1.8 
0.3 
In the  federations  the  total ranges from  7 %  of GDP  in Australia 
to  17 %  in Germany.  The  degree of direct federal financing is 
usually high  :  92  % in Australia, 88 % in Germany,  71  % in Canada 
7  5 % in Switzerland, and  64 % in the United States. 
In the  United States case,  where  the degree of direct federal 
financing is lowest,  there is a  very large number  of federal 
specific purpose grants programmes  which  provide matching funds 
for differing state or local systems. - 385-
).8.  Housing and Community  amenties [6].  Public expenditure in these 
sectors is estimated to have  amounted  to 1.9 %  of GDP  in the 
Community  in 1970,  compared  to a  range  from  0.5% of GDP  in the 
United States to 1.7% of GDP  in Germany.  Financing in the 
federations  tends  to  be  shared between levels of government with 
no  clear-cut pattern of predominant responsibility.  State or 
local governments  usually have  the detailed executive responsibilities. 
).9.  Economic  services [B].  While  this is an extremely heterogeneous 
group of activities (covering public policies for agriculture, 
industry,  transport,  energy,  manpower,  regions, etc.) with great 
variations in organisation by  country, it is interesting to note 
considerable similarity in the amount  of public expenditure 
involved  :  6 %  of GDP  in the Community  in 1970,  4% in Australia, 
Germany  and  the  United States,  and  7% in Canada  and  Switzerland 
As  regards the financing by level of government in the federations, 
the pattern is one  of a  broad  sharing between the federal and 
other levels.  Thus  in Australia and  Switzerland the federal share 
was  one-third, in Genn.a.ny  and  Canada  one-half,  and in the United 
States nearly two-thirds. 
).9.1. Agriculture,  with forestry and  fishing,  tends to  benefit from 
expenditure of around 1% of GDP  :  1.7% in the Community  (all 
levels of government)  in 1970,  l.J% in Canada,  1% in Switzerland, 
and  0. 7 % in the United States. 
3.9.2. Another 1arge and homogeneous  sector is transport and  communications, 
where  the Community  member  states spent 2.1% of GDP  in 1970,  as 
against 2.2% in the  United States, 2.5% in Australia, 2.6% in 
Germany,  J.  9 % in Canada,  and  nearly 5 % in Switzerland. 
J.9.J.  By  comparison,  budgetary aids to mining,  manufacturing and 
construction are quite small,  and  usually below 0.2% of GDP. 
Two  kinds of semi-macroeconomic  policy services,  both of strong 
relevance  to  the Community,  are poorly measured in the available 
statistics - manpower  and employment,  and  regional policies.  This is 
because in both cases the concepts inevitably overlap to a  large 
degree with sectoral activities already mentioned.  Manpower  policy 
includes training activities, which  may  be  considered as part of 
the  education sector, and  employment aids that may  be  considered 
public works  or aids to industry.  Likewise,  regional aids can  be 
regarded as aids to industry, or public works expenditure,  or, 
in the  case of  em~loyment premiums,  as manpower  policy.  For these 
reasons no  useful information can be  drawn  from  Tables 2  to 7  on  the 
amount  of public expenditure spent on  these functions. - 386-
In view  of the  policy importance of manpower,  employment  and 
regional policies,  special ad hoc  efforts have  been  made  to 
compile data.  on  the  main  sub-heads of expenditure. 
).9.4. Total identifiable manpower  and employment  policy expenditure in 
197  5 for Germany,  France ,  the  United  Kingdom,  Netherlands and 
Denmark  (these countries  accountin~ for 82% of Community  GDP) 
has been estimated as follows  :  (1) 
Public manpower  and 
employment  expenditure 
training (in enterprises or 
publicly aided institutions, 
excluding the  formal education 
million u.a. 
system)  1,649 
temporary  em~loyment maintenance 
or creation {temporary public 
employment,  or temporary aids to 
private enterprise or individuals)  2,335 
geographic mobility (incentives 
for mobility of individuals)  11 
public employment  services  947 
aids for training or employment 
of handicapped  persons  174 
other programmes  not covered 
(excludes regional  em~loyment 
premiums  - see  below  under 
regional policy) 
Total 
130 
5,248 
0.2 
O.J 
0.1 
0.6  ~~ 
By  comparison,  the amount allocated to the Community's  Social 
Fund  in 1975  was  612  million u.a.,  these amounts  being available 
principally for adult training schemes,  and  aids for the training 
of handicapped workers.  The  Fund  contributes 50  %  of the  public 
subsidy for projects covered  ;  the eligibility criteria give  some 
special priority to projects in problem regions.  Although it is 
difficult to make  comparisons with  the national expenditure data, 
it would  seem  that the Social Fund  matches a  fairly high  proportion 
of eligible training programmes.  However,  it is unable  to make  any 
contribution to other types of manpower  and  employment  programmes 
listed.  The  overall contribution to  broadly defined manpower  and 
(1)  Source  :  derived from  OECD  sources - 387-
employment  policy is therefore not large. 
Community  participation in the  financin~ of unemployment  insurance 
was  recommended  in the Marjolin Report {1).  Among  the variants 
considered, it was  suggested  the Community  might finance a  flat 
money  amount  contribution (of 2  budgetary units of account per day 
per unemployed  person)  to national schemes  which  would,  within 
certain constraints, remain quite different in accordance  with 
national economic  conditions and  preferences.  The  Community 
contribution would  be  financed  by  a  uniform  percentage  levy on 
wages  and  salaries.  The  scheme  would  be  redistributive in two 
ways,  firstly as between  the employed  and  unemployed  or as between 
states OJ.  regions with high or low  average rates of unemployment, 
a.rl  secondly as between high income  and  low  income  employees as 
a  result of the flat amount  benefits combined  with flat percentage 
CC'ntribuJ··' ons. 
Given  below  is a  simple  updating of the financial characteristics 
of this variant of such a  scheme,  applied to  the unemployment 
situation of 1975.  Official registered unemployment  data is 
taken,  and  there are many  problems of differences in statistical 
as well as real policy coverage as between  member  states which 
the present paper cannot attempt to explore_. 
The  United  States example  is a  reminder that a  strong harmonisation 
of member  state schemes is not necessarily a  prerequisite of 
federal participation. 
(1)  Report of the  Study Group  "Economic  and  Monetary  Union  1980",  Brussels, 
rmch 1975. D 
F 
I 
N 
B 
1 
UK 
IRL 
DK 
EC 
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Simulation of a  Community  participation in the financing of 
unemployment  insurance 
Benefits  Financing 
No.  of unemployed  Benefits at Total wage  and  Levy  on  Net_ 
1975  (1)  2 u.a.  per  salary income ,  wage  and  financial 
day  per un- 1975  (1)  salary  position 
employed  income  of 
0.5 % 
- 1000  - million  billion u.a.  million  million 
u.a.  u.a.  u.a. 
1.086  652  178  844  - 192 
840  ,504  lJ5  640  - 1)6 
1.107  664  75  356  + J08 
195  117  J8  180  - 6J 
208  125  27  128  - J 
O.J  0.2  1.2  0.6  - 0.4 
978  137  115  :fi5  +  42 
99  59  J.J  16  +  4J 
127  76  15  71  +  5 
4.640  2.784  137  2.784 
(1) ~  :  ~urostat, Monthly  General Statistics Bulletin, 9 - 1976. 
The  total benefits simulated in 1975  amount  to 2,784  million u.a. 
from  the  Community  as against total present national benefits of 
the  order of 9,200 million u.a  ••  Under  the extreme  (and  debatable) 
supposition that Community  benefits would  substitute for national 
benefits (rather than be  additional),  the Community  average 
financing  share of 33%  woul~ by  countr~·range from  nearly 85% 
for  the weakest Community  economies  to around 20%  for the, 
strongest Community  economies.  The  rate of the  levy on  salaries 
and  wages  required  to finance  the Community  benefit would  amount 
to 0.5%  (the case can be  made,  of course, for surpluses and 
deficits in the year by  year financing for such a  scheme,  but 
that is not provided for in the  present numerical  exam~le).In terms 
of the redistributive power  measure  (used in Chapter 5),  the net 
financial flows  would  result in an equalisation of about 0.7% of per 
capita income  differentials (at purchasing power  parity exchange 
rates). 
The  purpose of establishing an unemployment  scheme  of this kind 
would  in part be  to establish a  limited automatic  budgetary 
mechanism  for redistributing resources in the  Community  as a 
function of the changing economic  fortunes of member  states, and 
also to make  the individual members  of the Community  labour force - 389-
more  aware  of an act of solidarity across  the Community. 
3.9.6. Regional policy aids in the  Community  as a  whole  in 1974  may,  under 
a  narrow definition,  be  broken down  as follows  :  (1) 
capital subventions 
interest rate rebates 
employment  premiums 
fiscal exemptions 
other 
Total 
million EUR 
1,240 
287 
9JJ 
J6l 
27 
2,848 
0.1 
0.1 
0.3 
The  above  mentioned  figures refer only to direct regional aids 
to enterprises, mainly in the manufacturing industry.  Aids  paid 
to Berlin (in the case of Germany)  and aids given directly by 
regions  (see  the case of Italy) are excluded. 
The  figures exclude most of investment in public infrastructures 
in the development regions  (e.g.  roads,  harbours,  communication 
systems,  housing development and  redevelopment,  etc.) as well as all 
the sectoral aids  (small enterprises, agriculture, coal mining, 
textiles,  shipbuilding, S:.eel  etc.) which  may  have  an important 
impact on  regional development. 
The  Community's  Regional Development  Fund's initial allocation 
has been 2)8  million EUR  1975,  and  397  in each of 1976  and  1977.(2) 
The  grants may  not exceed  50  %  of the  public subsidy to  private 
investment; they may  range  from  10  to 30  % for public infrastructure 
projects.  For purposes of comparison with national regional aid 
ex-penditure,  the foregoing total of 2,848  million EUR  in 1974  might 
have  grown  to,  say,  about J,JOO  million EUR  in 1976,  in which 
case the Regional Fund's grants would  have  amounted  to about 12% 
of national regional expenditure on  the  narrow definition used 
i.e. at any event only a  small fraction.---
A straightforward comparison of Community  grants with national 
regional expenditure is not possible, as the former are given not 
only for private investment but also, and  mostl~ for the financing 
of infrastructure works  (60  %  of ERDF  allocation in 1975  ;  75 % 
in 1976). 
(1) ~  :  Estimates of the services of the Commission 
(2)  The  corresponding amounts  in budgetary units of accounts are 300 
(for 1975)  and  500  (for 1976  and  1977). - 390-
).10.  Inter-governmental transfers.  The  purposes,  techniques and amounts 
of transfers from  federal  to state and  local governments  have  been 
set out in detail elsewhere in Chapters 6,  7,  10  and  13.  In the 
present context it is sufficient to recapitulate the orders of 
magnitude  for the federations 
United States (1973-74) 
Gennany  (1973) 
Canada  (1973-74) 
Australia (1973-74) 
(1)  Excluding VAT  tax-sharing 
specific purpose  general purpose 
grants  grants or transfers 
2.7 
1.7 
3.2 
2·4 
%  of GNP 
0.4 
0.3  (1) 
1.0 
J.l 1· 
2. 
3· 
4· 
5· 
6. 
8. 
9· 
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EBU111ated  Breakdown  of 
Public Exp!nditur! in the European  CoJBUDities bj Function in 1970 
Units of  Percentage  Percentage 
account in  of total  of 
milli01111  expenditure  GDP  (1)-
General  Public Servioea  32,333  13-05  5·24 
General  adminilltration  15,103  6.10  2.45 
International  relati01111  4,233  1-71  0.68 
Public order and safety  6,950  2.81  1.13 
General  researoll  6,047  2.44  0.97 
~  17,428  7·04  2.82 
~  32,632  13.18  5-29 
!!!!ill!  32,909  13.2~ 1  5·33 
Social Security and Welfare  64,804  26.17  10.50 
Old age and survivore  35,776  14.44  5.80 
Invalidity, disability and occupational injuries  11,196  4.52  1.81 
Unemployment  1,824  0.74  0.29 
Faaily,  maternity and child allowances  12,858  5·19  2.08 
Other  3,149  1-27  0.51 
Houain5 and  COIIIIINDi t;r;  Allleni tieB  11,743  4·74  1.90 
Sani  taey services  3,953  1.60  0.64 
H01111ing  and otller  7,790  3-14  1.26 
Eoo!!oaio Serviou  38,425  15-51  6.23 
Labour,  wage  and employment  prograames  996  0.40  0.16 
.lgrioul  ture,  forestry,  fislling and hunting  10,414  4-20  1.69 
llining,  manufacturing and OOIIBtl'llotion  1,326  0.53  0.21 
llining  (796)  (0.32)  (0.13) 
llanutaoturing and 001111truotion  (529)  (0.21)  (0.08) 
Electricity, gu end -ter  2,473  1.00  0.40 
Roadll  7,236  2.92  1-17 
Inland and coastal -terwaye  1,164  0.47  0.19 
Other transport and  ooanmioation  5,171  2.09  0.84 
Otller economic services  9,645  3-89  1.56 
~  rr ,385  7.02  2.82 
'ro'l'.lL  247,660  100  40-13 
(1)  GDP  at market prices 
Note  on Traneferu Specific purpose transfere  (i.e. for given sectore) are included under the sectoral headings  for 
the donor level of government.  The  amounts  of total transfers,  for specific or general purposes,  are shown  in the 
total lines. General  purpose transfere are reflected in sectoral expenditure amounts  of recipient  levels of government. 
~~  EUR  6  -Evolution des finances publiques dans lea &tats membres  de  la Communaut6,  1966-70;  UK,  Ireland and, 
Den~~ark -National accounts,  1970-74 SOEX:;  + Ireland -National income  and expenditure,  1974;  UK- national 
income  and expenditure,  1963-73;  Denmark- Economic  survey of Denmark  1972  and Statistics Yearbook,  1971. 
Germany- Finanzbericht  1976  and Statistisches Jahrbuch 1973;  France  - Le  budget de  1970;  Italy -Nota 
introduotiva al bilancio 1970;  Belgium  - unpublished government  statistics; s.o.E.C.  'Public financing of 
research and development  in the countries of the Community'  (CREST/20/75);  1El&ments  chiffrh et 
etatistiques concernant !'utilisation des  or&di ts insori.pts au budget  1968/1973'. - 392-
Public Expenditure  in West  Germany by F\mction and Level  of Government  ~n 1971 
1.  General  Public Services 
General  administration 
International  relations 
Public order and safety 
Research 
2.~ 
3·~ 
Primary and secondary 
Further education  (excluding universities) 
Universities 
4-~ 
Hospitals 
Other 
5·  Social Security and Welfare 
Social security 
Family,  social  and youth 
War  pensions,  etc. 
Other 
6.  Housing and  Community Amenities 
Housing and planning 
Other community  alllenities 
7.  Other Community  and Social Service• 
Sport  and  recreation 
Art,  culture and religion 
8.  Economic Services 
Labour,  wage  and employment  programmes 
Food,  agriculture and forestry 
Mining and construction 
Electricity,  ga.e  and the  construction of 
buildings for cultural purposes 
Motorways 
Other roads 
Inland waterways  and harbours 
Other transport  and  communications 
Regional  assistance 
Other  (incl.  gen.  purpose inter-govt.  grants) 
'IOTAL  FINANCING 
TRANSFERS 
TOTAL  FINAL  EXPENDITURE 
Federal 
11,988 
2,854 
5,290 
573 
3,271 
22,715 
2,053 
516 
515 
1,022 
84 
19 
65 
116,579 
99,819(2) 
4,457 
9,074 
3,229 
759 
658 
101 
501 
424 
77 
15,793 
191 
3,731 
806 
941 
3,891 
2,021 
922 
1,700 
1,305 
286 
17,524 
State/ 
Local 
19,976 
10,137 
30 
8,712 
1,097 
29,319 
22,058 
4,657 
2,604 
9, 733 
7,312 
2,421 
15,755 
54 
8,578 
3,950 
3,173 
11,844 
4,142 
7' 702 
4,660 
2,379 
2,281 
16,366 
225 
2,026 
262 
1,466 
68 
10,161 
379 
502 
462 
816 
16,642 
Total 
31,964 
12,991 
5,320 
9,285 
4,368 
22,715 
31 '372 
22,574 
5,172 
3,626 
9,817 
7,331 
2,486 
132,334 
99,873 
13,035 
13,024 
6,402 
12,603 
4,800 
7,803 
5.1'79 
2,821 
2,358 
32,159 
416 
5. 757 
1,068 
2,407 
3,957 
12,182 
1,301 
2,202 
1 '767 
1' 102 
34,166 
187,996  (60.2)  124,313  (39.8)  312,30')  (100) 
- 13,1392  +  13,892 
174,104  (~'J£1)  13\205 (,11.?)  312,309  (leo) 
DM  m. 
Total  as  per-
centage of  GDP(l) 
2.99 
4.13 
2.97 
.68 
.48 
1.29 
.97 
.33 
1.66 
.63 
1.03 
.68 
.37 
• 31 
4.23 
.05 
• 76 
.14 
.32 
·52 
1.60 
·11 
.29 
.23 
·15 
Al.ll 
11.11 
(1)  GDP  at market  prices 
(2)  Includes  DM  87,127 bill spent  by the Sozialversicherungstrager  (independent  social  security 1nstitutions) 
~~  Statistisches Jahrbuch 1975,  pp.  402-405 
Note  on Transfers:  Specific purpose transfers  (i.e. for given sectors)  are  included under the sectoral headines  for  the 
donor level of government.  The  amounts  of total transfers  1  for specific or general  purposes,  are  shown  in the total  lines. 
General purpose transfers are reflected in sectoral expenditure  amounts  of recipient  levels of government, - 393-
Provisional Estimate of 
Public Expenditure in Australia by Function and Level of Govemaent  in 19J2h3 
1·  General  Public Services 
General  administration 
External affairs 
Law,  order and public safety 
General  research 
2. ~ 
3. ~ 
4·  !!!!!:lli 
5·  Social Securi  tz and Welfare 
6.  Housin.s and  CoiUIIIUli tz Amenities 
1·  Other  Co~~~~~~~mi tz and Social Services 
8.  Economic  Services 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Mining,  manufacturing and construction 
Transport  and  COIIIIIIUJlication 
Other 
9·  ~ 
Other 
General  Purpose Transfers 
TOTAL  Flll'ANCING 
TRANSFERS 
TOTAL  FINAL  EXPENDlTlJRE, 
~ 
(1)  GDP  at market  prices 
(2)  Includes  estimates 
Federal 
934 
466 
344 
41 
83 
1,190 
371 
197 
2,738 
177 
114 
896 
216 
61 
511 
109 
2,775 
15 
2,7fJ:J 
9,392"  (8o.6) 
- 3,614 
.s.,n8  (49.6) 
State/  Total  Local 
735  1,669  (2) 
375  841 
- 344 
360  401 
- 83 
- 1,190 
1,398  1,769 
68"t  884 
123  2,861  (2) 
91  268  (2) 
165  279 
786  1,683  (2) 
266  482 
2  63 
517  1,028 
1  110 
• 1,723 
1,037  1,052  (2) 
- 2,7fJ:J 
2,261  (19.4)  11~,&55 (100) 
+3,614  -
5,875  (50.4)  11, 655  (100) 
~~  Australian National  Accounts  1  National  Income  and Expenditure 1973-741  pages  51-65 
Total as per-
centage of  GD~ 1
) 
4.01 
2.01 
.83 
.96 
.20 
2.85 
4·24 
2.12 
6.87 
.64 
.67 
4.04 
1.16 
.15 
2.47 
.26 
2.52 
27.<;,6 
-
27-96 
Note  on Transfers  1  Specific purpose transfers  (i.e. for given sectors) are included under the sectoral headings for the 
donor level of government.  The  amounts  of total transfers,  for specific or general purposes,  are shown  in the total lines. 
General  purpose transfers are reflected in sectoral  expenditure amounts  of recipient  levels of government. 1· 
2. 
3. 
4· 
5· 
6. 
1· 
8. 
9· 
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Public Expenditure in Cllll&d&  bv Function and Level of Gove:mment  in 1971b2 
; ... 
Federal  Provincial/  Total"  Total .. per-
Local  centap oi_~ 
General  Public Services  2,094.6  2,357·5  4,452·1  4·75 
Total direct  2,044.8 
Total  intergowmmental  49.8 
General edainiBtretion  1,110.2  1",173.9  2,284.1  2.43 
Direct  1,109.5 
Intergow:mmental  0.7 
Foreim affaire and  international uabtance  311·5  - 311.5  ·33 
Direct  311·5 
Intergovemmental  -
Protection of 2eraona  and  2ro2!rt:t:  341.4  1,161.4  1,5Q2.8  1.60 
Direct  292.3 
Intergovernmental  49.1 
Reeearch eatabliabmente  331·5  22.2  353·7  .38 
Direct  331.5 
Intergove:mmental  -
National Defence  1.871.6  - 1,871.6  1.99 
Direct  1,871.6 
Intergove1'11118Dtal  -
Education  864.2  5,673.8  6,538.0  6.97 
---nireot  106.0 
Intergovemmantal  758.2 
Bealtb  1,603.4  3,239.3  4,842.7  5·16 
--Direct  133·5 
Intergovemmental  1,469.9 
Social Securi  t;z:  and  Welfare  5.417·9  1,549.9  6,967.8  7·43 
Direct  4.945·0 
Intergove1'11118Dtal  472.8 
Roueins and  Commuiit;z:  .lraenitiee  93.2  1,130.4  1,223.6  1.30 
Total direct  52.6 
Total  intergove:mmental  40·7 
Boueirur  70.5  439.1  5Q9.6  ·54 
Direct  45·5 
Intergovemmental  25.1 
Envil'ODIII8!lt  22.7  691.3  714.0  ·76 
~  7·1 
Intergove:mmental  15.6 
Other COIIIIUili t;z:  and Social Servicee 
Recreation and culture  164.2  595.6  759·8  .63 
Direct  151·9 
Intergove:mmental  12.3 
Economic Servi  cee  3,147·0  3,200.0  6,347·0  6.76 
Total direct  2,846.4 
Total  intergovemmental  3()0.6 
Develoi!!!!nt  of the  res!one  141.6  67.9  209·5  .22 
Direct  71.1 
Intergovemmantal  70·5 
Labour !!!l!lOl!!!!!;t  and  i.Dai£!tiOD  289.0  1.2  290.2  .30 
Direct  260.3 
Intergove1'11118Dtal  28.7 
A£!culture1 trade1 indueta and tourin  896.9  302.4  1,199.4  1.28 
Direct  8n.o 
Intergovernmental  83.9 
Tranal!2rt  and  cOIIIIINnication  1,207.2  2,475·8  3,683.0  3.92 
Direct  1,163.1 
Intergovemaental  44·1 
Natural reeourcee  276.7  352·7  629.4  .67 
Direct  266.4 
Intergovemmental  10.3 
Tranafera  to og mte!Ji!ri8ee  335·5  63.0  335·5  .36 
Direct  272.5 
Intergovemmental  63.0 
2.!h!.!: 
Direct  1,479.1  247·9  3,273.0  3·49 
Intergovernmental  1,546.0 
WTAL  FINANCING  18,218.5  (50.2)  18,057.3  (49.8  36,276.0  100 
TRANSFERS  4,588.9  + 4,588.9  - -
WTAL  FINAL  EXPII:NDITU!lB  13,629.6  (37.6)  22,646.2  (62.4  36,276.0  100 
(1)  GOP  at market prices 
~·  The  national Finances 1974/75  1 The  Canadian Tax Foundation,  Table 2/141  p.  23 
Note  on  Tra.nefare1  Specific purpoee tranefere  (i.e. for given sectors) are included Wider the sectoral headillt!"  for the 
donor level  of government.  The  amounts  of total tranefere, for specific or pneral purposes,  are ahown  in the total lin••· 
General  purpose transfers are reflected in sectoral  e%Pendi ture amount a  of recipient  levels of government.  ' 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
s. 
9· 
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Public Expenditure in Switzerland by Function and  Level of Government  in 19J3 
s.Fr,  m. 
Federal  State  Local  Total  Total  as per-
centage of GDP(l) 
General  Public Services  1,167  1,8o1  1,436  4,404  3.46 
General  administration  514  825  966  2, 305  1.81 
International  relations  474  - - 474  .37 
Police and fire protection  26  561  338  925  .73 
Law  enforcement  92  375  118  585  .46 
Prison servi  oe  61  40  14  115  .09 
~  2,291_  50  21  2, 362  1.85 
~  1' 195  2,956  2,210  6,361  4.99 
'Jniversities and basic research  964  555  6  1,525  1.20 
High  schools  32  719  45  796  .62 
Primary schools  33  1,354  1,884  3, 271  2.56 
Education system for employees  166  328  275  769  .60 
~  34  2, 345  473  2,852  2.24 
Social Securi  t;£  and  ~lelfare  12,217  3,273  874  16,364  12.83 
Social insurance  11 '736  1,695  264  13,695  10.74 
Contributions to employees'  retirement  460  1,077  246  1,783  1.40 
(insurance trusts) 
Sodal  >~elfare pa,yments  21  501  364  886  .69 
Housin&  and  Communi t;£  Amenities  267  423  883  1' 573  1,24 
Housing  130  73  98  301  .24 
Se1-1erage  (including >taste treatment 
facilities)  131  292  568  991  .78 
CerneterJ and public lavatory  1  24  152  177  .14 
Urban  planning and development  5  34  65  104  .08 
Other  Co:nmuni t;£  and Social Services  4,923  218  544  5,685  4.45 
Recreational  and cultural services  60  218  544  822  .64 
Broadcasting system  4,863  - - 4,863  3.81 
Economic  Services  3,435  3,482  2,417  9,334  7.31 
Agriculture  ( especiall,v stabilisation 
of farm  incomes  and prices)  1,090  173  36  1,299  1.02 
Forestry,  hunting and  fishing  29  102  74  205  .16 
Subsidies to  tourism,  industry and  32  21  27  80  .06 
cornmerce 
Public industrial utili  ties  - 1,004  240  1' 244  .98 
:·later supply service  - 26  225  251  ,20 
R;,ads  2,127  1,842  1 '733  5, 702  4.47 
Transportation  (excluding postal 
services,  railroad and air)  - 242  8o  322  .25 
Air transportation  157  72  2  231  .18 
2.l!lll  .  950  495  370  1,815  1.42 
TOTAL  FINANCING  30,125.6  (59.4)  3, 755·5  (27.1  6,868.9(13.5)  50,750  (100)  39.78 
TRANSFERS  - 3,646.6  ft-3,646.6  1+2,359·1  - -
l-2,359.1 
TOTAL  FINAL  EXPENDITURE  26,479  (52.2)  15,043  (29. 6)  9,228  (18.2)  50,750  (100)  39.78 
(l)  GDP  at  market  prices 
~:  Ciffentliche Finanzen der Schweiz,  1973 
Note  on Transfers:  Specific purpose transfers (i.e.  for given sectors)  are  included under the sectoral headings for 
the donor level  of government.  The  amounts  of total transfers,  for specific or general  purposes,  are shown  in the 
total lines.  General  purpose transfers are reflected in sectoral expenditure amounts  of recipient  levels of government. 1. 
2. 
3· 
4· 
5· 
6. 
8. 
g. 
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Pllblio Expenditure  in the United States by Function end Level of Government  in 1971h2 
Federal  s·tate  Local  Total 
General  Pllblic Services  6,269  - - 6,269 
Total direct  (expenditure)  6,269 
Total  intergovernmental  (transfers)  -
International Relatione  2,900  - - 2,900 
Direct  2,900 
Intergovernmental  -
Space  research and  technology  3,369  - - 3,369 
Direct  3,369 
Intergovernmental  -
~  76,358  - - 76,358 
Direct  76,358 
Intergovernmental  -
Education  13,045  30,407  27,466  70,918 
--nrr.ct  5,104 
---v.terane education benefits  1,800 
Other  3,304 
Inter112vernmental  7,941 
Grants  in aid•  School  lunch  end school milk programmes  616 
Jfaintenence end operation of schools  595 
Other grants  in aid  5,846 
Payments  for services: Scientific research end development  787 
Tuition payments  87 
.!l!.!!!h  5.478  5,651  6,059  17,188 
Total direct  4,166 
Total  intergovernmental  1,312 
Hospital•  2,446  4,954  5,396  12,796 
Direct  2,350 
Intergovernmental  96 
Other health  3,032  697  663  4,392 
Direct  1,816 
Intergovernmental  1,216 
Social Seeuri  tz end Welfare  71,736  15,267  3,527  90,530(2), 
Direct  57.729 
Intergovernmental  14,007 
Howoirur  end Colllllllnity Amenitiea  4,611  149  604  5,364 
Direct  2,630 
Intergovernmental  1,981 
Jsoraio Services  29,173  12,302  5,269  46,804 
Total direct  23,322 
Total  intergovernmental  5,851 
Natural  resources  11,729  1,971  528  14,228 
Direct  11,105 
-st.i:btlisation of farm prices and income  4,895 
Fam credit end  ineuranca  397 
Other agrieul  tural  resources  482 
So1l,  water end elactrici  t;y  energy resources  3,500 
Forests end perkll  1,484 
Mineral  resources  311 
Other natural  resources  36 
Inter112vernmenta1  624 
!!!&l!!!.t!.  5.540  10,272  3,641  19,453 
Direct  432 
Intereove~tal  5,108 
Air trane02rt  2,538  59  1,100  3,697 
Direct  2,419 
Intergovernmental  119 
Po• tal Servi  cas  9,366  - - 9,366 
Direct  9,366 
Intergovernmental  -
2!:1!!!:(3)  35,516  13,875  36,336  85,725 
Direct  33,024  9,117  35,666 
Intergovernmental  2,492  4, 758  670 
TOTAL  FINANCING  242,186(60. 7)  77,651(19.4 79,261(19.9  399,098  (100) 
+  33,584 
-33,584  - 36,759  +  36,759  -
TOTAL  FINAL  EXPENDITUlliO  ~8,60c2(52.3) 1'74.476(18. 7  116,020 
(29.0) 
399,098  (100) 
(1~  GDP  at market  prices 
(2  Includes  insurSJlce trust expenditures classified as direct  expenditure 
(3  Includes  liquor stores 
Source!  1972  Census  of Government,  Vol,  4,  No.  ';,  Tables  7 end 9,  pp.  29-31 
Note on Transfers,  Specific purpoee transfers  (i.e. for given sectors) are included under the sectoral headings  for the 
donor level  of government.  The  amounts  of total transfers,  for specific or gsneral purposes,  are  shown  in the total 
lines.  General  purpose transfers are reflected in sectoral expenditure amounts  of recipient  levels of government. 
¢ m. 
Total  as 
pe~i~~~~l  \ 
·59 
·27 
-32 
7·19 
6.68 
1.62 
1.21 
.41 
8.53 
·51 
4·41 
1.34 
1.83 
-36 
.88 
8.07 
37·58 
-
37·58 - 397-
Conversion rates between units of account and  other currencies 
This section refers to three different units of account  : 
(a)  The  statistical unit of account,  EUR,  is defined in terms of 
a  fixed quantity of gold.  Its conversionBtes are based  on  the 
central rates of the  "snake"  currencies and  market rates of 
exchange for the other freely floating currencies.  The  EUR 
in 1975  had  the following average exchange  rates  : 
1  EUR  = DM  ),21978  ;  Ffr.  5,68,  Lit 86),  FL  J,J5507  ; 
Fb/Flx 48,6572  ;  ~  0,597  ;  Dkr  7,57831  ;  ¢US 1,)2. 
(b)  The  budget unit of account,  u.a., is defined in terms 
of conversion rates which  were  the last parities for national 
currencies-declared to  the If1F.  It uses fixed exchange  rates. 
1 u.a.  = DM  ),66  ;  Ffr.  5r55  ;  Lit 625,- r  Fl ),62  ;  Fb/Flx 50,-
.t  0,4166. 
(c) As  from  1978  the Community's  budget expenditure will be 
expressed in Euronean  units of account,  EUA,  which  is already 
used  by  the  ECSC  and  EIB.  This unit of account is defined in 
terms of a  fixed  basket of the currencies of the  member  states. 
The  EUA  in 1975  had  the  following average  exchange  rates  : 
1  EUA  •  DM  ),049)2  ;  Ffr.  5,Jl914 ;  Lit 809,526  ;  Fl ),1)482  ; 
Fb/flx 45,5677  ; L 0,]60019  ;  ¢ 1,24074. Chapter 13 
MECHANISMS  FOR  FISCAL  EQUALISATION 
IN  AN  INTEGRATING  EUROPJ.~AN COMMUNITY 
by 
Russel Mathews - 401-
I.  THE  NATURE  OF  FISCAL  EQUALISATION 
For the  purposes of this paper,  fiscal equalisation is defined as a 
systematic process of intergovernmental financial transfers directed towards 
equalisation of the budget capacity or economic  performance  of a  number  of 
associated governments. 
1.  Fiscal Equalisation as Horizontal Fiscal Adjustment 
In principle, equalisation transfers may  take  the form  of vertical 
fiscal adjustments, designed  to maintain or restore financial 
balance  between  two  or more  levels of governement  (such as a  federal 
government  on  the one  hand  and  the governments of the member  states 
of the federation on  the other).  In this paper,  however,  attention 
will be  concentrated on  the  process of horizontal fiscal adjustment, 
which  is designed to equalise  the budgetary position of governments 
operating at the  same  level of jurisdiction,  such as states or 
provinces in a  federal  system,  local governments  in a  system of 
unitary government  (or, indeed,  a  federation),  recipient countries in 
an international aid program,  or the member  states of an economic 
community  or political association such as the European Community. 
In this context, it should  be  noted that the  term  horizontal refers 
to the  level of government  within which  budgets are equalised  ;  the 
purpose of the adjustment is to achieve horizontal fiscal balance. 
As  noted below,  the  process of horizontal fiscal adjustment may  take 
the form  either of transfers from  one  level of governement  to another 
(usually from  a  higher level,  such as a  federal government,  to a 
lower level,  such as states or provinces)  or of transfers within the 
same  level of government  (such as from  some  states in a  federation 
to other states in the  same  federation). 
2.  Budget Equalisation and Redistribution Among  Individuals 
In this paper, fiscal equalisation also needs  to be  interpreted as 
budget equalisation, directly affecting governments rather than 
the individuals whom  the @aVerments  represent.  However,  individuals 
are indirectly affected and  are intended  to be  affected by  the 
equalisation arrangements.  The  purpose  of fiscal equalisation may  thus 
be  stated broadly as being to permit or encourage  governments  to 
equalise the fiscal burdens and benefits accruing to individuals in 
the different jurisdictions subject to equalisation.  More  specifically, 
fiscal equalisation is intended to make  it possible  (and,  under 
certain circumstances,  worth  while)  for governments  within the 
equalisation system to provide a  standard range and  quality of 
administrative,  social and  economic  services for their citizens, 
whilst maintaining comparable fiscal efforts in the  form  of standard 
rates of taxation and  other charges.  The  purpose  (and  the effect) of - 402-
redistributing financial resources among  governments rather than 
individuals is to decentralise  the responsibility for resource 
allocation decisions (for example,  by  making  possible a  diversity of 
taxing and  spending patterns  among  the member  states of a  federation), 
whilst leaving citizens in the different jurisdictions which  are 
subject to equalisation equally well off in terms of their governments' 
capacity for,  or effectiveness in, service provision. 
).  Equalisation Standards 
Fiscal equalisation is systematic when,  as is assumed  in this study, 
equalisation standards of capacity or performance are adopted  and  the 
intergovernmental transfers are based explicitly on  the measurement 
of departures from  those standards.  The  choice of equalisation 
standard is a  political decision and  at least four kinds of equalisation 
standards may  be  distinguished  : 
(a)  a  fixed and  arbitrarily determined amount,  which  is distributed 
in accordance with designated allocation criteria, as under the 
scheme  of general revenue  sharing which  was  introduced in the 
u.s.A.  in 1972  ; 
(b)  equalisation to the standards of revenue  raising and  service 
provision which  are available to the government  or governments 
with the highest fiscal capacity, as under the Grants Commission 
arrangements in Australia where  the  standa:rd is based on  the 
budgetary performance  of the  two  States with the highest fixed 
capacity - New  South Wales  and  Victoria  ; 
(c)  equalisation to the average  standard of revenue raising and 
service provision for all governments  in the equalisation 
system,  as under the West  German  and canadian equalisation 
system. 
(d)  equalisation to a  minimum  standard,  for example  a  minimum 
standard of service provision,as under Australian grants 
for schools. 
4.  Partial Versus Full Equalisation 
The  adoption of the first of these equalisation standards implies that 
only partial equalisation is being attempted,  because only 
coincidentally will it produce  a  situation in which  the fiscal capacity 
or performance  of all governments in the equalisation  system is 
equalised.  The  use  of a  minimum  standard also implies partial 
equalisation.  The  other two  fonns of equalisation standard may  be 
modified in such a  way  as to achieve partial rather than full 
equalisation.  Thus  fiscal equalisation in Canada  is restricted to 
equalisation of revenue-raising capacity,  while equalisation in the - 403-
Federal Republic of Germany  is for some  purposes limited to an 
arbitrarily specified proportion  (such as 95  per cent) of the average 
standard.  In Australia,  likewise,  the Grants Commission  used  to 
reduce its recommended  grants by  a  so-called penalty  for claimancy. 
Partial equalisation may  also result from  institutional arrangements 
or from  the nature of the equalisation process itself. In Australia, 
for example,  the distribution of general revenue  grants  (made  for 
purposes of vertical fiscal adjustment)  has been  such as to make  it 
unnecessary for all States with below-standard fiscal capacity to 
apply for equalisation grants,  so  that not all states have  formed 
part of the  equalisation system.  In Canada,  also,  the fact that 
equalisation transfers have  been made  by  the Federal Government  has 
meant  that, although Provinces with below-average  revenue-raising 
capa.ci ty may  be  equalised up  to the average,  Provinces with above-
average revenue-raising capacity are not equalised down.  The  Canadian 
system  thus differs from  the  West  German  and  Australian systems,  which 
at least in principle are capable of achieving full equalisation. 
This is because in the case of West  Germany,  Lander with above-average 
capacity in effect make  transfers to Lander with below-average 
capacity,  while in Australia States with below-standard capacity are 
equalised to the  standard of the  two  states with the highest fiscal 
capacity (subject to such minor differences as may  exist in the 
fiscal capa.ci ties of those  two  Sta  tea) • 
5.  Limitations of Highest-Standard and Average-Standard Approaches 
Both  the highest-standard and  the average-standard approaches are 
subject to technical lind  ta.tions which  should be  noted.  As  a  general 
principle, fiscal equalisation payments  should be  independent of the 
policies of governments  receiving  the  payments.  This condition can 
be  fulfilled when  the highest-standard approach is used,  because  the 
~erformance of the below-standard governments does not affect the 
standard.  But  the condition is not met  when  the average-standard 
a-pproach  is adopted,  because  the performance  of the below-standard 
governments  enters into the calculation of the standard.  The  problem 
may  not be  very important if the budgets of the below-standard 
governments  are small relative to those of other governments,  as in 
Australia  ;  but it can become  significant if a  below-standard 
government has a  relatively large budget, as does  Quebec  in Canada. 
The  use  of a  highest-standard criterion presents problems  of its own 
because it implies the adoption,  as the equalisation yardstick, of the 
performance  of the government or governments  with the highest fiscal 
capacity or performance.  There is then a  dilemma if the  standard 
governments  are not engaged in an activity which  nevertheless needs 
to be  brought into the equalisation calculations•  This problem  has 
arisen in Australia in relation to the equalisation of mineral - 404-
royalties,  because  bauxite is not mined  in the  standard States, but 
is a  significant source of royalty revenue  in the claimant  (below-
standard)  State of Queensland.  The  Grants  Commission's  normal  procedure 
in assessing financial needs inrelation to royalties is to apply the 
standard States' average royalty rate to the difference between  the 
average revenue  base in the  standard States and  the revenue  base in the 
claimant State, adjusted for differences in population.  Because  the 
assessed financial needs  (which  form  the basis of the  recommended 
equalisation gr.ants)  may  be  negative or positive, a  negative need is 
indicated in circumstances where  the claimant State has mineral 
production,  but the standard States do  not.  But  the  problem is to 
determine  a  standard rate under  these circumstances.  (In practice, 
the Commission  has adopted a  standard rate based on its broad  judgement 
as to what  an appropriate rate may  be  under the circumstances,  having 
regard to standard rates for other minerals and  to the rates charged 
by  other governments for the mineral in question.) 
The  problem arises in a  slightly different form  in relation to 
taxation.  In Australia, if a  claimant (below-standard)  State imposes 
a  form  of taxation which is not imposed  in either of the  standard 
States, it is not regarded as having a  negative need in relation to 
that tax because  that would  make  the  recommended  grant dependent on 
the claimant 'State's policy (and would  obviously influence that 
policy). 
But this procedure  tends  to introduce a  bias into the equalisation 
arrangements in favour of the  claimant States (that is, the States with 
below-standard capacity)  and against the  standard States.  'Ibis is 
because  the revenue  bases which  are  taxed in the  standard States will 
tend to be  those  in respect of which  the  standard States have  a 
comparative advantage,  implying a  substantial shortfall in taxable 
capacity for the claimant States in.relation to those forms of 
taxation.  But because  the  standard States  •  tax arrangements are  the 
basis of the  standard,  claimant States will.not be  treated as having 
negative needs in relation to forms  of taxation in which  they have 
a  comparative advantage. 
If,  for example,  there are two  states in a  federation,  one  standard 
and  one  claimant,  and the main  form  of economic  activity in the 
standard state is business whilst  the main  form  of economic  activity 
in the  claimant state is tourism, it is likely that the  standard state 
will tax business transactions in some  way  while  the  standard state will 
seek to tax tourism.  Under  the highest-standard equalisation procedures 
applied by the Australian Grants Commission,  however,  this will result 
in the assessment of substantial positive needs for the  claimant 
state in respect of business taxation,  without any off-setting 
negative needs in respect of taxes on  tourism. - 405-
Under  circumstances where  there are substantial divergences in the 
budgetary patterns of the  governments  subject to equalisation,  and 
where  as in Australia such  governments are prevented from  imposing 
broad-based taxes such as the  value added  tax,  there may  be 
advantages in basing standards on  broad indicators of fiscal capacity 
or performance  rather than on  the  actual performance of the 
governments  used as standard. 
6.  The  Heasurement  Process in Fiscal Equalisation 
The  measurement of equalisation standards and departures from 
standards may  thus be  approached in one  of two  ways•  The  first 
involves  the use of a  standard or representative budget,  and  of 
measures  of relative fiscal capacity or performance  which  are  judged 
to be  relevant in the context of the standard or representative 
budget.  The  second involves the  use of indicators of relative fiscal 
capacity or performance,  which are not necessarily derived from  the 
budgets of the  governments  participating in the equalisation process· 
Indicators of fiscal capacity include,  for example,  statistics of the 
size and  distribution of personal incomes,  the size and age 
distribution of population,  the dispersion of population and  the degree 
of urbanisation,  and  the rate of population growth. 
As  in the case of the equalisation standard,  the  standard budget 
may  be  based on  the  performance of governments with the highest 
fiscal capacity,  as in Australia, or on  the average  perfo:mance of 
all governments,  as in Canada.  The  budget approach has the advantage 
of measuring relative fiscal capacity or performance directly, by 
reference to  the  items which  actually form  the basis of the budgets 
being equalised.  The  measurement is thus more  objective·than is 
'90ssible  Hhen  economic,  demographic  or other indicators are used as 
measures of capacity or need,  as in the case of the U.s.  revenue  -
sharing grants.This is because,  in the latter case, not only must 
an arbitrary choice of indicators be  made,  but also arbitrary weights 
must  be  assigned to the indicators for the  purpose of producing 
combined  measures of capacity or need. 
One  disadvantage of the  budget approach has been  noted in the 
preceding section.  Another is that this approach requires direct 
assessment of capacity or performance  on  the basis of what  may 
involve  a  very large number  of calculations,especially if many 
governments  exe  involved.  Because  of data limitations, it may  also 
require resort to estimations of broad  judgement on  a  significant scale, 
with a  consequential reduction in the objectivity of the  assessments 
which are made. 
The  budget approach  tends to be  more  easily applied to the equalisation 
of revenue-raising capacity than to the equalisation of expenditure 
needs,  which  no  doubt explains why  Canada  has restricted its fiscal 
capacity equalisation to the former.  In Australia where  as noted - 406-
above  the budget approach is used by  the Grants Commission  to 
assess both revenue and  expenditure needs,  there have never been more 
than three claimant States and  three standard States, and at present 
there are only one  claimant and  two  standard States.  'llle  Australian 
Grants Commission's detailed procedures could not be  easily applied 
to the 50  States in the u.s.A., although a  variant of the approach 
has been used by  the Commission in making  recommendations  on 
equalisation grants for nearly 900  local government bodies in 
Australia. 
The  budget approach may  be  facilitated by  harmonising budget policies, 
but again it is easier to harmonise  taxation policy than expenditure 
policy.  This no  doubt explains why  revenue equalisation has been based 
on  the budget approach in the  Federal Republic of Germany,  where  the 
Lander have  harmonised their taxation systems,  while  expenditure 
equalisation has tended to rely on  indicators of need  such as the 
degree of urbanisation. 
7.  Types  of Equalisation Transfers 
Basically,  there are four kinds of financial  transfers which  may  be 
made  for purposes of fiscal equalisation,  depending on  a  two-way 
classification between  general purpose  payments  and  specific purpose 
payments  on  the  one  hand  and  between grants and advances  on  the other. 
For the  purpose of the present discussion,  so-called block grants, 
which  are available for spending for a  designated broad purpose 
(such as education),  may  be regarded as specific purpose  payments. 
General  purpose  payments are available for spending at the discretion 
of the recipient governments in accordance with their own  priorities. 
Conflicts between  the spending priorities of the  governments  making 
the payments  and  those receiving them  are thus avoided·  Specific purpose 
payments,  on  tlle other hand,  must  be  spent on  the  purposes designated 
and  in accordance with any other conditions laid down  by  the government 
making  the payments.  Specific purpose  payments  are partial in 
character and  may  be directed towards o  bjecti  ve.s  other than fiscal 
equalisation•  There is an inherent resource allocation problem  in 
the use  of specific purpose grants, resulting from  tlle  possibility 
of revenue  substitution or expenditure substitution by  the recipient 
government.  ~latching or other revenue  conditions are sometimes 
attached to specific purpose  payments  to prevent the recipient 
government  from  reducing its own  revenue efforts and  thereby 
defeating the  purpose of the payments.  But action of this kind, 
designed to obviate revenue  substitution,  may  encourage  the recipient 
government  to divert expenditure from  fields which  are not subject 
to matching payments  to those which  are,  thereby distorting its own 
expenditure priorities. 
In some  countries, notably the U.S.A.,  specific purpose  grants have 
been  called conditional grants. It should be  noted,  however,  that - 407-
both general purpose  payments  and  specific purpose  payments,  and  both 
grants and  advances,  may  be  conditional or unconditional.  By 
definition,  expenditure conditions cannot be  attached to  @Bneral 
purpose  payments,  but revenue  conditions may  be  specified•  In Australia, 
for example,  general revenue  payments  which  have  been made  by  the 
Commonwealth  Government  to the States in the form  of tax reimbursement 
grants (later called financial assistance grants) have  been 
conditional on  the States refraining from  imposing their own  income 
taxes. 
Both  revenue  conditions and  expenditure conditions may  be  attached to 
specific purpose  payments.The  revenue  conditions may  take the form  of 
matching conditions or of more  general revenue  substitution conditions. 
The  former require the recipient government  to contribute funds from 
its own  resources, in a  specified proportion to the specific purpose 
payment,  to help finance  the designated expenditure.  The  Canadian 
Medicare  payments,under which  the Federal Government has contributed 
to the Provinces 50  per cent of the  cost of designated medical services, 
provide an example  of matching payments.  (It should be  noted,  however, 
that until 1975,  when  the Federal Government  placed a  ceiling on  its 
Medicare  contributions,  the fact that the program  was  open-ended and 
that spending decisions were  taken by  the  Provinces meant  that the 
Federal Government  was  effectively matching Provincial contributions, 
rather than vice versa.) 
General revenue  substitution conditions may  take  the form  of 
requirements that recipient governments  continue  to make  specified 
revenue  efforts in relation to the activities being supported by  the 
specific purpose  payments.  In Australia, for example,  Federal 
recurrent grants for schools have  been  subject to a  general condition 
that the States continue to devote at least the same  proportion of 
their revenue  budgets to schools as they committed in the year prior 
to the introduction of the Federal payments. 
t·lhether  the  use  of specific purpose  payments results in greater 
allocative efficiency than the use of general puDpese  payments will 
depend  on  which  level of government is in the better position to 
determine  revenue  and  expenditure priorities.  This in turn depends 
on  which  level of government is better able  to evaluate the decisions 
which  have  to be  made,  on  the basis of such factors as information 
sources,  responsiveness to the electorate and the spillover effects 
of the decisions.  Recipient governments may  have  an advantage in terms 
of information sources and responsiveness,  up  to  the  point where 
spillover effects occur  ;  thereafter the  balance of advantage must  be 
presumed  to lie with the higher level governments making  the transfer 
payments. 
Equalisation transfers may  also take the form  of either grants or 
repayable advances (i.e. loans).  Grants may  themselves  be  made  either 
for recurrent or capital purposes,  although in modern  budgets the 
distinction may  not always be  especially significant•  Advances  may  or - 408-
may  not be  interest bearing.  In Australia,  both general purpose  and 
specific purpose  payments  have  been made  in the form  of revenue  grants, 
capital grants and  advances.  Thus  general purpose  payments  include 
financial assistance grants from  the Commonwealth  to the States, which 
are available for general revenue  purposes  ;  capital grants in support 
of States' works  programs,  which  have  the effect of reducing the 
States'  borrowing requirements  ;  and  payments  which have  been  made 
in the  form  of repayable advances  from  time  to  time  for the  purpose 
of reducing State revenue deficits. 
Specific purpose  payments  in Australia also take  the  form  of revenue 
grants, in support of recurrent expenditure on,  say,  education  ; 
capital grants, for example  grants designated for expenditure on 
road construction  ;  and  repayable advances,  which  are usually adopted 
as the  form  of payment  when  the expenditures help to create revenue-
producing capital assets,  such as a  hydroelectric project or a  natural 
gas pipeline. 
8.  Co-ordination of General Purpose  and Specific Purpose  Payments 
A problem  may  arise when  one  level of government is making  both 
general purpose and  specific purpose  equalisation payments  to another 
level of governmen~ because  the effect of one  form  of payment  may  be 
either to cancel out or to duplicate the effect of the other. 
The  possibility of conflict between  the  two  forms  of payment arises 
partly because  they usually have different purposes  (general purpose 
payments  being directed towards capacity equalisation and  specific 
purpose  payments  towards  performance  objectives)  ;  and  partly because 
general purpose  transfers may  be  used  to finance  the  same  expenditures 
which  are  the  subject of the specific purpose  payments.  The 
opportunities for conflict are intensified if separate departments 
or agencies make  recommendations  or decisions in respect of the  two 
types of payment. 
Three  procedures have  been identified by  the Australian Grants 
Commission  as possible methods  of dealing with this problem.  These 
are described as the exclusion approach,  the deduction approach and 
the  inclusion approach. 
Under  the exclusion approach,  both  the expenditures which  are the 
subject of the specific purpose payments  and  the revenues used  to 
finance  those  expenditures  (including the  specific purpose  payments 
themselves)  are excluded from  the  budgets or financial data which  form 
the  basis of the calculations made  for purposes of the general purpose 
payments.  In effect, a  fence is placed around the activities which  are 
the  subject of the specific purpose  payments  and  they are not 
allowed to affect the rest of the  budget.  This approach has been 
adopted by  the Grants Commission  in respect of road grants,  which 
are  the subject of separate recommendation  by  the Commonwealth - 409-
Bureau of Roads.  The  approach is feasible because State taxes used 
to finance  road expenditure are  themselves earmarked for that purpose 
and are excluded from  the States'  revenue  budgets. 
Where  the latter condition does not hold and  State revenues generally 
are used to finance  expenditures which  are  the subject of specific 
~urpose transfers,  the exclusion approach cannot be  adopted.  The 
choice under  these circumstances lies between  the deduction approach, 
whereby  the specific purpose  payment  and that part of the relevant 
State's expenditure which  is financed by  that payment  are deducted 
from  the  revenue  and  the expenditure sides of the  budget respectively 
and  the  inclusion_ approach,  whereby  the specific purpose  payment is 
included in the State's budget on  the revenue  side while  the 
expenditure side records total expenditure,  including expenditure 
which  has been financed by  the specific purpose  payment.  The  two 
procedures are likely to result in different general purpose 
equalisation transfers,  because  under  the deduction approach only net 
expenditure will be  subject to general purpose equalisation while 
under the inclusion approach  both  gross expenditure and  the specific 
purpose  payment will be  equalised.  Irrespective of whether net or 
gross expenditure is equalised,  there is a  possibility of conflict 
between  the  two  kinds of payments,  especially if one  agency is 
concerned with general purpose  equalisation and  another with specific 
purpose  transfers. 
Such  a  situation has arisen in Australia,  where  the Schools 
Commission  makes  recommendations  on  grants for schools based 
essentially on  performance criteria, while  the Grants Commission  makes· 
recommendations  on  general purpose  grants based on equalisation of 
fiscal capacity ;  and  where  education remains  one  of the most important 
i terns  in the  budgets of the States to be  financed from  their own 
revenue  sources.  The  Grants Commission  has indicated that it proposes 
to deal with this problem  by  adopting the inclusion approach,  while 
substituting the  Schoo~s Commission's assessment of expenditure needs 
for its own  (subject to the inclusion of one  or two  items which  have 
not been  taken into account by  the Schools Commission  in its 
assessment of needs).  The  result of this approach will be  to adopt 
the Schools Commission's  performance  criterion in relation to 
expenditure equalisation and  the Grants Commission's  capacity 
equalisation criterion in relation to the  revenue  side of the  budget, 
which  will treat the  schools grants as a  revenue  source  to be 
equalised along l'li th taxes and  other revenues. 
9.  The  Eg ualisa  tion Base 
Fiscal equalisation may  be  applied to recurrent budgets  (or parts  there-
ofj,  loan programs  or capital outlays.  Where  revenue budgets  are being 
equalised there is a  problem in deciding whether or not to include the 
transactions of public authority business undertakings.  The  principle 
which  has been adopted by  the Australian Grants Commission  may  be - 410-
considered appropriate for general application.  This is to exclude  the 
activit~es of those business undertakings which  are inherently capable 
of being financially self-supporting (such as electricity undertakings); 
and  to include for purposes of equalisation the results of business 
undertakings  such as railways and  metropolitan public transport,  which 
have  an unavoidable financial impact on  the budget  (because  they 
are incapable of being operated profitably) and  which  give rise to 
fiscal inequalities among  the  governments  whose  budgets are being 
equalised. 
Such  inequalities are notoriously difficult to  measure~ The  Grants 
Commission  uses differences in per capita deficits (modified  to a 
comparable  basis) as a  starting point,  and  subsequently makes 
adjustments for policy differences in relation to fares and  freight 
rates, depreciation,  wage  rates and  superannuation.  But  the residual 
differences may  still reflect differences in policy or efficiency, 
arisin~ for example  from  the operation of uneconomic  branch  lines. 
The  form  of financial transfer which  is made  in particular circumstances 
tends  to reflect the  base  which  is subject to equalisation.  Where  the 
whole  of the recurrent budget is subject to equalisation, as in 
Australia in the  case of the so-called special grants recommended  for 
claimant States by  the Grants Commission,  the equalisation payments 
will take  the  form  of general purpose grants.  The  same  is likely 
to be  true of payments  made  to equalise revenue-raising capacity,  such 
as the Canadian  equalisation~ants. 
On  the other hand,  equalisation payments  in support of general 
borrowing programs  may  be  expected  to take  the  form  of general 
purpose  loans.  The  Australian States'  loan programs,  which  must  be 
approved  by  the  Commonwealth  and  State Premiers meeting as  the 
Australian Loan  Council before  the  Commonwealth  undertakes  the 
borrowing on  behalf of the States, are not at present allocated in 
accordance  with any explicit assessment of relative needs. 
However,  it is easy to conceive of a  situation in which  the distribution 
would  take  the form  of general  purpose  loans subject to equalisation. 
Specific purpose  grants or advances are likely to be  used  when  the 
government  mak1ng  the  payments  intends to limit its support to a 
particular category of exnenditure.  As  has been noted,  the  choice 
between  grants and  advances is likely to depend  on  whether  the 
nayment is for revenue  or capital  p~poses, and if the latter on 
whether or not the assets  so  created are revenue-producing assets. 
Specific purpose  ~yments for a  school building program  are  thus 
likely to take  the form  of capital grants,  while  payments  for 
sewerage  works  are likely to  be  made  in the form  of advances. - 411-
10.  General Distribution or Supplementary Payments 
A further distinction affecting the equalisation base is of some 
importance inraation to the form  in which  equalisation payments  are 
made.  This depends  on  whether the equalisation payments  are embodied 
in a  formula  used  to distribute a  pre-determined amount  or are made 
as supplementary  payments.  Under  the  former  approach,  the  total 
amount  to be  distributed is first determined independently of 
equalisation considerations,  and  the distribution among  recipient 
governments is then made  in accordance with equalisation principles. 
This approach has been  used  in many  countries  :  in the u.s.A.  in the 
case of the  revenue-sharing grants to States and  local governments 
made  under  the State and  Local Fiscal Assistance Act  of 1972  ; 
in Australia (implicitly rather than explicitly) in the  case of the 
financial assistance  grants and  their predecessor tax reimbursement 
grants  ;  in the  United Kingdom  in the case of grants to local 
authorities  ;  and  in the Federal Republic of Germany  in the case of 
the horizontal financial settlements. 
Under  the alternative approach,  the  payment  to a  recipient government 
is determined in accordance with equalisation principles and made  as 
a  su~plementary payment  to  the  government  concerned.  The  revenue 
equalisation grants made  by  the Government  of Canada  to the Canadian 
Provinces  take  this form.:,  as do  the  special grants paid in Australia 
on  the recommendation  of the  Grants Commission. 
Under  this approach,  the amount  of the supplementary payment  needs  to 
reflect not only any revenue-raising or expenditure disabilities which 
are included in the equalisation arrangements,  but also any 
equalisation elements which  are embodied  in other financial transfers 
which  have  been  made  to  the recipient governments.  Thus,  the special 
grants recommended  by  the Australian Grants Commission  take account 
not only of the claimant State's assessed needs in relation to its 
relative revenue-raising capacity and its expenditure disabilities, 
but also ~f the equalisation elements which  are implied by  differences 
in the  per capita amounts  of the other general revenue  assistance 
which  has  been received by  the claimant and  the  standard States. 
Tax-sharing arrangements which  are subject to equalisation principles 
will generally take  the form  of a  general distribution.  However,  it 
is of some  interest to note that under  the present Australian 
Government's  new  federalism policy,  a  three-tier system of 
equalisation is proposed involving  :  -
(a)  the  general distribution of the States'  share of income  taxes 
(which  will replace financial assistance grants) in accordance 
with equalisation criteria and  procedures which  will be 
reviewed  by  the  Commonwealth  and  States quinquennially in the 
light of recommendations  to  be  made  by an independent body 
(whether this will be  the Grants Commission  has still to be - 412-
determined)  ; 
(b)  within the quinquennial period,  supplementary equalisation 
grants,  to be  paid on  the basis of recommendations  made  by 
the Grants Commission  (in accordance with its existing principles) 
to any of the four States with below-standard fiscal capacity 
which  can sustain claims that their shares under  the  general 
distribution formula·are insufficient in relation to their 
fiscal capacity  ; 
(c)  at any  time,  supplementary  equalisation~ants for any  of the 
four states with below-standard fiscal capacity, in respect 
of the  income  tax surcharges which  individual States are to 
be  permitted to impose  under the  new  arrangements. 
Specific  purpose  payments  may  be  made  on  the basis of general 
distributions of predetermined amounts  or of supplementary payments. 
Specific purpose  grants not subject to revenue  conditions are  thus 
in the nature of supplementary payments.  By  contrast,  the distribution 
of road grants recommended  by  the  Commonwealth  Bureau of Roads  for 
payment  by  the Australian Government  to  the States is determined on 
the basis of a  series of calculations,  involving  ~-
(a)  direct assessment of the  road expenditure needs of States 
individually and  in the aggregate  ; 
(b)  an arbitrary decision as to  the shares of the total 
expenditure  to be  financed  by  the Federal Government  on  the 
one  hand  and  by  the States in the aggregate  on  the other  ; 
(c)  an allocation of the States'  financing share in accordance 
with  the relative capacities of the six States to raise  the 
motor  taxes which  are used  to finance  their share. 
The  difference between  a  State's assessed expenditure needs and its 
assessed tax contribution is then the amount  of its recommended  road 
grant.  (The  procedure  which  has been described over-simplifies the 
actual position in relation to road grants because  the  recommendations 
of the Commonwealth  Bureau of Roads  have  not been  precisely adopted.) 
Although  the  choice between general distribution and  supplementary 
payments  is often dictated by  the nature of the equalisation transfers, 
freedom  of action will sometimes exist.  The  question then arises as 
to which  approach is to  be  preferred  ?  If the  same  equalisation 
standard and  criteria are adopted in each case, if the  same  differences 
in revenue-raising capacity and  expenditure needs are evaluated 
and if the  same  amo.unt is distributed (including the  supplementary 
equalisationtransfers),  the distribution among  recipient governments 
will also be  the  same  under each approach. - 413-
However,  differences between  the  two  approaches are likely to result 
from  the fact that supplementary equalisation transfers are not 
usualJy predetermined,  so that the amounts  to be  distributed will 
not necessarily be  the  same  in each case.  Equalisation grants 
recommended  by  the Australian Grants Commission  and  revenue 
equalisation grants paid to the Canadian  Provinces are  thus  open-
ended,  in the  sense  that the grants depend  partly on  the measurement 
of the  standard and  partly on  the recipient governments'  relative 
position in relation·to the standard. 
This was  graphically illustrated in Canada at the  time  of the 
international energy crisis in 1974,  when  the  capacity of the oil 
and  gas  producing Provinces to raise mineral royalties increased 
dramatically.  As  a  result,  the national average was  itself raised 
and  the shortfall in each other Province's revenue-raising capacity 
became  so  large that, in the absence  of other arrangements,  substantial 
increases in Federal taxes would  have  been necessary to finance  the 
equalisation grants that would  have  become  payable  under  the formula. 
Despite their greater revenue-raising capacity,  the oil and  gas 
producing Provinces would  have  contributed only marginally to these 
increased taxes.  (The  problem  was  eventually dealt with by partly 
insulating the equalisation arrangements from  the price effects of 
the  increased oil and  gas revenues which  were  attributable to  the 
international fuel crisis.) 
11.  Timing  of Equalisation Payments 
The  problem discussed in the  preceding section is related to  the 
problem of the  timing of equalisation payments  and whether the 
payments  are to be  made  in respect of a  past year,  the current year 
or a  future  year.  The  degree of equalisation needed  may  itself be 
partly dependent on  whether payments are made  on  an ex ante or an 
ex  post basis and  on  how  the  payments are financed  by  the  government 
making  the  payments.  The  chdbe  of timing will no  doubt depend  partly 
on  the  importance which  is attached  to  this factor,  partly on  the 
availability of reliable information,  partly on  the variability of the 
factors which  give rise to the need for equalisation payments,  and 
partly on  the extent to which  the government making  the  payments  seeks 
to influence  the palicies or performance of recipient governments. 
As  a  general objective,  equalisation payments  should reflect relative 
needs or performance  in the year for which  the  payments are made, 
after appropriate allowance has been made  for the effect of the 
manner in which  the  payments  are financed.  The  Australian Grants 
Commission's approach  to the problem has been  to adopt a  two-part 
system,  whereby an advance  grant is recommended  for payment in the 
current year (the  ye~r of payment)  on  the basis of preliminary 
estimates of a  claimant State's needs,  and  a  completion grant 
(which  may  be  either  positive or negative) is recommended  for 
nayment  two  yea~ later when  the State's needs are finally assessed 
on  the basis of audited financial statements and  other data which - 414-
by  then have  become  available for the prior year (the year of review). 
The  total grant recommended  for payment  in a  particular year thus 
comprises  the advance  grant for the  current year and  the  completion 
grant (positive or negative)  for the year of review. 
12.  Vertical or Horizontal Transfers 
The  question of pre-determined or supplementary payments  referred 
to earlier is also related to another problem which  has so far been 
noted only briefly,  involving the question as to which  level of 
government  should make  e~ualisation transfers.  Even  in the  case of 
horizontal fiscal adjustments for purposes of budget equalisation 
(as opposed  to vertical fiscal adjustments),  a  choice exists as  to 
whether  the  transfers should be  made  by  a  higher level of government 
(such as the federal government in a  federation)  or between  the 
governments  operating at the  same  level whose  budgets are  to be 
equalised  (such as the  states in a  federal system). 
The  procedure adopted  may  depend  on  the revenue  sources available 
to the different levels of government,  and  in particular on  whether 
there is vertical fiscal balance  between  the different levels of 
government.  Thus  the higher level of government is more  likely to 
accept re8ponsibility for equalisation transfers if it has a  monopoly 
or near-monopoly of major revenue  sources  (as in Australia,  where  the 
Commonwealth  Government  has had almost exclusive control over income 
taxes and  sales taxes since World  Var II).  The  lower level of 
government,  on  the other hand,  is more  likely to accept responsibility 
for equalisation  transfe~ among  its member  governments if the 
equalisation arrangements are embodied  in a  general system of tax 
sharing (as in the Federal Republic of Germany  where  ~der  with 
above-standard fiscal capacity make  transfers to lander with below-
standard fiscal capacity). 
This question has a  bearing on  whether or not the equalisation transfers 
are likely to be  open-ended.  In the case of horizontal transfers, the 
the amounts  paid by governments with above-standard capacity will be 
equal to  the  amounts  received by  governments  with below-standard 
capacity  ;  and  the  situation which  arose in Canada at the  time  of 
the  energy crisis, when  the burden of adjustment fell on  the 
Federal Government,  could not arise. 
Under  a  system of horizontal settlements, states or provinces with 
above-standard capacity may  be  expected to take a  direct interest in 
establishing the equalisation standards, criteria and  procedures, 
thereby helping to ensure that the arrangements are equitable and 
effective from  the point of view  of all governments.  The  fact that 
equalisation payments  in Australia have  been made  by  the Federal 
Government  has tended to make  New  South Wales  and Victoria - the  two 
States with highest fiscal capacity- disinterested in the equalisation 
arrangements,  with the  consequence  that other States may  have  been 
treated more  advantageously than their relative fiscal capacities - 415-
may  have  warranted.  As  a  result,  taxpayers in New  South  ~ales 
and  Victoria may  have  been treated more  unfavourable  than is likely 
to have  been  the case if their own  State governments had  been 
negotiating the  equalisation~ansfers. 
This issue has obvious relevance  to the  problem of making  equalisation 
transfers within the European  Community.  '!here  may  be  some  advantages, 
from  the viewpoint of political acceptability, in having the 
equalisation transfers made  from  a  Community  fund,  because  this will 
tend to cloak the  impact of the equalisation arrangements on 
individual governments  with above-standard capacity or performance 
(which will of course be  the  governments  which  bear the burden of 
the equalisation).  From  the viewpoint of equity and  responsiveness 
to taxpayers,  however,  the balance of advantage  would  seem  to lie 
with a  system  which  records the  payments as horizontal transfers. 
II. THE  PURPOSE  OF  FISCAL  EQUALISATION 
In Part I, it was  suggested that the  purpose of fiscal equalisation may  be 
stated broadly as being to permit or encourage  governments  to equalise the 
fiscal burdens  and  benefits accruing to individuals in the different 
jurisdictions subject to equalisation.  More  specifically, it was  observed, 
fiscal equalisation is intended to make  it possible or worth while for 
governments within the equalisation system to provide a  standard range  and 
quality of services for their citizens, whilst maintaining comparable 
fiscal efforts in the  form  of standard rates of taxation and other charges. 
It is now  time  to examine  the purpose of fiscal equalisation in greater 
detail, and  in particular to distinguish between  two  concepts of fiscal 
equalisation which  reflect different policy objectives. 
1.  Concepts of Fiscal Equalisation 
There  are two  broad approaches  to fiscal equalisation, depending 
on  whether the  purpose is to equalise the fiscal capacity of the 
governments  participating in the equalisation arrangements or to 
equalise their fiscal performance. 
For  the  purpose  of the present discussion, fiscal capacity may  be 
defined as a  government's capacity to provide  services, having regard 
to its revenue  base and  the cost of providing those services. In 
relation to fiscal equalisation,  the concept of fiscal capacity is 
essentially a  comparative concept.  A govenment's fiscal capacity may 
therefore be  interpreted as its relative revenue-raising capacity 
(assessed by  reference to a  standard revenue effort and  the relative 
size of its revenue  base)  on  the  one  hand  and its relative cost of 
~roviding a  standard range and quality of service on  the other. - 416  -
Fiscal nerformance,  by  contrast,  may  be  defined as a  government's 
fiscal effort, having regard to  such factors as its revenue  effort 
and  its success in meeting  expenditure  and  other policy  objectives, 
Revenue  effort may  be  measured  by  reference  to the  government's revenue 
capacity,  but in relation to fiscal equalisation the concept of fiscal 
performance is again  essentially a  comparative concept.  The  definitions 
of fiscal capacity and fiscal performance will be  expanded  below. 
Although  both fiscal capacity equalisation and fiscal performance 
equalisation are concerned with the distribution function in public 
finance,  the redistributive effects of fiscal capacity equalisation 
may  differ significantly from  those of fiscal performance  equalisation. 
Moreover,  fiscal capacity equalisation is essentially neutral in 
relation to its effects onresourceallocation decisions and  economic 
stabilisation.  Fiscal performance  equalisation,  on  the other hand, 
involves action by  the  governments  making  the equalisation transfers 
which  is deliberately intended to influence  the  level and  pattern 
of taxation or spending of the recipient governments,  certainly in 
relation to  the allocation function and  possibly also  in relation to 
the stabilisation function. 
In a  federal or other multi-level system of government  in which  the 
equalisation transfers are made  by  a  higher level government  to  lower 
level governments*,fiscal capacity equalisation implies greater 
devolution of responsibility for decision-making than fiscal performance 
equalisation.  This is because,  under fiscal capacity equalisation, 
governments are merely put into a  position where  they may  provide 
services on  a  standard scale whilst imposing taxes and  other charges 
at standard severity.  They  are not obliged to match  the  standard 
revenue  effort  ;  indeed governments  receiving  equalisation payments 
are free to impose  below-standard taxes and  provide  correspondingly 
below-standard services,  or conversely to  combine  above-standard 
taxes and  above-standard services.  Similarly,  their pattern  of 
taxation and  spending may  differ from  standard. 
Fiscal capacity equalisation may  thus be  said to be  an instrument of 
decentralisation or diversity in public sector decision making.  In 
a  federal context, it provides a  federalist solution to the 
equalisation problem.  Fiscal performance equalisation,  by  contrast, 
involves  the specification of performance criteria and  conditions by 
the government or governments  making  the equalisation transfers, 
w.ith  the deliberate intention of influencing or harmonising the  taxation 
or spending policies of the recipient governments. 
*The  terms  'higher level'  and  'lower level'  are used  to denote  the 
respective ranges of jurisdiction of different levels of government 
and do  not necessarily imply qualitative differences in degrees of 
autonomy  or powers  of decision. - 417-
Fiscal performance  equalisation thus involves the  loss of an important 
degree of freedom  on  the part of the recipient governments.  In a  system 
of federal or multi-level government,  fiscal performance  equalisation 
serves as an instrument of centralisation or uniformity in public 
sector decision-making. 
It will be  clear from  the discussion in Part I  that general purpose 
payments will normally be  the appropriate means  of providing for 
fiscal capacity equalisation, while specific purpose  payments will 
normally  be  the most  suitable means  of providing for fiscal 
performance  equalisation.  However,  it is possible  to incorporate 
performance criteria in a  system of capacity equalisation payments. 
I.t  will  be  seen  below  that  a  revenue  effort component  may  be  introduced 
into an equalisation grants formula,  so that equalisation grants reflect 
both differences in fiscal capacity and differences in revenue effort. 
Conversely, it is possible to incorporate fiscal capacity criteria 
in arrangements for fiscal performance  equalisation. 
Although  the  two  objectives of equalising fiscal capacity and 
equalising fiscal performance  may  be  combined  in this way  in a  fiscal 
equalisation system,  there is an  inherent conflict between  the  two 
apvroaches.  If, for example,  a  tax effort component is inclUded in a 
fiscal capacity equalisation grants formula,  in the  short term at least 
this will have  the effect of changing the distribution of grants from 
the distribution which  would  have  resulted from  the application of a 
fiscal capacity equalisation criterion. In the long run,  the 
distribution may  be  expected to move  closer to a distribution based 
on relative fiscal capacities, as governments with below-standard 
effort raise their taxes in order to avoid the penalty imposed  by  the 
formula.  However,  if the equalisation is carried out by  horizontal 
transfers as in the Federal Republic  of Germany,  governments  with 
above-standard fiscal capacity also have  an incentive to maintain a 
relatively high  tax effort. 
2.  Fiscal Capacity Equalisation 
There  are  two  aspects of fiscal capacity equalisation,  namely 
equalisation of revenue-raising capacity (or revenue  needs)  and 
equalisation of expenditure needs. 
Both  revenue  needs and  expenditure needs  may  be  positive or negative 
and  are additive,  so  that a  government's total financial needs 
for equalisation purposes are represented by  the  sum  of its revenue 
needs  on  the one  hand  and its expenditure needs on  the other. 
A government's revenue  needs in relation to a  particular revenue  source 
may  be measured  by  the difference between its revenue-raising capacity 
and  a  standard revenue-raising capacity ;  this in turn is equal to 
the  product of a  standard revenue  effort and  the difference between 
the  government's per capita revenue  base  and  a  standard per capita 
revenue  base,  multiplied by  the  population of the territory over 
which  the government has  jursidiction. A separate assessment of need - 418-
must be  made  £or each revenue  source. 
A government's expenditure need in  ~lation to a  particular 
service is measured as the differential cost per capita of providing 
a  standard range and  quality of that service, multiplied by  the 
population of the territory over which  the  government has  jurisdiction. 
A separate assessment of need  must  be  made  for each expenditure category 
but,  where  per capita costs of providing services may  reasonably be 
expected  to be  equal for different governments,  assessed needs will be 
zero. 
Differential costs may  arise from  two  causes  :-
(a)  the need  to provide a  different number  of units of the service 
relative to standard  ;  and 
(b)  the  need  to incur  a  different unit cost relative to standard 
in providing the  service. 
The quantity differential may  arise from  such factors as differences in 
demographic  structure, resulting,  for example,  in the need  for one 
government  to  provide more  educational  services than another because 
it has in its jurisdiction a  higher proportion of school-age children 
to total population.  The  unit cost differential may  arise from  such 
factors as differences in wage  costs or differences in population 
size or density.  The  latter may  result in diseconomies of large  scale 
(affecting costs of network  services such as sewerage  and of services 
subject to congestion costs such as transport),or diseconomies of 
small scale  (affecting costs with a  substantial overhead  component, 
such as costs of general administration), or diseconomies of 
population dispersion (affecting costs of services which  must 
necessarily be  decentralised to some  extent,  such as costs of police, 
education and health services). 
There is an inherent problem in allowing for some  of these factors, 
because  to do  so may  discourage  the very structural changes which  may 
be  needed  to remove  the disabilities which  give rise to the financial 
needs.  To  make  capac1ty equalisat1on transfers.in respect  of inequalities 
associated with urbanisation may  thus weaken  urban planning pressures 
directed towards  the achievement of better population balance.  The 
conflict is essentially one  between  the  short-term problem of making 
it possible to equalise the  burdens of people in their present 
locations and  the  long-term problem of facilitating necessary structural 
changes. 
The  same  kind of problem arises in relation to economic  development. 
It is easier to apply the principle of fiscal capacity equalisation 
to  the administrative costs of government,  or the costs of providing 
social services,  than to expenditures intended to stimulate economic 
development  (which in any case are likely to be  largely financed 
through loan funds or specific purpose  programs rather than through 
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development depend  on  differences in natural resources as well as 
on  differences in the  supply and  effectiveness of labour and capital, 
and  equalisation payments  to compensate for differences in the 
resource  base  may  represent a  costly and inefficient response  to  the 
problem,  at least in economic  terms. 
In the context of this paper and  the problem  confronting the European 
Community,  about all that can be said is that the case for capacity 
equalisation for economic  development is stronger in an international 
situation, in which  labour especially and capital to a  lesser extent 
are relatively immobile,  than in a  federal situation. 
More  generally, it must  be emphasised . that the inequalities which  are 
subject to equalisation must in principle be  restricted to financial 
needs  which  are unavoidable,  and  must not be  due  to policy 
differences among  governments or differences in the relative efficiency 
with which  services are  provided.  In practice,  the distinction is not 
always easy to make,  and  many  of the data problems which  arise in 
the  process of assessing financial needs have  their origin in the 
difficulty of separating financial needs from  differences in policy 
and  efficiency. 
Finally, it needs  to be  reiterated that,  by  definition, fiscal 
capacity equalisation is directed only towards making it possible 
for governments  to provide a  standard range  and quality of services 
without imposing an above-standard burden of taxes and  charges on 
their citizens.  As  we  have  seen,  the measurement of capacity 
equalisation grants proceeds by assessing needs in relation to 
individual revenue  and  expenditure categories.  However,  this does  not 
mean  that a  government,  which  has below-standard capacity in 
relation to,  say,  a  value added  tax and  expenditure needs in relation 
to,  say,  costs of providing education services  is obliged to use 
its equalisation payments  to achieve a  standard level of activity 
in those  two  categories.  Nor  does it mean  that the aggregate burden 
of taxation and other charges and  the aggregate  level of expenditure 
must  be  brought up  to standard. 
The  fact that equalisation payments  make  it possible for a  government 
to reduce  the burden of taxation is undoubtedly one  of the factors 
which  leads to a  demand  that capacity equalisation transfers be 
accompanied  by  a  fiscal effort requirement.  But  the inclusion of 
such a  requirement in the equalisation arrangements involves the 
introduction of a  fiscal performance criterion and  a  corresponding 
departure from  fiscal capacity equalisation. - 420-
J.  Fiscal Performance Equalisation 
Fiscal performance  equalisation by  definition involves specification 
of performance  standards and  action to bring the budgetary performance 
of recipient governments  into line with those  standards. 
In the case of general purpose equalisation payments,  performance 
equalisation may  take  the  form  of the inclusion of a  revenue  effort 
component in the capacity  equalisation or other distribution 
formula.  Revenue  effort for this purpose  may  be  defined as the ratio 
of a  government's revenue  collections to its revenue-raising 
capacity as defined above  (or, alternatively,  to its revenue  base). 
For purposes of equalisation, it is necessary to measure  the relative 
efforts of the  governments  subject to equalisation,  and  this may  be 
done  by  comparing each  government's revenue effort ratio with the 
standard revenue  effort. 
The  original revenue-sharing proposals of the Nixon  Administration 
in the U.S.A.  would  thus have  resulted in a  distribution of the 
shared revenues in accordance  with  the  following formula*:  -
pi  (~~) 
Where  si  the  share of state  i 
N  total shared revenues  (which  were 
equal one  per cent of 
income  tax base) 
the  Federal 
p  = State population 
R  = revenues raised by  a  State and its 
local authorities from  own  sources 
y  State personal income  (the revenue 
base) 
*  N.L.  'i!eidenbaum  and  R.L.  Joss,  "  Alternative Approaches  to Hevenue 
Sharing- A Description and  Framework  for Evaluation ", National Tax 
Journal,  March  1970,  page  5· 
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Under this formula,  the basic distribution of the  shared revenues 
would  have  been  on  a  population basis,  subject to adjustment for 
differences in revenue effort among  the  States.  A State whose  revenue 
effort was  lC  per cent above  the national average  revenue effort 
(for the 50  States and  the District of Columbia)  would  thus have 
received  10  per cent more  than the  grant that would  have  been 
~ayable on  a  straight population basis  ;  the  converse would  apply 
if a State's revenue effort was  below  the national average. 
A revenue effort adjustment factor may  likewise  be  included in more 
complicated distribution formulas,  such as formulas directed  towards 
fiscal capacity equalisation.  One  such  formula is illustrated below 
in Part III. 
So  far it has been assumed  that performance criteria must be  restricted 
to revenue effort or other  aspects of budget performance.  However, 
performance  equalisation may  also  be  related to more  general criteria 
of economic  performance  that may  only have  an indirect bearing on 
budget  ~erformance.~Such criteria may  include  :  relative success in 
maintaining the level of economic  activity, as measured  say by 
changes in the  level of  unempl~yment ;  relative success in controlling 
inflation, as measured  say by  changes in the  consumer  price index  ; 
relative performance  in relation to  ~ublic sector balance and  the 
balance of payments,  as measured  say by  changes in the money  supply 
associated with  these factors  ;  and relative success in achieving 
economic  growth,  as measured  say by  changes in per capita gross 
domestic  product in constant prices. 
Such  criteria could be  applied by  introducing additional performance 
factors into the distribution formula.  The  measure  of a  government's 
performance in relation to a  particular factor would  be  expressed 
as a  ratio of the average of all governments  involved in the 
equalisation arrangements,  and  the resulting ratio  (or its inverse, 
as may  be  appropriate  )  included in the distribution along with 
population, fiscal capacity·and other relevant criteria. If a  country's 
rate of inflation excarled the average  for all countries included in 
the distribution, its government's  share of the  total would  be 
reduced accordingly. 
Whereas  in the  case of fiscal capacity equalisation the weighting of 
needs  elements is given· by  the  standard budget,  in the case of 
economic  ~erformance criteria it will be  necessary to allot weights 
on an arbitrary or subjective basis.  The  decision taken in this 
regard will no  doubt reflect judgments about the relative importance 
of different aspects of economic  performance.  The  different performance 
measures which  have  been listed above  are not necessarily mutually 
*  The  author is indebted to Hr.  Michael Emerson  for this suggestion. - 422-
exclusive and  in allotting weights care must  be  taken to avoid double 
counting. 
The  rationale of this kind of performance equalisation is that it will 
hel~ to prevent the benefits of capacity equalisation from  being 
dissipated or lost by  unsatisfactory economic  performance  on  the  part 
of recipient governments.  (Differences in revenue-raising capa.ci ty 
among  Community  members  at the present time  are thus obviously 
related to past differences in economic  performance). 
The  justification for such action is obviously limited to circumstances 
where  the  governments  subject to equalisation have  control over their 
own  economic  performance. It is therefore likely to be  more  appropriate 
in relation to international aid programs  than to fiscal equalisation 
in a  federation,  in which  member  states have  only marginal 
responsibility  for the level of activity,  the rate of inflation,  the 
balance of payments  and  the rate of economic  development.  The  technique 
thus has relevance to the  problems of distributing funds  among  the 
member  countries of the European  Community.  Even  in these  cases, 
however, it will be desirable to use  indicators of performance  which 
are related to controllable factors.  Thus  indexes of wage  rates 
(adjusted for productivity)  and  of public sector balance may  provide 
better indicators of a  country's success  in controlling inflation 
than the  consumer  price index,  which  will reflect uncontrollable 
factors  such  as  changes  in the  terms  of trade. 
Performance  equalisation on  the  expenditure side must  be  achieved 
through specific purpose  payments.  Systematic equalisation of expen-
diture performance  involves distribution on  the basis of cost-benefit 
analysis  or needs  criteria such as  population,  number  of school 
children, hospital patient-days,  length of roads,  etc. 
In effect, expenditure  performance  equalisation makes  the recipient 
governments  spending agents of the governments which  make  the 
payments  and  specify the  performance  standards  (which  may  include 
matching or other revenue  conditions).  As  has been noted,  under 
circumstances where  recipient governments'  own  revenues can be 
earmarked  to help finance  the expenditures which  are  subject to 
performance  equalisation, a  capacity equalisation component  may 
be  introduced into the  performance  equalisation formula.  The 
distribution of the specific purpose  payments  then depends  on  the total 
amount  to be allocated,  the distribution of the total expenditure 
among  recipient governments in accordance with their assessed 
relative needs,  and  the distribution of the contributions required 
from  recipient governments in accordance with their assessed 
relative revenue-raising capacity.  A formula of this kind is 
illustrated in Bart III. - 423-
liL. FISCAL  EQUALISATION  HODELS 
From  the numerous  equalisation models which may  be  constructed to illustrate 
the various kinds of equalisation arrangements which  have  been described 
in Parts I  and  II above,  five  may  be  selected as relevant to  the  present 
study  :  -
(a)  a  general fiscal capacity equalisation model  ; 
(b)  a  fiscal capacity equalisation model  which  incorporates a  revenue 
effort adjustment factor  ; 
(c)  a  model  for the distribution of a  pre-determined amount  by 
reference to differences in fiscal capacity  ; 
(d)  a  specific purpose  payments  equalisation model  which  incorporates 
a  revenue  capacity equalisation factor  ; 
(e)  a  model  for the distribution of a  pre-determined amount  by 
reference  to differences in both fiscal capacity and  fiscal 
performance. 
1.  Fiscal Capacity Equalisation  :  A General  Model 
The  general fiscal capacity equalisation model  is intended to provide 
for full equalisation of both revenue-raising and expenditure 
inequalitites for all governments participating in the equalisation 
arrangements.  The  model  may  be  applied to both vertical and 
horizontal  equalisation transfers and it may  incorporate either a 
highest-capacity or an  average-capacity equalisation standard.  The 
model  which is illustrated is concerned only with equalisation of 
recurrent  budgets through general  purpose grants by reference to a 
standard budget,  but it may  be  adapted to other kinds of capacity 
equalisation payments.  In this model  the equalisation grant  Gi 
is calculated as follows 
·vi 
(1) Where 
- 424-
p  population 
R  revenue  collections 
Y  revenue  base 
R  y  revenue  effort 
E  expenditure 
y/  additional percentage cost of 
providing services relative  to 
standard per capita cost. 
The  subscripts i  and  s  denote  the  individual government  being 
equalised and  the standard government  (orgovernments) respectively. 
In practice,  separate calculations will be  required for each  revenue 
source and  each category of expenditure,  the  effective weighting being 
determined  by  the  standard budget. 
It will be  seen that the  model  may  be  used  to describe  the fiscal 
capacity equalisation arrangements which  are in force in Australia, 
Canada  and  the  li'ederal Republic  of Germany.  In Australia,  the 
subscript  s  refers to the average  standard of the  two  States with 
the highest fiscal capacity - New  South \tales and  Victoria  ;  assessed 
needs of the  other States reflect calculations for both differences 
in revenue-raising  cap~city and  differences in costs of providing 
services.  In Canada,  the  subscript  s  refers to the national 
average  standard of all Provinces.  Assessed needs for the Canadian 
Provinces are restricted to  differences in revenue-raising capacity, 
that is to the first term on  the right hand  side of equation  (1). It 
is implicitly assumed  that all Provinces face  e~ual per capita 
costs  ~ /  P  in providing services  ;  that is ~ is assumed  to  be 
zero. 
s  s  _,  1 
In Australia and  Canada,  the  equalisation grants are in the  nature 
of supplementary payments,  the  size of which  reflects both the 
standard budget magnitudes and  the individual deviations from  standard. 
The  grants are  paid by  the  Federal Government  in each  country to the 
States or Provinces.  In West  Germany,  the grants reflect the  Land 
proportion of the taxes which  are  shared with the Federal Government 
and  G.  for an individual land is either positive or negative 
depending  on  whether the  Land's assessed fiscal capacity falls short 
of or exceeds  the national average fiscal capacity  ;  in this case, 
as in Canada,  it is an average  standard. 
The  cost disability factor in West  Germany  is calculated by  reference 
to disability indicators,  whereas in Australia it is calculated as 
far as possible by reference to budget  data.  In all three countries, 
revenue-raising inequality is calculated by  reference  to  budget data 
and  standardised measures  of the revenue  base. - 425-
2.  Fiscal Cauacity Equalisation with Revenue  Effort Adjustments 
It is a  relatively simple  matter to expand  the general fiscal 
capacity equalisation model  so  that it includes a  revenue effort 
adjustment.  A fiscal effort adjustment factor 
R./ R  l.  s  - --1  Y.  y 
l.  s 
may  be calculated for each government and  applied to  the  government's 
revenue  entitlement as determined on  the basis of its revenue-
raising capacity  :  -
The  grant is then calculated by  reference  to three  components, 
namely  a  revenue equalisation component,  a  revenue effort component 
and  an expenditure needs  component  :  -
p .• 
l. 
The  effect of the revenue effort adjustment will be  to reduce 
~r increase)the equalisation grant for a  government  by  the amount  of 
the government's below-standard  (or above-standard)  revenue-raising 
effort. 
J.  Fiscal Capacity Equalisation  :  Distribution of a  Fixed Amount 
Where  the objective is to distribute a  pre-determined amount  by 
reference  to differences in population,  adjusted for differences 
in revenue-raising capacity and in relative costs of providing 
services,  each  government's share  G.  of the total amount  G may  be 
calculated as follows  :- l. 
G. 
l. 
G  8·  _,  _~, 
(3) 
(2) where 
where 
f3i 
p 
Z  Ri 
£pi 
t  Ei 
£pi 
~ 
pi 
(i 
---- (a 
s. 
1  s  a 
di 
d a 
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average  revenue  per head for 
all governments 
average  expenditure per he~d 
for all governments 
average revenue-raising capacity 
of all governments relative to 
government i' s  capacity 
(4) 
cost of providing services for 
government  i  relative to average 
cost for all governments. 
proportion of government i' s 
population requiring services 
relative to average  proportion 
for all governments 
relative price factor to measure 
government i' s  salary and other 
costs relative to average for 
all governments. 
relative.scale factor to 
measure  government i'  s  unit costs 
in standard prices relative to 
average for all governments 
Again,  separate revenue  capacity and  cost relativities need  to be 
calculated for each category of revenue  and expenditure,  the weights 
being given by  the average  revenues and expenditures for all 
governments.  This model  assumes  the adoption of an average financing 
standard based on  the performance  of all governments  involved in the 
distribution. 
The  distribution of rate support grants to local governments in the 
United Kingdom  has been based  on  this kind of model. - 427-
4.  A Performance  Equalisation Hodel  Incorporating Revenue  Capa.ci ty 
Equalisation 
The  equalisation model  developed in the  previous section may  be 
ada~ted to the  problem  of distributing specific purpose  payments, 
where  the distribution is made  by  reference to assessed expenditure 
needs and  differences in the  capacity of the recipient governments 
to raise revenue  from  their own  sources to finance  the expenditures 
in question.  As  noted above,  the  procedure is only appropriate 
where  the recipient governments•  revenues from  own  sources can be 
earmarked for the programs  subject to equalisation. 
To  apply this model,  the total expenditure  program E for all 
governments  must  be  determined and its distribution among  the 
individual governments decided in accordance with  Delative needs as 
assessed.  The  next step requires a  decision about what  proportion 
of the total program is to be  financed by  specific purpose  payments 
and  what  proportion from  the  governments'  own  sources.  The  latter 
amount  will then be allocated among  the recipient governments  in 
accordance with their relative revenue-raising capacity, and  the 
grant Gi  to government  i  will be calculated as follows  :-
where 
and 
G. 
l.  (5) 
the total revenue  required to 
be  raised by all recipient govern-
ments  from  own  sources 
Y  the  revenue  base 
E. 
l.  the assessed expenditure  program 
for government  i 
The  effect of this approach is to  G~.llocate expend.i tures among  the 
recipient governments  in accordance with their relative assessed needs 
while  re~uiring financing contributions (to match  the specific purpose 
-oayments)  in accordance with their relative revenue  capacities.  As 
noted above,  this is essentially the approach which has recently been 
used by  the Commonwealth  Bureau of Roads  in Australia in making 
recommendations  to the Federal Government  on  road grants to the 
six States. - 428-
5.  Distribution of a  Fixed  Amount  by  Reference  to  ~~seal Capacity and 
Fiscal Performance 
The  distribution formula represented by  equations  (J) and  (4)  above 
may  be  expanded  to incorporate fiscal or economic  performance 
measures.  If, for example, it is desired to adjust the distribution 
in such a  way  as to reward or penalise governments according to their 
relative success in controlling inflation and  unemployment,  this 
may  be  done  by  varying equation (4) as follows  :-
where 
'r  .\ 
77;  Pi  (  f:- w1  + :~  w 2 <: ,  w3 /  (6) 
W. 
l. 
(from equation (4)) 
average  change  in tbe  consumer 
price index for all countries 
relative to  the  change  for 
country i 
change  in unemployment  in 
country i  relative to average 
change  in all countries 
weight allotted to each adjustment 
factor  ( £- w.  = 1.0) 
l. 
After  IIi  has been calculated in this way  for each country,  the 
distribution of the total amount  G  will be  effected in the  same 
way  as before  :-
G. 
l. 
(7) 
The  effect of this formula will be  to distribute the  total grant by 
reference  to population,  subject  to adjustments for differences in 
relative fiscal capacity and  in relative economic  performance. 
The  relatives for the inflation and  unemployment  adjustment factors 
may  be calculated by  expressing each country's variable as a  percentage 
of its level in the  preceding year (which as  the base will equal 100) 
and  relating that percentage  to the  simple average  of the corresponding 
percentages for all countries  (directly in the case of the 
unemployment  factor and  inversely in the case  of the inflation factor). 
The  following table shows  how  the necessary calculations may  be  made  :-l>-1 
~ 
8 
0 
A 
B 
c 
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TABLE  1 
Calcul  of Economic  Performance Adjustment  Factors 
INFLATION  FACTOR  UNEMPLOYMENT  FACTOR 
Consumer  Price Index  Re~stered  UnemElo~ed 
Year  1  Year  2  Relative  Year  1  Year  2  Relative 
PjPi 
110  121  110  120/110  200  180  90 
150  180  120  120/120  40  50  125 
130  169  130  120/130  100  115  115 
u./u 
~ 
90/110 
125/110 
115/110 
Average  Relative  120  110 
The  cha:ice. of weights for the different adjustment factors·,  and 
indeed  the  selection of the  performance  criteria which  are to  be 
the  subject of adjustment,  will necessarily be  arbitrary and  will 
involve political decisions.  The choice of weights will depend  on  the 
extent to which it is desired to emphasise  the capacity equalisation 
factor relative to whichever economic  performance  factors are brought 
into the  equation. 
This model  appears  to  be  relevant to  the  problem of distributing 
general purpose  funds  among  members  of the Europen  Community.  There 
will be  some  data problems arising from  difficulties in identifying 
and  measuring all the variables which are  to  be  taken into account 
and  some  nolitical judgements will need  to be  made. 
It will thus be  necessary to convert the figures for different 
countries into a  common  currency  ;  to establish a  budget standard and 
to estimate cost and  revenue  disability factors as part of the  process 
of measuring the fiscal capacity  inequalities for each country  ;  to 
determine  which  economic  performance  factors are  to be  brought into 
the distribution model  and  how  they are to be  measured  ;  and  to 
decide  on  the relative weights to be allotted to  the capacity factor 
and  the  performance factors.  Finally,  of course, it will be  necessary 
to determine  the amount  to  be distributed. - 430-
Conclusion 
Insofar as general purpose  grants arrangements are  concerned,  with 
the exception of the U.s.A.  (where  there has been  a  tendency to 
place rather more  emphasis  on  fiscal effort criteria) federal countries 
have  usually interpreted fiscal equalisation in terms of fiscal 
capacity equalisation rather than performance equalisation.  That is 
to say, fiscal equalisation within federations has  been  concerned 
mainly with  the distribution function of public finance,  except to 
the extent that specific purpose  payments  have  had  a  bearing on  the 
allocation function.  There  has been little attempt to incorporate 
macro-economic  performance criteria into equalisation arrangements, 
which  have  therefore had  little relevance for the  stabilisation 
function. 
In the case  of general purpose  equalisation payments  which  the 
European  Community  may  make  to its member  countries,  there are 
strong grounds for arguing that a  greater weight should  be  given to 
economic  performance  criteria.  National governments in the  Community 
have  much  greater responsibility for controlling the macro-economic 
performance  of their economies  than governments of member  states 
in a  federation.  As  a  result,  the redistribution effects which 
fiscal capacity equalisation is intended to achieve  can be dissipated 
by  inappropriate macro-economic  policies on  the part of individual 
countries.  ~he inclusion of economic  performance criteria in the 
grants distribution model,along the lines suggested in the  preceding 
section, will encourage  harmonisation of economic  policies at the 
same  time  as the  capacity equalisation criteria and  procedures 
facilitate greater uniformi~y in standards of public serVices 
throughout the Community.  Likewise  specific purpose  payments,  which 
as noted above  may  also incorporate  both capacity equalisation criteria 
and  performance  equalisation criteria,may be  designed  to achieve 
the  same  objectives. Chapter 14 
SIMULATIONS  OF  FINANCIAL  REDISTRIBUTiON  IN  THE 
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY 
(working paper) - 433-
Introduction 
The  first part of this paper sets out simulations for the 
Community  of the kind of inter-state financial redistribution 
that tend to be  found  in federations.  Conventional equalisation 
formulae are used  to calculate hypothetical general purpose  grants 
to economically weak  member  states.  The  examples are deliberately 
simplified, and  stylised as extreme  limiting cases. It is assumed 
that the entirety of interstate financial redistribution is 
channelled  through a  single equalisation mechanism.  The  purpose  of 
transposing these models  onto  the case of the Community  is to 
highlight one  dimension of mature  economic  integration - that of 
financial redistribution.  The  extent of financial distribution 
thus simulated might only be  expected in practise alongside other 
characteristics of mature  economic  integration (monetary union,  an 
appropriate political structure, etc.) 
Financial redistribution is not, however,  an all-or-nothing 
proposition in the way  that is true, for example,  of monetary  union 
redistribution is, on  the contrary, amenable  to continuous 
graduations both as to its amplitude and  as to the  cond.i tions on 
which it is extended.  The  second  part of the  paper therefore explores 
a  number  of possibilities for more  restricted financial 
redistribution under conditions which  may  become  operationally 
plausible for the Community  in the less distant future.  The  aim 
is to set out elements of a  general framework  within which 
limited or conditional redistributive activities can be  analysed. 
In the  third part comparisons are drawn  with existing Community 
instruments that entail financial redistribution which,  while 
relatively small in scale, relate to a  number  of interesting types of 
inter-government grant mechanisms. 
The  fourthpart broadly reviews questions of economic  policy and 
performance criteria, for use as part of redistributive mechanisms. 
For example, it is already the case  that certain federations use 
criteria of fiscal performance  (such as tax effort) as part of their 
grant for.mulae  ;  quantified macroeconomic  policy targets are 
included in Community  and international general purpose  loan 
arrangements.  There  may  be  further scope  for development of these 
concepts in the  Community  in the  period ahead. 
1.  Simulating redistribution through fiscal capacity equalisation 
The  classic objective of fiscal capacity equalisation is (as 
explained in detail in Chapter 13) to enable member  states to 
provide a  given minimum  average  standard of public services 
without forcing them  to impose  unequal fiscal burdens,  and  without 
imposing centralised control over the  provision of the  public 
serv.ices covered.  In the  pursuit of this objective a  number  of 
political and  technical choices are  necessary  ;  these choices 
have  also to be  made  in a  hypothetical way  in the  present paper - 434-
to enable Community  simulations to be made. 
On  the political side  two  issues are of principal importance 
(i)  the degree of equalisation 
(ii)  the  method  of transfer (vertical versus horizontal transfers) 
On  the  technical side  there are  two  further problems of 
(iii)  the measurement of revenue raising capacity 
(iv  )  the measurement of expenditure needs and costs. 
1.1.  Choice of the egualisa  tion s tand.ard 
As  regaDds  the degree of equalisation, a  Community-average  standard 
would  seem  to  be  the  most suitable starting point.  This follows  the 
Canadian and  German  examples.  While  in both  these cases the 
national average is used as a  standard,  Canada  pays grants to 
level up  the poorer states to 100% of the national average, 
whereas Germany  pays grants up  to 95%  (or more  in some  cases). 
The  examples below  show,  first,  three cases where  grants are made 
up to  100 %,  95  %  and  90  % of the Community  average  standards. 
A fourth case is added,  which  follows a  type  used for some  local 
government  (intra-Lander) equalisation in Germany  ;  here 
equalisation payments are made  up to  the higher of either 80 %, 
or half way  between the beneficiary state's level and  100 %. 
Australia provides the  example of a  federation ,equalising  ..  ~up to  the 
standard of the  two  richest states, rather than the national average. 
This system can only reasonably be  contemplated where  the 
beneficiary states are quite  small in relation to the donors, as 
is the case in Australia, but would  certainly not be  the  case 
in the  Community.  'Ibis example is, therefore, not further pursued. 
1.2.  Choice of the method  of transfer 
There are three basic models  :  (i) Grants paid from  a  federal 
budget to states beneath  the  equalisation standard,  the grants 
financed  from federal  zevenues and  therefore borne  by  taxpayers 
in all member  states.  'Ibis we  call the  "Canadian method" after 
their equalisation system.  (ii) Grants paid  to poorer states by 
richer states, giving a  simple settlement line of debits and 
credits summing  to zero.  This may,  or may  not, feature in the 
federal buiget,  but at any event the  payments make  no  call on 
federal revenues.  This we  call the  "German  method" after their 
inter-Lander Finanzausgleich system.  (iii) Grants  paid to all 
states, but in amounts determined by  an equalisation formula.  This 
we  call the  "United States method" after their General Revenue - 435-
Sharing mechanism.  The  "Canadian" and  "United States" methods are 
"vertical", involving JByments  between levels of government  ;  the 
"German" method is "horizontal",  involving payments across a  single 
level of government. 
Of  the  three ,  the  "United States method" is not simulated be low 
because it is a  system that is only really applicable in situations 
where  the highest level of government has a  strong fiscal imbalance 
in its favour (i.e. has large surplus own  revenues for distribution 
to the states).  This is an uninteresting hypothesis for the 
Community  case. 
As  between  the  "Canadian" a.m.  "German"  methods,  the choice is mainly 
a  political one as to whether transfers from  rich to poor states 
should be  transparent or not.  The  "German  method" is transJBrent. 
'!he  "Canadian method" is not entirely so,  since it is the federal 
budget that pays the grants from  national tax revenues. 
In the examples below both the  "German"  and  "Canadian" methods  are 
shown.  It should be  recognised that the  "German  method",  while 
having advantages for the  purpose of economic analysis, is 
distinctly unusual in political tems (probably unique)  and  only 
exists in its present form  because of the historical circumstances 
prevailing after the Second  War  {inter-lli.nder transfers had to be 
organized before  the federal government structure was  established). 
l.J.  Measurement of fiscal capacity 
In federations which do  not have  unified tax systems there are  two 
main methods of measuring fiscal capacity. 
'!he  first method is to adopt a  fictitious representative tax  system 
that either approximates to the  structure of tax rates am  bases in 
the  'average'  state {as in Canada,  or in stmies by  the u.s.  Advisory 
Commission  on  Intergovernmental Relations. {ACIR)  in their so-called 
"average financing approach"),  or is taken from certain states whose 
tax systems are adopted as the  standard (as in Australia). 
'!he  second method  is to use  economic  indicators to stand as proxies 
for fiscal caJBci  ty (as in many  United States grant programmes  where 
average personal income  per capita. is used, or in Switzerland. where 
composite imica  tors are constructed).  In this connection it can be 
argued that the federations referred to would  have  been long using 
GNP  and  other national accounts indicators in their fiscal federal 
relations had ther.  possessed harmonized  'national' accounts statistics 
by Etate. It might then be  questioned whether it is worthwhile  trying 
to construct fiscal capacity indicators for the E.C.,  since  the 
Community  has detailed and  completely harmonised national accounts 
data. 
An  objection to using national accounts aggregates is that these do 
not reflect in any way  the politico-economic choices reflected in - 436-
tax systems.  Tax  revenues,  especially for income  taxes, are not 
a  linear or simple  function of national accounts aggrega  tea (on 
non-linear taxes,  see further below). 
The  following simula  tiona therefore use  the first method,  with  the 
fiscal capacity of member  states being estimated by  a  method  similar 
to that of the ACIR's'average financing approach'.  Fiscal capacity 
measures are estimated for each of seven main  taxes or groups of 
taxes, as well as for aggregate fiscal capacity.  Moreover,  as will 
be  seen,  these measures  may  be  useful for other purposes 'beyond 
the present simulations of fiscal capacity equalisation.  One 
example  would  arise if a  'fiscal effort'  performance  criterion were 
to be  added  to the  system  (as discussed in the .!:b!E! part of this 
chapter)  ;  this can be  done  by  comparing real tax revenues with  the 
fiscal capacity estimates.  'Fiscal effort' data are given in 
Table  I  (iv).  A second example  is in the  possible use of a  personal 
income  tax capacity key for further financing of the Community 
budget beyond  its present Own  Resources  ;  from  the distributive 
point of view,  this could balance  the  present use of indirect tax 
Own  Resources  (see also Chapter 16). 
The  seven  taxes or groups of taxes for which fiscal capacity 
estimates have  been made  are set out in the  columns of Table  1  : 
(1)  value added  tax  (VAT)  (2)  excise duties  (EXC),  (J) other 
indirect taxes  (OIT),  (4)  personal income  tax (PIT),  (5)  corporate 
income  tax  (CIT),  (6)  other direct taxes  (ODT),  and  (7)  social 
security contributions (sse).  Column  {8)  gives total fiscal capacity 
and  column  (9), for comparison gives GDP  data. 
Table lJ!.2. gives the absolute amounts in millions of units of 
account.  In 1970  total taxation amounted  to 220,J56 billion units 
of account. 
Table .L.(ill gives the index numbers  of fiscal capacity per capita 
in relation to the Community  average of 100.  Illustrating the 
progressivity/regressivity characteristics of different taxes,  the 
fiscal capacity per capita for excise duties is estimated to range 
from  55  in Ireland to 118  in Denmark,  whereas for personal income 
tax  the  range is from  )2 in Ireland to 1)2 in Denmark.  Total fiscal 
capacity ranges from  55  in Ireland to 1)1 in Denmark,  whereas  the 
range  for GDP  is from  5J to 128. 
The  calculations of fiscal capacity for individual taxes have  been 
made  by  comparing  the total Community  real tax yield for a  given 
tax with an estimate, obtained from  the national accounts,  of the 
tax base  (e. g.  for the value added  tax,  private consumption  ;  for 
personal income  tax,  personal income,  etc.).  This gives the  'average' 
Community  rate of tax.  This rate is then applied  to individual 
countries•  tax bases to give  their fiscal capacity. - 437-
TABLE  l 
Fi seal  Capac1 ty and Effort,  by  Categories of Taxes,  by Country,  1970 
(i)  F1scal  capac1 ty m  mill,  u.a. 
VAT  EXC  OIT  PIT  CIT  ODT  sse  Total  GDP 
(l)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
GERMANY  9886  8013  6436  15180  4018  1697  18647  63877  187694 
FRANCE  7971  6574  5121  12275  3230  1353  15255  5l78C  147496 
ITALY  5849  5875  3475  5965  1675  748  10487  34072  92313 
NETHERLANDS  1806  1584  1134  2439  657  280  3337  11238  31951 
BELGIUM  1512  1248  930  2113  574  234  2719  9331  25662 
LUXEMBURG  54  44  35  74  20  9  96  332  1036 
UNITED  KINGDOM  7282  6560  4424  842T  2371  1013  12600  42676  120427 
IRELAND  266  295  152  178  55  27  448  1422  3876 
DANEMARK  936  707  571  1318  366  144  1582  5624  15591 
EUR  9  35562  30900  22278  47971  12966  5506  65173  220356  626043 
(u) F1scal  capac1ty per cap1ta in 1ndex numbers  (EUR  9  =  100) 
VAT  EXC  I  OIT  PIT  CIT  ODT  sse  Total  GDP 
--
(l) 
I 
(2) 
I 
(3)  (4) 
I 
(5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
GERMANY  116  108  120  132  129  128  119  120  124.6 
FRANCE  111 
I 
106  114  127 
I 
124  122  116  117  117 .o 
ITALY  76  88 
I 
72  58  60  63  75  72  68.3 
NETHERLANDS 
I  98  99  98  98 
I 
98  98  99  99  98.6 
_,Tim  ". L 
lll  106  109  115  116  lll 
I 
109  111  107.2 
LUXEMBURG  112  106  118  115  116  119  109  112  123.4 
UNITED  KINGDOM  93  97  90  8C  83  84  88  88  87 .s 
IRELAND  64  82  59  32  37  42  59  55  53.2 
DANMARK  135  118  132  141  145  135  125  131  128.1 
EUR  9  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100.0 
(111)  F1scal  capac1ty 1n  percentage relative shares 
VAT  EXC  OIT  PIT  CIT  ODT  sse  Total  GDP 
(l)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
GERMANY  27 .so  25.93  28.89  31.64  30.99  30.81  28.61  28.99  29.98 
FRANCE  22.42 
r 
21.28 
:~:~J 
25.59  24.91  24.57  23.41  23.50  23.56 
ITALY  16.45  19.01  12.43 
I 
12.92 
I 
13.59  16.09  15.46  14.75 
l'JETHERIANDS  I  5.08 
I  5.13  5.09  5.08  5.07  5.09  5.12  5.10  5.10  I 
BELGIUM 
I 
4.25  I  4.04  4.18  4.41  4.43  4.25  4.17  4.23  4.10 
LUXEMBURG  .15  I  .14  .16  .15  .16  .16  .15  .15  .17 
UNITED  KINGDOM 
I 
20.48  21.23  19.86  17.57 
I 
18.29  18.40  19.33  19.37  19.24 
IRELAND  • 75  .?6  ,68  • 37  .43  .49  .69  .65  .62 
DANJI!ARK  2.63  2.29  I  2.56  2. 75  2.82  2.62  2.43  2.55  2.49 
EUR  9  100.00 ~~0  J  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  lOO.OC  iOO,OO 
__j~----
(1V)  F1scal  effort  in 1ndex numbers  (EUR  9  =  100) 
VAT  EXC  OIT  PIT  CIT  ODT  sse  Total 
(l)  (2) 
I 
(3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
JERMANY 
I 
105.83  92.92  94.74  106.34  I  59.26  81.17  108,78  100.49 
FRANCE  l-58.23  71.48  104.14  45.66  100.47  87.51  126,68  101.9'3 
ITALY  234.90  ~~9. 94  47,80  51.07  110.22  108,65  102.20  81.2& 
NET!GRLAJ82  102.44  91.46  43.38  140.20  131.40  69.53  139.96  115.15 
BElGIUM  126.10  81.19  51.60  103.21  107.35  91.83  103.00  98.74 
LUXEMBURG  63.39  59.05  110.69  114.47  222.11  11.34  104.71  99.48 
UNITED  KINGDOM  40.53  134.29  172.06  171.48  157.45  162.75  54.90  108.07 
IRElAND  51.16  155.76  109.04  132.88  146.45  l43.lg  22.09  85.60 
DANJI!ARK  114. 30  159.50  69.75  212.85  42.60  22.19  16,25  103.96 
EUR  9  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  99.9'3  100.00  100.00 
VAT  - value  added tax,  EXC  - excises  and  1.mport  dut1es,  OIT  - other indlrect taxes,  PIT  - personal  1ncome  tax, 
CIT  - corporate  income  tax,  ODT  - other dlrect  taxes,  SSO  - S0Cla1  SeCUrlty contnbutlons, 
GDP  - gross  domest10  product 
Note  :  For  general  explanation of concepts  and methods  see text. - 438-
Most  tax rates are estimated as linear percentages of their tax 
bases.  However,  this simplification is not defendable for income 
taxes and social security contributions.  The  progressivity/ 
regressivity of these  taxes has therefore been  taken account of 
by assuming certain elasticity values for the  tax capacity per 
capita of each  tax by country with respect to differences in the 
amount of the tax lase per capita..  For example,  1.5 is the 
elasticity value adopted for personal income  tax.  This means  that 
for a  country whose  personal income  base  per capita is 90  in 
relation to  the Community  average of 100, its income  tax capacity is 
8 5 in  :Elation to  the Community  average  (i.e.  the tax capa.ci  ty 
differential is 1.5 times as great as the  tax base differential). 
The  elasticity values adopted  (1.5 for personal income  tax, 2.0 for 
corporation tax, 0.9 for social security contributions) are based 
on the findings set out in Table A of Chapter 9, which estimates for 
several countries the regional or state differentials in tax 
burdens per capita in relation to differentials in primary incomes 
per capita. 
Table  1  (iii) presents the data in the  form  of relative shares of 
the Community  total. 
1.4.  Measurement of expenditure  needs and costs 
Equalisation with respect to expenditure needs and  costs is a 
straightforward idea, but one  whose  application in practise is 
problematic.  The  aim is to take into account differences in the 
volume  of public services required by  individual states (for 
example,  for education different ratios of school-age children to 
the active labour force),  and in the cost of providing them  (some 
services are more  expensive in dense  conurbations and  sparsely 
populated rural regions, as compared  to medi urn-sized  towns) • 
'!be  problems concern both technical difficulties in measuring "needs" 
and  some  major economic  policy issues - notably whether equalisation 
with respect to cost differentials implies subsidising inefficient 
urban or rural structures. 
For these reasons,  and contrary to the measurement of revenue 
raising capacity,  the measurement of expenditure needs has not 
reached a  level of high sophistication in Canada,  the u.s.A., 
Germany  and  SWitzerland, an exception being Australia.  In Canada,  no 
account at all is taken of differences in 'needs', since  the 
equalisation system is confined simply to fiscal capacity equalisation. 
In the  German  horizontal equalisation,  the fiscal capa.ci ty per 
capita amounts of the  Uind.er are modified  by  simple  (nearly linear) 
measures of the  population d.ensi ty and  the degree of urbanisation  ; 
this is particularly  important  for the City-states. In the United 
States General Revenue  Sharing formulae,  urbanised population is 
given some  special weighting.  In Switzerland tax sharing arrangements 
are l:ased  on a  composite indica  tor,  the expenditure needs part of - 439-
which is reflected b,y  population density and geographical 
characteristics (mountain area).  The  local government financing 
systems of some  other countries use relatively sophisticated  'needs' 
measures, for example  in the  U.K.'s rate-support grant system. 
In Australia,  the Grants Commission  uses in its assessment 
of expenditure needs the  'standard budget approach', i.e. they 
estimate the hypothetical budgetary cost for a  number of expenditure 
categories for the claimant (beneficiary)  state of applying the 
standard of services applied in the  standard states. 
In the context of the Community,  cost differences between member 
states are far more  important than in the foregoing cases, notably 
because  exchange rates are determined by  the  productivity of the 
international trade sectors and not at all, of course,  by 
considerations of purchasing power parity in the  public sector. 
It would  clearly be absurd for simulations of budget equalisation 
between Community  countries to ignore differences in,  say, 
teachers 
1  salaries as between Italy and  Germany. 
In attemptin~  to  take account of these factors in the simulations, 
the following approach has been adopted,  separating (i) cost and 
(ii) volume  adjustments  ;  the following estimates are no  more  than 
a  first rough attempt to represent the factors in question. 
As  regards~  adjustments for the Community  case,  the recent 
development of purchasing power  parity (p.p.p.) exchange rates 
makes  available an important new  data source  (1),  since the global 
P•P•P•  exchange rates have  to be  constructed through estimating 
separately p.p.p.  indicators for all the main components of output. 
The  relatively familiar global p.p.p.  indicator is given in the 
column  (5)  of Table 2  for 1970  ;  for 1975  private consumption 
p.p.p.  indicators are available  (in column 6).  The  figures work 
as follows  :  the p.p.p.  factor of 104.7 for Germany  in 1970  means 
tha. t  German •  needs  •  are rated as being 4.  7 per cent higher on a  per 
capita basis than the Community  average.  These  figures are used in 
the global simulations below. 
More  precise public sector unit cost correction factors may  be 
calculated from  the same  source  by taking p.p.p.  indicators for 
public consumption,  public investment and private consumption 
(the latter being relevant for transfer payments),  and by weighting 
them  together according to their respective importance in the 
expenditure functions covered in the  simulated equalisation system. 
The  results given for 1970  in column  (8)  of Table 2  relate to  the 
sum  of education, health and sanitary services,  roads and social 
security and welfare  (excluding unemployment)  ;  these are sectors 
with respect to which certain limited equalisation simulations 
are set out in the  second part of this paper. 
(1)  See  source  to Table  2 F
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Additional Notes  on  Table  2 
Col.  (5)  V.  Paretti, H.  Krijnse  Locker,  Ph.  Goybet,  "Comparaison 
reelle du produit interieur brut des pays de  la Communaute 
europeenne  ", Analyse  et Prevision,  Futuribes,  Tome  XVIII, 
Juin 1974 and  an internal working  paper of the  SOEC. 
Col.  (6)  SOEC,  Survey of retail prices and  consumer  purchasing 
power  parties - 1975 
Col.  (7)  Volume  correction takes account of differences in age 
structure and  participation rates affecting expenditure on 
education, health and  social security and  welfare.  Volume 
correction is thus  the  weighted average of indices relative 
to Community  average of the percentage of children below 
15  years,  the  percentage of old people  over 65  years and 
the  participation rate.  (Source  :  SOEC  General Statistics 
Dec.  1975),  the weights being determined  by  the  proportion 
of expenditures in the  mentioned  sectors likely to be 
affected by  these factors  :  JJ %  by  percentage of children, 
26  %  by  percentage of old people,  10  %  by  participation rate 
and  Jl %  unaffected. 
Col.  (8)  Based  on  purchasing power  parties for public consumption, 
investment and  private consumption  (source  :as for Col.  (5)), 
weighted  (respectively 26  %  11 %  and  6J %)  according to their 
importance in the sectoral functions  covered  :  education, 
health,  sanitary services, roads,  social security and  welfare. 
For the  United  Kingdom,  Ireland and  Denmark  detailed comparable 
purchasing power  parity data are not available  ;  the  global 
GDP  purchasing power  parity data are  used. 
Col.  (9)  = Col.  (7)  X Col.  (8) - 442-
As  regards~  needs,  these are assumed  in the first instance, 
in the  global simulations below,  to be  equal for all countries. 
However,  in the  sectoral simulations, in the second  part of this 
paper,  indications are given of the  sensitivity of certain expenditure 
functions  (e.g.  education,  social security expenditure)  to some  basic 
demographic  facts for which  statistics are available  (number  of school-
age  children,  retired people,  and  other non-active population.  For 
each relevant expenditure function an appropriate  'volume  correction' 
factor is calculated in index number  form,  where 100 corresponds  to  the 
Community  average.  These  index numbers  are then weighted  together 
according to the amounts  of expenditure on  the functions in question. 
The  overall result is given in column  (8)  of Table 2, where  the 
range is from  the most disadvantaged case of Ireland  (volume  correction 
of 105.9)  to the most advantaged cases of Italy,  Luxembourg  and  the 
Netherlands  (volume  correction of about 95). 
1.5.  Results  of the  global simulations 
Table  3 sets out the results of  'global'  simulations.  The  term global 
means  that the equalisation simula  tiona have  been lela  ted to  the entire 
public sector ;  i.e. the total fiscal capacity of member  states is 
affected.  Public revenues in the Community  as a  whole  are )5.2% of 
GDP  in 1970  and  )8.5% of GDP  in 1975  (1) 
The  results in Table  3  should be  viewed  against the  background  of the 
results obtained from  the cross-country  studies on  the inter-regional 
redistributive power  of the total public sector insven countries. 
These  studies showed  a  range of results between  26  %  for the  USA  to 
56  %  for Australia, with an average for seven countries of 41  %  -
the figures here indicate  the degree  to which  inter-regional flows 
of  ~ublic finances equalise the differentials in average  per capita 
primary incomes  of states or regions within these  countries (see 
Chapter 5 for details).  These  transfers,  reduced  to net terms,  give 
total payments  to beneficiary states (or from  donor states) in the 
range  of 20  % to 4 % of GDP  of the national economy  (i.e. this amounts 
to larger fractions of the  GDP  of the  sum  of beneficiary and donor 
states respectively). 
Turning to  the  redistributive power  of the hypotheses set out in 
Table  3 for the Community,  it will be  seen that the results in the 
final column  (which is perhaps  the most appropriate since it relates 
to purchasing power  parity income  differentials within the Community) 
are well clustered in the range observed for  the  seven countries. 
For example,  looking at the  1975  estimates, 100%  equalisation under 
the  'German  method'  (line 2  (a))  gives the highest redistributive power 
of 50  %,  which  approaches  the highest observations among  the seven 
countries.  Under  this hypothesis equalisation payments  would  amount 
to 28  billion units of account,  or 2.7% of Community  GDP.  The 
recipients would  be  Ireland, Italy and  the  United Kingdom. 
(1)  SOEC,  Tax  Statistics, 1970-1975 S
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Dropping the equalisation standard to 90  % (line 2  (c)) reduces the 
redistributive power  to 32  %"  which  is in the  region of the  lower 
observations among  the  seven countries.  Under  this hypothesis the 
payments would  drop to lJ billion units of account,  or l.J% of 
Community  GDP.  The  recipients would  be  the  same  three countries, 
althoUgh  the  United Kingdom  is becoming a  marginal case - its income 
per capita being higher than for Italy and Ireland. 
The  average  observation for  the  seven countries finds a  coupterpart 
with a  41% redistributive power -at the 95%  standard under the 
German  method  (line 2  (b)), where  the equalisation payments  amount 
to 20  billion units of account,  or 2 % of Community  GDP. 
The  fourth model  shown  (as in line 2  (c)) makes  the position of 
beneficiary countries closest to  the Community  average less sensitive 
to the choice of the equalisation standard than under the preceding 
three cases.  The  overall redistributive power of this case is close 
to that of the 90  % standard. 
The  'Canadian method'  gives similar but somewhat  diluted, and  less 
transparent results - for the reasons of design already described. 
The  redistributive power  of the  'Canadian method'  tends to be  about 
one-fifth less than under  the  'German  method'. 
Comparing  the results for 1970  and  1975,  the amounts  of equalisation 
payments  a~ a  percentage of GDP  increase from  1.9 % (under the  100% 
equalisation standard)  to 2.  7 %.  This mainly reflects the real 
divergence in economic  performance of member  states over this period, 
with  the amounts  of equalisation payments rising for Ireland and 
Italy as a  share of their respective  GDPs,  and  the United Kingdom 
moving  from  being a  marginal case  (at the  100 % standard)  to a 
significant beneficiary.  These  comparisons give  some  illustration of 
how  an equalisation system  may  behave  dynamically over time  as a 
redistributor in relation to trends in relative economic  performance. 
As  regards  the  magnitude  of the  transactions for individual countries 
the following cases may  be  noted for 1975  : 
-Under the  100% standard  'German  method',  the receipts for the 
United  Kingdom  amount  to 5 %,  for Italy 13% of GDP,  and  for 
Ireland  JO  % of GDP  ;  the  payments  for other countries except 
Belgium  and  Luxemburg  amount  to about 3 1/2 % of GDP  (1)  (2) 
Tl} For Belgiwn  and  Luxemburg  payments  amount  to 7% and  1/2 % of GDP 
(2)  The  major determinant for the  level of receipts and  payments as 
percentage of GDP  is the difference between  the fiscal capacity and 
purchasing power  parity indicator.  This diffexence is negative for 
beneficiary countries (- 21  % percentage points for Italy, - 10  for 
the  United  Kingdom  and  - 39  for Ireland) and  positive for paying 
countries (22 % for Be1giwn,  1,5 % for Luxemburg  and about 12 % for 
the other countries). - 445-
-Under the 90% standard  'German  method',  the receipts for the United 
Kingdom  fall to 1/2 %  of GDP,  for Italy to 8 %  of GDP,  and  for 
Ireland to  23 %  of GDP  ;  the payments  for other countries  except 
Belgium  and  Luxemburg  amount  to about  1  1/2 %  of GDP. 
The  figures for beneficiary countries may  also be  compared  very 
roughly with (i) the magnitude  of these countries'  public sector and 
b:l.lance  of payments deficits for 197  5  ;  (ii) data on  an inter-
regional or state basis found  in the country studies  ;  and  (iii) with 
the Community's  present budgetary funds. 
In 1975  the general government borrowing requirements of the  three 
simulated beneficiary states were  for Italy 11  % of GDP,  for  the  U.K. 
5 % of GDP  and  for Ireland 16 % of GDP  ;  their balance of payments 
current account deficits in the  same  year were  for Italy 2% of 
GDP,  for the  U.K.  4 % of GDP  and  for Ireland 7%  of GDP.  Thus  the 
simulated equalisation payments,  for the beneficiaries, are very 
roughly of comparable  orders of magnitude  as the fiscal payments 
iml:Rlances of the year in question, and  considerably larger than the 
external payments in balances (this year,  of course,  had  a  large 
cyclical and  petro-dollar element in thtse financial imbalances,  which 
affected Germany's  public finances too  :  the  significance of the 
comparison should not be  s~~etched byond  noting certain orders of 
rnagni tude) • 
In Germany,  France,  Italy and  the United Kingdom  it was  found  that in 
richer regions there is a  relative surplus of taxation over public 
expenditures offsetting to a  considerable degree  balance of payments 
current account surpluses  ;  conversely in the poorer regions  there is 
a  relative surplus of public expenditures over taxation offsetting 
b:l.lance  of payments  current account deficits. In the  examples  given (1) 
for  the four countries in Chapter 5  balance of payments  surpluses for 
richer regions range  from  2 % to 17  % of regional product (average 8  %) 
and deficits for poorer regj.ons from  7 % to 22 % (average 15 %)  with 
some  exceptional Italian cases with deficits up  to 50%  of regional pro-
duct.  Corresponding to these balances  there are public finance  flows  out 
of richer regions between 3 %  and  12 %  of regional  product  (average  6 %) 
and  inflows into poorer regions between  J % and  16  % of regional product 
(average  9 %) ,  with substantially higher inflows into the exceptional 
Italian regions. 
These  figures represent orders of magnitude  roughly  comparable  to 
those  in the  simulations for the Community,  although the  case of the 
Community  with a  100% equalisation standard tends to overshoot 
somewhat  the  inter-regional findings.  The  highest  figures  in both the 
Community  simulations and  the  inter-regional studies tend to relate to 
relatively small  poor  regions which  are  'carried'  by the larger richer 
regions  through transfers that are much  lower magnitudes  proportionately 
to the latters' GDPs.  The  case of Ireland in the Community  may  be 
compared  to that of Bretagne  in France,  the Saarland in Germany,  or 
Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. 
(1)  These  examples are a  sample  of significant cases in the four countries. - 446-
2.  Simulation of sectoral applications 
2.1.  Unconditional equalisation spants for selected sectors 
Moving  on from  the foregoing global simulations closer towards  the 
more  detailed institutional practices found  in multi-level government 
settings, one  approach is to identify a  list of public expemi  ture 
functions where  the Community  might come  to have  an economic  or 
political interest in standards not diverging too far as between 
member  states.  The  economic  interest would arise  where  spillovers 
or externalities across member  states are significant, or could 
become  so in the event of large scale migration ;  al  terna  ti  ve ly 
political reactions to migration might eventually become  the  trigger 
requiring a  Community  response. 
The  list of public expemi  ture functions should excltde  those which 
are already, or could suitably become,  the  subject of direct 
expenditures or specific purpose  grants by  the Community.  These  would 
be  sectors where  the Community  would  typically have  even  stronger 
economic  or political interests (e.g. agriculture, regional policy 
in the Community  at present). 
In addition,  from  a  technical point of view,  to be  sui  table candidates 
for equalisation grants,  functions  should generate flows  of expenditure 
that are continuous  and  comparable  as between countries. 
Following these criteria, the following sectors are be  included in the 
present simula  tiona (total expenditure in the  Community  in 1970  being 
given for each)  :  education JJ billion units of account, health 
JJ billion units of account,  sanitary services 4  billion units of 
account, and  most  of social security am welfare 6J billion units 
of account.  The  main  exclusion from  the  social security category 
are unemployment  benefits,  on  the  grounds  that these  may  be  more 
suitable for specific purpose grants.  These  categories account for 
about two-thirds of total public expenditure. 
The  results are set out in Table 4, using the concepts described in 
the first part of this chapter.  All the results are given according 
to  the  'Canadian method',  and  for 1970  only in the absence of certain 
data for 1975. 
The  first set of results (cases 1  (a)  to  (d))  shows  the fiscal 
capacity equalisation payments  required  fo~ the selected sectors in 
:  the  (highly implausible)  case that no  cost or volume  adjustments 
are made.  Fiscal capacity equalisation is simulated assuming equal 
per capita needs at market exchange  rates.  This case is shown  only 
for the  purpose of comparison with the next set of cases (2  (a)  to 
(d))  which  allow for cost  differentials, as calculated on  the basis 
of purchasing power  parity factors for the main  components  of  ~ublic 
expenditure in the sectors covered  (see Table  2 above,  column  {7). 
The  total expemiture bill for 1970  ranges between 6.5 to 12.9 billion 
units of account under  the market exchange  rate hypothesis  ;  with 
cost adjustments  the bill falls to ).8 to 7.6  billion units of account, 
with a  redistributive power  in the range of 11  to 21  per cent. S
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Introduction of the volume  requirement factor (in cases 3 (a)  to  (d)) 
is quite important,  since Italy's relatively favourable  demographic 
structure reducellf  its benefits substantially, whereas Ireland's 
extremely unfavourable demographic  structure improves its benefits 
substantially.  The  United  Kingdom  benefits also as a  result of a 
less marked  demographic  disadvantage.  The  total bill is reduced 
slightly compared  to  the cases with only cost adjustments,  but 
the redistributive power  is increased. 
The  most striking result is that for Ireland  :  the member  state with 
by far the weakest fiscal  capacity per capita is found  to be in an 
even more  disadvantageous position when  the  public service volume 
implications of its exceptional demographic  structure are introduced. 
The  volume  adjustment for Ireland for the services covered is 
estimated to be  106  - i.e. 6 %  more  onerous  than for the average 
member  state (see Table  2,  Column  7).  This demographic  structure is, 
of course,  the inheritance of past generations of emigration to  the 
United  Kingdom  and  elsewhere, and reflects an interdependent pattern 
of poverty-emigration-fiscal incapacity (in the absence of budget 
equalisation with its trading and  labour market partners). 
2.2.  Forms  of grants for sectoral programmes 
This section compares  in a  simple way  the distributive and allocative 
implications of the  main  alternative forms of grant that may  be  used 
when  a  'higher'  level of government wishes  to participate in the 
financing of a  sectoral expenditure function executed at a  'lower' 
level of government.  Possible applications are in fields relating 
to  the objectives of convergence  of economic  capacity and  performance 
between member  states (e.g.  subsidies for infrastructure, industrial 
investment,  regional development,  manpower  training, etc.) 
Five main  types of financing are compared,  and  simulated in Table  5 
in relation to a  hypothetical expenditure function on which  member 
states were, at the outset before the E.C.  fund is introduced, 
spending. 5,000 million units of account - each individual country 
spending in proportion to its GDP. 
Case  II 
- general purpose  (unconditional)  equalisation grants.  This 
pursues the  system outlined in the  preceding section.  By 
definition this is only related to the sectoral function 
through the  processes of statistical calculation,  because 
the decentralisation principle leaves  open  the question 
of how  the money  is spent by the recipient government. 
(1)  Details of these existing Funds  diverge  from  the  simplified types here 
analysed.  The  following a  priori analysis does not  therefore necessarily 
apply to these  cases.  For example,  a  number  of 'priority policy rules'  in 
the Social Fund  result  in a  positive redistributive pattern expenditure 
(see more  below),  and  its matching ratio is in fact  5o%· p
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Case  III  - specific purpose  grants with a  uniform  matching ratio of 
JO%  with quota allocations by  country and  with a  global 
ceiling.  This is closest to the E.C.  Regional Fund  case  (1) 
Case  IV  - specific purpose  grants with variable matching ratios, 
without  quota allocations by country and with a  global 
ceiling.  ----
ants with variable matchin  ratios, 
without  quotas  at  least not  for all countries  and 
without a  global ceiling. In the  present context - that of 
considering types of grants for economic  development 
purposes capable of having positive allocative and 
redistributive effects - this fifth type of grant has 
particular potential.  Four variants, Cases  V a.  to d., 
are therefore examined. 
In the Cases I  to IV,  in which  the E.c.  fund  is introduced with a 
500  m. u.a.  ceiling, it is assumed  that the  response of national 
expenditures ranges  somewhere  between complete  substitution and 
complete addi  tionali  ty  ~  thus national expenditures, which are 
initially 5,000 m.u.a.,  become  somewhere  between 4,500- 5,000 m.u.a. 
as a  result of the Community  aid.  Positive incentive effects on 
national expenditures are on  the whole  unlikely,  since there is no 
cheapening of the  tax-price at the margin for the member  state managing 
the  expenditure function. 
Under  the equalisation system  (Case  I), the redistributive effects 
are powerful in relation to the  size of the E. C.  fund  expenditure 
(O.J of 1 %  of redistributive power,  with  the  sectoral equalisation 
objective attained with J58  m.u.a.  of expenditure)  :  however,  the 
effect on  the expenditure function will be very uncertain and 
unlikely to be  marked. 
Under  the uniform matching ratio without quotas  (Case II), the 
redistributive effects are zero.  The  E.C.  fund  is assumed  to allocate 
its limited funds  pari-passu with the  submission of eligible projects 
from  national authorities  ;  since these have  in turn been assumed  to 
be  proportional to GDP,  the E.c.  fund  would  be  close to operating on 
a  system of quotas proportional to GDP.  The  JO  % E.C.  fund 
contribution cheapens  the  tax-price  to  the national authorities of the 
projects covered  ~  however,  the  500  m.u.a.  ceiling has the effect 
that the E.C.  fund  only reaches about one-third of all projects,  and 
has no  impact at the margin on  national expenditures.  This means 
that the national authorities may  be  inclined to treat the E.C. 
funds,  as in the  preceding case ,  as if they were  general purpose 
grants, in which  case the effects on  the  expenditure function in 
question will again be  uncertain and  unlikely to be  marked. 
(1) Details of these existing Funds  diverge from  the simplified types here 
analysed·  The  following a  priori analysis does not therefore necessarily 
apply to these cases.  For example,  a  number  of 'priority policy rules' in 
the Social Fund  result in a  positive redistributive pattern expenditure 
(see more  below),  and its matching ratio is in fact 50%. - 451-
Under  the  uniform matching ratio .!!!!!! quotas  (Case  III},  there will 
be  a  blending of the effects found  under  the preceding two  cases 
(the quotas are here  taken from  the present Regional Fund).  'Ibe 
redistributive power  is as strong as under  the equalisation case, 
although at the expense  of a  higher .500  m. u.a.  expenditure total. 
For countries with relatively low  quotas,  the E.C.  funds are 
again absorbed with little effect on  marginal national decisions. 
For countries with relatively high quotas,  the  ~.c. funds  may 
encroach on  marginal resource allocation decisions at the national 
level - if there is a  possibility that not all the E.C.  funds  would 
be  ta.kenup, and  if the national authorities have  the fiscal 
capacity to provide their matching contribution on an increased 
volume  of projects. 
Under  the variable matching ratio case  (Case  IV),  some  possible 
fiscal capacity constraints (as  just referred to)  may  be  relieved, 
with the E.C.  fund  taking up  80% of the subsidy for Ireland, 60% 
for Italy a.n:i  50  % for the  U.K.,  with  the matching ratio dropped 
to 20 %  for the richest member  states.  'Ibis case has an intermediate-
to-low redistribUtive  power  of o.l to 1 % ;  this is because  the 
global ceiling on  the fund,  and  the allotment between countries, on 
a  b:i.sis  ~roportiona.l to eligible projects sutmitted, gives very 
limited (if any)  room  for the  poorer states to increase their 
expenditure efforts in the sector concerned  before  the E.C.  fund 
is exhausted. 
Cases V a.  to d.  open  up  some  more  dynamic  hypotheses,  assuming that 
the Community  was  prepared to devote  increased resources to  the 
function in question.  The  approach  considered most  promising is a 
development of the variable matching ratio· case, as in Case  IV 
but where  for relatively weak  member  economies  the fund  becomes 
open-ended,  while for the relatively strong member  economies it is 
restricted to matching eligible national expenditure at a  low  rate 
of reimbursement not in excess of initial bench-mark level.  Cases  V a. 
to c. all follow from  a  single grant system  ;  the variants examine 
different possible economic  responses in member  states.  The  objective 
would  be  to have  an E.C.  fund  that scored positively both as to 
redistributive effects and  as to its incentive effects-on national 
resource allocation and-economic  development  programmes. 
In these Cases V a.  to c., for the relatively weak  member  economies 
(Ireland, Italy and  the  U.K.),  the  purpose of the open-ended 
commitment  at high rates of reimbursement  (80 %,  60  % and  50  % 
respectively) would  be  to remove  the fiscal incapacity to mount 
larger programmes  of economic  development expenditure  ;  the open-
ended  commitment  ensures that the tax-price cheapening effect of the - 452-
E.C.  subsidies does  operate as  an incentive at the margin of national 
resource allocation decisions.  The  Cases V a  to c.  show  step 
increases in the incentive effect starting, for purposes of comparison, 
with the  negative case where  the E.C.  funds  only substitute for 
national expenditure,  Case  V a.  ;  next is shown  the case where  there 
is complete  ad.di tionali  ty of the E. C.  funds  on  top of maintained 
national expenditures,  Case  V b.;  then there is the highly positive 
case when  national expenditure increases as a  function of the E.C. 
matching ratio, Case  V c •• In the  U.K.  case  the  50  %  matching ratio 
leads to a  1.5 times increase in national expenditure.  In the Italian 
case a  60  %  matching ratio leads to a  1.6 times increase.  In the 
Irish case an 80 %  matching ratio reads to a  1.8 times increase.  The 
increased national expenditures brin& in their  t~multiplied 
increases in the  flow  of E.C.  fund  subsidies.  The  resultant total 
public expenditures  (national and  Community)  in the  three weaker 
economies  reach or exceed  the per capita levels of Germany.  This 
represents the kind of change in relative economic  development 
expenditures that could be  expected as part of a  process of economic 
convergence,  between the  present the  six stronger and  three weaker 
member  economies. 
As  regards the position of the six stronger economies,  their 
receipts from  the E.C.  Fund are deliberately restrained in Cases V a. 
to c.  to a  simple  substitution by  the Community  matching contributions 
for na.tional expenditures.  This would  be  to avoid an  'tmiesirable' 
general increase in public expenditure on  the functions in question 
a  contrary development would, if permitted,  not only add  to the 
general problem  of controlling public expenditure,  but would  also 
defeat the  'convergence'  objectives of the E.C.  Fund.  Under 
this reasoning, it may  be  questioned whether there would  be  any 
point in the E.C.  Fund  contributing at all to  the financing of 
expenditure in the  stronger economies  ;  a  counter-argument,  for 
maintaining a  low  Community  reimbursement rate, would  be  to ensure a 
Community  voice in the expenditure functions in question in all 
countries.  This may  be  important for the  purpose of guarding against 
competitive  subsidisation in such fields as regional policy and 
industrial investment aids  (there are other political arguments, 
e.g.  the anti  'two-tier' Community  thesis). 
The  final example,  Case  V d., does however  reduce  the receipts of the 
six stronger states to  below  that required  to match all national 
expenditure  ;  in this instance  the receipts under Case  IV- the 
variable matching fund  with a  global ceiling- are carried over 
in Case  V d., and  combined  with  the  most  'dynamic'  results from  the 
open-ended  fund  for the  three weaker  economies as in Case  V c. 
Completely open-ended  funds  score very positively from  the  point of 
view  of economic  incentive effects, but very negatively from  the 
point of view  of political acceptability to ministers of finance. It 
is partly for this reason, also,  that Cases V a.  to d.  are only 
open-ended  for the  three weaker  member  states.  Further assurances for 
the  purpose  of budgetary control could  be  introduced,  without - 453-
destroy~ng  the  scope  for the vital incentive efforts,  by  applying 
a  global ceiling for the  three weaker  member  states at, say,  the 
levels indicated under Cases  V c.  and  d ••  Under  these hypotheses  the 
ceiling would  be  high enough  to  permit and  encourage,  a  significant 
improvement in their relative economic  performance  in the field 
concerned. 
The  overall financial results of the  several cases may  be  summarised 
as follows.  E.C.  Fund  expenditure increases from  a  minimum  of Jj8 
m.u.a.  in the equalisation Case  I, to the  jOO  m.u.a.  ceiling level 
in Cases II to IV,  to 1,)66 m.u.a.  in Case  V.a.  (where,  however, 
total expenditure remains at 5,000 m.u.a.),  to 2,651 m.u.a.  in 
Case  V b., 3,7)6  m.u.a.  in Case  V c., falling back  to J,2Jl m.u.a. 
in Case  V d. 
The  gross redistributive power  of the E.C.  fund  expenditure  (before 
taking into account its financing)  was  about o. J of 1 % under  the 
equalisation system(~), the  quota system  \Case III), and  the 
variable matching ratio system without a  global ceiling but also 
before any incentive effects are assumed  to operate  (Case  V a.) 
Cases II and  IV,  both with  the  jOO  m.u.a.  global ceiling, have  a  zero, 
or only a  slight, redistributive power.  In Cases V b.  to d., however, 
with incentive effects assumed  to be  operating for the three weaker 
member  states,  the redistributive power  increases successively to 
l.J %,  2.4 % and  2.5 %. 
The  net redistributive power,  assuming a  personal income  tax capacity 
financing of the  fund,  is higher to a  significant but not dramatic 
degree.  Cases I, III and  IV  rise to  the 0,4 to 0.6 of 1 % level 
Cases  V b.  to d.  rise to 1.8, ).1% and  J.2% respectively. 
The  foregoing numerical examples  make  it possible  to envisage 
hypothetical packages of instruments which  could be  of significance 
in relation to  the Community's  macroeconomic  convergence  objectives. 
Assume,  for example,  that the Community  was  prepared to create a  set 
of financial instruments with a  redistributive power  of 10  %,  i.e. 
one-quarter of that found  in the average  fully integrated economy,  on 
condition that the  funds  could directly contribute  to  these objectives. 
This might  be  achieved by  a  set of grants instruments which  spent 
5,000 m.u.a.  on  specific purpose  grant programmes  along the  lines 
of Case  V d., which  would  yield a  redistributive power  of 4.9 %,  and 
5000 m. u.a.  on  equalisation payments  according to Case  I, which  would 
yield a  redistributive power  of 5·3  %•  The  equalisation payments  could 
be  the subject of performance  or policy conditions discussed in the 
third -part of this paper. 
To  these grant expenditures  may  be  added  the  prospect of a  further 
inducement of capital flows  on  market conditions.  The  grant subsidies 
would  in large measure  be  going to investment prospects whose  overall 
financial structures contain a  substantial proportion of long-term 
loan funds.  Institutional links between Community  grant funds  and - 454-
capital market agencies could assure further multiplier effects in 
the flow of capital to the regions or sectors in question.  For 
example,  the Regional  Fund  is already empowered  to grant interest-
rate subsidies on  loans from  the European Investment Bank  for certain 
types of project.  The  European Coal and  Steel Community  can also use 
its limited resources for granting subsidies in combination with its 
loan resources.  While  these  links cannot at present be  used  on  any 
substantial scale because of the  limitations of the grant funds,  they 
could  become  of major significance if the E.C.  grant funds  were 
developed along the lines sketched out above  (in Cases V b.  to d.) 
J.  The  Community's  present sectoral programmes 
The  distribution of the Community's  main grant and  loan operations 
is given in Table  6  in the  form  of per capita amounts  by  country, 
together with an indication of their redistributive power.  Total 
grant expenditures on  'structural'  funds amounted  to 1,0.50  m. u.a., 
including the Regional  Fund,  Social Fund,  Agricultural Guidance 
section, and  E.c.s.c.  operations.  The  Agricultural Guarantee  section 
(market support subsidies)  costs 4,245 m.u.a.  with a  total of all 
grant funds of 5,295  m. u.a  ••  Total loan expenditure amounted  to 
1,577  m.u.a., about equally split between  the E.I.B.  and E.c.s.c. 
Of  the structural funds,  the  Re~onal and  Social Funds  are of similar 
size  (J91  m.u.a.  and  491  m.u.a.)  (1)  and  redistributive power 
(0.2) and  0.24 of 1 %).  These  results are achieved,  however,  by  quite 
different means,  the Regional Fund  being subject to quotas,  and 
the Social Fund  applying priority policy rules for the  selection of 
projects.  The  Feoga  Guidance  section accounted for 1)1 m.u.a., with 
almost no  redistributive power  effect.  The  E.c.s.c. grant funds also 
have  an insignificant redistributive power. 
The  Guarantee  section of the Agricultural Fund  spent 4,245 m.u.a.  in 
1975.  The  distribution of this expenditure is not intended  to be 
related, of course,  to  the relative economic  strength of member  states, 
but to agricultural production.  Italy, Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom 
received comparable  amounts  per capita  ;  higher amounts  per capita 
were  received by  four relatively rich member  states (Belgium,  France, 
the  Netherlands and  Denmark)  and  by  one  poor member  state (Ireland). 
The  regression line of best fit in the distribution of these subsidies 
is close to equal per capita amounts  by  country,  which  implies a 
slightly progressive distribution with respect to  GDP  per capita. 
The  redistributive power  (0.46 of 1 %)  is small in relation to  the 
size of the expenditure  (in addition,  the statistical quality of the 
line of best fit is very poor). 
(1)  See  footnotes  to Table  6 for greater precision on  these amounts. D
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The  loan funds  of the European Investment Bank  (E.I.B.)  and 
European Coal  and Steel Community  (E.C.s.c.) have  no  grant element 
beyond that reflected in the somewhat  more  favourable borrowing terms 
that these institutions can secure by comparison with  the 
economically weaker  member  states. It is interesting nonetheless  to 
assess the distribution of the gross loan funds in a  similar way, 
particularly because  of the  possibility (already referred to) of 
providing institutional links between grant and  loan funds.  The 
loan operations of the E.I.B. in 1975  amounted  to 860  m.u.a., with 
a  redistributive power  (in the limited sense indicated) of 0.44 of 
1%; for the E.c.s.c.  the  figures were  717  m.u.a., with a 
redistributive power  of o.OJ of 1 %• 
Overall the redistributive power  of the Community  funds divides into 
three blocs,  each of approaching 0.5 of 1 % :  the  structural funds 
through grants amounting  to 1,2Jl m.u.a.,  the Agricultural Guidance 
section through expenditure of 4,275 m. u.a., and  the  loan operations 
through gross loans of 1,577 m.u.a  ••  For the reasons noted,  the 
'quality' of the redistributive power  of the last two  blocs is 
strongly qualified. 
4.  Conditionality for general  purpose  grants 
The  idea that general purpose  economic  aid, grants or loans,  be 
provided against economic  policy or performance  conditions may 
contain two  separate  types of economic  criteria : 
- the first may  be  criteria identifying economic  difficulties or 
weaknesses,  which  would  warrant  the aid to the beneficiary 
state and  possibly, determine its amount  ; 
- the  second  may  be criteria providing a  counterpart of  value to 
the donor,  including,  possibly, assurances that the beneficiary 
will, while consuming  the aid,  be  doing something significant to 
rectify the original difficulties or weaknesses. 
As  to the first type  of criteria, the  technical and  political problems 
are relatively slight. As  explained above,  general purpose  grant 
mechanisms  in federations are invariably based  on objective measures 
of economic  and/or fiscal capacity and  needs,  and  these are well 
tried in practise. While  the Community  itself has no  experience of 
budget equalisation systems, its Financial Mechanism  (although limited 
in the  scope  of its operation)  makes  interesting use  of a  mix  of 
macroeconomic  criteria :  payments  can be  made  where  states have  both 
a  relatively low  GNP  per capita position and  a  low  GNP  growth rate  ; 
moreover  the grants are larger if, in addition,  the member  state is in 
balance of payments difficulty.  General purpose  loan facilities, 
provided by  the Community  or the  IMF,  are based on  the severity of 
balance of payments difficulties, taking into account the nature and 
size of deficits, the  size of reserves,  and  exchange rate developments. - 457-
There is also a  case for a  cyclical criterion to be retained in this 
connection  :  e.g.  the short run deviation of actual from  potential 
output,  or unemployment  trends,  may  be  used in combination with 
criteria reflecting structural economic  weakness.  The  reasons would 
be, firstly,  to avoid problems of time-lags before short-run 
developments become  reflected in structural indicators,  and secondly, 
to enable the aid from  Community  funds  to have  something of the 
same  kind of elasticity with respect to the cycle that is normally 
found  in the response of public finance  to regional-cyclical problems 
in member  states. 
The  second  type of criterion is much  more  difficult. 
A basic principle is to avoid contradicting the first set of criteria. 
It is natural to hope  that the financial aid will rectify the original 
economic  weaknesses.  But success cannot be  directlymwarded,  nor can 
failure be  directly penalised, if this were  to mean  giving grants 
as a  function of economic  weakness but then to increase the aid if 
the  same  weakness is eliminated, or decrease the aid if it is 
exacerbated.  The  'counter-part'  criterion therefore has to be either 
independent of the criterion of economic  weakness,  or it has  to be 
a  policy instrument under the control of the recipient government. 
Within mature federations  there are  some,  but not many,  examples of 
explicit  'counterpart' cri·teria.  In the u.s.  a  tax effort criterion 
is included in the general revenue  sharing formulae,  such that a 
relatively higher tax effort by  a  givens tate directly increases the 
amount of its federal grant.  A quite different example  is found  in 
Australia, where  generalpurpose  ('Financial Assistance') grants are 
conditional on recipient states abstaining from  entering into the 
field of income  taxation.  In the early days of the Australian federation, 
and  more  continuously perhaps in Canada,  the avoidance of secession 
- with all its commercial and political implications - has been an 
implicit but more  basic counterpart. 
In the Community  context the use of a  tax effort performance criterion, 
used as an automatic modulator of the amount of grants, would  appear 
to be  conceivable. It is of clear relevance to  the Italian case. 
Table  2  above  showed  Italian tax effort in 1970  to have  been 81  per 
cent of the  Community  average  (the UK's  tax effort was  108  per cent). 
An  (unquantified)  improvement in fiscal performance was  stipulated as 
a  condition in the 1975 Community  loan to Italy. 
Trade restrictions, or the  limitation thereof, are one  of the criteria 
for IMF  higher credit tranche facilities  ;  however,  in the Community 
trade policies cannot be  considered a  variable. 
Criteria relating to macroeconomic  policy instruments,  such as the 
rate of growth of monetary and  budgetary aggregates and  the amount  and 
financing of budget balances,  are  used in relatively precisely 
quantified form  in balance of payments  loan negotiations  (both in the 
IMF  and  E.C)  but are generally absent in the context of inter-- 458  -
governmental  grant mechanisms.  This reflects of course  the fact 
that member  states of the  IMF  and  Community  have  full powers  over 
macro-economic  policy,  whereas  the  IMF  or Community  have  no  such 
powers. 
The  scope  for the  use of quantified monetary or budgetary policy 
conditions in balance of payments  loan operations is severely limited 
for both political (sovereignty)  reasons  and  because of technical-
economic  problems  (e.g.  the controversial signi'ficance of intermediate 
target variables in the monetary area).  A further very simple  reason 
is that balance of payments  loan operations are normally one-shot 
payments,  or 'once-a-cycle'  transactions.  There  is no  continuous 
flow  of financial aid  ;  most  of the  lender's powers  are used  once 
the  payment is made.  The  IMF  'higher credit tranche'  and  'extended 
facility'  provide for instalment  payments  over a  period of surveillance 
of economic  policy and  performance  criteria. However  the instalment 
period is usually only a  matter of months.  Post mortem  reviews of 
conditions negotiated in the agreement of loans  (such as recently 
in a  Community  loan to Italy)  shows  instances of  'unexpected' 
economic  developments outside the borrowing states' control having 
caused performance  to fall outside  the  negotiated conditions. It 
may  be  more  plausible to  envisage the  use  of quantified performance 
or policy criteria in the context of general purpose  grant mechanisms 
within the Community.  A continuous flow  of grant funds would  avoid 
the  problem  of one-shot payments  just mentioned.  The  legitimacy of 
such criteria is in a  sense greater in a  Community  setting than in 
federations,  since in these  cases member  states are not accountable 
for macroeconomic  policy, whereas in the  Community  the member  state 
is. 
Apart from  policy performance criteria, such as monetary  and  budgetary 
aggregates,  there  may  alternatively be  some  economic  performance 
indica  tors that can be  used without encountering the objections of 
contradicting the (first type  of) criteria of economic  difficulty 
or weakness•  The  rate of wage  inflation may  1:e  the best example. 
It may  make  economic  sense  to aid a  member  state which  is in severe 
economic difficulty, but which is making .a  commendable  effort to 
control wage  inflation.  Success on  this account will generally be 
an important precondition  of~neral economic  recovery.  In addition 
wage  inflation is less directly affected by  external price and 
exchange  rate developments  than,  say,  the consumer  price index. 
Inflation in general has powerful external effects across national 
frontiers in Europe  in the  sense of exacerbating or easing other 
countries'  inflation problems and  c6uld for this reason be  a  logical 
'counterpart'  criterion for financial assistance.  Finally, in the 
technical functioning of budget equalisation mechanisms  which  inclu1e 
cost correction factors (as described in the ~  part of this 
paper), it would  be  important to have  a  control to prevent public 
sector wage  cost escalationfrom being automatically repaid  through 
the grant mechanism. - 459-
5.  Concluding remarks 
In fully integrated economies  there is large-scale financial 
redistribution between regions or, in a  federal setting, member 
states. Interpreted in terms of regional or federal economics,  this 
redistribution serves several inter-related purposes  :  (i) to 
assure a  reasonably equal distribution of the cyclical and  secular 
fortunes of the economic  union,  (ii) to help assure as far as possible 
a  comparable  economic  performance as between  regions,  (iii) to avert 
flows  of migration that may  be  excessive, either by  political or 
economic  (congestion) criteria, and  ( i v)  to compensa. te and adjust 
for the absence  of trade and exchange  rate policies at the regional 
or state level. In unitary economies  the  larger part of these 
inter-regional flows  of finance result from  the operation of national 
policies at common  standards  ;  in decentralised federal or confederal 
settings the accent is more  on  the use of general or specific purpose 
inter-governmental grants. 
While  in the last analysis only the political processes can determine 
the appropriate scale of redistributive policies,  there are some 
major economic  reasons why  the model  of the fully integrated economy 
is excessive for the Community  of the foreseeable future.  These  are 
firstly, that the effective mobility of people is much  less, for 
linguistic and other reasons, in the Community  than in all mature 
economic  unions  ;  and,  secondly, that the Community  is not a  monetary 
union and  real wage  costs can still change  through exchange  rate 
changes. 
Two  major reasons,  on  the other hand,  remain  ~  the need  to assure a 
reasonably fair distribution of the  gains from  economic  integration, 
ani the objective of convergence  in economic  performance  as between 
member  states.  The  third factor,  migration, will certainly grow  over 
time  ;  there will be  a  sharp step increase in any case in the event 
of enlargement of the Community  to include more  migration-prone and 
less industrialised Mediterranean countries.  The  fourth factor, 
the  monetary and exchange  rate union, is an open  question for 
political choice  ;  if the Community  were  to try again in this field, 
the implications for redistributive policies should not be  overlooked. 
Against these OO.Ckground.  considerations the present paper has set out 
a  number  of quantified simulations of financial redistribution in 
the Community,  comparing  : 
- first, in one  extreme  case  the model  of a  fully integrated economy 
transposed onto  the Community,  and in which  up  to 40 %  of inter-
regional or inter-state per capita income  differentials tend to be 
offset by  inter-regional financial redistribution ; 
- secondly, in the other extreme  case the reality of the Community 
of today with its very limited redistribution function, accounting 
for about a  one  per cent offset of per capi'ta income  differentials ; - 460-
- and  thirdly, a  number  of hypothetical intermediate cases, 
accounting,  for example,  for a  10 % offset of per capita income 
differentials. 
A further objective has been, at the  same  time,  to set out 
simulation  exercises in the main  practised techniques of inter-
governmental financial relations, notably in the field of general 
and  specific purpose  grants,  paying particular attention to  the 
different mixes  of effects - as between  improvements in economic 
structures and  pure redistribution - depending upon  the  type of 
grant technique used. Chapter  15 
FISCAL  STABILISATION  POLICY  IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
AND  MONETARY  AND  EXCHANGE  RATE  POLICIES 
by 
Thee  Peeters - 463-
It is convenient to introduce a  discussion of the  Community  role in 
fiscal stabilisation policy with a  brief survey of some  of the 
general issues in the debate  on  economic  stabilisation policy measures 
not only because actual proposals for Community  initiatives should 
take into account the  latest developments in this area,  but also 
because  recent analysis of the role of fiscal policy has a  direct 
bearing on  the  objectives of European economic  and  monetary 
integration and  the approaches  towards it. This point was  emphasised 
in the first report of the Optica group  (1). It needs further 
development and  a  somewhat different presentation by  the  Study  group 
on  the Role  of Public Finance in European Economic  Integration,  so 
as to  provide a  general analytical framework  within which  various 
specific proposals in the  Community  context can  be  formulated and 
elaborated. 
1.  Keynesian  orthodoxy 
The  standard Hicksian IS-LM  analytical framework  is not only the 
cornerstone of most  macro-economics  courses  taught throughout  the 
Western world, it also provides the analytical foundation of the 
nee-Keynesian policy of economic  stabilisation through demand 
management  which is briefly summarized  as follows.  The  IS curve 
represents the  locus of points (pairs of interest rates and  real 
income)  in which  the real sector of the  economy,  including the 
government,  is in equilibrium,  and  the  1M  curve  represents a  similar 
locus of points for which  the demand  for money  equals  the supply. 
Joint equilibrium in the real and  the monetary sector determines  the 
level of real income.  This  level can consequently be  influenced 
through fiscal and  monetary  policy actions. 
Fiscal policy actions will shift the equilibrium in the real sector 
(the  IS-curve)  ;  monetary policy will affect the equilibrium 
situation in the monetary  sector (shifting the  1M  curve).  To  the 
extent that the  government controls the fiscal and  monetary 
instruments, it should therefore be  able  to·achieve  the level of 
real income  that corresponds to a  full employment  situation. 
This Keynesian approach sees government  (a) as a  stabilizer of 
fluctuations in the  private  sector,  (b)  equilibrium as a  state to 
be  achieved by deliberate  policy intervention rather than through 
the  operation of automatic market forces alone,  and  (c)  collective 
goods  as an important component  of the  social welfare function. 
Furthermore,  the need  to insulate the  domestic  economy  from  foreign 
disturbances in order to  permit national governments  to pursue 
independent economic  statilisation policies, explains in a  world of 
market integration,  the  concern of policy makers  with explicit 
balance-of-payments policies under a  fixed exchange  rate regime  and 
(1)  Optica Report  '75,  Towards  Economic  Equilibrium and  Monetary 
Unification in Europe,  Brussels,  Commission  of the European Communities, 
Doc.  II/909/75-E-final,  pp.  17-22 - 464 -
their frequent preference for  (managed)  flexibility.  Basically,  this 
view  considers exchange  rate policy as one  instrument by which 
governments may  preserve  some  independence in the  policy sphere with 
a  minimum  of disruption to the benefits of market integration in 
the  ~rivate sphere. 
The  challenges to this postwar orthodoxy have  engendered rapid 
progress in the area of theoretical specification and model  building. 
Among  the  most  important,  for the  purposes of this paper,  are  the 
explicit recognition of the  interactions among  all markets in a 
general-equilibrium system  ;  the  specification of full equilibrium 
in the  market for money  (and  other financial assets) in stock as 
well as flow  terms  ;  and  the distinction among  impact effects,  the 
dynamic  adjustment process,  and  the  long run stationary effects 
of a  disturbance  (1). 
2.  Crowding-out effects  (2) 
The  oldest,  but for our purposes least interesting, controversy 
directs the attention to  the effects of alternative fiscal and 
monetary  policy actions and  their relative efficiency.  The  traditional 
Keynesian view  that increases in government expenditure,  even if 
financed  by  taxes or by  borrowing from  the  public,  lead to increases 
in income  has been challenged by  the monetarists.  They  contend  that 
government expenditure displaces a  near-equal amount  of private 
spending.  Government  spending financed  through  taxation displaces 
or crowds  out private  spending through  the interest rate effect. 
This effect is not reflected in the  balanced-budget multiplier,  which 
in the  conventional Keynesian analysis equals unity.  Public expenditure 
financed  through  bonds also crowds out private  spending through a  rise 
in the interest rate and might·result in little net effect on  total 
s~ending. 
Crowding-out effects that operate  through the rise in the interest 
rate following an increase in government  spending are demonstrated 
in the Hicksian IS-LM  framework  as follows.  For the  tax-financed 
case an increase in public expenditures shifts the IS curve  to  the 
right.  But  the rise in income  through  the  balanced  budget multiplier 
increases the  transaction  demand  for money  balances.  With  a  constant 
money  supply,  this causes a  rise in the interest rate.  The  higher 
interest rate has a  negative effect through a  decline in net wealth. 
(1)  Marina  V.N.  WHITMAN,  Global  Monetarism  and  the Monetary Approach  to  the 
Balance  of Payments,  Brookings Papers on  Economic  Activity,  No.  3 1975 
P~·  533-34 
(2)  The  following analysis draws  heavily on N.N.  CHOUDHRY,  Integration of 
Fiscal and  Monetary sectors in Econometric Models  :  A Survey of 
Theoretical Issues and  Findings,  Staff Papers,  July 1976,  PP•  396-408 - 465-
Private expenditure is thus depressed which  in turn pushes  back  the 
IS curve.  It also shifts the  1M  curve  to the left,  thereby 
offsetting the initial expansionary effect of higher government 
spending.  Contrary to standard Keynesian analysis the balanced 
budget multiplier will,  therefore,  be  lower than unity.  According 
to  some  extreme  views there might even be  total crowding out and 
a  zero multiplier. 
Similar effects operate with bond  financed expansion in government 
expenditure.  The  initial rise in income  stimulates the  transaction 
demand  for money,  which  causes a  rise in the interest rate. 
The  deflationary effect of a  reduction in wealth  can also not be 
excluded.  Although  more  bonds  are  now  held by  the  private sector, 
its effect on net wealth may  be  more  than offset by  a  reduction in 
the  market value of the  existing stock of government  bonds 
resulting from  higher interest rates.  Higher interest rates have 
a  deflationary effect on  private expenditure. It is therefore argued 
that in the absence of an accomodating monetary policy,  the initial 
expansionary effect of a  bond-financed increase in government 
spending is  partially (or in the  extreme monetarist view  wholly) 
offset by  perverse wealth effects. 
The  controversy about the  crowding~out or perverse wealth effects 
associated with bond-financed or tax-financed government  spending 
is, however,  more  adequately dealt with by  including a  government 
budget constraint in Keynesian models  of income  determination,  a 
notorious neglect until a  decade  ago.  A government  budget constraint 
properly accounts for the  monetary repercussions of fiscal policy 
actions.  Even  in the absence  of discretionary fiscal policy, 
moreover,such a  constraint highlights the  repercussions of pure 
monetary actions on  the  budgetary balance. 
J.  The  government  budget constraint 
The  government  budget constraint is the  missing link that closes 
the relationship between  the  public sector and  the rest of the 
economy.  In the IS-LM  framework if such a  constraint is imposed 
on  the  system,  fiscal policy actions will affect the IS and  1M 
curves simultaneously.  But this is essentially the point made  by 
the monetarist crm-rding-out  literature.  The  demonstration runs as 
follows. 
In a  closed economy,  the  government  budget constraint implies 
that total expenditures  by  the  public sector have  to be  equal to 
total financing available from  taxes,  new  government  bond  issues 
and  the net creation of base  money.  This constraint imposes 
restrictions on  the  governments  freedom  to  choose  ~rbitrary values 
for all policy variables.  Given  n  policy instruments,  arbitrary va-
lues  can only be assigned to, at most,  n-1  of  th&~. More  specifically, 
it is demonstrated that the  outcome  of fiscal policy actions is not 
independent from  the monetary policy that is being pursued. - 466  -
Symbolically the government  budget constraint can be  written as 
follows  : 
G +  P - T = dB  + dH  [1] 
where  G =public sector expenditure  on  goods  and  services and  other 
transfer payments. 
P = interest payments  on  outstanding government  bonds  held by  the 
public 
T = public sector taxes 
B = net public holdings of government  bonds 
H = monetary base  (high  powered  money) 
Equation [l]  states an important relation (a)  between  stocks 
and  flows,  and  (b)  between monetary and  fiscal variables,  by 
recognizing that a  deficit or surplus must  be  financed by  the 
creation or destruction of money  or of interest-bearing public dept. 
Consider the latter relationship first.  Take  an expansion of G. 
It will raise income  but does not necessarily lead to an equivalent 
increase in T,  which  depends  on  income.  A change  in the budget 
deficit must  be  matched  by  a  change  in the right-hand side of the 
equation.  Changes  in the  government deficit, therefore,  cause 
changes in either the monetary base  or privately held government  bonds, 
or both,  depending on  the way  the  budget deficit is being financed. 
Consider first changes in privately held government  bonds.  They 
normally affect interest rates, which in turn will crowd  out 
private expenditures.  Second, if the deficit is financed  through 
an  expansion of base money,  the dependence  of the effect of the 
fiscal stimulus on  an accomodating monetary  policy is self-evident. 
In both cases a  government budget constraint introduces the  necessary 
link between  the fiscal sector,  the monetary sector and  the rest 
of the economy. 
As  long as there are interest-elastic expenditures,  the assumption 
that monetary forces have  no  role systematically overstates the net 
effect of fiscal policy - which is to  say,  overstates the multiplier. 
All this has by  now  become  standard macroeconomic  analysis of fiscal 
and  monetary  policy. 
The  budget constraint, however,  has not only highlighted the 
interdependency of fiscal and monetary  policies in the context of 
macro-economic  stabilization. It also suggests that a  condition for 
full-long-run equilibrium in a  static model  of the  type  being 
traditionally considered is that dH/dt = dB/dt  =  0.  This implies that 
in the  long run the  budget should be  balanced. It is worth mentioning - 467-
that some  striking conclusions have  been reached with respect to 
the multiplier effects of government  spending in the context of 
such a  constraint.  In a  seminal  paper by  Blinder and  Solow  (1), 
published in 1973,  it was  pointed out that, contrary to the 
monetarists'position,  the equilibrium  (long run)  multiplier for 
money-financed deficit spending is smaller than that for bond-
financed deficit spending  (2), but in the latter case the system 
could be  unstable.  With  pure  bond  financed fiscal policy in a 
stable system - and  stability appears to be  an empirical question-
the  long-run effects of increased government  expenditure will be 
more  expansionary than in the  pure  money  creation case. 
The  justification for this result follows  once it is understood  that, 
start~  from  an initial long-run equilibrium income  level with a 
balanced budget,  an increase in government  spending will cause 
subsequent deficit financing to  be  larger if it is financed  by  bond 
issues than if it is financed  through money  creation, for two 
reasons  :  (a) initially income  will rise less so  that the induced 
increase in tax receipts will be  smaller,  and  (b)  the increase in 
privately held outstanding bonds  requires greater interest payments. 
A given initial budgetary gap is therefore harder to close under bond 
financing,  so  that it takes a  greater rise in income  to induce 
tax receipts sufficient in a  new  equilibrium to close  the budgetary 
gap. 
In the short run,  however,  the well known  proposition still holds 
that, if the  1M  curve is not vertical,  the impact multiplier of 
money-financed deficit spending is more  expansionary than that of a 
bond-financed deficit. The  old debate about  the relative effectiveness 
of monetary and  fiscal policy for stabilisation purposes has  thus 
gained a  renewed  momentum. 
For  the  purposes of this paper the analysis so far suggests  two 
conclusions  :  (a) it is necessary to consider fiscal stabilization 
policy at the Community  level in close connection with monetary 
stabilization policy at the  Community  level  :  (b) it may  be 
misleading to focus exclusively on  the short run impact of fiscal 
stabilization in disregard of the  long-run implications and 
repercussions. 
(1)  A.S.  BLINDER,  R.M.  SOLOW,  Does  Fiscal Policy Ma.Uer,  Journal of Public 
Economics,  Nov.  1973,  pp.  319-37 
(2)  The  lowest multiplier holds for the  purely tax-financed government 
spending (balanced budgets). - 468-
4.  The  balance  of payments  constraint 
How  are  the results summarized  so far affected in the  case of an open 
economy  ?  More  specifically what  link, if any,  does exist between 
fiscal stabilization and  budgetary deficits on  the  one  hand  and 
balance of payments  equilibrium on  the other  ?  The  latter question 
is not unimportant in the  context of proposals for fiscal stabilization 
policy as a  step towards  the ultimate goal of an economic  and 
monetary  union. 
As  a  starting point reference can be  made  to  the views held by  the 
"New  Cambridge  School".  According to this School  (1),  the  current 
balance of payments  account is essentially determined  by  the  government 
budget.  Two  elements are crucial in this proposition.  First,  three 
aggregate sectors for goods  and  services in the  economy  are  considered, 
i.e.  the  private,  the  government,  and  the foreign sector.  An  excess 
of one  sector's savings over investment must  then be  equal to  the 
excess demand  for  commodities i.e. the  net financial and/or 
monetary deficit of the  other two  sectors together.  This is 
illustrated by  the following ex-post identity. 
(S-I)  - (G-T)  - (X-M)  =  0  (2) 
In other words,  an excess demand  for financial assets in one  sector 
~ust be  accomodated  by  an excess  supply of financial assets by  the 
other two  sectors. 
Secondly,  the  New  Cambridge  school submits that the  private sector 
has a  rather stable financing surplus i.e. a  net demand  for 
additional financial wealth in the  form  of assets issued by  the 
government  and/or the  foreign sector.  Therefore,  with  (S-I) > 0 
as a  structural characteristic of the  economy,  a  deficit on  the 
balance of payments  on  current account  (  (X-M)  ~ o)  must  correspond 
to  (and  be  determined  by)  an  even bigger deficit in the  government 
budget.  The  prescription for improving the current account would 
then imply a  restrictive budgetary policy in order to reduce  the 
government deficit. If it is true that the current account is 
determined  by  the budgetary balance,  an important conclusion would 
follow  for the  countries of the  ~uropean Community  :  they ought start 
urgently to coordinate their budgetary policies at the Community  level 
in order to avoid persistent current account incompatibilities among 
the member  countries. 
More  in line with  the analysis in the  previous section is the 
"portfolio approach"  that was  elaborated as an extension of the  theory 
of the international adjustment mechanism  developed in the writings 
of Mundell  in the  early sixties.  The  portfolio approach resolves a 
(l) The  following presentation follows closely the related discussion in the 
Optica Report  '75,  op.  cit., pp.  17-20 and  appendix  B. - 469  -
fundamental  shortcoming of the  underlying short-run (Keynesian) 
model,  namely  that stocks of assets are implicitly held constant 
although the  savings and  investment flows  that occur cause  changes 
in the  stock of these assets.  Models  were  therefore developed in which 
both stock and  flow  equilibrium conditions are  imposed  (1). 
The  fundamental criticism against the  monetary and fiscal policy mix 
model,  i.e. that trade imbalances represent a  flow  while  their 
financing affect stocks, is thus dealt with· 
The  importance of this point is illustrated as follows.  Financing 
a  (chronic)  trade deficit by  a  corresponding capital inflow increases 
the  stock of indebtedness  towards  the rest of the world in every 
period.  Analogously,  a  country's lending to  the rest of the  world 
increases with  the  financing of a  trade  surplus in every period. 
With  these  stock~ of foreign indebtedness or credit growing,  there 
must  come  a  point where  further credits are granted only at 
increasingly higher interest rates because of the risk of default. 
Adjustment of the  traditional Keynesian monetary and fiscal policy 
mix  models  are  therefore  necessary in order to  take into account 
changes in the interest-rate elasticities of short-term capital 
flows  induced  by  the  growth  in foreign indebtedness. 
The  stock-flow relationship also demonstrates that the  ser~c1ng 
of this growing  stock of foreign debt requires growing interest 
payments,  which  in turn have  to be  financed  by  (growing)  short term 
capital inflows.  As  a  result,  even in a  static world interest-rate 
differentials have  to  be  widened  continuously to attract the necessary 
funds.  To  the extent that there exist (institutional) barriers to the 
levels which  domestic interest rates can reach,  the  use  of the 
fiscal-monetary policy mix  for balance  of payments  purposes and 
internal  balance is thus constrained for reasons not previously 
recognized. 
The  portfolio approach  extends  the analysis of the implications of a 
government  budget constraint into  the  framework  of an open  economy. 
For an open  economy  the  government deficit can  now  also oe  financed 
by  the  disposal of foreign exchange  reserves  (R),  besides the 
financing mechanisms  for a  closed economy  namely  new  government  bond 
issues and  (or)  the net  creation of base  money.  Symbolically,  the 
government  budget  constraint  for an  open  economy  is written as 
follows 
G + P  - T = dB  + dH  - dR  (J) 
(1)  H.G.  GRUBEL,  Domestic  Origins of the  Monetary Approach  to  the  Balance 
of Payments,  Essays in Internation~Finance, N°ll7,  June  1976,  pp.l5-16 - 470-
The  current account deficit that -according to equation  (2)  -
corresponds to the government  budget deficit,  assuming for simplicity 
no  accumulation of net financial wealth in the  private sector (i.e. 
when  S = I) ,  must  be  financed either by  a  capital inflow or with a 
reserve  outflow,  depending on  the financing of the government  budget 
deficit.First, consider the  case of bond  financing.  If the domestic 
private sector is not willing to acquire  the  bonds issued by  the 
government  (S  = I), the  government  bonds will have  to be  bought 
by  the foreign sector.  This results in a  capital inflow equal to the 
current account deficit and  assures overall balance of payments 
equilibrium.  In other words,  the  government deficit that is at the 
origin of the current account deficit generates for its financing  a 
capital inflow that restores equilibrium in the  overall external 
accounts. 
If, on  the  other hand,  the  budgetary deficit is financed  by  a 
creation_. of base  money  - either directly via an advance  of the 
Central Bank,  or indirectly via a  purchase of public bonds  by  the 
Central Bank- and  with  the  private  sector not willing to hold the 
money  created by  this increase in the  base,  these balances must 
end  up  in the foreign exchange  market.  Ultimately they will be 
exchanged against foreign reserves  through Central Bank  interventions, 
thereby entailing a  deficit in the  overall balance of payments, 
except for the  case of a  reserve-currency country whose  the increase 
in money  balances will be  accepted as international reserves by 
other countries. 
Unlike  the  current account analysis of the  New  Cambridge  School 
which  concentrates attention only on  the  government  budget as a 
possible determinant of a  current account disequilibrium,  the 
portfolio approach  examines  also the choice of the financing 
mechanism  of the  government  budget as a  factor which  determines the 
short-term structure of the  balance of payments  in its current, 
capital and  reserve account components.  The  Optica Report 
concludes  (1)  : 
"In the  long run,  the  structure of the balance of payments 
is determined by  the desire of  the  private  sector to hold 
various assets and  currencies,  In the  shorter run,  the 
"portfolio approach"  puts emphasis  on  the  overall budget 
nolic  of the  overnment  in the  sense  that a  fiscal -
monetar  olic  2  that is not in line with  the  rivate 
sector's desire to accumulate  money  or with  the  foreign 
sector's desire  to  accumulate  the country's money  as 
international reserves,  must  produce  a  loss in reserves. 
(1)  Optica Report,  op.cit., p.  20 
(2)  As  opposed  to a  "pure" fiscal policy,  defined as a  policy where  there 
is no  monetary creation induced by  a  budget deficit, - 471-
As  this situation is not sustainable in the  long run,  the 
government must,  in such  a  case,  either reduce its 
deficit or increase  the  part of it which  is financed  by 
issuing bonds.  This  second  choice,  however,  is also 
limited since,  even if it is small,  a  country cannot 
float unlimited quantities of bonds  on  the  international 
market.  In the  short run,  moreover,  if it is not very 
small, it must accept an increase in the rate of interest 
the  "portfolio approach"  and  the  New  Cambridge  School's 
approach  give  pre-eminence  to  the  management  of the 
government budget over monetary  policy in the determination 
of macro-economic  variables." 
The  shift  in emphasis  suggested by  the portfolio approach from 
fiscal stabilisation  policy which  deals with  the  problem of 
maintaining internal balance  towards a  government  budgetary policy 
that determines a  desired external current account,  has rather 
unconventional implications.  This  lesson is namely  that harmonisation 
of budgetary policies between  the member-states  should become  a  major 
preoccupation of European economic  integration in order to assure 
consistent current account targets.  One  could even  extend the 
argument in favour of a  Community  fiscal policy, In contrast however, 
to the argument in Oates'  paper  (1)  such  a  policy would  be  less 
relevant for its direct and  indirect effect on  aggregate  demand  and 
employment  than for its implications for net wealth creation and  the 
external current account. 
5.  A tentative reconciliation of conflicting views 
How  are  the  conclusions of the  previous survey to  be  reconciled with 
the  conventional wisdom  which  argues in the European context for a 
selective and  flexible  use  of fiscal policy at the national level 
as a  necessary condition for  the effective establishment of a 
European  currency area  ? 
It is generally admitted that currency unification does not only imply 
centralisation of monetary policy (or an agreement on  strict 
adherence  to a  well-defined rule of conduct in monetary expansion). 
Automatic  equilibrating mechanisms  for intra-Community  payments 
imbalances are also required.  They  are  based usually on  capital and 
labour-mobility,and/or on  changes in aggregate demand  and  hence  in 
regional employment.  If therefore in a  currency union regions cannot 
have  balance-of-payment problems,  this is only because  the automatic 
interregional adjustment process  transforms  them  into "regional" 
problems.  With  a  centralized monetary policy  (and  fixed  exchange  rates) 
(1)  See  Chapter 10 - 472-
it is argued that the  regional imbalances that are likely to arise 
require a  fully-fledged,  flexible fiscal policy at the national 
level (1).  With  an insufficiently diversified and  flexible fiscal 
system and  downward  real wage  rigidity the  overall tendency of the 
system  towards full employment  would  become  dependent on  effective 
labor mobility within the  whole  area. If both fiscal policy flexibility 
and  adequate  labour mobility were  lacking,  excess supply of labour 
would  tend to become  a  strong and disruptive regional problem. 
How  does this view fit with  the prescription for harmonisation of 
fiscal policies derived  from  the  portfolio theory  ?  The  key  answer 
is that even within the  framework  of the  portfolio analysis and 
its policy conclusions,  national governments will still be  able  to 
influence  the  geographical distribution of employment  and  economic 
activity.Taxes and  public  spending can still be  freely determined b¥ 
national governments  (and/or a  Community  authority for that purpose) 
to influence  the  geographical disposition of aggregate  demand. 
The  same  instruments also remain available for influencing the  timing 
and  the  level of aggregate  demand  in order to  smooth  out remaining 
fluctuations.  The  size of the  government  sector deficit can still be 
choosen freely.  The  only restriction is that the deficit be  financed 
by  loans at the going market interest rate, and  provided the  long 
run equilibrium conditions which  derive  from  a  government  budget 
constraint and  a  balance of payments constraint are not violated. 
At  this stage it is useful to  point out that the  portfolio approach 
tend~ to focus  on  the  characteristics of the  system in stationary-state 
equilibrium.  But  long-run  tendencies are  compatible with many 
specifications of impact effects and  dynamic  adjustment mechanisms. 
It is only in extreme  formulations  that short run policy implications 
are derived from  the  characteristics of long-run stock-equilibrium 
conditions,  thereby suggesting that adjustment is actually achieved 
rapidly enough  to make  the  characteristics of the  transition 
unimportant.  This latter view,  however,  is probably an excessive 
reaction against the  long standing practice of a  reliance  on  the 
Keynesian model  as  the  basis for policy thinking and  policy 
formulation.  As  the analysis of the  conditions for stationary state 
(1)  See  among  others R.  MASERA,  A Stylized Hodel  of a  Highly Open  Economy 
Under  a  System  of Fixed Exchange  Rates,  and its Implications for 
the Establishment of Currency Areas,  Oxford Bulletin of Economics  and 
Statistics,  Aug.  1975,  pp.  211-225.  G.  MAGINIFICO,  European Monetary 
Unification,  London,  ~1acMillan, 1973  ;  study Group  on  Economic  and 
Monetary  Union,  European  :-~conomic Integration and Monetary  Unification, 
Brussels,  Commission  of the European Community,  197J. .- 473-
equilibrium suggests, it may  be  very misleading to rely on  the 
standard Keynesian model  as a  guide  to policy making  over a  succession 
of short periods within each of which  the  Keynesian model  may  appear 
to be  a  reasonable approximation to reality (1).  The  major 
shortcoming of this approach is that equilibrium conditions are only 
determined in terms of flows  or what Swoboda  has called quasi-
equilibrium.  (2)  But the  exclusive attention paid to  the  characteristics 
of longrun stock-equilibria may  be  equally misleading. 
How  long  is the  long run,  is in the  end  the critical question about 
the  ap~licability of stationary-state general-equilibrium analysis 
to policy issues.  The  issue is significant not onry because of the 
notoriously short time horizon of policy makers,  but,  more 
fundamentally,  because of the  very real social costs that may  be 
associated with disequilibrium states or with different adjustment 
mechanisms.  Today 
"economists disagree relatively little about the  long-run 
general equilibrium characteristics of the  economic  system. 
But for  the short-run,  when  the  system diverges either from 
some  of the  behavioral relations or from  one  or more 
equilibrium conditions,  there is substantial disagreement 
about which relationships can be  assumed  to hold throughout 
and which  not, about which markets can be  assumed  to  be 
continuously in equilibrium and  which not.  And,  the  longer 
the  "short run" is, the  more  important these divergences 
become  in determining the  policy implications of the 
competing approaches. 
Closely related to  the question of the  length of run over 
which  adjusment takes  place is the question of whether the 
assumption of fundamental stability that underlies equilibrium 
analysis is valid.  If the  world is in fact subject t6 
frequent disturbances and  shifts in behavioral parameters, 
then  the equilibrium model  is not appropriate for policy 
analysis,  nor is it obvious that a  mode  of analysis that 
always  begins with equilibrium can yield meaningful 
answers for a  system whose  initial state is inevitably 
disequilibrium".(]) 
(1)  H.G.  JOHNSON,  the Monetary Approach  to Balance of Payments  Theory,  in 
Further Essays in Monetary Economics,  London,  Allen & Unwin,  1972, 
p.  247. 
(4)  A.  S~TOBODA, Equilibrium,  Quasi-Equilibrium and  ~1acro-:r~conomic Policy 
under Fixed Exchange  Rates,  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  February 
1972,  pp.  162-171 
(J)  Marina V.N.  WHITI<:AN,  op.cit.  p.  528 - 474-
It appears  to be  difficult to model  portfolio equilibrium and  stock 
adjustment satisfactorily without  shedding much  of what is of interest 
for stabilisation policy•  l\'iarnina  V  .N ...  Whitman  even concludes that 
"focussing on  the  long-run general-equilibrium characteristics 
of the economic  system  •••  consigns to irrelevance  the 
problems  of economic  stabilisation with which  most  policy-
makers  are  primarily concerned and  to ineffectiveness the 
traditional macro-economic  tools of monetary and  fiscal 
-policy".  (1) 
In practice  the  challenge is one  of reconciling the  importance 
of recognizing the  long-run implications of policies undertaken to 
achieve  short and  medium-term  goals without ignoring short-and 
medium-term  effects when  focussing on  the  long-term full equilibrium 
situation. 
(1)  Ibidem,  p.  536 - 475-
Lessons  for fiscal stabilization in the  Community 
6.  The  case for fiscal stabilization at the Community  level 
The  case for a  fiscal stabilization policy at the  Community  level 
is convincingly put forward  in W.  Oates•  paper (1).  The  literature 
on fiscal federalism  strongly argues for  the  stabilization function 
to be  transfered to  the upper-tier level of government.  The 
arguments  need not be  repeated here.  What  this paper has pointed 
out in addition is the  importance  of understanding the  close and 
necessary connection between fiscal and  monetary stabilization 
policy at the Community  level.  A link was  also established between 
the public sector deficit and its financing on  the  one  hand  and 
the  external balance  on  the  other.  Because  of its monetary 
repercussions harmonisation of budgetary policies, in particu:.ar 
of public sector deficits and  borrowing requirements,  between member-
countries has an important role  to play in assuring consistent intra-
Community  current account targets and  capital flows.  In this sense 
a  Community  fiscal stabilization policy is a  key  element in any 
program for  ~uropean monetary integration.  At  the  same  time  the 
link between fiscal and  monetary  stabilization policy implies that 
proposals for fiscal anti-cyclical actions at the Community  level 
will become  fully effective only to  the  extent that they will be 
supported by  a  Community  control over monetary conditions. 
It is hard  to  envisage  the adequate debt financing power  and 
mechanisms  which  a  Community  anticyclical bUdgetary policy would 
require,  in a  framework where  the access  to the member-states 
capital markets and  monetary conditions are a  jealously guarded 
national prerogative.  However,  a  Community  debt-issuing and 
debt-management  policy could play an. important role.in the creation 
of a  truly integra  ted European capital market.  Such  an integra  ted 
capital market in_turn would  be a  major step forward in the 
direction of European  monetary integration.  r~1ajor fiscal initiatives 
of the  kind envisaged in this paper turn out to be  closely dependent 
on  joint progress in the monetary field,  including exchange  rate 
developments. 
A Community  fiscal stabilisation policy requires occasional 
financing of deficits and  the distribution of the burden of the 
resulting government debt.  Indeed, if it has  to be  assumed  that 
monetary  policy will remain firmly in the hands of national 
authorities,  there are hardly realistic prospects for fiscal 
initiatives at the  Community  level being financed  through  monetary 
expansion.  This leaves only the  possi i.lity of bond  financed deficits. 
But  this possibility is not without probiems either.  A Community 
fiscal authority that could issue its own  debt would  either act as a 
(1)  See  Chapter 10 - 476-
powerful instrument for European capital market integration and 
thereby interfere rather strongly with the  presumed  continuation 
of national control over monetary conditions.  Or, alternatively, if 
Community  securities ought to  be  floated on  the  separate national 
markets,  the Community  borrowing capability depends on  the  goodwill 
and  the policies of the national monetary authorities. If monetary 
conditions differ between member  countries, it is important to  the 
Community  authorities in which  the  market the  securities can 
actually be  issued.  For  the national authorities it is obviously not 
immaterial either which  market is choosen.  'I'he  debt manaeement 
policy implied by a  credible and  workable  Community  fiscal 
stabilization policy can only  be  operated in conjunction with 
effective monetary arrangements between  the  member  states. 
?.  Further lessons 
With  the  foregoing sobering thoughts in mind  what other lessons 
for a  Community  budgetary policy can  be  suggested  ? 
(a)  The  policy implications that derive  from  the  portfolio approach 
suggest that the  government's budgetary accounts ought  to be 
"balanced"  in some  relevant sense,  with the  important qualification, 
of course,  that a  balanced budget would  be  at best a  valid 
pro-position only for the  long run  •.  Possible conflicts between  the 
short run stabilization function of the  budget and its medium  and 
long run allocative and redistributive functions are also a  factor 
which  should  be  taken into account.  The  allocative and  distributive 
objectives of the  government budget require an implementation  in 
accordance  with  longer run financing planning schemes,  whereby 
expenditures are  linked to the  growth of productive  potential of 
the  economy.  This suggests a  level and  growth of government  spending 
that is set primarily on  the  basis of allocative and distributive 
objectives and,  therefore,  independent of the  requirements 
of stabilisation policy.  A more  stable public  expenditure pattern 
would  be  the  result.  The  demand  management  requirements for 
stabilisation purposes would  thus  be  shifted to  the revenue  side 
of the  budget.  The  discrepancies between relatively stable 
expenditures over the  business cycle and cyclical variations in tax 
revenues would  be  covered by  bond  issues. 
(b)  The  suggested budgetary rule  should be  operated in conjunction 
with an adequate measure  of fiscal influence.  I1easures of the 
quantitative  impact of fiscal policy are indispensable not only to 
analyse  past fiscal policy.  Hore  important,  measure3 of fiscal 
influence  should enable  economic  advisers to prescribe  the right 
dosage  of fiscal stimulus (restraint)  when  an insufficient 
(excessive)  level of private demand  is forecast.  Experience  indicates 
that even at the  national level forecasting as well as  the  use  of 
the  "right" measure  of fiscal influence is not at all easy.  At  the 
Community  level these difficulties will be  increased.  Without - 477-
discussing in detail a  suitable budgetary concept the previous 
point suggests already two  conditions that have  to be  met  : 
(i)  the expenditure  side of a  budget is considered as cyclically 
neutral if expenditures increase  from  one  year to  the  next at 
the rate of growth of potential output,  and  (ii) the  revenue  side 
of a  budget is cyclically neutral if tax revenues  increase in 
proportion to actual GNP  (1). 
(c)  A conceivable stabilisation function for the Community  budget 
cannot be  dissociated from  an overall framework  in which  Community 
policies are discussed and  confronted with comparable  policy action 
at the national level.  In this context a  clear need will exist to 
evaluate in a  continuous process  the  cyclical adequacy of the 
Community  budget in relation to  the  national budgets and  nationally 
differentiated business cycle conditions. It seems  hardly feasible 
to direct Community  responsability to  some  cyclical indicator(s) 
of an average  Community  situation while disrPgarding the 
actions undertaken or planned by  national authorities.  A minimal 
requirement to avoid conflicting interventions is therefore  a 
consensus  on  a  common  framework  for evaluation of  Co~~unity wide 
business cycle conditions in which  the  nationally differentiated 
outlook is duly integrated. 
Given  a  sufficiently integrated framework  for policy analysis and 
policy formulation,  it has  been  arg~ed that there is no  further 
need  for coordination of stabilization policies among  countries 
if each  country makes  adequate  use  of the available policy 
instruments  (2).  However,  it is unlikely that national fiscal 
authorities would  succeed better than a  centralized fiscal authority 
in achieving some  "optimal" degree  of fiscal stabilization that 
will maximize  the  Community  welfare function,  whether that is 
determined  by  some  combination of  separate national objectives 
or is based  on  some  aggregate measure  of Community  welfare 
(assuming  competence  and  adequate  authority at either level of 
government) • 
Even  with full information concerning the actions of other member 
countries the  sum  of independent national fiscal policies may  be 
non-optimal,  possibly because of each government's failure  to  take 
full account of the externalities of its own  actions or, alternatively, 
because  of the  "free riders" that rely on  the  convenient spillovers 
from  other countries policies.  The  failure of a  government  to  take 
(1)  For an extensive discussion see D.  BIEHL  e.a.  Heasuring  the  Demand 
i:ffects of Fiscal Policy, in Fiscal Policy and  Demand  Nanagement,  J.C.B 
Mohr,  TUbingen,  1973 
(2)  W  .M_.  GORDEN,  'Ihe  Coordination of Stabilization Policies Among  Countries 
in ANDO-HERRING-MARSTON.(eds.),  International Aspects of Stabilization 
Policies,  Federal Reserve  Bank  of Boston,  1974,  PP•  139-145. - 478-
account of the externalities of its own  policies on  other member 
countries is particularly likely in the case of conflicting 
objectives for stabilisation policy between  the  member  countries. 
The  "free rider" problem is most likely to arise when  the national 
objectives are 'the  same  but the  needed fiscal measures are 
unpleasant or  politicall~ costly (1).  But the extent to which 
coordination or (partial) centralization of fiscal stabilization 
action is required,  because of externalities,  spillovers and free 
rider problems,  will critically depend  on  the existing exchange 
rate arrangements.  At  the  same  time it should  be  realized that the 
growing interdependence among  the  member  countries through· 
integrating goods  and  services markets will weaken  the efficiency 
of fiscal measures  to  change  relative prices between countries because 
of import  leakages.  High  marginal income  propensities to import 
also reduce  the  government's expenditure multiplier. 
8.  A final reflection 
The  preceeding pages  leave no  great scope for major initiatives in the 
field of Community  fiscal stabilization policy in the absence of 
parallel progress in the monetary field.  The  best one  can hope  for 
in the  near future  are increased efforts in the  coordination of 
national stabilization policies.  In the  context of the work  of a 
group on  the Role  of Public  Finance in European Integration an 
intriguing question remains, at least in the  mind  of the author of 
this paper.  To  what extent is it possible to dissociate  the 
allocative and distributive functions of the  Community  budget from 
the  stabilization function  ?  Or  to put it differently,  to what 
extent is it possible  to  suggest a  strengthening  of the allocative 
and distributive role of the  Community  budget, if there are  no 
prospects for a  (increased)  Community  role in stabilization ? 
Consider for example  the  creation of a  Community  unemployment 
compensation  scheme,  the  purpose  of which  would  be  essentially 
redistributive.  The  extent to which different countries,  however, 
would  benefit from  this scheme,  together with  the  total amount  of 
expenditure  involved,  would  depend,  among  other things,  on  the 
efficiency of (national)  stabilization policies. Is it realistic -
does it fit the facts of life - to transfer "  expenditure" 
responsibility to  the Community  level whereas national stabilizatio.n 
policies could  "decide"  the amounts  of money  to  be  paid out ? 
The  problem:  raised is primarily political of course. It does  suggest, 
nevertheless,  the  need  for some  overall balance in the  proposals for 
further progress  towards  economic  integration,  including· an 
increased role for the  Community  in fiscal and  monetary stabilization. 
(1)  P.  REYNOI,DS  ALLEN,  Organization and  Administration of a  Monetary  union. 
Princeton Studies in International Fjnance,  No  JB,  June  1976,  pp.  58-61. Chapter  16 
THE  ASSIGNMENT  OF  TAX  RESOURCES  BETWEEN  lEVELS  OF  GOVERNMENT  t  THE 
EXPERIENCE  OF  FIVE  FEDERATIONS,  AND  PERSPECTIVES  FOR  'DiE 
COMMUNITY'S  RESOURCES 
(working paper) - 481-
1.  Broad  principles and  techniques 
The  assignment of tax revenues by  level of government has a  theory and 
practice roughly analogous,  although perhaps less clearly developed,  to 
that for the assignment of public expenditure functions.  On  the  tax 
side, there are  two  main  simple tenets.  The  first is that taxes should 
be  assigned to jurisdictions whose  geographic extent corresponds to 
where  the  burden of the  taxes is located.  This is well illustrated 
by  the cases of customs duties,  which  are invariably federal taxes, 
as against property taxes,  which  are usually local.  The  second  tenet is 
that as far as possible each level of government  should  be in fiscal 
balance ,  in the  sense that its own  revenue  sources (sepa.ra te  taxes and 
parts of shared taxes)  should  rna tch the magnitude  of its expenditure 
responsibilities and  that as a  result the decision making  processes 
for public expenditure and  revenue-raising should be  kept as close 
together as possible at the political level. 
The  analysis of these  broad principles in practise becomes  extremely 
complicated - the geographic incidence of tax burdens is difficult 
to trace at all precisely, and  the nature of fiscal responsibility 
breaks down  into multiple concepts of legislative authority,  powers 
of collection and rights to  the revenue  proceeds.  In addition,all 
countries'  systems  bear the  stamp of historical events (specially wars) 
and  constitutional traditions. Within  these  limits, however,  the 
following brief review of the  systems of five federations shows  the 
range  of possibilities in the fiscal field developed by  a  group of 
industrialised economies  having in common relatively  decentralised 
political structures. 
The  main  techniques of interest are those of tax-sharing and  tax-
overlapping.  Both  relate to cases  where  more  than one  level of govern-
ment  exploits the same,  or a  similar,  ta:x:  base.  The  term tax-sharing 
is used where  the revenues  of a  single tax are divided between levels 
of government  (here Germany  supplies the main  examples).  The  term 
tax-overlapping is used when  different levels of government  compete 
in the  same  tax field,  but with different rates a.nd  often differences 
in the  tax l:ase  and  allowances  (as notably in the  United States and 
Canada).  Tax-overlapping allows greater state autonomy,  but usually 
requires complex  vertical and horizontal coordination arrangements 
to avoid  the ill-effects of excessive  tax competition. 
~uestions of tax-sharing and  tax-overlapping would  seem  to be 
particularly relevant in the Community  context,  since there are no 
major broadly-based tax sources beyond  customs duties which,  in the 
experience of modern  federations,  have  consistently become  the 
exclusive  prerogative of the  'top'  level of government.  Personal 
and  corporate  i~come taxes are usually the  subject of tax-sharing 
or overlapping arrangements.  There  is no  common  pattern for general 
sales taxes and excise duties. - 482-
2.  The  systems evolved in five federations 
The  federal tax structures (1)  evolved  in the five countries studied 
may  be  very roughly classified as follows 
2.1.  federal predominance  (Australia) 
2.2.  high degree of tax-Sharing with little decentralised autonomy 
(Germany) 
2.).  high degree of tax-overlapping and of decentralised autonomy  (Canada 
and  the United States) 
2.4.  state predominance  (switzerland) 
2 .1.  Fede :ral predominance  - Australia 
Since  the  second world war,  when  the states lost all powers  to 
raise income  taxes, Australia's tax system has been bu'ely 
distinguishable from that of a  unitary sta.te  (2).  The  federal 
government has exclusive control over personal and corporate income 
tax, the general sales tax, excises, and  customs duties.  The  states 
and  local government have  between  them  taxes on  land, motor vehicles, 
liquor, and  miscellaneous entertainments,  stamp duties, and,  since 
1971,  the payroll tax. 
This exceptional fiscal imbalance in favour of the federal government 
has been offset by the very important general purpose grants to 
states (see chapters  6  and  13), which were  origninally seen as 
repayments of the states' foregone  income  taxes  ;  indeed the grants 
have  been conditional on the states keeping out of the income  tax 
field. 
(1)  Presented in a  standardised statistical form in T.ables  1  to 5 
(2)  See  Annex  1 for the unitary countries of the  Community - 483...,. 
Table  1 
Australia  :  Distribution of Tax  Revenues  by level of Government,  1973-74 
I. 
II. 
III. 
Amounts  in Mio  ¢ Austr.  %  distribution 
Common- states  Local  Total  Co  DUD on- State; 
wealth  wealth  lqcal 
TAX  SHARING  (l)  - - - - - -
TAX  OVERLAPPING 
Estate, sift and  8).1  18.5.6  - 268.7  31  69 
succession duties 
TAX  SEPARATION 
Commonwealth  : 
Personal income  tax  .548.5.1  - - .548.5.1  100  -
Corporation income  taJ  2013.1  - - 2013.1  100  -
Custoa duties  604.4  - - 604.4  100  -
Excise duties  1.5.54.6  - - 1.5_54.6  100  -
Sales tax  968.7  - - 968.7  100  -
Other  208.2  - - 208.2  100  -
StateLlocal  2  (2) 
Property taxes  - 688.0  688.0  - 100 
Liquor taxes  - 57·3  .57·3  - 100 
Taxes on  ~mbling  - 200.7  208.7  - 100 
Motor  taxes  - 376.9  376.9  - 100 
Stamp duties  - 430.9  430.9  - 100 
Payroll tax  - 667.0  667.0  - 100 
Other  - 1.57.0  1.57.0  - 100 
Total  ~0917.2  2771.4  ~)688.6  80  20 
(1)  See  text for new  proposals 
(2)  Of  which  80 %  for local  governments 
Source  :  Public Authority Finance,  Taxation,  1974-75,  Australian Bureau 
of Statistics Canberra 1976,  Tables .5  and 7. - 484-
This fiscal structure has given the  federal authorities virtually 
complete  control over fiscal stabilisation policy. 
There are recent developments in the direction of a  return towards  more 
usual federal  arrangements,  with the new  government  in the spring of 
1976  proposing to introduce tax-sharing and  tax-overlapping provisions 
for the  personal income  tax.  In the first instance  (in 1976-77)  certain 
genera purpose  grants from  the federation to the  states would  be 
converted into a  tax-sharing formula,  and in the following year states 
would  be  empowered  to apply surcharges or rebates on  federal income 
tax. 
2.2.  High  degree  of tax-sharing with little decentra.lised autonomy  -
Germany 
Most  of the major taxes,  notably the  personal and  corporate income 
taxes,  the  VAT  and  the larger part of the local business tax, are 
shared between  two  or three levels of government.  The  rates and 
bases of the  shared taxes are uniform,  (except, within limits, for 
the rates of the local business tax).  The  shares of the income  taxes 
are fixed in the constitution as follows. 
Personal income  tax 
Corporation tax 
Federal 
4J% 
~% 
I.inder 
4J% 
.50% 
14% 
The  bases to which  these percentages are applied are the amounts  of the 
income  taxes collected at the  LKnder  level, after certain corrections 
(Zerlegung)  ~  These  corrections are needed  to arrive at a  true 
measurement  of the effective tax capa.ci ty of a  Land  before sharing 
with the Bund  and finally equalizing tax capacity between  the Linder 
(see Chapter  6  ). 
Distortions in the field of corporation taxe.s arise because  corporate 
income  is taxed exclusively at the  location of the head  office and not 
the  location of branches  ("Betriebsstitten"), which  often are located 
in various other Linder.  These  results of corporation tax collections 
are  therefore corrected by  a  pro-rata distribution of tax revenue 
between  the  Land  of the head office and the Land  or Linder with 
branches  on  the basis of wages  paid in the various places.  As  a 
further administrative  simplification only corporations with taxable 
profits of more  than J million DM  are considered in the  process of 
zerlegung. - 485-
Distortions in the field of wage  taxes  (the largest part of personal 
income  taxes) arise because wage  earners living in a  certain Land  are 
often employed  in another  (neighbouring)  Land.  The  wage  taxes, 
however,  are withheld at the  place of  employment.  '!he  resulting 
wage  tax collections are corrected by returning the wage  tax revenue 
to the  Land of domicile of the employee.  Statistics for this  o~eration 
are  provided by  the  system of wage  tax cards (Lohnsteuerkarten). 
For reasons of administrative simplicity the correction is made  every 
three years only.  The  wage  tax revenues that have  to be  transferred 
are expressed as a  percentage of the total wage  tax revenue of the 
collecting L!nder.  These  percentages are then applied for the 
subsequent three years. 
It is interesting to note that the receiving Linder in the  Z,erlegung 
mechanism are the same  as the receiving Linder in the horizontal 
Finanzausgleich. 
The  total volume  of inter-tinder corrections for the  wage  tax and 
corporation tax corresponded to 2 %  in 1970  and nearly 4 %  in 
1975 of the total of the  Lander  (and communes) share of wage  tax 
and of the Lander share of corporation tax. 
The  VAT  shares can be, and have often been,  changed by Federal law. 
Thus,  in 197J the shares were 6  5 % for the BWld  and J5  % for the 
Linder  ;  6J  :  J7 in 1974  ;  68.25  :  )1.75 in 1975  ;  and 69  :  Jl in 
1976.  'lhe  Linder share is distributed between the  l&nder according 
to population and fiscal capacity (see Chapter  6). 
The  local business tax  (Gewerbesteuer),  except for the payroll tax 
part of it, is distributed between Bund,  Uinder and  municipalities 
according to a  formula,  which first fixes the part of the municipalities 
and then splits the remaining amount  :1J  % to the Bund  and  50  % to 
the lander. 
The  main  exclusively federal taxes are in the field of excises. -.486-
Table  2 
Germany  Distribution of Tax Revenues  by  Level of Government,  197'3 
I. 
II. 
III. 
~.n M.  11'1  % distr:Lbutior: 
Federal  Linder  LOcal  Total  Federal  Land; 
LOcal 
TAX  SHARING 
Personal income  tax  37714  37714  12278  87706  43  57 
Corporation tax  64!P  64~  - 12911  5J  5J 
Value  added  tax  32166  1732  - 49485  65  35 
Local  business tax  J5ll  J5ll  10755  17777  20  80 
( Gewerbesteuer, 
excl.  payroll tax) 
TAX  OVERLAPPING  - - - - - -
TAX  SEPARATION 
Federal  :  (l) 
Custom  duties  Jl72  - - 3172  100  -
Excises  (excl.  30570  - 30570  100  -
excise on  beer)  -
Other federal  6704  - - 6704  100  -
taxes 
Lind.erllocal  : 
Net worth  tax  - 3234  - 3234  - 100 
Tax  on  motor  - 4989  - 4989  - 100 
vehicles 
Excise on  beer  - 1269  - 1269  - 100 
Other Land  taxes  - 1993  - 199J  - 100 
Property tax  - - 3208  )208  -- 100 
Payroll tax  - - 2535  2535  - 100 
Other local taxes  - - 112)  112)  - 100 
Total  120293  76486  29899  22£676  5J.l  46.9 
(1)  Custom  duties are own  revenue  of EC  (100%  since 1.1.1975), but are, 
however,  counted as  Federal  revenue  in this table. 
~  Finanzen und Steuem, Fachserle  L,  Reihe  2, Sta.tistisches 
Bundesamt,  1973,  p.  15 - 16 - 487-
The  tax autonomy  of a  single Land  is non-existant,  since the  legislative 
powers  are concentrated at the federal level. However,  the  Linder 
majority is able to control tax policy decisions through their 
representation in the Bundesrat,  whose  agreement is required for 
practically all changes in tax law  and  on  questions affecting fiscal 
equalisation and  tax sharing. 
While  the  charges in the normal rates for the income  taxes are 
subject to constitutional rigidities,  the  1967  law  on  economic  growth 
and  stabilisation (Stabili  tats-und Wachstumsgesetz)  allows greater 
flexibility in the adjustment of fiscal arrangements for the  purposes 
of contra-cyclical policy. 
2.).  High  degree  of tax-overlapping and decentralised  autono~y - Canada 
and  the United States 
In ~  the main  broadly lased taxes are used  by  both federal and 
provincial/local levels of government,  notably the  personal and 
corporate income  taxes and  general and  other sales taxes.  'I'he  Canadian 
case is most  striking for the  number  of major changes in the 
constitutional arrangements for these  taxes experienced since  the first 
world  war.  Canada  has tried all the main  foms of tax-sharing and  tax-
overlapping arrangements.  The  inter-war period  • known  as the  "tax jungle", 
was  characterised by  wide-spread competition between  provinces and 
with the federal government in the  income  tax field.  During  the  second 
world  war  (as in Australia)  the  provinces  temporarily ceded their 
income  tax powers  to  the federal govemment,  but in exchange  received 
'rental }::ayments'  which were a  form  of general purpose  grants to 
the  provinces  (again as in Australia). After the  war  these  'rental' 
agreements lasted until 1962.  The  last five years of this period saw 
a  regime  of shared taxes comparable  to the present German  system; 
the  provinces received a  fixed share of the uniform national taxes 
collected in their area (10 %  of the  personal income  tax, 9 %  of 
the  corporate income  tax,  and :JJ  % of estate duty). 
In the decade  1962-1972  the  provinces regained more  legislative 
autonomy  in the  income  tax fields.  The  federal government  offered to 
collect provincial taxes as long as they conformed  to  the  federal 
base, while  provinces remainsifree to set their rates. ·vertical 
co-ordination in the income  tax field was  provided by  a  system of 
limited tax credits allowed against the federal tax in favour of the 
provincial tax. I. 
II. 
III. 
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Table  3 
Canada  Distribution of Tax  Revenues  by  Level of Government,  1971-72 
amounts  in l.fio  ¢ Can.  %  distribution 
Federal  Prov/  total  Federal  Prov/ 
Local  Local 
TAX  SHARING  - - - - -
TAX  OVERLAPPING 
Personal income  tax  7227  2967  10194  71  29 
Corporation income  tax  2683  786  )469  77  23 
General and other 
sales taxes  J645  2.)62  6007  60  40 
Succession duties  132  1)8  270  49  51 
Social insurance 
levies  571  )40  911  63  37 
Pension plan levies  826  )00  1126  73  27 
Other  4  67  71  6  94 
TAX  SEPARATION 
Federal  : 
Custom  duties  989  - 989  100  -
Prov./Local  : 
Property taxes  - )424  )424  - 100 
Motive  fuel taxes  - 1168  1168  - 100 
Health insurance  - 865  865  - 100 
premiums 
Business taxes  - 470  470  - 100 
Total  16077  12887  28964  55·5  44.5 
~  :  The  National Finances,  Canadian  Tax  Foundation,  Toronto,  1975 
table 2  - 13 - 489-
For the period 1972-1977  the tax supplement method was  adopted 
whereby provincial taxes are calculated as an additional percentage to 
the federal rates.  Collection agreements between  the federal and 
provincial authorities are extensive, but Quebec  still collects its 
own  income  taxes and Ontario its own  corporation tax. 
The  exercise of decentralised fiscal macroeconomic  policy by  provinces 
is a  more  open issue than in Australia or ~ermany. For example,  in 
the general sales tax field, in 1975,  Ontario reduced its rate from 
7 % to 5%  in order to  stimulate consumer spending. 
The  United States system is characterised by tax-overlapping of 
federal and  state/local govemments in the fields of personal and 
corporate income  taxes, excises and death and gift duties. 
In the  personal income  tax field a  ma.jorl ty of eta  tes ( 40)  now 
impose  a  broadly-based personal income  tax, mostly with a  moderately 
progressive rate structure (in 1960 only .30  states used a  personal 
income  tax).  Many  states follow closely the federal income  tax 
blse, although differences still exist.  The  tendency towards 
uniformity in state personal income  tax bases could now  become 
stronger,  as  a  result of legislation enacted in 1972  and effective 
in 1974,  which  makes  possible a  system of federal collection of 
state personal income  taxes.  Federal collection is optional for 
the states.  The  latter would have  to introduce  tax bases identical 
to the federal  tax.  Advantages of economies of scale for the  tax 
administration and  tax-payers stand against the  limitation of 
fiscal flexibility in the field of state tax bases, e.g.  exemptions. 
Rates could still vary between federal and states levels and 
between the different states.  No  state has opted for federal collection 
so far. 
The  situation is similar for corporate income  tax.  Most states (45) 
impose  a  corporate income  tax, although with relatively low  rates. 
Corporate income  tax bases in the states are increasingly: 
approximating to the federal base.  Each  level of government collects 
its corporation tax separately. - 490-
Table  4 
United States  :  Distribution of Tax  Revenues  by  Level of Government  1971-72 
Amounts  in Mio  US  ¢  %  distribution 
Federal  State  local  total  Federal.  State/ 
I.  TAX  SHARING 
II.  TAX  OVERLAPPING 
Personal income  tax  94737  12996  2230  109963  86.2 
Corporation income  tax  32166  4416  - .36.592  87.9 
Excise  on  motor fuel  4167  7216  59  11442  )6.4 
Excise  on  alcoh. 
beverages  .5089  1684  '70  6843  74.4 
Excise  on  tobacco  2207  2831  166  .5204  42.4 
Public utilities  2237  1215  890  4)41  51.5 
Death and  gift duties  54.36  1294  - 67JO  80.8 
III.  TAX  SEPARATION 
Federal 
Custom  duties  3287  - - 3287  100 
State/local  : 
Property tax  ( 1)  - 1257  41620  42877  -
Sales tax (2)  - 17619  2727  20)46  -
Insurance  tax  - 1477  - 1477  -
Motor  vehicle ( 3)  - )108  225  3333  - licences 
Other and  unallocable  4407  47.59  17.52  '10917 
Total  15.37.33  59871  49739  263343  59.4 
(1),  (2),  (3)  Property tax,  sales tax and motor  vehicle licences are 
subject to tax overlapping between  state and  local level 
~  Govemment  Finances,  Vol.  4,  Number  5,  Bureau of the  Census, 
Washington  D.C.,  October 1974,  from  tables 3 and  5 
Loca 
13·8 
12.1 
63.6 
25.6 
57.6 
48.5 
19.2 
-
100 
100 
100 
100 
41.6 - 491-
For both income  taxes "tax co-ordination" takes place between 
federal,  state and  local income  tax systems.  The  two,  or sometimes 
th.cee,  tax amounts  for private persons or corporations are not 
simply added  up  to arrive at the total tax burden.  State  (and  local) 
income  taxes are deductible in computing  taxable income  under  the 
federal income  tax.  The  tax deduction technique  provides an incentive 
for the states to introduce  personal income  taxes or to use  them 
more  intensively,  since in ~ffect the Federal government is agreeing 
to repay a  large part of any state income  tax increases. 
Federal and  state  governments make  use  of a  wide  range  of excise 
duties.  The  bulk of the revenue  comes  from  overlapping excise duties 
levied by both  levels of government  ;  on  alcohol,  beverages, 
tobacco and  gasoline.  Rates  show  considerable differences as between 
states. 
The  u.s.  payroll tax for unemployment  programmes  has interesting 
features  (especially in view  of the suggested involvement of the 
Community  in this field).  The  federal tax rate of ).2% of wages, 
up  to a  fixed ceiling, is largely passed back to the eta  tes under 
tax-credit arrangements.  The  money  is paid into state unemployment 
trust funds  ;  the  states detemine the basic features of their 
unemployment  programmes,  such as coverage,  benefit levels,  the level 
of state tax,  and eligibility criteria. In total 90  % of unemployment 
benefits are state administered  ;  benefit levels vary  si~ificantly 
between  states. 
2.4.  State predominance  - Switzerland 
The  Swiss  experience is interesting to the community  since it is 
a  case in which  the state level of government  (cantons) have 
retained a  significantly stronger hold over the  tax system  than in 
any of the preceding examples. 
Federal tax revenues have  recently been  41 %  of the total for all 
governments,  as against 5J % in Germany,  55%  in Canada,  58  % in 
the  United States, and 80 % in Australia  (see Tables 1  to 5 for 
fi  seal years) • 
The  traditional principles of distribution of Swiss  taxes have  been 
'indirect taxes to the Confederation and direct taxes to the Cantons 
and  local level'.  The  federation has exclusive use  of customs duties, 
the  turnover tax and  excise duties.  Unlike in all other federations, 
it only has a  small minority share in the income  taxes.  The  federal 
government's autonomy  in the  turnover tax and income  taxes is only 
accepted for limited periods (e.g. at present from  1972  to 1982), 
at the end  of which  the arrangements have  to be  renegotiated 
with  the cantons and voted on  in referenda. 
The  'federal direct tax'  (former  'Wehrsteuer'  or defence  tax) 
taxes individual and corporate incomes  and corporate net worth. 
Part of its proceeds are  transferred to the cantons according to 
a  fiscal capacity key.  The  federal government does  not have  autonomy 
in adjusting the rates -this requires  amendment  to the constitution. T
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'Ihe  cantons tax the income  and the net worth of individuals and 
corporations.  The  tax bases vary between  the cantons, and as between 
the federal direct tax and  the cantonal  taxes.  There is, however, 
a  trend towards a  harmonization of tax bases.  Tax  ra  tea, however, 
differ considerably between  the cantons which have  complete fiscal 
autonomy in this respect. 
In addition,  municipalities participate in these  taxes using the 
tax supplement approach.  The  municipalities in most cantons have  the 
right to determine a  coefficient which  - multiplied by  the cantonal 
tax rate - gives the amount  of municipal tax. 
Vertical tax co-ordination does not take place  between the federal, 
cantonal and  municipal levels in the case of taxation of individual 
persons  (except for the political controls over the federal government 
already noted).  The  three  tax amounts are added and  constitute the 
total tax burden of the taxable private persons.  In the case of 
corporate income  and corporate net wor~th taxation, vertical tax 
co-ordination does  take  place by  the deductions approach.  Horizontal 
tax coo:rdina  tion between cantons, however, is assured by double-
taxation agreements. 
The  federal and municipal taxes on income  and net worth are collected, 
together with the cantonal taxes, at the cantonal level. 
A long-standing feature of Swiss fiscal arrangements has been the use 
of fiscal capacity keys, as opposed to  'real' taxes.  In the  period of 
confederation 18  JO  - 1848,  confederal expenditure was  financed by 
contributions from  cantons on  the basis of fiscal capacity keys  (1). 
Since federation,  from  1848  to  19~, there remained  the  (rarely used) 
principle of using fiscal capacity contributions as a  supplementary 
source of revenue  to cover needs at the federal level. Fiscal capacity 
keys  (much  revised in techni<lue)  continue to be  used for redistributing 
certain federal tax revenue  {see above  on federal direct tax)  and in 
the formula for specific purpose grants. 
One  result of the foregoing arrangements is that the Swiss federal 
government is unable  to conduct a  positive macroeconomic  fiscal policy. 
(1)  'nle  development of federal revenues in Germany  from  1871  to 
World  War  I  was  characterized also by a  system of (population-
based)  contributions from  the states to  the federal level. It 
was  stated explicitely in the Constitution that these contributions 
(the so-called Matrikularbeitrige)  should be  paid as a  supplement 
to the federal customs and  excise revenues until the  Reich  was 
given direct taxes.  --- 494-
J.  Perspectives for the  Community  resources 
).1.  Present own  resources and related powers 
The  Own  Resources decision of 1970 aimed at giving financial autonomy, 
of a  very limited kind,  to the Community  budget. 
Following federal examples, it gave  100 % of customs duties and 
protective levies (for produce  governed by the Common  Agricultural 
Policy)  to the community.  Further financial requirements are  to be  met 
from  the  VAT  once  a  common  base is negotiated,  and in the meantime  an 
equivalent sum  is raised on the basis of a  GNP  key.  The  use of VAT  is 
to be  limited to 1 % of the  base  (about 10 % of all Vat receipts). 
While  the customs duties and agricultural levies have  become 
entirely Community  resources,  this of  itself confers no  significant 
powers of fiscal action on the Community  institutions.  Customs duties 
can only be  changed in the context of multilateral trade agreements 
in GATT,  or through once-and-for-all new  preferential arrangements 
such as with EFTA  countries and  groups of developing countries. 
The  value of agricultural levies is determined exogenously by  the 
course of world farm prices in relation to the fixed Community  prices. 
As  regards the  VAT,  negotiation of the  common  tax base on the basis of 
the so-called draft 6th directive  wa~  largely concluded in 
December  1976.  When  the  system  is in operation,  the  Community 
VAT  rate will be  decided each year as part of the  budgetary 
procedure.  Under  the  present system decisions are  taken on the 
expenditure side of the budget,  and  the  VAT  rate  (or at present its 
GNP  key substitute) is calculated as the residual item  r  the 
Community's  budget has to be  in current equilibrium. 
Since all fiscal powers in effect lie on the expenditure side of the 
budget, questions of 'fiscal autonomy'  of the Community  have  also to 
be assessed in these  terms. 
The  expenditure decisions are  taken jointly by  the  Council and 
Parliament after the Commission has submitted a  draft budget. 
Expenditure items can be,  and are amended,  as the bu::lget  goes 
through successive readings in the council and  Parliament.  The  powers 
of 'last word'  in this i tera  ti  ve  amendement  process lie with the 
Council as regards so-called  'obligatory'  expenditures,  which 
includes the agricultural fund.  The  Parliament has the  'last word', 
within a  limit, defined in a  formula,  over  'non-obligatory' 
expenditures,  which include  the Social and Regional Funds  and 
budgetised development aid expenditure.  The  formula limits the 
'maximum  rate  •  of increase of no n-o  bliga  tory expenditure to a 
percentage which is related to macroeconomic  indica  tors  .. - 495-
Thus  powers  over the Community's fiscal decisions are vested 
through the expenditure decision-making system very largely in member 
states through the  Council  (voting normally under the qualified 
majority formula  (1)  ) ,  and  only in a  small- although actively 
exploited - degree in the Parliament. 
'llle  Community's  VAT  revenues,  when  operational,  will  constitute 
part of a  tax-sharing arrangement.  However,  member  states will remain 
uniquely responsible for the rates of VAT  charged to  the  tax-payer. 
The  system  thus differs from  Germany's internal system for sharing 
the  VAT  between  Bund  and  .I..Einder,  where  the  decisions on  the  tax 
rates charged to consumers are  taken jointly at the federal level 
by  the bundestag and  Bundesrat, with the Lander having their say 
through the latter.  (Germany's contribution of VAT  to the Community 
wi 11  come  from  the Bund • s  share) • 
Outside  the Community  budget as such,  the  Coal and steel Community 
has the  power  to raise own  resources througp imposing a  production levy. 
This at present stands at 0.29 %,  which  yielded 70  M.U.A.  in 1975· 
J.2.  Future Resources 
In the future  there are a  number  of issues governing when  further own 
resources would  be  required,  and  what  they might consist of.  These 
issues will be discussed with reference to the following list of 
conceivable further financing sources 
- more  VAT,  beyond  the 1 % limit  ~ 
- contribution keys,  based  on  fiscal capacity or national accounts 
concepts; 
- corporation tax  ; 
- levies for a  Community  unemployment  fund,  or from  a  minimum  oil 
price mechanism, 
-other tax-expenditure_ programmes 
- borrowing  (or saving) 
Exhaustion of present own  resources.  Table 6 sets out forecasts of 
available resources and  needs on  the basis of expenditures for the 
years 1976  to 1979.  By  1979 it is forecast that budget expenditures 
will reach 9,750  M.U.A.  (at 1976  prices). Its financing would  take 
all customs duties and agricultural levies and 0.71 of 1% of the  VAT 
(1)  A qualified majority requires 41  out of :13  votes,  where  members 
states weights are D 10,  F 10, I  10,  UK  10, B 5,  NL  5,  DK  J, IRL  J, 
L 2. - 496-
leaving 2,009 M.U.A.  or 0.29 of 1% of the  VAT  unused. 
These  forecasts omit,  however,  a  number  of factors which will in 
all proba.bili  ty reduce  this margin by  the end  of the decade,  notably 
budgetisation of certain development aid activities of perhaps 
..500  M. U.A.,  expenditure under the Financial Mechanism  of perhaps 
200  M.U.A.  ,  the budgetary effects of the adhesion of Greece, 
expenditure in sectors where  policies have  been proposed but are not 
yet decided  (e.g.  energy and  transport infrastructure). In addition 
there is the possibility of development of certain funds  (e.g. 
Regional Fund)  which are at present new  and  small in relation to 
the function in question. 
While  more  precise forecasts cannot be  made  in cnticipation of 
political decisions,  there would  seem  to be  a  strong probability that 
the Community  will exhaust its present own  resources by  the end of 
the decade.  When  taking also into  account  the time-lags inherent  in 
the  processes of negotiation and  legislation, it would  also seem  that 
the issue of 'next own  resources' is already ready for debite. 
More  VAT  beyond  the present 1% limit.  Assuming  the  common  VAT  goes 
into  o~ration as at present nlanned  on  1.1.1978,  the institutionally 
easiest way  of making available further own  resources would  be  to 
raise the 1%  limit• A further 1%  tranche would  raise about 
7 billion U.A.  (at 1976  prices). 
The  main  problem would  be  the distributive budget-burden sharing 
implications.  All the Community's  present  own~sources are indirect 
taxes, which tend to be  regressive in their incidence as between 
member  states with respect to GNP.  This was  a  major factor leading 
to the creation of the Financial Mechanism  as a  result of the Eri  tish 
budgetary  'renegotiations' of 1974-75  ;  the Financial Mechanism  makes 
general po.rpose  grants to member  states in weak  economic  situations, 
reimbursing them  in part for the excess of  their Own  Resources 
payments  over their GNP  share. 
An  extension of the  VAT  own~source system could be accompanied  by a 
further redistributive mechanism.  Apart from  the Financial Mechanism 
precedent, another example  of technique in this area is seen in some 
aspects of the equalisation formula  used in Germany  for distributing 
between  the  Lander the  proceeds of the aggregate  ~ders' share of 
the  VAT  (see Chapter  6  for further detail). 
As  remarked,  the effective fiscal autonomy  represented by  the 
present VAT  plan is very limited.  An  extension ·of  the  VAT  ceiling might 
also increase the viability of making  the  Community  VAT  rate an 
independent fiscal reality,  perceived by  the  tax-payer.  The  national 
and  Community  elements could  be  made  more  independent.  In Chapter  10 
it is suggested,  that for the  purposes of stabilisation policy, changes 
in the Community  VAT  rate might be directly implemented at the level I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
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Table  6 
Forecasts of expenditure under the Community  Budget,  and  of maximum 
available resources,  1976  - 1979 
in million·u.a. 
1977  1978  1979 
1976 
at  1976  prices 
Total  expenditure  7577  8979  9680  9750 
Total  revenue  7577  8979  9680  9750 
1.  misc.  revenue  71  72  72  72 
2.  custom duties  3555  3979  3411  3506 
3.  agric.  levies  737  1149  1180  1184 
4·  VAT/GNP  contribution  3214  3779  5017  4988 
(%  of total  VAT  base)  (0.5 %)  (0.57  %)  (0.74 %)  (0.71  %) 
Maximum  available  VAT  6445  6595  6814  6997 
(%  of total  VAT  base)  (1  %)  (1  %)  (1  %)  ( 1  %) 
Remaining  VAT  3231  2816  1797  2009 
(%  of total  VAT  base)  (0.5 %)  (0.43  %)  (0.26  %)  (0.29  %) 
Source:  Triennial  financial  forecasts,  1977-1978-1979,  Preliminary Draft, 
General  budget  of the European Communities  for the financial 
year 1977,  Vol.  7,  Table  3. - 498-
of the  tax-payer ;  instead of being absorbed by  member  states as 
now  envisaged, it would  be  for member  states to take an initiative 
to change  their own  national  VAT  rate if they wished  to offset the 
effect of a  Community  VAT  rate change.  The  political case for a 
stronger distinction between  Community  and national VAT  rates would 
be  to make  the Community  institutions more  transparently responsible 
on  the fiscal side for their expenditure policies.  This would  be 
notably relevant in the context of the role of the directly elected 
European  Parliament. 
Contribution keys,  based on  fiscal capacity or national accounts 
concepts. 
The  use  of contribution keys  for directly financing the budget is 
administrately convenient and can be  given any desired budget-burden 
sharing characteristics  ;  however, it is devoid of positive integration 
characteristics, from  the fiscal, institutional, or stabilisation 
policy points of view. 
Technically it is possible to envisage keys,  useable for Community 
financing,  based either on  national accounts aggregates or on  fiscal 
capacity concepts.  The  United Naions has for a  long-time  used 
progressivity functions in combination with  GNP  keys.  If, for example, 
the  Conununi ty wished  to complement its present indirect taxes with 
further resources having the distributive characteristics of direct 
taxes this could be done.  A range  of hypothetical keys are set out 
in Table?,  showing  'total fiscal capacity', and  'personal income 
tax capa.ci ty' and  GNP  keys,  in addition to data relating to the  present 
budgetary system  (see footnotes to the  Table  for short definitions). 
An  explanation of fiscal capacity concepts and methods is set out 
in Chapter 14 in the context of budget equalisation mechanisms  ;  the 
same  methods  can be envisaged also in the present context of direct 
budget financing. 
Corporation tax. If the Community  institutions wished  to envisage 
extending the  own  resource  system together with a  major new  fiscal 
initiative, a  number  of arguments would  point to the corporation tax. 
These  would  be  favourable  implications for the commercial integration 
of the community  ;  from  a  distributive point of view it would  have 
the qua.li ty of taxing automatically the enterprises that were  able to 
profit most  from  the integration of the  common  market and  from 
economic  conditions in general  ;  and there could be  positive 
implications for the Community's  capacity to conduct a  stabilisation 
policy. 
Experience  with the  VAT  shows,  however,  that major fiscal reforms 
in the Community  take a  very long time  to achieve.  For the Community 
to enter into the corporation tax field could only be  considered as 
a  long term objective.  At  present the Community's  activity in this field - 499-
is limited to proposals for harlllonisation of the different systems 
of corporation tax and  withholding tax on dividends (1). 
In the corporation tax field the ColiD!luni ty would  not necessarily have 
to follow  the  VAT  model of aiming at a  complete harmonisation of the 
tax l::ase.  The  experience of Canada,  the United states and Switzerland 
suggests that differences in the bases,  as  well  as  the rates,  of state 
versus federal corporation taxes,  may  be workable.  However,  as 
between member  states in the  CoiDJiluni ty,  there would  be  major 
differences in the relationships between the corporate and personal 
income  taxes to reconcile, in addition to the questions of 
harmonising the basic form of corporation tax as between distributed 
and  undistributed profits. 
In 1974,  corporation tax yielded 18 ,8)5 M. U.A.  in the Community, 
which is one  third of that yielded by  the  VAT·  An  amount equivalent 
to 1  % of the  VAT  base would  imply a  corporation tax rate yielding 
about  one-third of present corporation taxes.  If the Community  were 
to consider a  tax-sharing arrangement for the corporation tax, it 
would  seem  implausible to envisage the reform for the  sake of less 
than,  say, a  third or half of total corporation tax revenues. 
Unemployment  and  energy levies.  These  items are to  be  noted as the 
two  conceivable  sources of significant revenues that might arise from 
the introduction of new  Community  policies.  The  idea of a  Community 
unemployment  fund is pureued in Chapter 12.  As  regards energy levies, 
proposals are being discussed for a  minimum  energy price, whose 
mechanisms  might entail an import levy.  However,  the minimum  prices 
envisaged are so much  lower than the price of present OPEC  oil 
supplies that questions of energy levy revenues would  not appear 
for the  time  being to be  of material interest in the  present context. 
Other tax-expenditure programmes.  In a  recent proposal of the  Commission 
for a  market organization of agricultural alcohol,  a  community 
alcohol tax was  favoured,  which would partly ~inance expenditures in 
this sector.  This would  be a  relatively low-rate consumption tax 
supplementary to the already high excises on alcohol in most member 
states.  This case  raises broader questions as to whether  the  Community 
should not be  involved in the excise taxation of agricultural products 
for which it has market intervention responsibilities.  The  wine  sector 
is a  clear economic  anomaly in this regard with the  Community  budget 
spending large sums  on the disposal of surplus production, while 
some  member  states restrain consumption with very  __ high excises. 
A  potentially important example  for combining tax and expenditure 
policies arises in the field of regional policy.  To  pursue  the 
regional policy objective of transferring resources from  congested 
(1)  Bulietifl ot 'the E'.C.,  Supplement 11/75·,  •'Harmonisation of systems of 
company  taxation and  of withholding taxes on 
dividends",  July 1975 - 500-
areas to less-developed regions it has sometimes been proposed  to 
work with a  double  system of disincentives and  incentives.  The  more 
disincentives - via taxation of economic activities in congested 
areas - are applied,  the less financial aid is needed to give 
incentives for moving capital and  labour to less developed regions. 
Such  "push and  pull" actions accordingly have  the attraction of limiting 
budgetary expenditures.  An  appropriate tax base could be  new  investment 
expenditure in congested areas (conceivable alternatives could be 
payroll,  capital or  the increase of land values  in specified 
areas and sectors). 
Borrowing powers.  'Ihe  Community  already has significant borrowing 
powers  through  the  Coal and Steel Community,  the European Investment 
Bank  and  the  Community  Loan,  and further powers are being sought 
for Euratom to aid in the financing of nuclear power sta  tiona, 
and for the proposed European Export Bank.  None  of the existing loan 
transactions are bud.getised,  although this issue has been under 
discussion,  notably in connection with the powers of the European 
Parliament. 
Table  7 
Breakdown of Budgetary Contributions,  Simulated Own  Resources,  GNP  Key 
and Indica  tors of Fiscal Capa.ci ty in 1974 
D 
F 
I 
NL 
B 
1 
UK 
IRL 
DK 
E.c. 
Real contri- Simulated Own  Resources  (2) 
butions to  Customs  VAT  Total  GNP  Personal 
1974  fiscal  (4)  income 
Budget  (1)  duties, 
ca)city  tax capa.ci  ty  agricultural  (J  (5)  levies 
JJ.4  29.7  )0.8  )2.1  JJ.l  )6.4 
2).5  15.9  21.1  2).1  2).2  25.0 
14.8  12.9  1).7  1).6  1).0  9.8 
10.0  9.4  5.8  6.0  6.1  6.4 
7.4  6.5  4.4  4.9  4.6  5-2  0.2  0.2 
9.0  2).2  20.5  16.6  16.7  1).7 
O.J  o.4  0,8  0.6  0.6  O.J 
1._4  2.0  2.9  2.8  2.6  '3.0 
100  100  100  100  100  100 
General note  :  all figures are calculated at current market exchange 
rates, budgetary data having been converted from  budgetary units of 
account. - 501-
(1)  Source  :  Bu1letin of the E.c., Supplement 7/74•  "Couwli.ty's 
Economic  and  Financial Situation Since Enlargment",  Table VIII, 
These data are strongly influenced by the transitional measures for 
the new  three member  states, hence their much  lower contributions 
than under the simulated Own  Resource  system, 
(2)  Source  :  Bulletin of the E.C.,  op,  cit., Table  XV,  These data 
are  'simulated' in the  sense that they estimate what the definitive 
Own  Resources system would have  given in 1974  had the transitional 
arrangements for the introduction of this system and for new  member 
states not applied, 
(J)  'Total fiscal capa.citv'assumes applying to each member  state a 
standard structure of tax types,  bases and rates corresponding the 
'average Community  tax system'.  See  Chapter 14  for details of 
methodology. 
(4)  Source  :  National Accounts Aggregates,  19§0-74,  S,O,E.C.,  1975, 
1974  GNP  data are here used, rather than the  time-lagged formula 
applied under the  Community's budgetary legislation for some 
purposes, 
(5)  'personal income  tax camci  ty' assumes a  progressivi  ty function 
(elasticity of tax  c~pacity) of 1.5 with respect to differentials 
in average  per capita personal incomes of member  states,  This figure 
compares with the range of 1.55 to 2,75 observed for the inter-
re~onal distribution of personal  income  tax burdens  in the  countries 
studied in Chapter  9  (see Table 2  of Chapter  9  ). 
Two  ideas for a  further evolution of these  borrowing powers have  been 
discussed in Chapter  · 0  ,  firstly to concentrate all the Community's 
capital market transactions through a  single agency,  and  secondly 
to add to the Community  budget powers  to finance  conjunctural surpluses 
or deficits with borrowing or saving operations.  The  objectives would 
be  to favour capital market integration,  to economise in loan raising 
opera  tiona, and to provide an instrument of· Community  contracyclical 
policy. 
Conclusion,  The  ideas on corporation tax and other functional taxes 
discussed above  cannot be  considered as adequate potential sources 
of general and regular revenue after exhaustion of the  1  ~-6  VAT  limit. 
As  a  general system for the  period ahead,  there would  be advantages 
in having open at the  same  time  two  marginal sources of finance  : 
first a  further tranche of VAT  resources,  and secondly a  progressive 
revenue  source.  The  policy intention would  be for the neutral VAT  source 
to be  used for purely sectoral ('or alternative') functions,  and for 
the progressive  source  to be  used for functions with a  strong 
redistributive purpose.  There would  not, however,  be  an ear-marking of 
funds,  and it would  be  open for the budgetary authorities (Council 
and Parliament)  to decide on their relative use as part of the  normal 
budgetary procedure,  In the  present situation there are no  effective 
revenue options open for the  budgetary authorities at all - 502-
(the customs duties a.m.  agricultural levies can hardly be  manipulated 
for revenue  purposes)  '  this is a  highly abnormal situation for a 
buiget required to fulfill multiple economic  functions. - 503-
Annex  1 
Assignment of tax resources between central and local levels of 
government in the E.C.  countries. 
For the eight unitary states of the CODlDluni ty the  breakdown  between 
central and local tax revenues in 1974  was  : 
Tax  revenue by  F  I  NL  B  L  UK  IRL 
level of 
government 
Central  in%  93·5  94.J  97.6  92.8  84.6  87.)  90.4 
Local  in%  6.5  5·7  2.4  7-2  15.4  12.7  9.6 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source  1  Eurostat,  Tax Statistics 1969  - 1974,  1975 
DK 
?O.LJ 
29.6 
100 
In the only federal state of the Community,  Germany,  the corresponding 
split was  53 %  federal,  J4 % Linder and lJ % local. 
In the unitary member  states non-central (local and regional)  taxes 
are typically of relatively minor importance with shares of between 
2 %  and 15 %  of total tax  revenue in 1974, 
The  major sources of local taxation in the Community  fall within  two 
groups  : 
- taxes on land and property 
- taxes on income  (personal and/or corporate income). 
All countries use a  tax on  land and property at the  local level,  In 
Denmark, however,  taxes on  personal income  are the principal source of 
local revenue.  Germany  and  Luxembourg  have  a  local tax on corporate 
income,  whereas Belgian local and regional authorities impose  a 
surcharge on the national tax on company  income. - 504-
In most  member  states local and regional governments  share in the 
proceeds of various central taxes.  Most  countries rely also on  a 
great variety of less significant indirect taxes of low  yield for 
local income. 
In recent years local and  regional government finance has become 
increasingly dominated  b,y  grants from  central governments.  Local 
tax revenues as a  share of total local revenue  vary from  80 % 
in Luxembourg  to only 4 %  in the  Netherlands {the range  for the other 
member  states js from  30  % to 60  %. ) Chapter 17 
BUDGETARY  POWERS  OF  THE  EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 
by 
Martin O'Donoghue - 507-
The  Budgetary Powers  of the European  Parliament  An  Economic  View 
Introduction 
The  overall project is concerne~ with  the future  role of the 
Cpmmuni ty Budget,  and  especially with  the  wa;ys  in which it might 
contribute to the  process of economic  integration within the  Community. 
Part of this examination should  concern itself with the actual 
procedures for the  operation of the Budgetary process,  since  the 
efficiency of a  fiscal system is not independent of the means 
chosen for its operation.  Apart from  this specific study group 
interest,  the issue of budgetary responsibility and  operation has 
also been discussed in the wider Community  context.  In particular the 
budgetary role of the European  Parliament has been  the  subject of 
both debate  and  legislative action.  For these reasons a  brief paper 
summarising an economist's perspective on  the budgetary role of 
a  parliament is of relevance. 
Decision-making in economic  theory 
In the usual market-based models  of the economic  system little 
attention is paid  to either the characteristics of decision-makers 
themselves or the procedures/institutions needed  for decision-making 
when  any form  of group or collective decisions are required  (as is 
the  case with a  government  budget).  Economic  actors such as households 
or firms are assumed  to  be  'rational', though  this concept is some-
what  ambiguous  and  capable of varying interpretations (1).  Where 
~rivate action is concerned  the  individual actor (consumer,  firm)  is 
assumed  to assemble  the  relevant information,  and decide  upon  the 
best use  of the  scarce  economic  resources available  to him  in terms 
of their ability to satisfy his preferences (or attain his objectives). 
This  mode  of analysis is also transferred to discussion of the 
fiscal system. It is assumed  that in framing budgetary policy the 
relevant decision-maker(s)  (politicians, bureaucrats) will seek to 
allocate resources in terms  of their ability to best satisfy or attain 
stated objectives. 'Full employment',  1p:rice  stability', 'maximum  growth 
in living standards' are examples  of such group objectives, and  policy 
is assumed  to aim  towards their attainment by  the most efficient route. 
While  some  difficulties in the formulation or specification of these 
objectives may  be  noted it is nonetheless assumed  that the efficient 
operation of the economy  requires  the identification and  articulation 
of objectives in an operationally meaningful way,  and  the deployment 
of resources to attain these coherent and  rational objectives in the 
least costly manner. 
(1)  C.  Tisdell  'Concepts of Rationality in Economics'  Philosophy of the 
~Qcial Sciences,  Vol.  5.  1975. 
see also  :  R.  Amacher,  R.  Tollison and  T.  willet 'The  Economic  Approach 
to Public· Policy'  Cornell University Press 1976 - 508  -
Decision-making in non-profit institutions 
This  picture of defined objectives pursued by agreed methods,  alters 
radically when  one  turns from  the  standard economic  models  to 
discussions of governments  and  other non-profit  mak~ng institutions 
such as voluntary bodies,  charities, hospitals,  schools etc. 
(while  some  of these institutions  can and do  function as profit-
maximisers,  the  typical observed pattern is that they pursue 
other goals).  For these bodies the  usual situation is one 
characterised by multiple possible goals or objectives, and with 
varying numbers  of interested parties who  may  participate to varying 
degrees in the decision-making process. 
Very different conclusions emerge  from  such models  to  those described 
in the  standard economic  case.  Decisions must  now  be  taken by  some 
dominant or governing group-usually a  majority,  and  the composition 
of this dominant  group displays varying degrees  of instability. 
Whereas  individuals have  sets of defined objectives, collections of 
people,  or groups,  do  not.  Therefore  much  of the decision-making 
activity in organisations is taken up  with  the  search for goals or 
objectives which will gain the  support of the  necessary majority. 
In other words  the  emphasis shifts from discussions of the best 
means  to attain stated objectives towards a  search for acceptable 
objectives.  In this process  the distinction between ends and  means 
becomes  blurred. 
Other interesting inferences and  conclusions have  been drawn  from 
such studies,  but one  which  is worth  stressing is that the  objective 
of 'rational' activity in such conditions becomes  one  of minimum 
revelation of preferences,  both to avoid  the inevitable conflicts 
which  would  accompany any comprehensive  statement of preferences  (since 
different individuals are expected to have  different preferences) 
and  to avoid any weakening of one's bargaining postion.  Given  the 
lack of real or imagined agreement on  goals, it is hardly surprising 
that the setting and defining of goals  and objectives should be re-
garded as  relatively unimportant.  Thus  one writer maintains that  goal 
statements  'exert little control over action.  Much  of the organisation's 
work  does not  seem  to  be directed towards  goal attainment'  (1) 
Economic  analysis of Collective Choice 
These  references to  the decision-making process in non-profit making 
institutions are of relevance  to any discussion of the  budgetary 
process - whether in an EEC  or other  in~nutional context.  While  there 
may  be  major and  highly important economic  reasons for the  presence 
of a  budgetary process,  there is no  reason to expect that this 
budgetary system will function along the  lines of the  standard 
economic  model,  in the  sense  of identifying the  most efficient means 
(1)  K.  Warck  'The  Social Psychology of Organising'  Addiston-Wesley 1969, 
p.  37 - 509-
of attaining clearly defined objectives.  On  the contrary it is more 
realistic to  expect  that it will  correspond to the behavioural  pattern 
of other organisations and  groups in which the decision-making process 
is oriented towards identifying the minimum  necessary set  of goals 
for the formation and/or maintenance of a  governing majority. 
The  analysis of collective  decision-making relevant to any discussion 
of the  best procedures for budgetary operation has been  pursued along 
several different routes by  economists.  One  avenue  of study has been 
concerned with  the  formal  properties of collective choice,  with  the 
necessary preconditions for satisfactory choice-making,  and  with  the 
definition and  content of social welfare  functions  (such functions  in 
some  sense  to be  capable of representing the  community  ordering of 
various possible  situations).  since  such analyses are  concerned 
primarily with  the  internal logic of collective choice rather than 
with any  institutional setting they are not  the  most relevant for  our 
~resent purposes,  though  they do  help to illuminate  the  underlying 
issues involved  (1). 
Of  the analytical approaches which  do  attempt to allow for institutional 
~.s-pects,  two  may  be  defined,  which  are of interest.  One  of these is 
usually termed  the  'public interest' approach,  and  the  second  described 
as  the  'self-interest' approach.  In both approaches  the  political 
framework  is taken as given,  but in the  former it tends  to exist 
further apart from  the  independent voters who  bring it into existence. 
The  essence of the  'public interest'  view  might  be  described as 
suggesting that even  though  public sector decisions may  not conform 
to  the  preferences of the  individuals who  comprise  the electorate, 
nonetheless  these decisions display a  form  of collective rationality. 
The  self-interest view  on  the  other hand  views  public institutions 
and  decision-making processes as extensions of individual behaviour, 
and  the  success of such  community activities is to  be  judged in 
terms of their ability to maximize  individual well-being,  or power, 
or some  otherobjective desired by  the  individual(s)  concerned. 
Despite their differing views about the  nature of the  motivations 
which  underly public decision making,  it is interesting that both 
of these approaches  tend  to yield similar inferences and conclusions 
about  the  nature of the  procedures which  will emerge  and  of the 
decisions which will be  taken. 
Thus  one  exponent of the  public interest approach,  1indblom(2) 
analyses  the  process of collective decision-making or policy making 
in three phases.  The  first of these is akin to  that of our standard 
economic  model  described earlier. In this approach  goals and 
objectives are first clarified  and  ranked in order of importance• 
The  possible  methods  of attaining these  goals are then identified 
(1)  D.  Nayston  'The  Ideal of Social Choice'  HacMillan,  1974 
(2)  C.  LindbJom  'The  Policy-Haking Process'  Prentice Hall 1968 - 510 -
and  their relative costs determined,  thus permitting a  choice of 
actions based  on~tional and  comprehensive  procedures.  But this method, 
argues Lindblom,  cannot be  pursued for any  but the  most  trivial 
problems,  because it is not feasible  to collect and  process the 
volume  of information required for this comprehensive  approach. 
Instead the  process is simplified by  restricting the range of 
alternatives for consideration,  by  imposing constraints of time, 
resources of other forms,  and  by this process altering the  nature of 
the decisions sought from  those which  'maximize'  to  those which 
'satisfice•. In particular as part of this process of reducing the 
complexity of group decision-making to manageable  proportions, 
there is a  tendency to focus on  incremental changes  in existing 
~ositions rather than attempt any major or far-reaching changes in 
policies or activities. 
In this view  public decision making will tend  to concentrate on 
maximising agreement,  or establishing concensus,  rather than searching 
for the  most  effective policies to maximise  the  'public interest: 
since  these  latter might require drastic shifts in policy  from  time 
to time. 
The  'self interest' approach on  the other hand  would  reject any 
concept of a  public interest which  existed independently of the 
personal interests of individual members  of the community.  Instead 
it starts from  the  presumption that individuals make  the fiscal 
or other choices for the  community,  and  enquires why  a  majority of 
the citizens may  be  willing to permit a  small number  of (elected) 
representatives to make  'coercive'  decisions,  by  which  they may  be 
obliged to  pay  taxes or accept other actions which  lower their 
personal welfare.  One  of the best-known examples of this self interest 
approach is that of Buchanan  & Tullock  (1). 
The  need for some  social action arises from  the characteristics of 
various goods  and  services  (Defence,  Law),  therefore  the rational 
individual is willing to agree  to  group action for provision of 
such  items.  Two  types of cost may  be  imposed· on  the  individual by 
collective action.  One  type will be  the  'external'  costs which  can be 
imposed  on  him  if he  must  pay his share of any  collective action 
authorised by  others.  The  scale of these external costs may  be 
expected to diminish as the  number  of people  required to authorise 
collective actions increases.  Thus  if every individual could authorise 
public action these external costs would  be  at their peak,  since 
many  people  would  order services for which  they would  pay their tiny 
individual share·  At  the other extreme, if unanimity is required before 
collective action is authorised,  then these external costs would  be 
at a  minimum  since no  action could  be  undertaken of which  the individual 
in question did not approve. 
(1)  J.Buchanan & G.  Tullock  'The  Calculus of Consent'  Univ.  of Michigan 
Press 1962. - 511-
The  second  type  of cost arising from  collective action will be  the 
decision making  costs themselves.  These  will include  the administrative 
costs for group action as well as the costs of acquiring relevant 
information and  of negotiating the decision.  In this instance  the 
costs may  be  expected  to rise as the  number  of people  needed  to 
authorise collective action rises.  Clearly such decision costs are 
at a  minimum  when  the  individual need  consult nobody  other than 
himself.  They  will be  at their peak  when  everybody must  be  a  party 
to the decision. 
The  empirical question is to determine  the  point at which  costs are 
minimised.  No  general answer is possible but typically it would  be 
expected that something less than total unanimity and  more  than a 
majority would  be  identified as the acceptable balance between  the 
two  opposing cost trends. 
Some  of the  inferences from  this form  of analysis are also of 
relevance  to our later discussion of the European  Parliament's role in 
budgetary matters.  Thus  one  of the ways  for reducing agreement costs 
is to adopt decision rules which will apply to particular series or 
groups of issues.  Another  procedure is to decentralise decision mecha-
nisms  so  as  to minimize  the size of the collective unit. Vote  trading 
in sequential decisions and  side payments  to secure agreement are 
methods  of identifying the  intensity of preferences on  various 
issues which  also  serve  to  lower or contain agreement costs.  (It 
should be  added  that side  payments  do  not imply cash bribes - they 
may  take  such  forms  as status, authority, shifts in organisational 
structures or other actions which  can enhance  the  situation of the 
'voter'  in question). 
The  Budgetary Role  of the European  Parliament 
Equipped with this outline of the  economic  treatment of collective 
choice,  we  may  now  turn to consider the  budgetary role of the 
European  Parliament.  First we  may  summarise  the existing role of the 
parliament in this sphere  (the account which  follows draws  heavily 
on  the article by  Ehlermann  (1)). 
The  budgetary powers  of parliament are regulated by Article 203  of 
the  Treaty.  This draws  a  distinction between compulsory and non-
compulsory expenditure.  In the case of compulsory expenditures _ 
parliament can submit proposals for modifications to the Council 
(of Ministers) but they require express approval if they are to be 
accepted.  If approval is not given the  proposals are considered to 
be  rejected. 
In the case of non-compulsory expenditures the Parliament has powers 
(1)  C.D.  Ehlermann  'Applying the  New  Budgetary Procedure for the First Time' 
Common  Market  Law  Review  Dec.  1975. - 512-
of decision-making within specified limits, of what are described 
as a  subjective and  objective nature. 
The  subjective limit arises from  the  requirements concerning 
majority of votes cast, any Parliamentary amendment  to  the Council's 
draft budget at the first reading stage must  be  by a  majority of 
its members.  If the Council  then modifies  these amendments,  the 
Parliament view  can only prevail at the  second reading if it has 
both a  majority of its members  and  three-fifth of the votes cast 
in its favour. 
The  objective limit a~plies to all Community  institutions, including 
the  Council.  In the  case  of Parlimant it restricts its powers  to 
increase non-compulsory expenditure  to a  maximum  rate established 
annualJy by  the Commission  on  the  basis of GNP,  inflation and  budget 
data for the  member  states. If Council proposals remain under half of 
this amount  the  Parliament is entitled to  the  remainder  ;  If the 
Council  exceeds half the  Parliament is nonetheless entitled to 50% 
of the  maximum  calculated.  Beyond  this level any further increases 
require  the  joint approval of CounciJ  and  Parliament  (with rarliament 
auplying  the  second  stage voting rule  - majority of members  and 
three-fifth of votes cast). 
In addition the Parliament also claims  to  have  the right to reject 
the  entire draft budget.  Whether this right actually exists is not 
clear. 
These  arrangements  stem from  the revision of the Treaties in 1970  and 
19?1.  At  that juncture  the  classification of expenditures into 
compulsory and  non-compulsory groups was  made  on  the  basis of what was 
termed  the  'Harmel list'  ,  which  designated ).6 %  of the 1970  budget 
as non-compulsory.  When  this function was  taken over by  the 
Commission  for the first time  in the classification of the  1975 
budget,  22.6  ~;  was  placed in this non-compulsory category.  These 
changes  led  to  some  debate  in the Community  institutions  ;  the  outcome 
rras  that ex-penditure  was  deemedto  be  compulsory only when  the 
Council had  determined  the  principle and  amount  of such  spending in a 
legal act outside of the  budget.  All other items are  to be  regarded 
as  non-compulsory. 
?oss~ble develouments in the  budgetary role of Parliament 
This brief outline of parliament's budgetary role indicates that it 
has  been acquiring expanded  powers  in this area, and  that there is the 
possibility of further development in the future.  We  may  now  ask 
in the  light of the earlier theoretical summary,  what  the direction 
or nature of such  changes might be. 
Budget related activities which are relevant to  such  consideration may 
be  grouped  under four headings  (a)  powers  of initiative  (b)  powers 
to legislate orauthorise (c)  power  to audit or evaluate and  (d) 
powers  to disseminate information concerning expenditures. - 513 -
Insofar as (a)  is concerned  the  Parliament already possesses 
power  to propose  initiatives to  the Council in the  case of compulsory 
expenditures,  hence  no  discussion of this point is needed.  (We  are 
ignoring the  possibility that such  powers  of initiative be  removed 
or curtailed.) 
Insofar as  (b) is concerned it has been  seen that Parliament 
already possesses some  powers  to authorise  spending of a  non-
compulsory  nature.  The  question is whether these  powers  should  be 
amended  in any way.  This question might for convenience  be  best 
thought of in terms  of whether the  Council  or the Parliament is the 
preferable decision-making body  for budgetary matters. 
The  earlier discussion suggests that in general  the Council would 
be  the  more  efficient decision-makin~ unit because  of it's smaller 
size and  more  clearly defined composition.  It has been  seen that 
decision making  costs rise as the  numbers  participating in this process 
increase.  This would  be  so  aven in a  national parliament which 
already possessed clearly defined groups or 'parties'  of like-
minded  people,  hence  the emergence  of governments  or smaller 
policy-making bodies within the  larger governing parties.  Within 
the European  Parliament where  there  are less  clearly defined 
groupings of more  recent origin,  the costs of organising majorities 
for or against each proposal, are likely to be  greater, the more 
so  since  there is no  'governm~nt'  to  shape  or organise policy. 
It might  be  held against this view  that the  Parliamentary solution 
would  be  preferable  to  the Council  one,  because  the  very size of 
parliament permits a  much  greater range of views to find expression 
and  these more  diverse  positions can be  given concrete financial 
shape  through  the  organisation of the  necessary committees and 
systems of side  payments,  decentralised decision making  and  other 
features which  were  seen to emerge  as part of the  collective 
choice mechanism. 
A second  point to be  made  in favour of the·  Parliamentary solution 
is that the  presumed  instability of its majorities are a  guarantee 
of no  systematic  'oppression'  of specified groups of the sort which 
can occur when  a  dominant  majority is formed  of sufficient 
stability to  pursue its policies for prolonged periods.  In effect 
majorities which  continuously or frequently change  in composition 
provide  the maximum  possibility for people  or groups to  be  on  the 
'winning'  side at least some  of the  time. 
Two  counter arguments which  favour the  small group  (Council)  solution 
also fall to be  considered.  One  is the  obverse  of the flexibility inherent 
in unstable majorities.  Given  this instability there will be  a  tendency 
for marginal  support to be  secured for a  group or policy by  specific 
incentives for these marginal potential supporters.  Such  action 
frequently leads to patterns in which  there are specific or  'tailored' 
benefits financed by  general taxes,  or general benefits financed  by 
tailored taxes,  both of which  can generate  local  'exploitation'  and 
hence  inefficiency in the  overall budgetary system. - 514-
The  second argument  in favour of small groups centres on  the nature 
of the decisions which  emerge  from  groups of differing sizes. It is 
suggested that larger groups  tend  to generate  'incremental'  changes, 
because  the wide  representation of interest does not permit 
substantial departures  from  the status quo,  whereas  smaller groups 
are better able  to process  the  necessary data,  negotiate in 
several dimensions and  organize  the required  'trade-offs'  which  will 
accompany  more  radical and  sweeping policy changes.  At.its 
simplest small groups are  more  radical than large. 
Persuasive cases can thus be built up  both for and  against the  view 
that the European Parliament should have  increased powers  to legislate 
/authorise Community  expenditures.  Support for either viewpoint will 
be  influenced by  a  number  of factors including (i) individual value 
judgements  (ii) the  experience of existing procedures for making 
expenditure decisions and  (iii) consideration of the  other developments 
which  would  need  to accompany  any increased role for the  Parliament 
in this field. 
Insofar as (i) is concerned  the generalisation might  be  advanced  that 
those  who  subscribe  to a  'self-interest'  theory of collective decision 
making will tend  to favour a  nationalistic procedure via the Council 
of I·:inisters,  whereas  those  favouring a  'public interest'  viewpoint 
will incline  towards a  strengthening of the European Parliament. 
As  with all generalisations this will not apply precisely to each 
case.  Insofar as (ii) is concerned it would  take a  major empirical 
research project to establish whether and  to what  extent the Council 
has functioned as a  more  radical decision-making body  than the 
Parliament,  and  whether it has been capable of major policy 
initiatives or has been  primarily confined  to  more  incremental 
or trivial forms  of decision.  Examples  have  been cited to illustrate 
both possibilities. It would  be  interesting to document  the pattern 
more  extensively before  seeking to derive any  conclusions•  Meantime 
one  need  simply note  that the case for a  smaller decision making 
body  (e.g.  the Council of Hinisters)  being capable of more  radical 
beha.viour  than a  larger body  (the  Parliament) is not proven. 
Insofar as (iii) is concerned  the question arises as to whether any 
expansion in the  budgetary powers  of the  Parliament would  call for 
consequential changes in other aspects of its organisation and  operation. 
S~ecifically it would  be  expected that any substantial expansion of 
the Parliament's financial powers would  generate pressures  to formalise 
or organise its decision-making procedures.  Following the pattern of 
other fiscal entities it would  in effect develop some  embryonic 
form  of European  government  or executive from  the prevailing majority. 
This would  be  the more  likely if the Parliament were  faced with 
expenditure decisions of importance  to several member  states or 
interest groups  (parties).  Those  who  would  welcome  progress  towards 
some  form  of Community  government or executive might  thus be  expected 
to  support the granting of greater fiscal powers  to the Parliament, 
whereas  those  who  favour  the  emphasis  on national sovereignty are 
likely to be  more  lukewarm  in their support for such moves. - 515 -
Whatever  the  outcome  regarding the Parliament's powers for 
authorising or legislating on  fiscal matters there  should be 
considerably less dispute concerning the  third of the four functions 
listed at the outset of this section,  namely  the  powers  to audit 
and  evaluate Community  tax and  expenditure  programmes.  This function 
should be  seen as .allied to  the fourth function namely  that of 
disseminating information.  For the  peoples of the Community  to be 
convinced that taxation and  spending programmes  are worthwhile it 
is necessary for them  to have  adequate  information about the 
purposes of each programme  and  the extent to which  these  purposes 
have actually been achieved.  Parliament can play a  vital role in this 
area by  undertaking systematic and detailed studies on  the effects 
and  effectiveness of budgetary programmes,  and  by  ensuring that the 
results of these  studies are widely publicised throughout the 
Community.  This would  serve  the function of keeping the people 
aware  of Community activities as well as demonstrating that 
financial resources were  being used efficiently.  These  auditing 
evaluation activities of Parliament would  also serve as a  spur 
to effective performance within the Community  institutions themselves 
and  would  demonstrate  that Community  personnel were  acting in the 
interests of the  Communities as a  whole. 
Conclusion 
It is not the  intention in a  brief paper such as this to attempt 
any comprehensive assessment of the fiscal role of the European 
Parliament.  The  aim was  rather to draw  attention to the fact that 
fiscal systems do  not operate in a  political or administrative 
vacuum,  and  that any policy decisions on  the future development of 
the Community  fiscal system  (whether based  on  the work  of our Study 
group or not)  should take account of the  legislative/executive context 
in which  they will operate.  While  these aspects are not primarily matters 
on which  economists can  adjudicate,  there is a  substantial body 
of experience and  theorising concerning the interaction of these 
political/administrative/legislative factors with economic 
considerations.  One  purpose of the  paper was-to  summarise  the approach 
which  economists would  bring to bear on  issues of this nature in the 
hope  that it will stimulate further discussion and work  in this area. 
A more  specific purpose of such a  paper would  be  to establish whether 
the  proposals put forward  in our report would  necessarily entail 
developments in the decision-making or executive functions of the 
Communities.  The  broad conclusion is that they do  not require any 
such changes in the  immediate future.  However  any longer - run 
evolution of the  Community's fiscal system along the lines illustrated 
by us could have  some  noticeable  impact on  these other features of 
the Community's  operations,  and would  therefore deserve  proper 
consideration at the appropriate  juncture. STUDIES 
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